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ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

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THE
ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE

ILLUSTRATED WITH
ESSAYS AND NOTES.

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THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

BOOKS III.—X.



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PLAN OF BOOK III.

IT has been already assumed without proof, that virtue implies purpose (*Eth.* II. iv. 3, II. v. 4, II. vi. 15), and therefore of course will and freedom. Before proceeding to the analysis of particular virtues, Aristotle begins by examining the generic conception of the Voluntary, with a view chiefly to the comprehension of its species, Purpose.

The first five Chapters of Book III. are accordingly devoted to this subject, and stand so much apart from what goes before and after, that some have been led to the conclusion that they were written as a separate treatise (see Essay I. p. 10). That several parts of these chapters are unnecessarily repeated in Book V. c. xiii., and that certain points in them do not agree with the psychology of Books VI. and VII., is no argument against the present chapters having formed part of Aristotle's original draft and conception of his *Ethics*, but only tends to show that Books V. VI. VII. were written later. It is more to the purpose to notice that in Chapter V. § 10; there is an apparent ignoring of the whole discussion upon the formation of moral states which occupies the commencement of Book II., and that no allusion occurs to 'the mean' or to 'happiness.' On the other hand, while we must attribute a sort of completeness in itself and a sort of isolation to the account of the Voluntary, we must also acknowledge that there is at all events great skill shown in the way in which it is worked into the general ethical treatise by §§ 21, 22 of the fifth chapter. And on the whole these chapters bear out the theory which seems most natural with regard to the composition of the *Ethics* (see Essay I. pp. 42, 43), as they both exhibit to some degree the characteristics of a separate treatise, and also appear to have been written in reference to the preconceived plan of the entire work. The contents of these chapters are as follows:—

- (1.) The general definition of the Voluntary. Ch. I.
- (2.) The special account of Purpose, that it is distinct from desire, wish, opinion; its relation to the process of deliberation. Ch. II.—III.
- (3.) Some consideration of the question whether Wish is for the absolute or the apparent good. Ch. IV.
- (4.) An attack upon the position that while virtue is free, vice is involuntary. Ch. V.

The remainder of the book is occupied with a discussion of the two first virtues upon Aristotle's list—courage and temperance. With regard to courage the following heads are treated of:—

- (1.) Its proper objects; Ch. VI.
- (2.) That it is a mean; Ch. VII.
- (3.) That true courage is to be distinguished from five spurious kinds of courage; Ch. VIII.
- (4.) That it is particularly related to pain, and implies making great sacrifices for the sake of what is noble; Ch. IX.

The objects and the nature of temperance are treated of in Chapters X. and XI. And the book ends with two remarks on intemperance: (1.) that it is more voluntary than cowardice; and, (2.) that its character is shown in its etymology; Ch. XII.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ III.

ΤΗΣ ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἐκούσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκούσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου, τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρός τε 2

I. 1—2 Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ—κολάσεις] ‘Virtue then being concerned with feelings and actions; and praise and blame being bestowed on those which are voluntary, while pardon and sometimes even pity are conceded to the involuntary, it is surely necessary for those who treat of virtue to define the voluntary and involuntary; and moreover this will be useful for legislators with a view to their rewards and punishments.’ In the *Eudemian Ethics*, which contain generally speaking a reproduction of these *Ethics*, for the most part compressed, but also occasionally expanded and supplemented, we find (*Eth. Eud.*, II. vi.) a more definite and reasoned statement of the voluntariness of virtue and vice, which is by far the best and most ingenious part of the books that certainly belong to Eudemus. His reasoning is briefly as follows:—All οὐσῖαι are ἀρχαί, and tend to reproduce themselves; and only those ἀρχαί are properly so called (κίνηται) which are primary causes of motion, as is especially the case with regard to immutable motions, whose cause is doubtless God. Mathematical ἀρχαί are called

so only by analogy, not being causes of motion. We have hitherto only mentioned necessary consequences: but there are many things which may happen or may not, and whose causes therefore must be, like themselves, contingent. All human actions being contingent, it is obvious that man is a contingent cause, and that the reason of the contingency in his actions is his ability to will one way or the other, as is farther manifest from our praise or blame of actions. A deeper ground than that which Aristotle has taken might surely have been found for the position that morality implies freedom. But though philosophy even before Aristotle had dealt to some extent with the ideas of necessity and freedom, it remained for the Stoics to open the question more decisively; and (for reasons elsewhere given) this is one main point in which modern systems may claim an advantage over the ancient ones (see Essay VII.). It is plain that the discussion of free-will in this place is never metaphysical, and rarely even psychological. An appeal to language and common opinions sums up nearly the whole.

3 τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολάσεις. δοκεῖ δὲ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα. βίαιον δὲ οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὕσα ἐν ᾗ μηδὲν συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσαι ποι ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι 4 ὄντες. ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννος προστάττοι αἰσχροῦ τι πράξαι κύριος ὢν γονέων καὶ τέκνων, καὶ πράξαντος μὲν σώζονται, μὴ πράξαντος δ' ἀποθνήσκουσιν, ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει πότερον

The scope of the argument is limited to a political, as distinguished from a theological point of view (*ἀναγκαῖον τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρησίμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι*).

3 δοκεῖ δὲ—*γινόμενα*] 'Now those acts seem to be involuntary which are done under compulsion or through ignorance.' In asking what is the Voluntary, Aristotle does not pursue a speculative method of inquiry. Such a method might have commenced with the deep-lying ideas of personality and consciousness, of the individuality of the subject, &c. But he is content with defining the voluntary by a contrast to the common notions (*δοκεῖ*) of what constitutes an involuntary act. It might be said that this is giving a merely negative conception of freedom. But in fact the conception given is positive, only the analysis of it is not pushed very far. The voluntariness of an act Aristotle represents to be constituted in this—that the actor is in every case the *ἀρχή*, or cause of his actions, except in cases of compulsion, where there really is a superior *ἀρχή* (Kant's 'heteronomy'), or of ignorance, where he does not know what his action is, and can only be held to be the cause of what he meant to do. In what sense and how the individual is an *ἀρχή*, is the point where Aristotle stops short in the inquiry.

βίαιον δὲ—ὄντες] 'That is compulsory, whose cause is external to

the agent, and is of such a nature that the agent (or patient) contributes nothing towards it; as, for instance, if a wind were to carry you to any place, or men in whose power you are.' *Ἀρχή* seems here equivalent to *ἀρχὴ κινήσεως*, the efficient cause. Aristotle attributes spontaneity so decisively to the individual act, that he confines the term compulsion as only applicable to cases of absolute physical force, where a man's limbs are moved or his body transported, as if he were inanimate, by some external power. The compulsion of threats, fear, and such like, he will not call compulsion without qualification, because still the individual *acts* under it. He has already spoken of the life of money-making as being *βίαιός τις*, 'in a sort compulsory' (*Eth.* I. v. 8). With *ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων* cf. v. viii. 3: *πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν—οἷον τὸ γηρᾶν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν*.

4—9 The cause of the act must be entirely from without, for in some cases men are forced, not to an act, but to an alternative. They may do what is grievous for the fear of what is worse. Such acts, then, are of a mixed character, partaking of the nature both of voluntariness and involuntariness. Relatively to the moment, they come from the choice and will of the individual. Abstractedly and in themselves they

ἀκούσιά ἐστιν ἢ ἐκούσια. τοιοῦτον δέ τι συμβαίνει καὶ 5
περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολάς· ἀπλῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς
ἀποβάλλεται ἐκὼν, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν
ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες. μικταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ τοιαῦται 6
πράξεις, εἰκόνασι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐκουσίοις· αἶρεται γάρ εἰσι
τότε ὅτε πράττονται, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν

are contrary to the will. But as every act aims at something in reference to the particular moment, and is thus entirely dependent on it, so these must be judged as acts done and chosen voluntarily, and according to circumstances must obtain blame or praise. There seems to be four cases which Aristotle conceives as possible: (1) Praise is deserved where pain or degradation is endured for the sake of some great and noble end; (2) but blame, where what is degrading is endured without a sufficiently great and noble end. (3) Pardon is conceded where human nature succumbs, under great extremities, to do what is not right; (4) except the action be such as no extremities ought to bring a man to consent to, in which case pardon is withheld. In these distinctions we may recognise a practical and political wisdom such as might be found in the speeches of Thucydides, but the discussion does not rise to the level of philosophy.

6 μικταί—οὐδέν] 'Now it may be said that such actions are of a mixed character, but they are more like voluntary actions, for they are chosen at the particular moment when they are done, and the moral character of an action depends on the circumstance of the moment; hence also the terms 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' must be predicated in reference to the moment when a person is acting. Now, in the supposed case (ἐν τοιαύταις πράξεσι), the individual acts volun-

tarily; for the efficient cause of the movement of the accessory limbs is in himself, and where the cause is in a person, it rests with him to act or not. Therefore such things are voluntary, though abstractedly perhaps, involuntary, for in themselves no one would choose any of such things as these.'

τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως] The phrase is general, not referring only to the cases under dispute, but to action universally. In this sense we may translate τῆς πράξεως 'of an action.' Τέλος is used here in a peculiar sense to denote the 'moral character of an action.' This sense arises out of a combination of associations, 'final cause,' and 'motive,' being combined with 'end-in-itself,' 'perfection,' 'completeness.' A precisely similar use of the word occurs, *Eth.* III. vii. 6: Τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας—ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει· (on which see note). The Paraphrast treats the present passage as if the τέλος of an action were different from the voluntariness of an action; and as if the argument were, 'because the character of an action as good or bad is judged in reference to the mind of the actor at the moment of action, so also must the voluntariness of an action be judged.' Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐκάστης πράξεως τέλος κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν αὐτῆς ἐστί, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ πονηρὸν γίνεται ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον, ἢ τὸ ἀκούσιον, κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν ὅτε πράττεται, ζητητέον. Of course the interpretation of Muretus is wrong which attri-

καιρόν ἐστιν. καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον, ὅτε πράττει, λεκτέον. πράττει δὲ ἐκὼν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν· ὣν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ μὴ. ἐκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἔλοιτο καθ' αὐτὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν.
 7 ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαινούνται, ὅταν αἰσχροὺς τι ἢ λυπηρὸν ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν· ἂν δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ψέγονται· τὰ γὰρ αἰσχισθ' ὑπομεῖναι ἐπὶ μηδενὶ καλῷ ἢ μετρίῳ φαύλου. ἐπ' ἐνίοις δ' ἔπαινος μὲν οὐ γίνεται, συγγνώμη δ', ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξῃ τις ἃ μὴ δεῖ, ἃ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ
 8 μηδεὶς ἂν ὑπομεῖναι. ἔνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀποθανατέον παθόντι τὰ δεινότατα· καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγκά-
 9 σάντα μητροκτονῆσαι. ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρίναι ποῖον ἀντὶ ποίου αἰρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον, ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν· ὥς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἔστι τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα λυπηρά, ἃ δ' ἀναγκά-

butes a merely popular and un-Aristotelian sense to τέλος 'actio—terminatur eo ipso tempore quo agimus.'

ὅτε πράττει] The omission of τις, especially after conjunctions like εἰ, ὅτε, &c., is common in Aristotle, though not peculiar to him. Cf. *Eth.* III. ix. 5: πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται. *Pol.* VII. xiii. 8: ὥσπερ εἰ τοῦ καθαρίζειν λαμπρὸν καὶ καλῶς αἰτίωτο τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης.

τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη] The 'subservient,' or 'instrumental' limbs. The modern word 'organised,' which has grown out of the Aristotelian conception of ὀργανικὸν σῶμα, does not exactly represent it. 'Organisation' implies multiplicity in unity, the co-existence and interjunction of physical parts under a law of life. But in ὀργανικός originally nothing more was implied than 'that which is fitly framed as an instrument,'—according to Ari-

stotle's principle, that the body is the means to the life, mind, or soul, which is the end. Cf. *De An.* II. i. 6: ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζῶνι ἔχοντος. τοιοῦτο δέ, ὃ ἂν ᾖ ὀργανικόν. *De Part. An.* I. i. 41: οὕτως καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ σῶμα ὄργανον (ἐνεκά τινος γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὅλον), ἀνάγκη ἔρα τοιονδὶ εἶναι καὶ ἐκ' τοιονδὶ εἰ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται.

8 καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου—μητροκτονήσαι] 'For the things which compelled the Alcæon of Euripides to kill his mother appear absurd,' i. e. the curses threatened by Amphiaræus, who, when departing for Thebes, enjoined his son to put Eriphyle to death. Aspasius preserves the lines:—

Μάλιστα μὲν μ' ἐπὶρ' ἐπισκήψας πατήρ,
 80' ἄρματ' εἰσέβαινεν εἰς Θήβας ἰών.

ζονται αἰσχροί, ὅθεν ἔπαινοι καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ τοὺς ἀναγκασθέντας ἢ μή. τὰ δὲ ποῖα φατέον βίαια; ἢ ἀπλῶς ¹⁰ μὲν, ὁπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός ᾗ καὶ ὁ πράττων μηδὲν συμβάλλῃται; ἃ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἰρετά, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἐκούσια. μᾶλλον δ' ἔοικεν ἐκούσιους· αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δ' ἐκούσια. ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποίων αἰρετέον, οὐ ῥᾶδιον ἀποδοῦναι· πολλαὶ γὰρ διαφοραὶ εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα. εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίῃ βίαια εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν ¹¹ γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἴη οὕτω βίαια· τούτων γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν. καὶ οἱ μὲν βία καὶ ἄκοντες λυπηρῶς, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ καλὸν μεθ' ἡδονῆς. γελοῖον δὲ τὸ αἰτιᾶσθαι τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὸν εὐθέρaton ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἑαυτόν, τῶν δ' αἰσchrῶν τὰ ἡδέα. ἔοικε δὲ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι οὗ ἔξωθεν ἢ ¹² ἀρχῇ, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος.

10 ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποίων αἰρετέον, οὐ ῥᾶδιον ἀποδοῦναι] There is something careless about the composition here, as these words repeat what has been already said in the preceding section. Ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρίναι ποῖον ἀντὶ ποίου αἰρετέον.

11—12 In these sections Aristotle guards his definition against a possible misconception. Having defined the compulsory to be that whose cause is external, he disallows the supposition that the two great inducements to all action, the pleasant and the noble, because external to us, make the actions they induce compulsory. His arguments against this supposition are: (1) It would make all action compulsory, and thus imply more than any one would wish to support. (2) Compulsory actions are painful; those done for the pleasant or the noble are pleasurable. (3) It leaves out of account the internal susceptibility of the agent (αὐτὸν εὐθέρaton ὄντα). His

own definition, then, is sufficiently qualified by the addition of the words, 'the person under compulsion in no-wise consenting' (μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος).

τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ] Aspasius reads τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ λυπηρά. The commentators Victorius, Muretus, Giphanius, and Zell, get over the difficulty by taking τὰ καλὰ to mean 'non *honesta*, sed *formosa*, *pulchra*.' It is plain, however, that the same classification of inducements is here referred to as that given *Eth.* II. iii. 7, the *συμφέρων* being a means either to the ἡδὺ or the καλόν. The καλόν is in short 'the noble,' or 'the good, viewed as morally beautiful.' A concise definition of it is given in *Rhet.* I. ix. 3: καλὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὃ ἂν δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ὢν ἐπαινετὸν ᾖ, ἢ δ' ἂν ἀγαθὸν ὢν ἡδὺ ᾖ, ὅτι ἀγαθόν. It is used in the present passage not at all emphatically, but simply to denote that form of inducement which con-

- 13 Τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἐκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυτον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράξας ὁτιοῦν, μὴδὲν δὲ δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, ἐκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὃ γε μὴ ᾔδει, οὐδ' αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυπούμενός γε. τοῦ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ ἕτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἐκὼν· ἐπεὶ
- 14 γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον. ἕτερον δ' ἔοικε καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ μεθύων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος οὐ δοκεῖ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν, ἀλλὰ

sists in our wishing to do a thing because it is right. A little examination shows that the writing here is vague, for presently it is said to be absurd to assign the cause of the good things to oneself, and of the bad things to pleasure (αἰτιᾶσθαι—τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἑαυτόν, τῶν δ' αἰσχροῶν τὰ ἡδέα); whereas consistently the 'good things' would have been assigned to 'the good' as an external cause by those who maintained the position, εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα κ.τ.λ. Also would Aristotle say that what is done διὰ τὸ καλόν, is always done μεθ' ἡδονῆς? This goes strangely against *Eth.* III. ix. 4—5, where the higher satisfaction of the καλόν is represented as purchased by great pain. There is a vagueness also in the use of βία, which first stands for that which compels, and secondly for that which is compelled. The principle, however, is well brought out, that the objective inducement to an action cannot be separated from the subjective apprehension of this in the will.

13 τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν—ἔχειν ἴδιον] 'Now that which is done through ignorance is always non-voluntary, but it is involuntary only when followed by pain, and when it is a matter of regret. For he who has done something through ignorance,

but without feeling any dislike at the action, has not, it is true, acted voluntarily, inasmuch as he did not know he was doing it, but, on the other hand, not involuntarily, since he is not sorry. With regard, therefore, to actions done through ignorance we may say that he who repents has been an involuntary agent, while him who does not repent we may distinguish as having been a non-voluntary one; for where there is a real difference, it is proper to have a distinctive name.' Aristotle begins the discussion of ignorance as modifying volition by this refined distinction, that an action may be done through ignorance, and yet not against the will. It may in short be neither with the will nor against it. He then goes on to consider the precise meaning of δι' ἄγνοιαν.

14—16 ἕτερον δ' ἔοικε—ἀκουσίως πράττει] 'There seems to be a farther difference between acting through ignorance and doing a thing in ignorance. Common opinion pronounces that the drunken or the angry man acts not through ignorance, but in consequence of drunkenness or anger, and yet that he does not act wittingly, but in ignorance. Without doubt every depraved man is in ignorance of what he ought to do, and of that from which he ought to refrain, and it is

διὰ τι τῶν εἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδὼς δὲ ἀλλ' ἀγνοῶν. ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς ἀ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὦν ἀφεκτέον, καὶ

in consequence of this error that men become unjust, or bad generally. But the term involuntary is not meant to cover ignorance of man's true interest. Ignorance which affects moral choice, and ignorance of the universal, are the causes, not of involuntary action, but of wickedness, and it is precisely for this ignorance that wicked men are blamed. The ignorance which causes involuntary action is ignorance of particulars, which are the circumstances and the objects of actions. With regard to these particulars, pity and pardon may be proper; for the man who acts in ignorance of some particular is an involuntary agent.' The connexion of this somewhat compressed passage is as follows. An act is involuntary when caused by ignorance. But ignorance cannot be said to be the cause of an act if the individual be himself the cause of the ignorance. In that case ignorance rather accompanies the act (ἀγνοῶν πράττει) than causes it (δὲ ἀγνοίαν πράττει). We see this (1) in instances of temporary oblivion, as from anger, or wine; (2) in those of a standing moral ignorance or oblivion (εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὸ συμφέρον—ἢ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἀγνοία—ἢ καθόλου ἀγνοία). The only ignorance, then, which is purely external to the agent, so as to take away from him the responsibility of the act, is some chance mistake with regard to the particular facts of the case. A great deal of trouble has been expended upon the endeavour to distinguish and explain the various terms, ἀγνοοῦντα πράττειν—ἀγνοεῖν τὸ συμφέρον—ἢ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἀγνοία—ἢ καθόλου ἀγνοία. But a closer examination shows that these different terms are not opposed to each other,

but rather are all different ways for expressing the same thing, being opposed to the ἢ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς ἢ πράξις. This is the way in which the Paraphrast understands the passage, for he renders it: Αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται πράξεις οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀκούσιοι· ἢ γὰρ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἀγνοία, ἣτις ἐστὶν αἰτία τῶν κακιῶν, οὐκ ἔστιν αἰτία τοῦ ἀκούσιου, ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας. Οὐ γὰρ τὸ καθόλου περὶ τῆς μέθης ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι πονηρόν, αἴτιον γίνεται τοῦ ἀκούσιου, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀγνοῆσαι μερικῶς τήνδε τὴν μέθοδον οἶον, φέρε εἰπεῖν, οὐκ εἰδὼτα μέχρι πόσον πίνοντας ἐνι μεθύειν. Aristotle strictly confines ignorance, as a cause of involuntary action, to mistakes about particulars. Before proceeding to this particular ignorance, he separates from it that kind of ignorance which is faulty, because caused by the agent himself. Of this there are two kinds, the temporary, as for instance that caused by intoxication, and the permanent, such as that caused by any vicious habit. 'Ignorance of the universal' is not different from 'ignorance of our real interest,' but serves to point the antithesis of 'ignorance of the particular': nor is it opposed to ignorance as shown in wrong moral choice, but to ignorance of external facts. It goes to constitute ignorance in the purpose, for in every moral act there is a universal conception, as well as a particular application of this. But Aristotle does not here enter upon the psychology of the subject, as is afterwards done, *Eth.* vii. iii. The word συμφέρον is used, *Politics*, i. ii. 11, to include and denote all kinds of good, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον.

14 διὰ τι τῶν εἰρημένων] Some refer

- διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἁμαρτίαν ἄδικοι καὶ ὅλως κακοὶ γίνονται.
 15 τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὸ συμ-
 φέρον· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἀγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου
 ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου (ψέγονται γὰρ διὰ
 γε ταύτην) ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ αὐτῆς πράξις.
 16 ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων
 τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει. ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι
 αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστί, τίς τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἡ ἐν
 τίνι πράττει, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἔνεκα
 τίνος, οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἡρέμα ἢ σφόδρα.
 17 ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀγνοήσκει μὴ μαινόμενος,
 δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα· πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτὸν γε; ὁ
 δὲ πράττει, ἀγνοήσκειν ἂν τις, οἷον λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν
 αὐτούς, ἡ οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρρητα ἦν, ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος
 τὰ μυστικά, ἡ δεῖξαι βουλούμενος ἀφεῖναι, ὡς ὁ τὸν κατα-
 πέλτην. οἰηθείη δ' ἂν τις καὶ τὸν υἱὸν πολέμιον εἶναι ὥσπερ
 ἡ Μερόπη, καὶ ἐσφαιρῶσθαι τὸ λελογχωμένον δόρυ, ἡ τὸν
 λίθον κίσσηριν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ παίσας ἀποκτείναι
 ἄν· καὶ δεῖξαι βουλούμενος, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι,

this to § 11, τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ, but it appears simply to mean 'not from ignorance, but from one of the things now specified,' (i. e. drunkenness or anger). Cf. III. III. 11, τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον, which refers to the passage immediately preceding.

16—17 The particulars connected with an action are as follows. (1) The person doing it, about which ignorance is impossible to the doer. (2) The thing done, which may not be known, e.g., Æschylus did not know he was revealing the mysteries. (3) The thing or person made the object of the action (περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι), e.g., Merope did not know it was her son. (4) The instrument, e.g., one might fancy one's spear had a button on it. (5) The purpose, or tendency of the act (ἔνεκα τίνος), e.g., one wishing to preserve might kill.

(6) The manner (πῶς), e.g. one might strike harder than one wished.

ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά] Referring to the well-known story that Æschylus was summoned before the Areopagus on the charge of having revealed the mysteries, against which charge he pleaded that he had never himself been initiated.

ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη] This same incident is alluded to by Aristotle in the *Poetics*, c. xiv. 19: Κράτιστον δὲ τὸ τελευταῖον, (i. e. τὸν μέλλοντα ποιεῖν τι τῶν ἀνηκέστων δι' ἀγνοίαν, ἀναγνώρισαι πρὶν ποιῆσαι), λέγω δὲ οἷον ἐν τῷ Κρεσφόντῃ ἡ Μερόπη μέλλει τὸν υἱὸν ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτείνει δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ' ἀνεγνώρισεν.

καὶ δεῖξαι βουλούμενος, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι, πατάξειεν ἄν] 'And wishing to show the way, as those do who box with the open hand, a man might give another a blow.' Aspasia

πατάξειεν ἄν. περὶ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα τῆς ἀγνοίας οὐσης ἐν 18
οἷς ἢ πρᾶξις, ὁ τούτων τι ἀγνοήσας ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι,
καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις· κυριώτατα δ' εἶναι
δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἢ πρᾶξις καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα. τοῦ δὲ κατὰ 19
τὴν τοιαύτην ἀγνοίαν ἀκουσίου λεγομένου ἔτι δεῖ τὴν
πρᾶξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ. ὄντος δ' 20
ἀκουσίου τοῦ βία καὶ δι' ἀγνοίαν, τὸ ἐκούσιον δόξειεν
ἄν εἶναι οὗ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότει τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν
οἷς ἢ πρᾶξις. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι 21
τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔτι 22
τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐκουσίως πράξει, οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες· εἴτα 23
πότερον οὐδὲν ἐκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ
θυμὸν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἐκουσίως τὰ δ' αἰσχροὶ ἀκουσίως; ἢ
γελοῖον ἐνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος; ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως τὸ ἀκούσια 24
φάναι ὧν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπὶ τισι
καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τινῶν, οἷον ὑγείας καὶ μαθήσεως. δοκεῖ δὲ 25
τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέα.
ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ 26

explains ἀκροχειρίζεσθαι thus: ἔστι τὸ
πυκτεύειν ἢ παγκρατιάζειν πρὸς ἕτερον.
ἀνευ συμπολοῦς ἢ ὅλων ἄκραις ταῖς
χερσὶ μετ' ἀλλήλων γυμνάζεσθαι, i.e. it
is what we call 'sparring.' This same
phrase δεῖξαι βουλόμενος was applied
before to 'the man who was showing
the catapult,' and was given as an
instance of one being ignorant of the
nature of his act. Here it is an
instance of ignorance of the tendency
of an act. The different kinds of
ignorance are not very distinct from
one another.

18 περὶ πάντα δὴ—ἕνεκα] 'Ignorance then being concerned with all these circumstances of the action, he that was ignorant of some one of these is held (δοκεῖ) to have acted involuntarily, and especially (if ignorant) with regard to the most important; and the most important seem to be the objects of the action and the tendency of it.' The words ἐν οἷς are

used at the beginning of the section in a general sense, as before (§ 15); afterwards they correspond with περὶ τί καὶ ἐν τίνι (§ 16). There is an awkwardness about οὗ ἕνεκα. A person knows with what end or view he is acting (and this is what οὗ ἕνεκα legitimately expresses). But he is mistaken about the means which he uses. Hence wishing to produce one result he produces another. But what he mistakes, is not the end (οὗ ἕνεκα) but the means (τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος). The phrase here would imply that an action had an end, or aim of its own (οὗ ἕνεκα) independent of the doer,—in other words a tendency, of which therefore the doer might be ignorant.

20-27 Having separated off the involuntary in its two forms of compulsion and mistake, there remains to us the conception of the voluntary, as that whose cause is in an agent knowing the circumstances of the action.

27 θυμὸν ἀμαρτηθέντα; Φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἥττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα πάθη. αἱ δὲ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας. ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.

2 Διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἐκουσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀκουσίου, περὶ

This definition requires justification, owing to a false notion (οὐ καλῶς λέγεται) that acts done from anger or desire (which are 'in the agent') are involuntary. This notion is refuted by the following arguments: (1) It would prove too much, and would make all the actions of brutes and of children involuntary. (2) Some acts prompted by desire or anger are right and good. We must either call these involuntary, or say that, while these are voluntary, bad acts similarly prompted are involuntary. Either supposition is absurd. (3) There is a feeling of obligation (δεῖ), attaching sometimes to these emotions; we *ought* to desire some things and be angry at some. This feeling of 'ought' implies freedom. (4) Acts prompted by desire are pleasant; involuntary acts, painful. (5) We have as strong a feeling about errors of passion, as about errors of reason, that they are to be eschewed (φευκτά). The passions are as much part of the man as the reason, therefore acts prompted by them are acts of the man.

The polemic in these arguments does not seem to be directed against any philosophical school, but rather against a popular error. Aristotle does not deal with the maintainers of the doctrine of necessity as a whole, but only with those who, allowing that half our actions are free, would argue that the other half are not free. Such reasoners are comparatively easy to answer. The most important argument adduced by Aristotle is the third, where he implies that the idea of

freedom is contained in that of duty. He does not draw out this principle, nor could he have done so without anticipating the philosophy of later times. The last argument seems to come to this, that you cannot separate a man from his passions, or say the reason is the man's self and the passions not. Elsewhere Aristotle says ὁ νοῦς αὐτὸς ἕκαστος. And in truth the relation of a man's desires to his individuality might be more deeply investigated than is here done.

φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω] This seems a counterpart to the former argument, ἄτοπον ἴσως τὸ ἀκούσια φάναι ὧν δεῖ δρᾶσθαι. The passions are proved to be voluntary on account of the feeling of reprehension we have for errors of passion. On the emphatic opposition between φευκτόν and αἰρετόν, cf. *Eth.* x. ii. 5.

II. Having given a generic account of the voluntary, Aristotle proceeds to examine the special form of it which he calls προαίρεσις. This does not mean the will as a whole (for which indeed, Aristotle has no one name), but a particular exhibition of it, namely, a conscious, determinate act of the will. 'Purpose' or 'determination' is perhaps the nearest word in our language, but in fact no word exactly corresponds. The contrasts and distinctions made in this chapter might at first seem unnecessary, until we observe that Aristotle is himself founding a new psychology. The

προαιρέσεως ἔπεται διελθεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἥθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. ἡ² προαίρεσις δὲ ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταῦτόν δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἐκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκούσιου καὶ παῖδες καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα κοινωνοῦσι, προαιρέσεως δ' οὐ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἐκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ' οὐ. οἱ δὲ λέγον-³τες αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν ἢ βούλησιν ἢ τινα δόξαν οὐκ ὀικασιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν. οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἢ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός. καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς⁴

word προαίρεσις only once occurs in Plato, and then not in its present psychological sense, but merely denoting 'selection' or 'choice.' *Parmenides*, p. 143 B: τί οὖν; ἐὰν προελώμεθα αὐτῶν εἴτε βούλει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον εἴτε τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἐν εἴτε τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἀρ' οὐκ ἐν ἐκάστη τῇ προαίρεσει προαιρούμεθ' αἰετὶ ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖσθαι ἀμφοτέρω; It is true that the verb προαίρεσθαι is of frequent occurrence in Plato, but generally in the sense of 'selecting' or 'preferring,' and not 'purposing' or 'determining.' As in other cases, then, Aristotle takes up a floating term from common language, and gives it scientific definiteness, so that it becomes henceforth a psychological formula. His account of προαίρεσις in the present chapter is, that it is a species of the voluntary (ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταῦτόν δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἐκούσιον), and that it differs from anger, desire, wish, and any form of opinion. (1) It differs from desire or anger as not being shared by irrational creatures, as being often opposed to desire, &c. (2) It is still less like anger than like desire, anger excluding the notion of purpose or deliberate choice (ἡκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ). (3) It is not wish, because we often wish for what is impossible, or beyond our control, and because, speaking gene-

rally, wish is of the end, whereas purpose is of the means, and restricts itself to what is in our power. (4) Nor is it opinion, which may be about anything, the eternal or the impossible, and which is characterised as true or false, not, like purpose, as good or bad. Nor is it opinion on matters of action. For opinion on good and evil does not constitute the moral character in the way that purpose does; again, the use of these terms in common language points out a difference between purpose and opinion.

Purpose then, being a species of the voluntary, implies also intellect (μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας) and deliberation. It is a deliberate desire of what is within our own power (βουλευτικὴ δρεῖσις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, *Eth.* iii. iii. 19).

1 οἰκειότατον γὰρ—πράξεων] 'For it seems most closely bound up with virtue, and to be a better criterion of moral character than even actions.' Cf. *Eth.* x. viii. 5: ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ πότερον κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὥς ἐν ἀμφοῖν οὐσης. The importance of this position as a ground-work for the whole doctrine of morality must be estimated by the advance which is made in it beyond what Plato had arrived at.

3 οἱ δὲ λέγοντες] There is a tendency in Plato to merge the distinctions of will and reason: whether some of his school are here alluded

ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ' οὐ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς
 5 δ' ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος μὲν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὐ. καὶ
 προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία
 οὐ. καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις
 6 δ' οὔτε λυπηροῦ οὐθ' ἡδέος. θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἥττον· ἥκιστα
 7 γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ μὴν
 οὐδὲ βούλησίς γε, καίπερ σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον· προαίρεσις
 μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι,
 δοκοίη ἂν ἡλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων,
 8 οἷον ἀθανασίας. καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἔστι καὶ περὶ τὰ
 μηδαμῶς δι' αὐτοῦ πραχθέντα ἂν, οἷον ὑποκριτὴν τινα νικᾶν
 ἢ ἀθλητὴν· προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' ὅσα
 9 οἴεται γενέσθαι ἂν δι' αὐτοῦ. ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ
 τέλους ἔστι μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος,
 οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα, προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν,
 καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ
 λέγειν οὐχ ἄρμόζει· ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ
 10 τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι. οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα
 δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἥττον περὶ τὰ αἰδία καὶ
 τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· καὶ τῷ ψευδεῖ καὶ ἀληθεῖ
 διαιρεῖται, οὐ τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις
 11 μᾶλλον. ὅλως μὲν οὖν δόξη ταύτων ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδεὶς.

to, or whether it is a merely popular confusion of terms that Aristotle attacks, is not clear.

5 καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ] It might be said that desires are really contrary to each other, and contradict each other as much as purpose contradicts any desire, *e.g.*, the desire for money is thwarted by that for pleasure. But the psychology is not very explicit here, and Aristotle seems to imply, without definitely expressing it, that in the moral will there is an element contradicting the desires in a manner different from that in which one desire interferes with another.

7 βούλησις δ' ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων,

οἷον ἀθανασίας] 'But wish is for impossibilities, as, for instance, immortality.' This is not a passage that can be cited as an indication of Aristotle's opinion with regard to a future life. 'Αθανασία here means 'exemption from death,' and does not touch the question as to the imperishability of the soul. It seems to have been a stock instance of an impossible wish. Dr. Cardwell quotes Xenophon's *Symposium* (I. § 15): οὔτε γὰρ ἔγωγε σπουδάζω ἂν δυναίμην μᾶλλον, ἢ περ ἀθάνατος γενέσθαι.

11-13 ὅλως μὲν οὖν ἴσμεν] 'Now that purpose is identical with opinion as a whole, perhaps no one maintains at all. But neither is it identical with any special kind of opinion.

ἀλλ' οὐδέ τινι· τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ
 ποιοί τινές ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν οὐ. καὶ προαιρούμεθα¹²
 μὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί
 ἐστὶν ἢ τίνι συμφέρει ἢ πῶς· λαβεῖν δ' ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνυ
 δοξάζομεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις ἐπαινεῖται τῷ εἶναι οὐ¹³
 δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς. καὶ
 προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἅ μάλιστα ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξάζομεν
 δὲ ἅ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν. δοκοῦσί τε οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ προαιρεῖσθαι¹⁴
 τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλ' ἔνιοι δοξάζειν μὲν ἄμεινον,
 διὰ κακίαν δ' αἰρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἅ δεῖ. εἰ δὲ προγίνεται δόξα¹⁵
 τῆς προαιρέσεως ἢ παρακολουθεῖ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐ τοῦτο
 γὰρ σκοποῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτόν ἐστι δόξη τινί. τί οὖν ἢ¹⁶
 ποῖόν τι ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐθέν; ἐκούσιον μὲν
 δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προαιρετόν. ἀλλ' ἄρά¹⁷
 γε τὸ προβεβουλευμένον; ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου
 καὶ διανοίας. ὑποσημαίνειν δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῦνομα ὡς ὃν
 πρὸ ἐτέρων αἰρετόν.

Βουλευόνται δὲ πότερα περὶ πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βουλευτόν³

For in purposing what is good or bad our moral character consists,—not in opining it. And we purpose to take or avoid, or something of the kind, but we opine what a thing is, or for whom it is good, or how; but we do not exactly opine to take or avoid. And while purpose is praised rather by the epithets, “of the right object,” or “rightly,” opinion is praised by the epithet “truly.” And we purpose on the one hand things that we know for certain to be good, but we opine what we do not exactly know for certain.’

οὐδέ τινι] *i.e.* purpose is not identical with an opinion as to moral matters. The first argument to prove this is characteristic of Aristotle as opposed to Plato. He says, ‘our moral character does not consist in our opinions on good and evil, but in the deliberate acts of our will.’ This is guarded afterwards by the limitation (§ 15) that ‘opinion may go to form purpose, and may

again be reacted on by it;’ but the question is, are they identical?

12—13 The arguments in these sections consist in an appeal to language—we cannot speak of ‘opining to take,’ &c.

μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς] *H is of course not connected with μᾶλλον. It simply means ‘or.’ Ὀρθῶς, which should properly go with a verb, seems used because the verb προαιρεῖσθαι was much commoner before Aristotle than the abstract form προαίρεσις. Ὀρθή is applied to ὁρεῖσις (the element of desire in προαίρεσις), *Eth.* vi. ii. 2.

III. Since Purpose implies deliberation, this latter is now analysed, and an account is given, first of its object, secondly of its mode of operation. The object of deliberation is determined by an exhaustive process. All things are either eternal, or mutable; we do not deliberate about things

ἐστίν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; λεκτέον δ' ἴσως βουλευτὸν οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλευσάιτ' ἄν τις ἡλίθιος ἢ μαινόμενος, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων. περὶ δὲ τῶν αἰδίων οὐδεὶς βουλευέται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, αἰεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταῦτά γινομένων, εἴτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴτε καὶ φύσει ἢ διὰ τινὰ αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν. οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, οἷον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμβρων. οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης, οἷον θησαυροῦ εὐρέσεως. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ

⁶ eternal. Of things mutable, we do not deliberate about those things which are regulated by necessity, by nature, or by chance. Hence it remains that we deliberate about mutable things within the power of man, and not about all such, but about those within our own power, and not about ends, but about means, and where there is room for question. The mode of operation in deliberating is a kind of analysis. Assuming as desirable some end, we first ask what means will immediately produce this end, what again will produce that means, and so on till we have brought the last link of the chain of causation to ourselves, when we commence acting at once, the last step in the analysis being the first in the productive process. If any step occurs which is on the one hand necessary for the given end, and on the other hand unattainable by us, the chain cannot be completed; the deliberation is relinquished. But if all the steps are feasible, that which was indefinite before at once becomes definite, and purpose succeeds deliberation. A discussion of the nature of *εὐβουλία* as related to *φρόνησις* occurs *Eth.* vi. ix., but is evidently written quite independently of the present chapter, on which it improves by employing the formula of the moral syllogism, and by inquiring after the faculty which

perceives ends. We might have expected Aristotle to say that in the deliberation which precedes an action some account should always be taken of the right or wrong of the action. But here the only question is represented to be, how a given end is to be obtained? What action will serve as a means to it? Hence while the present discussion must be considered a subtle piece of elementary psychology, and of great merit in the infancy of the science, on the other hand it seems incomplete as regards the theory of morals.

3—5 *περὶ δὲ τῶν αἰδίων—εὐρέσεως*] 'No man deliberates about eternal things, such as the universe, or the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side in a square; nor indeed about things in motion, if the motion takes place invariably in the same way, whether of necessity, or by nature, or from any other cause, as in the instance of the solstices and the risings of the sun: nor about things entirely variable, like droughts and rains: nor about matter of chance, like the finding of a treasure.' The opposition to *τὰ αἰδία* is *τὰ ἐν κινήσει*. The more exhaustive division of objects would have been that which is given *Eth.* vi. i. 6, into *τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν* and *τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα*. But there is an absence of logical formulæ in the present book which is observable. The instances here given

περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων, οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκύθαι ἄριστα πολιτεύονται οὐδείς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλευέται. οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν τούτων οὐθὲν δι' ἡμῶν. βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν πρακτῶν· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστι λοιπά. αἷτια γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι βουλευόμενοι περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτῶν πρακτῶν. καὶ περὶ μὲν τὰς ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐκ ἔστι βουλή, οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων (οὐ γὰρ διστάζομεν πῶς γραπτέον)· ἀλλ' ὅσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δ' αἰεὶ, περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα, οἷον περὶ τῶν κατὰ ἰατρικὴν καὶ χρηματι-

of the eternal are (1) the universe, (2) a particular mathematical truth—that the diagonal of a square is incommensurate with its side. That the universe is eternal, being uncreated, indestructible, and, as a whole, immutable, was part of Aristotle's physical philosophy. Cf. *de Cælo* I. x. 10: "Ὅστ' εἰ τὸ δλον σῶμα συνεχὲς ὃν ὅτε μὲν οὕτως ὅτε δ' ἐκείνως διατίθεται καὶ διακεκόσμηται, ἡ δὲ τοῦ δλου σύστασις ἐστὶ κόσμος καὶ οὐρανός, οὐκ ἂν δ' κόσμος γίγνοιτο καὶ φθείροιτο, ἀλλ' αἱ διαθέσεις αὐτοῦ. The above mathematical truth is called 'eternal', *De Gen. An.* II. vi. 15: ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ τρίγωνον ἔχειν δυσὶν ὁρθαῖς ἴσας ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ τὴν διάμετρον ἀσύμμετρον εἶναι πρὸς τὴν πλευρὰν αἰδίων. It is mentioned as one of those things which philosophy begins by wondering at, and ends by feeling their universal necessity. *Metaphys.* I. II. 15: καθάπερ τῶν θαυμάτων τὰντόματα τοῖς μήπω τεθεωρηκόσι τὴν αἰτίαν, ἡ περὶ τὰς τοῦ ἡλίου τροπὰς ἢ τὴν τῆς διαμέτρου ἀσύμμετρίαν· θαυμαστὸν γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν, εἴ τι τῷ ἐλαχίστῳ μὴ μετρεῖται. δεῖ δὲ εἰς τούναντιον—ἀποτελεντῆσαι—οὐθὲν γὰρ ἂν οὕτω θαυμάσειεν ἄνθρωποι γεωμετρικὸς ὡς εἰ γένοιτο ἡ διάμετρος μετρητή. Two kinds of eternity seem here placed in juxtaposition—one physical, the other ma-

thematical. But eternity or necessity can only exist in relation to the laws of the mind that perceives it. Therefore we might say that these two kinds of eternity find their meeting-point in a metaphysic above the division of the sciences. Aristotle however is writing οὐ κατ' ἀκριβειαν.

7 αἷτια γὰρ—ἀνθρώπου] 'For the causes of things seem to be as follows, nature, and necessity, and chance, and again reason and all that depends on man.' A similar classification of causes is implied *Eth.* I. ix. 5, VI. iv. 4. The relation of necessity and chance, as causes, to nature, forms the subject of Aristotle's *Physics*, Book II. Chapters iv.—ix. See Essay V. pp. 221—5.

8 καὶ περὶ—γραπτέον] 'And on the one hand there is no deliberation about sciences that are fixed and complete in themselves, as for instance about writing—for we do not doubt how we ought to write.' The ἀκριβεῖς ἐπιστῆμαι here meant are not the 'exact sciences,' as we may judge from the instance given. 'Ακριβής seems equivalent to 'fixed' (cf. the note on *Eth.* I. vii. 18), and ἐπιστήμη is used in a wavering sense, almost equivalent to τέχνη, though the words are immediately afterwards distinguished.

στικήν, καὶ περὶ κυβερνητικήν μᾶλλον ἢ γυμναστικήν, ὅσω
 9 ᾗττον διηκρίβωται, καὶ ἔτι περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοίως, μᾶλλον
 δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας· μᾶλλον γὰρ
 10 περὶ αὐτὰς διστάζομεν. τὸ βουλευέσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ
 τὸ πολὺ, ἀδήλοις δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον.
 συμβούλους δὲ παραλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὰ μεγάλα, ἀπι-
 11 στοῦντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐχ ἱκανοῖς διαγνῶναι. βουλευ-
 ὀμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη.
 οὔτε γὰρ ἱατρὸς βουλευέται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ
 πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν
 οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τέλος τι, πῶς καὶ
 διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι, καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου
 γίνεσθαι διὰ τίνος ῥᾶστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι'
 ἐνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κακείνο διὰ
 τίνος, ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει
 ἔσχατον ἐστίν· ὃ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε ζητεῖν καὶ
 12 ἀναλύειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ διάγραμμα. φαίνεται
 δ' ἡ μὲν ζήτησις οὐ πᾶσα εἶναι βούλευσις, οἷον αἱ μαθημα-
 τικαί, ἡ δὲ βούλευσις πᾶσα ζήτησις, καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ
 13 ἀναλύσει πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει. καὶ μὲν ἀδυνάτω

II οὔτε γὰρ—διάγραμμα] 'The physician does not deliberate whether he is to cure, nor the orator whether he is to persuade, nor the statesman whether he is to produce a good constitution. The end is not the subject of deliberation in any science. An end being assumed, we consider how and by what means it can be brought about; if it appear that there are more ways than one, we inquire which is the easiest and best; if it can be accomplished by one means alone, we inquire how this produces the end, and by what it is itself produced, until we come to that which as a cause is first, but is the last thing to be discovered; for such deliberation as we describe is like seeking the solution of a geometrical problem by analysis of the diagram.' The process of deliberation is analytical, proceeding

backwards ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. It ends with the πρῶτον αἴτιον, *i.e.* the individual will. 'Will,' says Kant, 'is that kind of causality attributed to living agents, in so far as they are possessed of reason, and freedom is such a property of that causality as enables them to originate events independently of foreign determining causes.' That each man is, as regards his own acts, an originating cause not determined by other causes, is Aristotle's view throughout. Kant's definition throws light upon this.

κακείνο] Refers to ἐνός and διὰ τούτου.

ὥσπερ διάγραμμα] Aristotle compares deliberation with the analysis of mathematical problems. Given a problem in geometry, *e.g.*, to find the method of constructing some figure. Assume it as constructed, and draw it

ἐντύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται, οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε πορισθῆναι· ἐὰν δὲ δυνατὸν φαίνεται, ἐγχειροῦσι πρᾶττειν. δυνατὰ δὲ ἂ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἂν· τὰ γὰρ διὰ τῶν φίλων δι' ἡμῶν πως ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν. ζητεῖται δ' ὅτε μὲν τὰ ὄργανα, ὅτε δ' ἡ χρεία αὐτῶν.¹⁴ ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ὅτε μὲν δι' οὗ, ὅτε δὲ πῶς ἡ διὰ τίνος. ἔοικε δὲ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχὴ¹⁵ τῶν πράξεων· ἡ δὲ βουλὴ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶ πρακτῶν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα. οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη βουλευτὸν τὸ τέλος¹⁶ ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη. οὐδὲ δὲ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, οἷον εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο ἢ πέπεπται ὡς δεῖ· αἰσθήσεως γὰρ ταῦτα. εἰ δὲ αἰεὶ βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἤξει. βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ¹⁷ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό, πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον ἤδη τὸ προαιρετόν· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς προκριθὲν προαιρετόν ἐστιν. παύεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει, ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον· τοῦτο γὰρ τό

accordingly. See what condition is immediately necessary, and what again will produce this, &c.

14 [ζητεῖται δ'—διὰ τίνος] 'The question is sometimes what instruments are necessary, sometimes how they are to be used; and, speaking generally, we have to find sometimes the means by which, sometimes the manner or the person by whom.' Michelet makes a difficulty about ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς, explaining it 'in reliquis categoriis;' but the Paraphrast renders it simply καὶ ἁπλῶς.

15 ἔοικε δὲ—ἕνεκα] 'It seems, therefore, that man is, as we have said, the cause of his actions: that deliberation is about the things to be done by ourselves, and that actions are means to something else.' In one sense, and so far as deliberation is concerned, action must be regarded as a means. Cf. *Rhetoric*, I. vi. 1: πρόκειται τῇ συμβουλευοντι σκοπὸς τὸ συμφέρον, βουλευόνται δὲ οὐ περὶ τοῦ τέλους ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος,

ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ συμφέροντα κατὰ τὰς πράξεις. But in another sense, and from a moral point of view, each action is an end-in-itself. Cf. *Eth.* vi. ii. 5: Οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς—τὸ ποιητόν. Ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν· ἡ γὰρ εὐπραγία τέλος, ἡ δ' ὁρεῖς τούτου.

16 εἰς ἄπειρον ἤξει] 'It will go on to infinity'—impersonal. Cf. I. ii. 1, I. vii. 7.

17 παύεται γὰρ—προαιρούμενον] 'For every one stops inquiring how he shall act, when he has brought home the first link in the chain to himself and to the guiding principle in himself; that is to say, to that which purposes.' Throughout these discussions we find a striking clearness of expression for some of the ordinary phenomena of consciousness; on the other hand, evident tokens that the psychology is new and tentative; and again, a want of deeper inquiry into the nature of personality and of the will.

- 18 προαιρούμενον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων
πολιτειῶν, ὡς Ὅμηρος ἐμιμῆτο· οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς ἂ προ-
19 ἐλοῖντο ἀνήγγελλον τῷ δήμῳ. ὄντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ
βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη
βουλευτικὴ ὀρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἐκ τοῦ βουλευσασθαι γὰρ
20 κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν
προαίρεσις τύπῳ εἰρήσθω, καὶ περὶ ποῖά ἐστι, καὶ ὅτι τῶν
πρὸς τὰ τέλη.
4 Ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστίν, εἴρηται,

18 δῆλον δὲ—δῆμῳ] 'Now this is exemplified from the old politics which Homer depicted; for the kings used to announce to the people the course they had selected.' Cf. the conduct of Agamemnon, *Iliad* II. 53, sqq. A modern illustration is furnished by the French Parliaments, which used to register the edicts presented to them by the king as a matter of course. The Paraphrast explains the comparison by making the people represent the προαίρεσις.—Εἰσάγει γὰρ τοὺς βασιλεῖς μετὰ τὴν βούλην τὸ προκριθὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντας τῷ δήμῳ ὥσπερ τῇ προαίρεσει, ὥστεπραχθῆναι. The people were required to acquiesce in and carry out the decisions of the kings, which else would have remained unratified. So the reason announces its decisions to the will or purpose, *i. e.* the active powers in the mind. Metaphors of this sort never accurately represent mental distinctions. The present comparison has many flaws. For the προαίρεσις is here called τὸ ἡγούμενον, which does not answer to the people, distinguished from the king. Again, it is the individual (ἐκαστος), not the reason, that announces his deliberations to the leading part in himself. What constitutes the individual as separate from the will or purpose? And, is not reason part of purpose, how then can it be distinguished from it?

19 ὄντος δὲ—βούλευσιν] 'If the object of purpose is that, which, being in our power, we desire after deliberation, purpose will be a deliberate desire of things in our power. After deliberating we decide, and form a desire in accordance with our deliberation.' The Paraphrast here reads κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν at the end of this passage. There might seem to be something plausible in the change, because βούλευσις is represented as confining itself to means; hence how can we be said to desire κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν? Consistently, our desires must depend on something else, namely, βούλησις—deliberation is the faculty for attaining them. On the other hand, the phrases βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ, and βουλευτικὴ ὀρεξις, run the consideration of means and ends together.

IV. Hitherto every act has been regarded as a means, and has been accounted voluntary because originating in the individual. Deliberation and purpose have been restricted in their function to the mere choice and taking of means. A great question therefore remains to be mooted, whence do we get our conception of ends? What is the nature of the faculty called βούλησις, which has been assumed to be the faculty of ends? Are we as free in the choice

δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινο-
μένου ἀγαθοῦ. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν τὸ βουλευτὸν τάγα-₂

of these, as we are in that of the means? Aristotle contents himself with mentioning in the present chapter that there are two extreme opinions, the one (that of Plato) that wish is always for the good; the other (that of the sophists) that it is for the apparent good. He rejects both of these, the first as contradicting facts, the second as ignoring any true object of wish. He takes a position between them, that, abstractedly and ideally, as appealing to the universal reason (ἀπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν) the good is the object of wish, while to the individual mind only what appears good can seem desirable; hence, although the wise man, who is in accordance with the universal reason, and is its exponent in particular cases (τάληθες ἐν ἐκάστοις ὁρᾷ, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὢν), wishes for the good alone, others are deceived by false appearances and by pleasure, and choose what is not truly good. Aristotle for the present passes over the important question, which is discussed in the next chapter, Does our knowledge of what is good depend upon our natural character? And if so, how can vice and virtue be called free? The statement in § 4, ἐκάστω δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον (βουλευτὸν) is inconsistent with his usage of the word βούλησις elsewhere; see the passages quoted in next note.

1 δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι.] This doctrine is found stated at length in the *Gorgias* of Plato, p. 466, sqq. Polus having argued that the position of a tyrant or orator is enviable, because 'he can do what he wishes,' Socrates answers that 'the tyrant or orator does nothing that he wishes:'. φημί γάρ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς

ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι σμικρότατον—οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται, ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν· ποιεῖν μέντοι ὃ τι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι. Then follows an account of βούλησις, that it is of ends not means. Πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι, ὃ ἂν πράττουσιν ἐκάστωτε, ἢ ἐκείνο οὐ ἕνεκα πράττουσι τοῦθ' ὃ πράττουσιν; By which it can be demonstrated that βούλησις is of the absolute good. The difference between Plato's account and the one above is, that Plato distinguishes βούλησις from ἐπιθυμία, while Aristotle does not. The βούλησις of Plato is the higher will or desire of the Universal. In this higher sense of the word wish, no one wishes except for what is good, that is, in his best moments, in the deepest recesses of his nature, if the true bearings of his wish be pointed out to him. In this sense the wish of the individual is in accordance with universal reason, and is an expression of it. In a lower sense, we wish with different parts of our nature, and thus wish for all sorts of things, bad as well as good. But to this latter kind of wish the name 'desire' is appropriate. The tenet ὅτι ἀγαθοῦ βούλησις ἐστίν is of great importance for morals. It implies much that modern systems would convey in other terms, such as the 'supremacy of conscience,' the 'autonomy of the will,' &c. Elsewhere Aristotle distinctly maintains it. Cf. *Metaphys.* xi. vii. 2: τὸ ὁρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενα. τούτων τὰ πρῶτα τὰ αὐτὰ (transcendently the objects of reason and of longing are identical). Ἐπιθυμητὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν, βουλευτὸν δὲ πρῶτον τὸ ὄν καλόν. In

θὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι βουλευτὸν ὃ βούλεται ὁ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἰρούμενος (εἰ γὰρ ἔσται βουλευτὸν, καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἦν δ', εἰ
 3 οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν), τοῖς δ' αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν τὸ βουλευτὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλευτὸν, ἀλλ' ἐκάστω τὸ δοκοῦν· ἄλλο δ' ἄλλω φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε,
 4 τάναντία. εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἄρα φατέον ἀπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν βουλευτὸν εἶναι τὰγαθόν, ἐκάστω δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον; τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τὸ τυχόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ διακειμένοις ὑγιεινά ἐστὶ τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς δ' ἐπινόσοις ἕτερα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα· ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν
 5 ἐκάστοις τάληθες αὐτῷ φαίνεται. καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἔξιν ἰδιά ἐστὶ καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τάληθες ἐν ἐκάστοις ὀρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὢν. τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οὕσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται· αἰροῦνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.

De Animā, III. x. 4, he makes the wish (or will) side with reason, in opposition to desire. 'Ἡ γὰρ βούλησις ὁρεῖσι· ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν κινῆται, καὶ κατὰ βούλησιν κινεῖται. ἡ δ' ὁρεῖσι κινεῖ παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ὁρεῖσι τίς ἐστίν. In other parts of the *Ethics* also (which may hence be concluded to have been composed at a different period from this chapter) this distinction between βούλησις, the general wish, and any particular desire or determination, is observed. Cf. *Eth.* v. ix. 6: οὐθεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, οὐδ' ὁ ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττει. οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται οὐθεὶς ὃ μὴ οἶεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον. viii. xiii. 8: τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἢ τοὺς πλείστον τὰ καλὰ, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὠφέλιμα.

τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ] This is a corollary of the doctrine of Protagoras. If the individual could only

know what 'seemed' to him, he could only wish for what seemed good. Thus the objective distinction between good and evil is done away with (συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλευτὸν). Cf. *Metaphys.* x. vi. 1: 'Εκείνος (ὁ Πρωταγόρας) ἔφη πάντων χρημάτων εἶναι μέτρον ἄνθρωπον, οὐδὲν ἕτερον λέγων ἢ τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστω τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι παγίως. τοῦτου δὲ γιγνομένου τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνει καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. Cf. *Essay II.* pp. 91-3.

4 ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς] The good man is made here again, as above (II. vi. 15), that standard of right and wrong, that exponent of the universal reason, by which Aristotle escapes being forced into an utterly relative system of morals.

5 οὐ γὰρ οὕσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται] The 'pleasant' is often characterised

Ὁντος δὴ βουλευτοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ 5
προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις κατὰ
προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἐκούσιοι. αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι
περὶ ταῦτα. ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ 2

in Aristotle as 'the seeming good.' Cf. *De Motu Animal.* vi. 5: δεῖ δὲ τιθέσθαι καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθοῦ χάραν ἔχειν, καὶ τὸ ἡδύ· φαινόμενον γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν.

V. Aristotle winds up his account of the voluntary, by arguing that virtue and vice are free (ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία). As before remarked, this must not be taken as a metaphysical discussion of the question of free-will. Partly, the question had never yet been fully started; partly, Aristotle would have thought it foreign to an ethical treatise; partly, we find in the present chapter that same elementary and tentative character which marks the previous discussions in this book. In dealing with one of the real difficulties of the question at the end of the chapter, Aristotle contents himself with a very qualified and moderate assertion of freedom, which contrasts with the dogmatic statements on the same subject in the *Ethics* of Eudemus. The discussion here is evidently suggested by, and directed against, the doctrine of the Platonists, that 'vice is involuntary,' since it consists in ignorance. The arguments are as follows: (1) All action implies the possibility of its contrary, hence if to act rightly be in our power, to act wrongly must be in our power also. (2) That an individual is the originating cause of his actions, is a conception which it is difficult to get rid of. This implies freedom. (3) We all act as if vice were free as well as virtue. It is

punished by the state. Even for ignorance and carelessness producing vice, men are held to be responsible. (4) Men must not charge their acts upon their natural character—rather their character is produced by their acts. (5) The analogy of bodily infirmities shows us that if some vices are congenital, some, at all events, are self-produced. (6) The great difficulty of the question is as follows: if, as was said above (Chapter IV.), we each of us desire what seems good; if our conception of the end, that is, our idea of good, depends not on our own will, but on nature, or our character and tendency from birth; and if all our acts are determined by this conception of the end, how can they be called free? Aristotle answers by putting various alternatives: (α) you may either accept this position in its full extent. It will then apply to virtue as well as vice. Both will be equally under a law of nature. Neither will be voluntary. But this the mind seems to revolt against. (β) Or, you may say that while the end is absolutely determined, the means to it are all free as springing from the will of the individual. Thus, virtue and vice are free, because all their parts are free. (γ) Or, you may modify the doctrine by admitting that there is something self-produced and self-determined in the character as a whole, and therefore in the idea of good, which is to determine our actions.

1-2 ὄντος δὴ—ἡ κακία] 'The end then being the object of wish,

κακία. ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μή, καὶ τὸ ναί· ὥστ' εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔσται αἰσχρὸν ὂν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχρὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. εἰ δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς

οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πενήρως οὐδ' ἄκων μάκαρ,

ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ τὸ δ' ἀληθεῖ· μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς

while the means are the objects of deliberation and purpose, the actions that are concerned with the means must depend on purpose and must be voluntary. But every calling out of the virtues into play is concerned with the means; virtue accordingly is in our power, and in like manner so is vice.'

αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις] The words περὶ ταῦτα are ambiguous. The Paraphrast confines them to 'the means,' which rendering is supported by κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν. Actions were above said to be means (III. iii. 15).

αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι] This is an unusual expression. We find it again, *Eth.* x. iii. 1: οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι ποιότητές εἰσιν. Aristotle's usual formula is ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν, i.e. the evocation of the internal nature into consciousness or action, under the regulation of the moral law. He seems averse to considering ἀρετή as a δύναμις, or latent quality that might be so evoked. The psychology of this passage is different from that of *Eth.* vi. xii. 8-10. Here it is said that βούλησις gives us the idea of the end, and that virtue consists in προαίρεσις and βούλευσις taking the means; there that virtue gives the end, and an intellectual faculty (φρόνησις) the means.

2 ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν] Elsewhere (*Metaphys.* VIII. ii. 2) Aristotle states in more philosophical form this first step in the doctrine of free-will, namely, that every psychical δύναμις is a capacity of contraries, see Essay IV. p. 187.

3 τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι] 'And this is, according to our hypothesis,—being good and bad.' ἦν = 'is as we have said,' referring to the preceding section. Trendelenburg in his paper on τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (*Rheinisches Museum*, 1828) tells us that ἀγαθοῖς in the present passage is by attraction to ἡμῖν. It is therefore to be distinguished from the logical expression τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, 'the essential idea of goodness.'

τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς—ἀληθεῖ] 'But to say that "No man prefers a crime or spurns a bliss" seems half false and half true.' The line here quoted, on which the discussion in this chapter turns, is of uncertain authorship. It is quoted in the dialogue which bears Plato's name, περὶ Δικαίου. This fragmentary dialogue is, in all probability, not Plato's, but of the Platonic school (though Victorinus ascribes it to Plutarch). It stands pretty much on a level with the ninth book of the *Laws* (see Essay III. p. 166), and one

ἄκων, ἢ δὲ μοχθηρία ἐκούσιον. ἢ τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις 5
ἀμφισβητητέον, καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν εἶναι
οὐδὲ γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα 6
φαίνεται καὶ μὴ ἔχομεν εἰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ
τὰς ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὧν καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν
καὶ ἐκούσια. τούτοις δ' ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' 7
ἐκάστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν· κολάζουσι γὰρ
καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρῶντας μοχθηρά, ὅσοι μὴ βίᾳ ἢ δι'
ἄγνοιαν ἥς μὴ αὐτοὶ αἵτιοι, τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας
τιμῶσιν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν προτρέφοντες, τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες.
καίτοι ὅσα μὴτ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μὴβ' ἐκούσια, οὐδεὶς προ-

can hardly doubt that it is referred to here. Cf. p. 374 A: Πότερον δὲ ἐκόν-
τας οἶε ἔχειν τοῦτο τὸ ἄδικον τοὺς
ἀνθρώπους ἢ ἄκοντας; ὧδε δὲ λέγω,
ἐκόντας οἶε ἄδικεῖν καὶ ἀδίκους εἶναι ἢ
ἄκοντας; Ἐκόντας ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες·
πονηροὶ γάρ εἰσιν. Ἐκόντας ἄρα σὺ
οἶε πονηροὺς εἶναι καὶ ἀδίκους ἀνθρώ-
πους; Ἐγώ γε· σὺ δ' οὐ; Οὐκ, εἰ γέ τι
δεῖ τῷ ποιητῇ πείθεσθαι. Ποίῳ ποιητῇ;
"Ὅστις εἴπεν

οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μάκαρ.

Ἀλλὰ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ ἢ πα-
λαιὰ παροιμία ἔχει, ὅτι πολλὰ ψεύ-
δονται ἄνθρωποι. The answer to this is,
an argument to show that injustice is
δι' ἀμαθίαν, and therefore involun-
tary. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐψεύσατο τοῦτό γε
ἄνθρωπος. The original saying was pro-
bably a mere truism, πονηρὸς meaning
not 'wicked,' but 'wretched.' This
play on the word rendered the line
peculiarly suitable for the Platonic
argument.

5 γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων ὥσπερ
καὶ τέκνων] The analogy here given,
when looked at closely, does not imply
any very strong assertion of free-will
(though Aristotle meant it to be so).
For the father inherits, or receives by
nature, qualities that he transmits to
his children. Analogously the will

might be regarded as an effect, as well
as a cause, of circumstances.

7 τούτοις δ' ἔοικε—νομοθετῶν] 'This
seems to be supported by the testimony
both of individuals and of legislators
themselves.' The argument drawn
from the constitution of society, from
the fact of rewards and punishments,
goes so far as this. It proves that the
mind is of a nature to be acted on by
inducements. It, of course, does not
touch the metaphysical difficulty as to
the whole world being bound by a law
of necessity. But it proves an in-
stinctive belief existing in society,
exactly coincident with the position
of Aristotle, that the individual is the
cause of particular acts. There is no
natural tendency in criminals to dis-
claim responsibility for their crimes.
If they do so, it is not from an in-
stinctive feeling, but rather from a
sophisticated mind. As before said,
this fact is not sufficient to disprove a
metaphysical system which would
represent legislature, judge, criminal,
and the whole world, as forced to do
what they do by an irresistible suc-
cession of cause and effect. But
ethically and politically it is sufficient
to justify a practical assumption of
freedom. And in any system it must
at all events be taken account of.

τρέπεται πράττειν, ὥς οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου ὃν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ
 θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεῖν ἢ πεινῆν ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων.
 8 οὐθὲν γὰρ ἤττον πεισόμεθα αὐτά. καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ
 ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, εἰάν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον
 τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια· ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ.
 κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας.
 καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ δεῖ ἐπίστα-
 9 σθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστι, κολάζουσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δι' ἀμέλειαν ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὥς ἐπ' αὐ-
 10 τοῖς ὃν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι. ἀλλ'
 ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι. ἀλλὰ τοῦ
 τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ζῶντες ἀνειμένως, καὶ τοῦ
 ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἱ μὲν κακουργοῦντες, οἱ δὲ ἐν
 πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις διάγοντες· αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα
 11 ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν
 μελετώντων πρὸς ἡντιοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν· διατελοῦσι
 12 γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν
 13 περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἑξῆς γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου. ἔτι
 δ' ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸν
 ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει

8 διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια] Cf. *Politics*, II. xii. 13: 'Ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Πιττακὸς νόμων δημιουργὸς ἄλλ' οὐ πολιτείας· νόμος δ' ἴδιος αὐτοῦ τὸ τοὺς μεθύοντας, ἂν τυπτήσῃσι, πλείω ζημίαν ἀποτίνειν τῶν νηφόντων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πλείους ὑβρίζειν μεθύοντας ἢ νηφοντας οὐ πρὸς τὴν συγγνώμην ἀπέβλεψεν, ὅτι δεῖ μεθύουσιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. Drunkenness is self-caused ignorance of right and wrong. (Cf. *Eth.* III. i. 14). The law of Pittacus is given in the *Rhetoric* to illustrate an ἐνστασις depending on an appeal to authority. (II. xxv. 7) Εἰ τις ἐνθύμημα εἶπεν ὅτι τοῖς μεθύουσι δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ ἁμαρτάνουσιν, ἐνστασις ὅτι οὐκ οὖν ὁ Πιττακὸς αἰνετός. οὐ γὰρ ἂν μείζους ζημίας ἐνομοθέτησεν ἐάν τις μεθύων ἁμαρτάνῃ.

10—12 αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα—

ἀναισθήτου] 'For the particular developments of the mind in each case give people their character. This may be illustrated by the case of those who are practising for some contest or action,—for they keep on exercising their powers. Now not to know that the several states of mind arise from particular developments of the powers is absolute idiocy.' This passage contains exactly the same theory of the formation of moral states as that given at the beginning of Book II. But it is written independently of the former passage—in that separate way, which must be called a marked peculiarity of Aristotle's writings.

13 ἔτι δ' ἄλογον—ἀκόλαστον] 'Again it is absurd to say that he who acts unjustly does not wish to be unjust, or he who acts intemperately

ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, ἐκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη, οὐ μὲν ἐάν γε¹⁴
 βούληται, ἄδικος ὧν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος· οὐδὲ γὰρ
 ὁ νοσῶν ὑγιής. καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἐκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς
 βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς. τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν
 αὐτῷ μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀφέντι
 λίθον ἔτ' αὐτὸν δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπ' αὐτῷ
 τὸ βαλεῖν καὶ ῥῖψαι· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ. οὕτω δὲ
 καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιοῦτοις
 μὴ γενέσθαι, διὸ ἐκόντες εἰσὶν· γενομένοις δ' οὐκέτι ἔξεστι
 μὴ εἶναι. οὐ μόνον δ' αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι ἐκούσιοι¹⁵
 εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοις καὶ αἱ τοῦ σώματος, οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν·
 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ φύσιν αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δι'
 ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ ἀμέλειαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ
 πῆρωσιν· οὐβείς γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσαιε τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου
 ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλεῆσαι· τῷ δ' ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας
 ἢ ἄλλης ἀκολασίας πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμῆσαι. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ¹⁶
 σῶμα κακιῶν αἱ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται, αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὐ.
 εἰ δ' οὕτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν κακιῶν
 ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἂν εἶεν. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ¹⁷

to be intemperate.' Aristotle would not say himself that any one 'wished to be intemperate,' that is, wished it in the general, in the abstract, for its own sake. But here he points out that those who do not wish to be intemperate yet take the steps that lead inevitably to this. He argues that the means make the end free; the outset, the conclusion; the parts, the whole. Afterwards (§ 22) he allows that the general state is not so entirely in our power as the particular act. With regard to the former it is rather true to say that we are responsible for it, than that we choose it. A paradox then still remains, that men produce by voluntary acts that which they do not wish. The resolution of this is to be found in *Eth.* vii. iii., where it is shown that right moral acting consists in allowing the act of the moment to be sufficiently in-

fluenced by universal considerations. Error and vice, on the contrary, consist in suffering the universal idea, the general conception of what is good and desirable, to stand in abeyance.

¹⁴ προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι.] 'But after he has thrown his health away, he has no longer a choice.' To 'give away' is the only sense in which *προτεσθαι* is used in the *Ethics*. Cf. iv. i. 9, ix. i. 7, &c.

^{17—20} This complex argument will be perhaps made most clear, if divided into the following separate members. (1) *Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι—αὐτῷ* is the general protasis. Suppose it to be said that all aim at what appears to them good, but that their ideas and impressions are beyond their control, being dependent in each case on the character of the individual. (2) On this an alternative follows: *either* (εἰ

φαινομένου αγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ὁποῖός ποῦ ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ.

μὲν οὖν—αἷτιος) the individual is the cause of his own character, and so accordingly of his ideas, or (3) let us see what the consequences will be if we allow that the individual is not the cause of his own character (εἰ δὲ μή—εὐφύια). In this case no one will be responsible for doing wrong: wrong will reduce itself to mere ignorance, the knowledge of the good to a happy gift of nature. (4) But these extreme deductions are overthrown (εἰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστίν—ὀπωσδήποτε) by its being shown that they will equally disprove the voluntariness of virtue, as well as that of vice. (5) The argument is concluded by summing up the results of the previous discussions (εἴτε δὴ—ὁμοίως γάρ). In whatever sense virtue is said to be free, whether as implying that the idea of the end is in our power, or only that there is something free and individual in the taking of means,—in exactly the same sense will vice be free, for these two opposite terms stand on exactly the same footing.

17 τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι] 'But are not masters of their impression.' Φαντασία is a special word, denoting something between sense and intellect (φαντασία γὰρ ἕτερον καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας· αὐτὴ τε οὐ γίγνεται ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις. *De An.* iii. iii. 5). It denotes, in short, the sensuous impression of an object. Aristotle says that we may have a false φαντασία even where we have true opinions, as, for instance, our φαντασία of the sun makes it a foot in diameter, while our belief is that the sun surpasses in magnitude the habitable world (φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ψευδῇ, περὶ

ὃν ἄμα ὑπόληψιν ἀληθῇ ἔχει, οἷον φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος, πεπίστευται δ' εἶναι μείζων τῆς οἰκουμένης, *De An.* iii. iii. 15). Φαντασία is closely allied with μνήμη, it belongs to the same part of the mind (*De Memor.* i. 9). Memory and φαντασία are something short of intellect—Aristotle attributed them to the lower animals. Cf. *Metaphys.* i. i. 3: τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ταῖς φαντασίαις ὄν καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμπειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν. Cf. also *Eth.* vii. iii. ii. Brutes and the incontinent are said to follow their φαντασίαι, *De An.* iii. iii. 21: καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ ὁμοίως εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὰς πράττει τὰ ζῷα, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, οἷον τὰ θηρία, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐρίοτε πάθει ἢ νόσοις ἢ ὕπνῳ, οἷον οἱ ἄνθρωποι. Cf. *Eth.* vii. vii. 8. We find the word φαντασία not as yet settled into a psychological formula in Plato's *Theaetetus*, p. 152 B, where the doctrine of Protagoras is shown to imply that everything is as it appears, and that this appearing is identical with sensation. Σ. τὸ δέ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐστίν; Θ. Ἔστι γάρ. Σ. Φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἰσθησις ταῦτόν ἐν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις, ὅλα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος, τοιαῦτα ἐκάστω καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι. Aristotle, giving a scientific account of it in the *De Anima*, separates it, as we have seen, from sensation on the one hand, and reason on the other. The term does not correspond with any of our regular psychological terms. In relation to the fancy and the imagination, it represents the material for these, the brain-images out of which the creations of fancy (as well as the phantasmagoria of dreams) are con-

εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἑξέως ἐστί πως αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐθεὶς αὐτῷ αἴτιος τοῦ κακὰ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα πράττει, διὰ τούτων οἰόμενος αὐτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι. ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ ἀυθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φύναι δεῖ ὥσπερ ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ἧ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἰρήσεται. καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυῆς ὃ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν· τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὃ παρ' ἐτέρου μὴ οἶόν τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἷον ἔφυ, τοιοῦτον ἔξει, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα. εἰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἐκούσιον; ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ ἀγαθῷ¹⁸ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε φαίνεται καὶ κεῖται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀναφέροντες πράττουσιν ὁπωσδήποτε. εἴτε δὲ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἐκάστῳ φαί-¹⁹ νεται οἰονδήποτε, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ παρ' αὐτὸν ἐστὶν, εἴτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἐκούσιως τὸν σπουδαῖον ἢ ἀρετὴ ἐκούσιον ἐστὶν, οὐθὲν ἤττον καὶ ἡ κακία ἐκούσιον ἂν εἴη· ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ δι' αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει. εἰ οὖν,²⁰ ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἐκούσιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἑξέων συναίτιοί πως αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος

structed. Aristotle, not entering at all into the philosophy of the imaginative faculties, merely speaks of φαντασία as furnishing a necessary element to thought (νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος, *De Mem.* i. 5). From what has been said it is easy to see the special appropriateness of the word in the above passage to denote an impression or idea of the good received passively, and in itself erroneous.

19 εἴτε δὴ—τέλει] 'Whether, then, the conception of the end, of whatever kind, comes not to each individual by nature, but something also is contributed by himself (τι καὶ παρ' αὐτὸν ἐστὶν), or whether the end indeed is fixed by nature, but it is

through the good man's voluntarily taking the means that virtue is voluntary; in either case, I say, vice will be not a whit less voluntary (than virtue), for the bad man, exactly as the good, has individuality (τὸ δι' αὐτὸν) in the particular actions, if not in the conception of the end.'

20 καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἑξέων συναίτιοί πως αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν] 'For we are ourselves joint causes, in a way, of our own states of mind.' The word συναίτιος, meaning not the primary, but a concomitant cause, is of not unfrequent occurrence in Plato. Cf. *Timæus*, p. 46 D, where it is said of fire, &c., δοξάζεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων οὐ συναίτια, ἀλλ' αἴτια εἶναι τῶν πάντων. On the general bearing of Aristotle's

τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἐκούσιοι ἂν εἶεν· ὁμοίως
 21 γάρ. κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τό τε
 γένος τύπων, ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν, καὶ ὅτι ἕξεις, ὅφ' ὧν τε
 γίνονται, καὶ ὅτι τούτων πρακτικαὶ καθ' αὐτάς, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ'
 ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος προστάξῃ·
 22 οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἐκούσιοί εἰσι καὶ αἱ ἕξεις· τῶν
 μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους κύριοι ἐσμεν,
 εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθ'
 ἕκαστα δὲ ἢ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρω-
 στιῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦν οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτω χρῆσασθαι,
 23 διὰ τοῦτο ἐκούσιοι. ἀναλαμβάνοντες δὴ περὶ ἐκάστης, εἴπωμεν
 τίνες εἰσὶ καὶ περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς· ἅμα δ' ἔσται δῆλον καὶ
 πόσαι εἰσίν. καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας.

treatment of the question of free will, see Essay VII, pp. 316-18.

21-22 These sections form the junction between the somewhat isolated treatise on the Voluntary and Aristotle's discussion of the separate virtues. They bear marks of having been added for the express purpose of forming a junction. For after a general statement of the theory of virtue in section 21 there is a *resumé* of some points with regard to the voluntariness of actions and habits, which is just what a man might have been likely to add after reading over his own treatise, and thinking that it required a word or two of elucidation.

22 οὐχ ὁμοίως δὴ — ἀρρωστιῶν] But actions and habits are not equally voluntary, for we are masters of our actions from the beginning to the end because we know all the particulars, but we can only control the beginning of our habits, while the gradual addition made by each particular step is unperceived, as is the case also with illnesses.

23 ἀναλαμβάνοντες δὴ περὶ ἐκάστης — εἰσίν] 'Let us therefore resume our discussion of the separate virtues,

stating what they are, with what actions they are concerned, and in what manner. It will at the same time appear how many there are.' On the assumed completeness of Aristotle's list of the virtues, see note on *Eth.* II. vii. 1, and the plan of Book IV.; cf. also *Eth.* III. x. 1, note.

καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας] Aristotle's admirable account of courage is to some extent indebted to the observations of Plato, while in some points again it is a protest against the Platonic theory. In the *Protagoras* (pp. 349-351, 359-361) courage is identified with the science of the truly safe and the truly dangerous. In the *Laches* (pp. 198-201) a refinement is made upon this, and it is argued that, if danger be 'future evil,' courage cannot be the science of this, for a science excludes all consideration of time, so, if courage be a science at all, it must be the science of good and evil universally. Thus Plato merges courage in that universal wise consciousness, which he considered the true ground of morality. In the *Republic* (p. 430 B), courage is said to be the maintenance of

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἤδη 6 καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, φοβούμεθα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά, 2 ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὀρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα 3 τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν πένιν νόσον ἀφιλίαν θάνατον, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι· ἕνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρόν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ

right principles in spite of the distractions of danger. By Aristotle, courage is more definitely fixed as a condition of the moral side of man's nature, and as implying not only a consciousness, but a conscious choice of the highest moral good. Its sphere is limited to war, and thus a rather special and restricted character is given to the virtue. At the same time a reverence is shown for the nobleness of courage beyond what we find in Plato. And deep human observations are made which are in the best style of Aristotle's moral writing.

VI. 1-2 περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη—ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὀρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ] These points are accepted from Plato, cf. *Protag.* p. 358 D: προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε. *Laches*, p. 198 B: ἡγούμεθα δ' ἡμεῖς δεινὰ μὲν εἶναι ἃ καὶ δέος παρέχει, θαρραλέα δὲ ἃ μὴ δέος παρέχει· δέος δὲ παρέχει οὐ τὰ γεγονότα οὐδὲ τὰ παρόντα τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ προσδοκώμενα· δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ. . . . τούτων δὲ γε τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀνδρείαν προσαγορεύεις; κομῶν γε. The subject of the present chapter is the proper sphere of courage. ἤδη καὶ πρότερον, *Eth.* II. vii. 2.

3-8 φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν—κινδύνῳ] These sections contain a protest against the doctrine represented in the *Laches*, p. 191 D, E, where

courage is extended to all those objects which are here expressly excluded from it—dangers by sea, illness, political conflicts, even the encountering of temptation. Βουλόμενος γὰρ σου πυθέσθαι μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ ὁπλιτικῷ ἀνδρείους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἱππικῷ καὶ ἐν ξυμπαντί τῷ πολεμικῷ εἶδει, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κινδύνοις ἀνδρείους ὄντας, καὶ ὅσοι γε πρὸς νόσους καὶ ὅσοι πρὸς πένιας ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολιτικά ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσι, καὶ ἔτι αὖ μὴ μόνον ὅσοι πρὸς λύπας ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσιν ἢ φόβους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ἡδονὰς δεινοὶ μάχεσθαι, καὶ μένοντες ἢ ἀναστρέφοντες . . . εἰσὶ γὰρ πού τινες, ὧ Λάχης, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἀνδρεῖοι. Aristotle treats all such applications of the word ἀνδρεῖος as merely metaphorical (λέγεται δ' ὑπὸ τινῶν ἀνδρείος κατὰ μεταφοράν), to these he opposes the proper use of the word (κυρίως δὲ λέγοιτ' ἂν, § 10) as belonging peculiarly to war.

ἕνια γὰρ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν] Cf. *Eth.* III. i. 24: δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπὶ τισι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τινῶν, οἷον ὑγείας καὶ μαθήσεως. It admits of discussion how much, independently of a merely permissive attitude in the will and reason, the instincts of fear, anger, and desire, may be positively called out and even created by considerations and suggestions of the reason, or how far their place may be supplied by the reason itself.

μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπεικῆς καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ φο-
 βούμενος ἀναίσχυντος. λέγεται δ' ὑπὸ τινων ἀνδρείος κατὰ
 μεταφοράν· ἔχει γάρ τι ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· ἄφοβος
 4 γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος. πενίαν δ' ἴσως οὐ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι
 οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι' αὐτόν.
 ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἄφοβος ἀνδρείος. λέγομεν δὲ καὶ
 τοῦτον καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ἔνιοι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς
 κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἐλευθέριοι εἰσι καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων
 5 ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς ἔχουσιν. οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ
 παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται ἢ φθόνον ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων,
 δειλὸς ἐστίν· οὐδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρείος.
 6 περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν ὁ ἀνδρείος; ἢ περὶ τὰ
 μέγιστα; οὐβείς γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος τῶν δεινῶν. φο-
 βερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ
 7 τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι. δόξειε δ'
 ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος εἶναι, οἷον εἰ
 8 ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ ἐν νόσοις. ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν τοῖς
 καλλίστοις; τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ· ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ
 9 καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. ὁμόλογοι δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ
 τιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις.
 10 κυρίως δὴ λέγοιτ' ἂν ἀνδρείος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον
 ἀδεῆς, καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυια ὄντα· τοιαῦτα
 11 δὲ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν
 θαλάττῃ καὶ ἐν νόσοις ἀδεῆς ὁ ἀνδρείος, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὥς οἱ
 θαλάττιοι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνώκασιν τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν
 θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ εὐέλπιδες εἰσι
 12 παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν
 ἀλκὴ ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν· ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς
 οὐβέτερον ὑπάρχει.

It is a similar question which is discussed by Kant, How far is it possible to obey in a positive sense the injunction, 'love your enemies'?

6 φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας γάρ] See Essay V. p. 242.

10-12 κυρίως—ὑπάρχει] 'He then can be properly called brave who is fearless about the noble kind of death, and about things which sud-

denly (ὑπόγυια ὄντα) bring on death, —and such are especially the affairs of war. No doubt the brave man, when he is upon the sea, or upon a sickbed, will be brave: but his bravery will not be that of a sailor. Landsmen in danger of drowning give up all hope of safety, and feel repugnance at the thought of such a death; while sailors are made confident by

Τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτό, λέγομεν δὲ τι καὶ 7
 ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερὸν τῷ γε νοῦν
 ἔχοντι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄνθρωπον διαφέρει μεγέθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον
 καὶ ἥττον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος 2
 ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ
 τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ, τοῦ καλοῦ
 ἔνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἔστι δὲ μᾶλλον 3
 καὶ ἥττον ταῦτα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὰ μὴ φοβερά ὡς
 τοιαῦτα φοβεῖσθαι. γίνεται δὲ τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν ἡ μὲν 4
 ὅτι οὐ δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἡ τι τῶν
 τοιούτων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ μὲν οὖν 5
 ἂν δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἔνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ
 ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος· κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ, καὶ
 ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. τέλος 6

their experience. Besides, men put forth their courage on occasions where to die is helpful or glorious; but in death at sea or from sickness neither of these qualities is to be found.' This passage is a curious exemplification of Athenian feeling. In spite of the glorious traditions of Salamis, the Athenians had never attained those instincts which are inherited by the descendants of the Norsemen—the feeling that 'the deck' is their proper 'field of fame.'

VII. This chapter discusses courage as being a mean state with regard to daring and fearing. Setting aside terrors which are too great for human nature to bear, the brave man is calm (*ἀνέκπληκτος*), and endures or fears all things in their due measure according to the true standard, his aim being to attain the noble. Thus he is distinguished from the extremes by whom these proportions are violated. The extremes, by a refinement which Aristotle does not extend to the other virtues (cf. note on *Eth.* II. vii. 2), are fourfold. (1) Deficiency of fear,

producing a character which has no name. (2) Excess of fear = cowardice. (3) Deficiency of daring = cowardice. (4) Excess of daring = rashness. Two of these terms are identical, and one is nameless, so that the extremes really reduce themselves to cowardice and rashness (§ 12). Some excellent remarks are introduced on the characters of the boastful man and the rash man.

1 τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν—*θαρραλέα*] Having said where fear and courage are to be looked for, we next observe that fear admits of degrees, so that courage is proportionate. 'Now the Fearful is different to different persons, independent of our calling some things fearful beyond human endurance. These latter are fearful to every man in his senses, but dangers that are not beyond human endurance differ both in magnitude and in degree, a difference found also in the things that give courage.'

6 τέλος δὲ—*ἀνδρείαν*] This difficult section must be taken in connexion with what has gone before. Aristotle is determining the charac-

ὁ δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ
 ὁ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν. τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος· ὀρίζεται
 γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει. καλοῦ δὲ ἔνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει
 7 καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλ-
 λόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς
 πρότερον ὅτι πολλά ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), εἴη δ' ἄν τις μαινό-
 μενος ἢ ἀνάλγητος, εἰ μὴθὲν φοβοῖτο, μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε
 τὰ κύματα, καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτούς. ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν
 8 ὑπερβάλλων περὶ τὰ φοβερά θρασύς. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ
 ἀλαζὼν εἶναι ὁ θρασύς καὶ προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας. ὥς οὖν
 ἐκείνος περὶ τὰ φοβερά ἔχει, οὕτως οὗτος βούλεται φαίνε-
 9 σθαι· ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται, μιμεῖται. διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ
 πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασύδειλοι· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ θρασυνόμενοι
 10 τὰ φοβερά οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. ὁ δὲ τῷ φοβεῖσθαι
 ὑπερβάλλων δειλός· καὶ γὰρ ἂ μὴ δεῖ καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ

teristics of a brave act. He here says that 'the End-in-itself, or perfection, of a particular moral act will be identical with that which belongs to the formed moral character. The End-in-itself for courage, as a whole, is the idea of the noble. The idea of the noble, therefore, must be that End-in-itself which a man proposes to himself in each separate act of bravery in order to constitute it brave.' In short, the meaning comes to this, 'what makes an act truly brave, is that, like the perfect state of bravery, it aims at the noble.' The term τέλος is used in a sense between that of 'perfection' and 'motive,' or rather as implying both (see Essay IV. p. 176, and cf. *Eth.* III. i. 6, note). 'Ἐνέργεια, in πάσης ἐνεργείας, is opposed to ἔξις as 'act' to 'state.' The phrase τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν τέλος occurs again III. ix. 3: οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ. The whole notion that a moral act can only be considered good when it exhibits the qualities of the

formed moral character has been already brought forward, II. iv. 3.

καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ—ἀνδρείαν] 'Now to the brave man courage is something ideally noble (καλόν). Of this nature, then, must be the end of courage, for it is the end of a thing which in each case determines its character. Therefore the noble is the end for the sake of which the brave man endures and does whatever is brave.' The argument is as follows: Nobleness is what characterizes bravery, therefore it is the end of bravery (because final and formal causes coincide), therefore it should be the end of each brave act. The above explanation agrees with that given by the Paraphrast, except that he does not appear to supply τέλος with τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. His words are, τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος ἐστὶ πάσης ἐνεργείας τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν, τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς ἔξεως γίνεσθαι· οἷον αἱ κατὰ δικαιοσύνην πράξεις τέλος ἔχουσι τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς ἔξεως τῆς δικαιοσύνης πράττεσθαι· καὶ αἱ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρίαν

πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ. ἐλλείπει δὲ καὶ τῷ
 θαρρεῖν· ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερβάλλων μᾶλλον κατα-
 φανής ἐστίν. δύσελπις δὴ τις ὁ δειλός· πάντα γὰρ φο-¹¹
 βεῖται. ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος ἐναντίως· τὸ γὰρ θαρρεῖν εὐέλπιδος.
 περὶ ταῦτά μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὃ τε δειλὸς καὶ ὁ θρασὺς καὶ¹²
 ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, διαφόρως δ' ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτά· οἱ μὲν γὰρ
 ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν, ὁ δὲ μέσως ἔχει καὶ ὡς
 δεῖ· καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς προπετεῖς, καὶ βουλόμενοι πρὸ τῶν
 κινδύνων ἐν αὐτοῖς ὃ ἀφίστανται, οἱ δ' ἀνδρεῖοι ἐν τοῖς
 ἔργοις ὀξεῖς, πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι. καθάπερ οὖν εἴρηται,¹³
 ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ θαρραλέα καὶ φοβερά, ἐν οἷς
 εἴρηται, καὶ ὅτι καλὸν αἰρεῖται καὶ ὑπομένει, ἢ ὅτι αἰσχροὺς
 τὸ μῆ. τὸ δ' ἀποθνήσκειν φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ ἔρωτα ἢ τι
 λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρείου, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δειλοῦ· μαλακία γὰρ
 τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίποννα, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν ὑπομένει, ἀλλὰ
 φεύγων κακόν.

*Εἶστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι, λέγονται δὲ καὶ⁸
 ἕτεραι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτικὴ·

κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς ἕξεως τῆς ἀνδρίας.
 κ.τ.λ.

13 Aristotle denounces suicide committed on account of poverty, or love, or anything grievous, as the act rather of a coward than of a brave man. Taking a broad human view of life, he does not sympathise with or discuss the sentimental deaths of the Cynic philosophers (see Essay II. p. 130). Suicide was afterwards dignified by the Stoics with the name of *ἐξαγωγή*, 'ushering oneself out of the world.'

VIII. This chapter discusses the spurious kinds of courage, classified under five heads. Of this classification we find the germ in Plato's *Protagoras*, p. 351 A: *θάρσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τέχνης γίγνεται ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ τε καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας, ὥσπερ ἡ δύναμις, ἀνδρεία δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεται.* The

five shades (*τρόποι*) mentioned by Aristotle are (1) apparent courage produced from a regard to the opinions of society, (2) from experience of the particular danger, (3) from anger, (4) from a sanguine mind, (5) from ignorance.

I *πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτικὴ*] This phrase is to be found in Plato's *Republic*, p. 430 c, where it probably originates, but it is there used in a different sense from the present. Plato meant by the term 'civil courage' to distinguish the true courage of a civilized man from all merely brutal instincts. *Δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἄνευ παιδείας γεγонуῖαν, τὴν τε θηριώδη καὶ ἀνδραποδώδη, οὔτε πάνυ νόμιμον ἡγεῖσθαι, ἄλλο τέ τι ἡ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖν.* Ἀληθέστατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. Ἀποδέχομαι τοίνυν τοῦτο ἀνδρείαν εἶναι. Καὶ γὰρ ἀποδέχου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτικὴν γε, καὶ ὀρθῶς

μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν· δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ὀνειδῆ καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμὰς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρεύτατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι² παρ' οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι. τοιούτους δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἑκτορα.

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχεῖν ἀναθήσει·

καὶ Διομήδης,

Ἐκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ' ἀγορεύων,
'Τυδείδης ὑπ' ἐμεῖο.'

³ ὁμοίωται δ' αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένη, ὅτι δι' ἀρετὴν γίνεται· δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὀρεξιν (τιμῆς

ἀποδέξει. Aristotle meant by 'civil courage' that daring which is prompted, not by an independent desire for the noble, but by a regard to reputation, and to the fame or disgrace, and even punishment, awarded by society to brave or cowardly actions respectively.

διὰ τὰ ἐκ νόμων ἐπιτίμια] The laws relating to cowardice are alluded to, *Eth.* v. i. 14.

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο—ἐντιμοί] 'And for this cause men appear to be more brave in communities where cowards are held in dishonour, and the brave in honour.' Aristotle does not actually assert that real courage is capable of cultivation by the influence of society. But if we do not put too fine a meaning on the word courage, there is no doubt that it flourishes most in warlike ages and communities. And, in short, with all but the very few, individual virtue generally springs out of the feelings of society; what is first outward, afterwards takes root in the mind.

² τοιούτους δὲ—ἐμεῖο] 'Now just such men does Homer depict, as, for instance, Diomed and Hector, (when he says,) "Polydamas will be the first

to cast a reproach at me," and so Diomed, "Hector will some day, haranguing among the Trojans, declare, Tydides, by me terrified, fled to the ships." Cf. *Iliad* xxii. 100, viii. 148, sq., where the line ends φοβεύμενος ἵκετο νῆας.

³ ὁμοίωται δ'—ἄνθος] 'But this courage is most like the kind which we have described, for it originates in virtue, namely, in a sense of honour (αἰδῶ), in a desire for the noble (since it aims at reputation), and in a fear of dishonour as of something base.' On the nature of αἰδῶς, see *Eth.* iv. ix. and the note on ii. vii. 14. Most admirably does Aristotle touch off here in a few words the spirit of honour which is the nearest approach to, and, at all events in many of the relations of life, the best substitute for, a genuine morality. In reading his words, we can hardly fail to be reminded of Burke's magnificent lament over the loss of the age of chivalry. 'The unbought grace of life, the cheap defence of nations, the nurse of manly sentiment and heroic enterprise, is gone! It is gone, that sensibility of principle, that chastity of honour,

γάρ) καὶ φυγὴν ἐνείδους, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος. τάξαι δ' ἂν τις 4
καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζομένους εἰς ταυτό·
χείρους δ', ὅσω οὐ δι' αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ
φεύγοντες οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρόν· ἀναγκάζουσι
γὰρ οἱ κύριοι, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἑκτωρ

ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτόσσοντα νοήσω,
οὐ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας.

καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες, καὶ ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες τὸ αὐτὸ 5
δρῶσι, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παρα-
τάττοντες· πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. δεῖ δ' οὐ δι'
ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ 6

which felt a stain like a wound, which inspired courage whilst it mitigated ferocity, which ennobled whatever it touched, and under which vice itself lost half its evil, by losing all its grossness' (*Reflections on the Revolution in France*, p. 149). Just as Plato placed the philosopher above the man of honour (*θυμοειδής*, cf. *Repub.* p. 547-9), so Aristotle conceives of a courage higher and purer than that which emanates from the spirit of honour.

4 'Civil courage' is of two kinds (1) that which depends on honour, (2) that which depends on fear. The latter may remind us of the description given by Plato (*Phædo*, p. 68 D), where he speaks of most men being courageous from a sort of cowardice. There is a vast falling off between the first class and the second. To the second belongs the spirit of Asiatic slavery, which Burke contrasted with the spirit of chivalry (*l.c.*). The instances here given are the compulsory measures used by the princes in the Trojan war to make the people fight, and similar devices used by the Persians, &c.

ὁ Ἑκτωρ] This is a misquotation, the words are those of Agamemnon

(*Iliad*, II. 391), and stand thus in the original: 'Ὀν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης ἐθέλοντα νοήσω Μιμνάζειν παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, οὐ οἱ ἔπειτα Ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας ἢ δ' οἰωνούς.'

τύπτοντες] As done by the Persians at Thermopylae, Herod. VII. 223.

6 δοκεῖ δὲ—ἔστιν] 'Experience of particular dangers is also accounted a kind of courage; which gave Socrates occasion to think that courage was a science. Different men have experience in different dangers, and regular soldiers in the dangers of war. Now there are many unreal shows of danger in warfare, and professional soldiers, being perfectly accustomed to these, appear brave, because other men are deceived by appearances.' The second cause (after that of a regard for opinions) which gives rise to a semblance of courage, is experience, the quality of the practised veteran. The effects of this may be analysed and subdivided into (1) a familiarity with, and contempt for, much that is seemingly, but not really, terrible; (2) a skill of weapons, &c., giving both an offensive and a defensive superiority (*ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας*).

ἐμπειρία ἢ περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία τις εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ᾤθη ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ' οἱ στρατιῶται· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἁμάλιστα συνειρώ-
 7 κασιν οὗτοι· φαίνονται δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι
 τῆς ἐμπειρίας, δυνάμενοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ τοιαῦτα
 ἔχοντες ὅποια ἂν εἴη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ

ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης] Cf. *Memorab.* III. ix. 2, and Plato, *Protag.* p. 350, where it is agreed that those who dive most boldly are the professional divers, those who fight most boldly the professional soldiers, &c. This empirical view of courage forms one side, it is true, of the Socratic doctrine, but by no means the whole (see Essay II. p. 123), and the statement about Socrates in the text is accordingly unfair. The statement is corrected by Eudemus in his *Ethics* (III. i. 13), where he well sums up the present part of the subject: "Ἔστι δ' εἶδη ἀνδρείας πέντε λεγόμενα καθ' ὁμοιότητα· τὰ αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ. Μία μὲν πολιτικὴ· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ δι' αἰδῶ οὔσα. Δευτέρα δ' ἡ στρατιωτικὴ· αὕτη δὲ δι' ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι, οὐχ ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη, τὰ δεινὰ, ἀλλ' ὅτι (ἴσασι) τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν.

πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου] This is the reading of Bekker, supported by a majority of the MSS., the Scholiast, the Paraphrast, Casaubon, &c. It is illustrated by Cicero, *Epist. ad Att.* v. 20: 'Scis enim dici quædam πανικά, dici item τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου,' where the *editio princeps* (Romana) has κοινά, another instance of similar confusion. Another reading, supported by six MSS., is τὰ καινὰ τοῦ πολέμου, which would mean 'the surprises of war.' The phrase occurs in Diodorus Siculus, xx. 30: ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ὅτι πολλὰ

τὰ καινὰ τοῦ πολέμου. Cf. Thucyd. III. 30: καὶ μὴ ἀποκινήσωμεν τὸν κίνδυνον, νομίσαντες οὐκ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ καινὸν τοῦ πολέμου ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃ εἴ τις στρατηγὸς ἐν τε αὐτῷ φυλάσσοιτο καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐνορῶν ἐπιχειροίη, πλεῖστ' ἂν ὀρθοῖτο: where also the MSS. vary between καινόν and κενόν. It would seem, then, that τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, and τὰ καινὰ τοῦ πολέμου, were both received formulæ, only with different senses. In the text above, either phrase might have been substituted for the other, according as it was more familiar to the transcriber. But τὰ κενὰ alone makes good sense, for while the soldiers would get accustomed to the empty show, the noise and pageantry of war, it is not true to say that they would get accustomed to the surprises of war, these being exactly what not even the experienced could calculate upon. Perhaps there is no better setting forth of the κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου than in the speech of Brasidas, Thucyd. iv. 126, 4: οὗτοι δὲ τὴν μέλλησιν μὲν ἔχουσι τοῖς ἀπείροις φοβερὰν· καὶ γὰρ πλήθει ὕψους δεινοὶ καὶ βοῆς μεγέθει ἀφόρητοι, ἥ τε διὰ κενῆς ἐπανάσεισιν τῶν ὅπλων ἔχει τινὰ δῆλωσιν ἀπειλῆς· προσμίξει δὲ τοῖς ὑπομένουσιν αὐτὰ οὐχ ὁμοῖοι.

συνειρώκασιν] The *συν* here seems to mean not 'together,' or 'at a glance,' but as in *συνγινώσκω*, *σύνοδα*, &c., 'intimately,' 'privily,' 'familiarily.'

παθεῖν κράτιστα. ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνόπλοις ὀπλισμένοι 8
μάχονται καὶ ἀθληταὶ ἰδιώταις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις
ἀγῶσιν οὐχ οἱ ἀνδρείοτατοι μαχιμώτατοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ
μάλιστα ἰσχύοντες καὶ τὰ σώματα ἄριστα ἔχοντες. οἱ 9
στρατιῶται δὲ δειλοὶ γίνονται, ὅταν ὑπερτείνῃ ὁ κίνδυνος
καὶ λείπωνται τοῖς πλήθεσι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς· πρῶτοι
γὰρ φεύγουσι, τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ μένοντα ἀποθνήσκει, ὅπερ
κάπὶ τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ συνέβη. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αἰσχροὺς τὸ φεύ-
γειν καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἰρετώτερος·
οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκινδύνευσον ὡς κρείττους ὄντες, γνόντες
δὲ φεύγουσι, τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ αἰσχροῦ φοβούμε-
νοι· ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος οὐ τοιοῦτος. καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν 10
ἀνδρείαν ἐπιφέρουσιν· ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ
διὰ θυμὸν ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενοι,
ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς· ἰτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς
πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος 'σθένης ἔμβαλε
θυμῷ' καὶ 'μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε' καὶ 'δριμὺ δ' ἀνὰ
ῥίνας μένος' καὶ 'ἔξεσεν αἷμα·' πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα
ἔοικε σημαίνειν τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὀρμὴν. οἱ 11

9 οἱ στρατιῶται δὲ—συνέβη] 'But regular troops lose heart when the danger is overpowering, and when they are inferior in numbers and equipment. In such cases they are the first to run away, while citizen troops remain and die, as actually happened at the Hermæum.'

ἐπὶ τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ] Of this affair the Scholiast gives the following account. Coronea had been betrayed to one Onomarchus of Phocis; an engagement took place in an open spot called the Hermæum; the Coronean citizens were killed to a man, while their Bæotian auxiliaries fled in a panic. Τὰ πολιτικά, by a common usage, is nearly equivalent to οἱ πολῖται. Cf. *Æsch. Persæ*, i. τὰδε μὲν Περσῶν—πιστὰ καλεῖται, &c. Στρατιῶται, or mercenaries, in the time of Aristotle had not a high name. As common fighting men, the machines of

war, they are opposed to the independent heroism of the brave man; see below, III. ix. 6. The present passage contrasts the courage of the man of honour with the hardiness of the veteran, which under any extraordinary pressure gives way. 'Citizen courage' in the instance mentioned cannot externally be distinguished from the very highest kind of courage.

10 καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ'—δριμύν] 'The spirit of anger, too, men reckon as courage, and they who act through anger (like brutes turning on those who have wounded them), get the character of being brave, because the converse is true, and brave men are spirited. The spirit of anger is most keen for the encountering dangers, and hence Homer wrote:

"(Apollo) put strength into his spirit."

μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς· τὰ θηρία δὲ διὰ λύπην· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πληγῆναι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἐάν γε ἐν ὕλῃ ἢ ἐν ἔλει ᾗ, οὐ προσέρχονται. οὐ δὴ ἐστὶν ἀνδρεῖα διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀλγηδόνος καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὁρμαῖν, οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν προορῶντα, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ ὄνοι ἀνδρεῖοι εἶεν πεινῶντες· τυπτόμενοι γὰρ οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς· καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσιν.
 12 οὐ δὴ ἐστὶν ἀνδρεῖα τὰ δι' ἀλγηδόνος ἢ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον. φυσικωτάτῃ δ' ἔοικεν ἡ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι. καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσι,

"He roused up his strength and spirit."

"Fierce strength in his nostrils."

"His blood boiled."

For all such things appear to signify the awakening and outbreak of anger. These quotations are obviously made from memory, and none of them are quite accurate. The first seems to be compounded of *Il.* xiv. 151, μέγα σθένος ἔμβαλ' ἐκάστω καρδίῃ, and xvi. 529, μένος δέ οἱ ἔμβαλε θυμῷ. The second appears to be meant for *Il.* v. 470, ἔτρυνε μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἐκάστου. The third is *Od.* xxiv. 318, ἀνὰ ρίνας δέ οἱ ἦδη Δριμὺ μένος προὔτυψε. The last is not in Homer at all. This passage illustrates the progress of psychology towards distinctness, for it is impossible to translate it simply into English; θυμός means more than anger, or than any one modern word, for even with Aristotle it includes what we should call 'spirit.' But with Homer it meant (1) life, (2) spirit, (3) wrath, (4) heart, (5) mind. Aristotle in quoting Homer fails to remember this great indefiniteness, though there is no doubt that in Homer a simple and physical account is given of the manifestations of courage.

12 φυσικωτάτῃ δ' ἔοικεν—εἶναι]

'Yet the sort that springs from anger appears most natural, and with purpose and motive added, it becomes genuine courage.' Taking this sentence in its context, it must be an apology for the ἀνδρεία διὰ θυμόν. Aristotle had said that anger makes a man brave only in the sense that a hungry ass is brave, obeying the goads of a blind instinct. He adds that the instinct of anger is part of our nature (cf. *Eth.* ii. iii. 10, note, and vii. vi. 2), and that, rightly directed and brought under the control of the will and reason, it can be elevated into a moral state. It is remarkable on what a high level Aristotle places courage. It must be entirely, he says, prompted by a desire for what is morally beautiful (οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν); mere physical courage is only an assistance in realising this (ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς), and the prompting of anger, &c., will make men pugnacious, but not brave (οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι μάχιμοι μὲν, οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι δέ). Perhaps Aristotle makes almost too great a separation between true courage and this 'spirited element,' which must be its physical basis. This is to be attributed (1) to

τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἤδονται· οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι μάχιμοι μὲν, οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι δέ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πάθος· παραπλήσιον δ' ἔχουσί τι. οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλτιδες ὄντες ἀνδρεῖοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολ-¹³ λάκις καὶ πολλοὺς νενικηκέναι θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις. παρόμοιοι δέ, ὅτι ἄμφω θαρραλέοι· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὰ προειρημένα θαρραλέοι, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἶσθαι κρείττους εἶναι καὶ μῆθ' ἐν ἀντιπαθεῖν. τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσι¹⁴ καὶ οἱ μεθυσκόμενοι· εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται. ὅταν δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ συμβῇ τοιαῦτα, φεύγουσιν· ἀνδρεῖου δ' ἦν τὰ φοβερά ἀνθρώπων ὄντα καὶ φαινόμενα ὑπομένειν, ὅτι καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ μῆ. διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέρου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ¹⁵ ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις· ἀπὸ ἑξέως γὰρ μᾶλλον, ἢ καὶ ὅτι ἦττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς· τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο, τὰ δ' ἐξαίφνης κατὰ τὴν ἑξιν. ἀνδρεῖοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ¹⁶ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων, χείρους δ' ὅσῳ ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν, ἐκείνοι δέ. διὸ καὶ μένουσί τινα χρόνον· οἱ δ'

his high moral tone, (2) to his analytical mode of treatment. In Shakespeare, as in Homer, courage is attributed to physical causes. It is made sometimes to depend on the action of the spleen, or it is connected with the gall. Cf. *King John*, Act II. Sc. 1:

'Rash, inconsiderate, fiery volunteers,
With ladies' faces and fierce dragons' spleens.'

And *Hamlet*, Act II. Sc. 2, quoted below on *Eth.* IV. V. 6.

13—15 The fourth kind of spurious courage is that which arises from a sanguine mind. This may be due to previous success, and gives a confidence like courage, but also like intoxication. Such confidence is liable to a collapse.

15 διὸ καὶ—ἑξιν] 'For this reason it seems braver to be fearless and untroubled in sudden perils than in such as may be anticipated. In the former case a man is brave more by habit, or in other words less by premeditation; for in foreseen dangers a man may calculate and reason out the course to be chosen, in sudden ones he must depend upon his habitual character.' This acute observation puts real courage in opposition to the case of a man puffed out with a sort of extraneous confidence. Take a man on a sudden, and you will find how brave he is. While Aristotle makes courage a quality of the moral will, he requires that it should be a settled habit, and a second nature of the mind, not prepared consciously to meet a particular emergency.

16 ἀνδρεῖοι δὲ—Σικανίοις] 'In the

ἡπατημένοι, εἰάν γινῶσιν ὅτι ἕτερον ἢ ὑποπτεύσωσι, φεύγουσιν· ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον περιπεσόντες τοῖς
 17 Λάκωσιν ὡς Σικυωνίοις. οἳ τε δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι εἴρηται ποιοῖ τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρεῖοι.

9 Περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἡ ἀνδρεία οὔσα οὐχ ὁμοίως περὶ ἄμφω ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά· ὁ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταῦθ' ὡς δεῖ ἔχων ἀνδρεῖος
 2 μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. τῷ δὴ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται. διὸ καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἡ ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ
 3 λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἢ τῶν ἡδέων ἀπέχεσθαι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι, οἷον κὰν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι γίνε-
 ται· τοῖς γὰρ πύκταις τὸ μὲν τέλος ἡδύ, οὗ ἕνεκα, ὁ στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιμαί, τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγεινόν, εἶπερ σάρκινος, καὶ λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος· διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ ταῦτ' εἶναι, μικρὸν ὃν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα οὐδὲν ἡδύ φαίνεται ἔχειν.

last place, men appear brave from not knowing their danger. Such persons are not far removed from the sanguine, but are inferior to them, because they have no self-confidence, as the sanguine have. This confidence makes the sanguine to stand their ground for a time; while those who have blundered into bravery, as soon as it appears that the danger is other than they suppose, take to their heels, as was the case with the Argives, when they fell in with some Lacedæmonians whom they took for men of Sicyon.' The last and poorest semblance of courage is when something daring is done unknowingly, and from a mistake. The instance given is mentioned by Xenophon (*Hellenics*, iv. 10). Some Spartans assumed the shields of some vanquished Sicyonians, and were at first contemptuously encountered by the Argives, who, when they discovered their formidable enemies, took to flight.

IX. This interesting chapter is on the connection of courage with pain and loss. The nobleness of courage chiefly depends on the sacrifice which it implies (*ἐπίλυπον ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται*). The brave man by encountering death consciously makes a sacrifice of the greatest magnitude, since he runs the risk of relinquishing a life which is eminently valuable, and, by reason of his virtue, full of happiness. Courage, then, is not to be called pleasurable, except as attaining to a satisfaction above all pleasure, attaining, in short, to the end of one's being (*οὐ δὴ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται*). The conscious heroism of the brave man distinguishes him from the recklessness of the mercenary; it disqualifies him, indeed, from becoming mere rank and file, a mere machine of discipline.

3 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ—ἔχειν] 'Without

εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ὃ μὲν ἄ
 θάνατος καὶ τὰ τραύματα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ ἄκοντι
 ἔσται, ὑπομένει δὲ αὐτά, ὅτι καλὸν ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μὴ.
 καὶ ὅσω ἂν μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχῃ πᾶσαν καὶ εὐδαιμονέ-
 στερος ἢ, μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπηθήσεται· τῷ τοιούτῳ
 γὰρ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀπο-
 στερεῖται εἰδώς· λυπηρὸν δὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἥττον
 ἀνδρεῖος, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καλὸν

doubt the end that belongs to courage is pleasant in itself, but this pleasantness is neutralised by the attendant circumstances, as happens likewise in the contests of the arena. The end at which the boxers aim, the garland and the honours, is pleasant; but the blows, and indeed the whole exertion, are painful and grievous to flesh and blood; so that by the multitude of intervening pains the incentive, which is small in itself, loses all appearance of being pleasant.'

4 καὶ ὅσῳ—αἰρεῖται] 'And in proportion as a man possesses all excellence, and the happier he is, so much the more will he be pained at death, for to such a one life is especially valuable, and he will consciously be deprived of the greatest blessings. And this is painful. But he is not the less brave, nay, perhaps even more, because he chooses the noble in war in preference to those other goods.' These last words may remind us of the characteristic attributed by Wordsworth to his *Happy Warrior*, who is 'more brave for this, that he hath much to love.' The whole of Wordsworth's description may well be compared with that of Aristotle:

'Who, if he be called upon to face

Some awful moment to which Heaven has joined

Great issues, good or bad for human kind,

Is happy as a lover, and attired

With sudden brightness, like a man inspired;

And, through the heat of conflict, keeps the law

In calmness made, and sees what he foresaw;

Or if an unexpected call succeed,

Come when it will, is equal to the need:

He who, though thus endued as with a sense

And faculty for storm and turbulence, Is yet a soul whose master-bias leans To homefelt pleasures and to gentle scenes;

Sweet images! which wheresoe'er he be

Are at his heart, and such fidelity

It is his darling passion to approve;

More brave for this, that he hath much to love.'

The consciousness of the sacrifice to be made appears rather more prominent in Aristotle's brave man than in Wordsworth's. In saying this we must not forget that the word 'sacrifice,' in the moral sense of the term, expresses an idea that has grown up in the human mind subsequently to Aristotle. How nearly Aristotle, by the force of his penetration, realised it, the present chapter shows most remarkably.

5 ἀντ' ἐκείνων αἰρεῖται. οὐ δὲ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ
 ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφά-
 6 πτεται. στρατιώτας δ' οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει μὴ τοὺς τοιούτους
 κρατίστους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἥττον μὲν ἀνδρείους, ἄλλο δ'
 ἀγαθὸν μὴδὲν ἔχοντας· ἔτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κιν-
 δύνους, καὶ τὸν βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται.
 7 περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· τί δ' ἐστίν,
 οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.
 10 Μετὰ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν· δοκοῦσι

5 οὐ δὲ—ἐφάπτεται.] 'Therefore it is not the case that in all the virtues virtuous action is accompanied by pleasure, except in so far as one attains to the End-in-itself.' On the import of this passage, see Essay IV. p. 176. With ἐφάπτεται, τίς is to be understood; see above, III. i. 6, note.

6 στρατιώτας δ'—καταλλάττονται.] 'After all, perhaps it is true that it is not brave men such as I have described who will make the best mercenaries, but fellows who, while they are less brave, have nothing to lose; for these are ready for dangers, and will sell their life for a trifling sum.' See above, ch. viii. 9, note. On the readiness of miserable wretches for danger and death, cf. Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, Act III. Sc. 1:

Second Murderer.—I am one, my liege,
 Whom the vile blows and buffets of
 the world
 Have so incens'd, that I am reckless
 what
 I do, to spite the world.

First Murderer.—And I another,
 So weary with disasters, tugg'd with
 fortune,
 That I would set my life on any
 chance,
 To mend it, or be rid on't.

X. Μετὰ δὲ ταύτην—ἀρεταί.] 'Next

let us speak of temperance, for these (namely, courage and temperance) seem to be the excellencies of the irrational parts of our nature.' This is almost the only indication which Aristotle gives of the system upon which he has arranged the several virtues in order; he places together, and first treats of, the development of the lower and more instinctive qualities. On the arrangement of the remaining virtues see the plan of Book IV. With regard to the first two, there is a want of any distinct principle in their arrangement. If it be said that they are based on *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία*, and that Aristotle begins at the bottom of the scale, why does he not begin with *σωφροσύνη*, since *θυμός* is higher than *ἐπιθυμία* (*Eth.* vii. 1)? Again, as we have seen (ch. viii. § 12) *θυμός* is here considered rather as having an occasional connection with courage than as being the basis of it. But in fact Aristotle's *Ethics* are very little psychological in their character. In them psychology and morals are both in process of formation; we cannot therefore expect in so tentative and unfinished a work to find systematic arrangement. Aristotle probably began his list of the virtues with courage and temperance because they were two of the Greek cardinal virtues, and when he came to temperance, he said 'this comes

γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὐταὶ εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί. ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς ἢ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν· ἥττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας· ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. περὶ ποίας οὖν τῶν ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν. διηγήσθωσαν δὲ αἱ ψυχικαὶ καὶ αἱ σωματικαί, ὅσον φιλοτιμία φιλομάθεια· ἐκάτερος γὰρ

next, since it also belongs to the irrational part of our nature.'

τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν] The instincts, such as those of self-preservation, fear, desire, &c., can only be capable of excellence by being brought under a law (μεσότης, λόγος) of the intellect, having no law in themselves. This law of the intellect becomes the most important part of the conception of virtues, as form is more striking than matter. In Plato the law is put for virtue altogether, and thus, as we saw, he calls courage a science. Similarly in the *Charmides*, where temperance is discussed, the nearest definition that is given is 'self-knowledge,' though it is shown that mere 'self-knowledge' has no content, and would be a useless blank; therefore it is implied that knowledge of the good must be added to make the conception complete.

It is the extreme opposite of Plato's view to speak of temperance as 'a virtue of the instincts' (τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν); the word μεσότης however in the next line implies what was omitted, namely, 'under a law of the intellect.' The formula of Aristotle attributes a worth to the bodily instincts which would be opposed to asceticism.

μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς] Σωφροσύνη, which, in spite of the false etymology given in Plato's *Cratylus*, 411 E, and *Eth.* vi. v. 5, meant originally 'sound-mindedness' (in German Besonnenheit), soon came to mean temperance with regard to pleasures. In this sense it is often popularly defined by

Plato, cf. *Repub.* p. 430 E: κόσμος ποῦ τις—ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ καὶ ἡδονῶν τινῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια. *Sympos.* p. 196 C: εἶναι γὰρ ὁμολογεῖται σωφροσύνη τὸ κρατεῖν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, &c. Aristotle's procedure in discussing it is first to ascertain definitely its object. Pleasures are either bodily or mental. With mental pleasures temperance and intemperance are not concerned. Nor again with all bodily pleasures—not those of hearing, nor of smell; but only the merely animal pleasures (ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῆα κοινῶν) of touch and taste. Even taste, as an object of intemperance, reduces itself to touch; and with regard to touch we must exclude the manly and human satisfaction felt in exercise, &c. (chapter xi.) Desires of the kind in question are either common, or special and acquired (ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπιθετοί); in the former, excess is the only kind of error possible; in the latter all kinds of errors are committed. The only pains with which temperance and intemperance can be concerned are pains arising from the want of certain pleasures; these pains the intemperate man feels to excess. While intemperance thus consists in excess, there is no such thing as deficiency in the sense for the above-named pleasures; thus there is no name for the opposite extreme to intemperance. In respect of propriety, health, and fortune, and with a regard to what is noble, the temperate man preserves a balance.

2 διηγήσθωσαν—διανοίας] 'We must take a distinction between the bodily

τούτων χαίρει, οὗ φιλητικός ἐστίν, οὐθὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικαὶ εἰσίν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλομύθους καὶ διηγητικούς καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας, ἀκολάστους δ' οὐ λέγομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς λυπουμενούς ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἢ φίλοις.

3 περὶ δὲ τὰς σωματικὰς εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτας· οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὀψείως, ὅον χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται· καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὡς δεῖ χαίρειν καὶ τούτοις, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν.

4 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβιβλημένως χαίροντας μέλεισιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὐθὲς ἀκολάστους λέγει, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὡς δεῖ σώφρονας. οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὁσμὴν, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας μήλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυμιαμάτων ὁσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν ἀκολάστους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς μύρων καὶ ὄψων· χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὅτι διὰ τούτων ἀνάμνησις

6 γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμητῶν. ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν πεινῶσι, χαίροντας ταῖς τῶν βρωμάτων ὁσμαῖς. τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαίρειν ἀκολάστου· τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμητὰ

7 ταῦτα. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις κατὰ ταύτας

pleasures and such as are mental, like ambition and the desire of knowledge. The man who has either of these feelings takes pleasure in the object of his desire without the body being at all affected, but only the mind.' The writing is loose here, constituting a σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ σημαινόμενον. Transitions as from φιλοτιμία to φιλότιμος are common. Cf. below, ch. xi. § 3: διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι, where there is nothing preceding which answers to γαστρίμαργοι, only a general description of a course of action.

4—5 While Aristotle justly says that the words temperance and intemperance do not apply to the pleasure

felt in colours, forms, painting, music, and acting, it is strange that he should have spoken of these at all as bodily pleasures. Such a way of speaking shows an early and immature psychology.

6 Pleasures of smell are not the objects of intemperance, except accidentally, as by association, reminding people of eating, &c. Eudemus quotes a witty remark on the subject. *Eth. Eud.* iii. ii. 10: ἐμμελῶς ἔφη Στρατόνικος τὰς μὲν καλὸν ὄζειν, τὰς δὲ ἡδύ.

7 Brutes, says Aristotle, have no pleasures of hearing, or smell, or sight, except accidental ones, namely

τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴν πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς ὁσμαῖς τῶν λαγωῶν αἱ κύνες χαίρουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει· τὴν δ' αἰσθήσιν ἡ ὁσμὴ ἐποίησεν. οὐδ' ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοός, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ· ὅτι δ' ἐγγύς ἐστι, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἦσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτῃ φαίνεται. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν ἡ εὐρὼν ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα, ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἔξει. περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δὲ ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὣν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται· αὗται δ' εἰσὶν ἀφῆ καὶ γεῦσις. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ τῇ γεύσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι· τῆς γὰρ γεύσεώς ἐστιν ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιῶσιν οἱ τοὺς οἶνους δοκιμάζοντες καὶ τὰ ὄψα ἀρτύνοντες. οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, ἢ οὐχ οἷ γε ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἢ γίνεται πᾶσα δι' ἀφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις. διὸ καὶ ἡὔξατό τις ὀψοφάγος ὦν τὸν φάρυγγα αὐτῷ¹⁰

when sounds or scents indicate to them their prey or their food. It may be questioned whether this is absolutely true, whether, for instance, brutes are not capable of some pleasure from musical sounds. This appears to be the case with lizards and snakes; and horses are fond of bells. It is said that the cat likes the smell of mint. Dogs like the smell of carrion, apparently for its own sake, this being their taste. With brutes the senses are the intellect, and thus by the well-known law that as an organ increases in fineness of perception, it decreases in sensitiveness to pleasure and pain,—we may conceive how it is that the fine perceptive organs of brutes are to them in a less degree the instruments of pleasure. See Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, pp. 880 and 886.

εὐρῶν ἔλαφον] This alludes to Homer, *Il.* iii. 23:

ὥστε λέων ἐχάρη μεγάλῃ ἐπὶ σῶματι κύρσας,

εὐρῶν ἢ ἔλαφον κεραὸν ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα.

10 διὸ καὶ ἡὔξατό τις ὀψοφάγος] The name of this glutton is recorded by Eudemus (iii. ii. 10), who paraphrases the present passage as follows: διὸ οἱ ὀψοφάγοι οὐκ εὐχονται τὴν γλῶτταν ἔχειν μακρὰν ἀλλὰ τὸν φάρυγγα γεράνουν, ὥσπερ Φιλόξενος ὁ Ἐρύξειδος. Athenæus mentions the same story (viii. 26), quoting the verses—

Φιλόξενος ποθ', ὥς λέγουσ', ὁ Κυθήριος εὔξατο τριῶν ἔχειν λάρυγγα πῆχεων.

Aristotle uses the word φάρυγγα here in its loose sense for the 'throat,' as λάρυγξ (which properly meant the top of the windpipe) was also loosely employed by the ancients to mean the whole throat. Speaking scientifically Aristotle confined the term φάρυγξ to mean the *trachea* or windpipe, distinguishing it from the *œsophagus* or gullet, cf. *De Part. An.* iii. iii. 1: ὁ μὲν οὖν φάρυγξ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐνεκεν πέφυκεν—ὁ δ' οἰσοφάγος ἐστὶ δι' οὗ ἡ τροφή πορεύεται εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν. The latter was the term properly required above. Aristotle seems to

μακρότερον γεράνου γενέσθαι, ὡς ἡδόμενος τῇ ἀφῆ. κοινοτάτη δὴ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ' ἣν ἡ ἀκολασία· καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δίκαιως ἐπονείδιστος εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ἢ ἄνθρωποί ἐσμεν
 11 ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ἢ ζῶα. τὸ δὴ τοιούτοις χαίρειν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶν θηριῶδες. καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώταται τῶν διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς ἡδονῶν ἀφῆρηνται, οἷον αἱ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις διὰ τρίψεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμεναι· οὐ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἡ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀφῆ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τινὰ μέρη.
 11 Τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι. οἷον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσικὴ· πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηραῖς ἢ ὑγραῖς τροφῆς, ὅτε δ' ἀμφοῖν, καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων· τὸ δὲ τοιαῦδε
 2 ἢ τοιαῦδε, οὐκέτι πᾶς, οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν. διὸ φαίνεται ἡμέτερον εἶναι. οὐ μὲν ἀλλ' ἔχει γέ τι καὶ φυσικόν. ἕτερα γὰρ ἑτέροις ἐστὶν ἡδέα, καὶ ἔνια πᾶσιν ἡδίω τῶν
 3 τυχόντων. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὀλίγοι ἀμαρτάνουσι καὶ ἐφ' ἑν, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον. τὸ γὰρ ἐσθίειν τὰ τυχόντα ἢ πίνειν ἕως ἂν ὑπερπλησθῇ, ὑπερβάλλειν ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πλήθει· ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία. διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι, ὡς παρὰ τὸ δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ
 4 λίαν ἀνδραποδώδεις. περὶ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν πολλοὶ

have considered that the pleasure of gluttony was not in *taste*, of which the tongue was the organ, but in the contact of food with the passage of the oesophagus.

XI. 1 καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὅμηρος] *Iliad*, xxiv. 129: μεμνημένος οὐτε τι σίτου, Οὐτ' εὐνῆς, the remonstrance of Thetis to Achilles. It is plain what εὐνῆς means.

2 διὸ—τυχόντων] 'Hence (this choice of particular foods, &c.) appears merely factitious. In reality, however, it has something natural in it, for different things are pleasant to different people, and all men have their preferences.' Aristotle attributes

the very diversity of tastes to a law of nature, which no doubt exists,—and to a wise purpose, else what a fearful rivalry there would be in the world. Some MSS. for πᾶσιν read τισιν. It seems common for transcribers, when they do not understand a sentence, to play fast and loose with πᾶς and τις: see below, *Eth.* v. vii. 4.

3 γαστρίμαργοι] — 'Greedy-bellies' from μάργος, cf. Homer, *Od.* xviii. 2, μετὰ δ' ἔπρεπε γαστέρι μάργῃ—and Euripides, *Cyclops* 310, πάρες τὸ μάργον σῆς γνάθου.

πληροῦντες αὐτήν] sc. τὴν γαστέρα, which is to be supplied from γαστρίμαργοι, according to the Aristotelian mode of writing.

καὶ πολλαχῶς ἁμαρτάνουσιν· τῶν γὰρ φιλοτιοῦτων λεγομένων ἢ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον, ἢ ὅς οἱ πολλοί, ἢ μὴ ὡς δεῖ, κατὰ πάντα δ' οἱ ἀκόλαστοι ὑπερβάλλουσιν· καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν ἐνίοις οἷς οὐ δεῖ (μισητὰ γάρ), καὶ εἴ τισι δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν τοιούτων, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ αἷς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς 5 ὑπερβολὴ ὅτι ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτόν, δῆλον· περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας τῷ ὑπομένειν λέγεται σῶφρων ἀκόλαστος δὲ τῷ μὴ, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος τῷ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὅτι τῶν ἡδέων οὐ τυγχάνει (καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονή), ὁ δὲ σῶφρων τῷ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἡδέος. ὁ μὲν 6 οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδέων πάντων ἢ τῶν μάλιστα, καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥστε ἀντὶ τῶν ἄλλων ταῦθ' αἰρεῖσθαι· διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνων καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν. μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία· ἀτόπῳ δ' ἔοικε τὸ δι' ἡδονὴν λυπεῖσθαι. ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἤττον ἢ 7 δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὴ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα διακρίνει τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὐ· εἰ δὲ τῷ μὴθὲν ἐστὶν ἡδὺ μὴδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἑτέρου, πόρρω ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι· οὐ τέτευχε δ' ὁ τοιοῦτος ὀνόματος διὰ τὸ

4 ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον, ἢ ὅς οἱ πολλοί] It seems almost certain that ὡς here is an interpolation. It could not have been said that 'with regard to the special pleasures men are called "lovers of particular things" because they like them as people in general do.' What Aristotle wrote was, no doubt, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, 'or because they like them more than people in general;' cf. *Eth.* iv. iv. 4, ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. The copyist must have taken ἢ οἱ πολλοί for a separate sentence, and so have thought it necessary to insert αἷς.

5 καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονή] 'And thus it is pleasure that

produces him his pain.' This is stated as if it were a sort of disgraceful paradox, which takes place in intemperance.

7 οὐ πάνυ γίνονται] Aristotle, from his experience as a Greek, might have been justified in asserting that a deficiency in the sense for pleasures 'could hardly be said to exist.' It is not so certain that the same would be true in all periods of the world. It is not so certain that the monkish turn of mind does not occasionally diminish to an unhappy extent the natural and human feelings, so as to impair the kindliness, the geniality, and the good sense of mankind.

8 μὴ πάνυ γίνεσθαι. ὁ δὲ σώφρων μέσως περὶ ταῦτ' ἔχει· οὔτε γὰρ ἴδεται οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δυσχεραίνει, οὐδ' ὅλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὔτε σφόδρα τοιοῦτω οὐδενί, οὐτ' ἀπόντων λυπεῖται οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἢ μετρίως, οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, οὐδ' ἔτι μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐθέν· ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἐστὶν ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν ἡδέα ὄντα, τούτων ὀρέξεται μετρίως καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων μὴ ἐμποδίων τούτοις ὄντων ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν. ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας· ὁ δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.

12 Ἐκουσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς δειλίας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονήν, ἡ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὣν τὸ μὲν αἰρετόν, τὸ δὲ φευκτόν. καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθίρει τὴν τοῦ ἔχοντος

8 We see how indefinite after all Aristotle has left the standard of temperance, he refers it merely to the blank formula of *ὡς δεῖ* and *τὸ καλόν*. In so leaving it, however, he appeals to a sense in each man's own mind. There is a relative element to be considered, the health or fortune of the individual (*πρὸς ὑγίειαν, μὴ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν*), and there is also something that appears absolute amidst all that is relative (*τὸ καλόν*).

ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων] This is an awkward piece of writing. *Οὕτως* refers to those phrases which have been negatived—*παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν*.

XII. Which is most voluntary, cowardice or intemperance? a suitable question to conclude a Book which opened with a theory of the voluntary and proceeded to discuss courage and temperance. Thus far there is method. Courage and temperance are considered very much throughout in relation to each other, and here they are considered in relation to the voluntary. On the other hand the subject of this

chapter is closely connected with the theory of the formation of habits (*Eth.* II. i.—ii.), and also with the questions mooted above (*Eth.* III. v.) as to the voluntariness of vicious habits. Standing then as it does isolated, it forms an instance of the immaturity of Aristotle's moral investigations.

Intemperance is more voluntary than cowardice, inasmuch as it consists in *choosing* pleasure, while cowardice is under a sort of compulsion, flying from pain. (2) Again it is easier by practice to learn to resist temptation, than it is to learn to withstand danger, for the opportunities are frequent and free from risk. Hence intemperance is the more disgraceful of the two. (3) These vices are in a peculiar way different from each other, for cowardice as a whole is more voluntary than its parts. Intemperance as a whole is less voluntary than its parts.

The chapter ends with some remarks on the nature of *ἀκολασία* as connected with its etymology.

2 καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη—ποιεῖ] 'And while pain distracts and overturns the

φύσιν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ποιεῖ, μᾶλλον δ' ἐκούσιον· διὸ καὶ ἐπονειδιστότερον. καὶ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι ῥᾶον πρὸς αὐτά· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ οἱ ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν ἀνάπαλιν. δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐκούσιον ἢ δειλία εἶναι τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον· αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἄλυπος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξίστησιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ρίπτειν καὶ τᾶλλα ἀσχημονεῖν· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ βίαία εἶναι. τῷ δ' ἀκολάστῳ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα ἐκούσια, ἐπιθυμοῦντι γὰρ καὶ ὀρεγομένῳ, τὸ δ' ὅλον ἤττον· οὐθὲς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκολάστος εἶναι. τὸ δ' ὄνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς παιδικὰς ἀμαρτίας φέρομεν· ἔχουσι γάρ τινα ὁμοιότητα. πότερον δ' ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθὲν πρὸς τὰ νῦν διαφέρει, δῆλον δ' ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου. οὐ κακῶς δ' ἔοικε μετενηνέχθαι· κεκολάσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν ὀρεγόμενον καὶ πολλὰν αὐξήσιν ἔχον, τοιοῦτον δὲ μάλιστα ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς· κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις

mental balance of him who experiences it, pleasure does nothing of the kind.' *Φύσις* here denotes the perfect or normal state: see above, *Eth.* II. i. 3, note.

3 δόξειε δ' ἂν—ἐξίστησιν] 'But cowardice is not equally voluntary with (*i. e.* is more voluntary than) its particular acts, for in itself it is painless, while its particulars distract the mind with pain.' It seems curious to speak of cowardice in this abstract way as distinct from all particular acts of cowardice. It is, however, true that cowardice is not, like intemperance, a growing chain upon the mind. Each cowardly act, while it leaves the mind irresolute and so prone to fresh cowardice, on the other hand brings experience and renders the mind more familiar with danger. Thus cowardice, which at first was involuntary, tends to become more and more voluntary and deliberate, the more it is continued in; but in-

temperance, which at first was voluntary, becomes the longer it lasts more and more involuntary and a mere bondage.

5—6 τὸ δ' ὄνομα—ὄρεξις] 'Now the name intemperance (or unrestrainedness) we apply also to the faults of children, for these have some resemblance to it. *Which* is called from *which*, matters not for our present purpose; obviously that which is later in conception is called from that which is earlier. And it seems no bad metaphor, for that which hankers after what is base, and which has a mighty capacity for development, requires to be chastened, and this is just the character of desire and of the child. Children live entirely by desire, and have the longing for what is pleasant most strongly.' Eudemus (*Eth. Eud.* III. ii. 1) commences his account of intemperance with this etymology. He points out that ἀκόλαστος is capable of two meanings,

7 ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις· εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθὲς καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ
 ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἡξεί· ἅπληστος γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις
 καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ ἀνοήτῳ, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια
 αὔξει τὸ συγγενές, καὶ μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ ὦσι, καὶ τὸν
 λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν. διὸ δεῖ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτάς καὶ
 8 ὀλίγας, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μῆθεν ἐναντιοῦσθαι. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον
 εὐπειθὲς λέγομεν καὶ κεκολασμένον· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸν παῖδα
 δεῖ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ
 9 ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν λόγον. διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ
 ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν
 τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε·
 10 οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος. ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ
 σωφροσύνης.

'he that has not been chastened' and 'he that cannot be chastened.' His account of the metaphor implied in the word appears to be lost. He says (§ 3) διεγράψαμεν πρότερον πῶς τὴν ἀκολασίαν ὀνομάζοντες μεταφέρομεν, but in *Eth. Eud.* II. iii., to which he alludes, there is apparently a lacuna. Aristotle declines to decide which is the primary and which the metaphorical use of the word; but there can be no doubt that the punishment and unrestrainedness of children is the more concrete and the primary idea.

7 εἰ οὖν—ἐναντιοῦσθαι] 'If then this thing be not obedient and subjected to the governing element, it will develop vastly; for the longing for what is pleasant is insatiable in him that is foolish, and it seeks satisfaction from all quarters; and the

exercise of desire increases its native powers, and if the desires grow great and vehement, they expel all reasoning in the end. Wherefore the desires should be moderate and few, and no-wise opposed to the law of reason.' *Εὐπειθές* is indefinite; it might refer either to ἡ ἐπιθυμία or ὁ παῖς. Aristotle speaking indistinctly had the idea of ἐπιθυμία most present to his mind. Out of this etymology of 'intemperance' he develops anew the relationship which ought to exist between the passions and the reason. The passions should be to the reason as a child to his tutor. This analogy was already suggested in *Eth.* I. xiii. 19: διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι.

PLAN OF BOOK IV.

WITH only two exceptions, this Book follows faithfully the programme drawn out in the seventh chapter of Book II. These exceptions are, that it inverts the order of the social virtues—Truth, Wit, and Friendship; and that, being at its close fragmentary or mutilated, it omits to discuss Indignation, and breaks off in the middle of a discussion upon Modesty.

The only question, then, that arises, is—can we find any logical sequence in Aristotle's list of the virtues as given in Book II. and followed out here? There are various principles on which a classification of the virtues might have been made; as, for instance, on a principle of psychological division, it might have been shown how the virtues are the proper development of man's nature in its various parts. Or, again, with a view to education, the virtues might have been arranged according to the most natural order of inculcation. Or, again, in point of excellence, the greater virtues might have taken precedence of the lesser ones. But no one broad principle of this kind is to be found in the arrangement made by Aristotle. It must always be remembered that his *Ethics*, while tending to advance psychology very greatly, are not composed upon a psychological system. Hence, though he said (*Eth.* III. x. 1) that Temperance must succeed Courage, because these both consisted in the regulation of the brute instincts, we do not find elsewhere any reference to a classification of the parts of man's nature. Aristotle, having clearly divided moral from intellectual excellence, does not carry out the same sort of division in discussing moral excellence. He seems to have taken up first the most prominent and striking qualities, according to the common notions in Greece—Courage, Temperance, and Liberality. Liberality suggested to

him Magnificence—Magnificence, High-mindedness; and from this he proceeded to distinguish the more ordinary quality of Ambition. He then added, what had hitherto been omitted, the virtue of regulation of the temper; and pointed out that in social intercourse three excellent qualities are produced by bringing the demeanour under the control of the law of balance. Lastly, even in the instinctive and untrained feelings of Modesty and Indignation, this same law exhibits itself.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ IV.



ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ δ' ἐξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος, δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἢ περὶ χρήματα μεσότης· ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων, οὐδ' αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λήψιν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν ² πάντα ὅσων ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ³ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία περὶ χρήματα ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις. καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀνελευθερίαν προσάπτομεν αἰεὶ τοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζουσι, τὴν δ' ἀσωτίαν ἐπιφέρομεν ἐνίοτε συμπλέκοντες· τοὺς γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανηροὺς ἀσώτους καλοῦμεν. διὸ καὶ φαυλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. πολλὰς γὰρ ἅμα ⁴ κακίας ἔχουσιν. οὐ δὲ οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται· βούλεται γὰρ ἄσωτος εἶναι ὁ ἔν τι κακὸν ἔχων, τὸ φθείρειν τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄσωτος γὰρ ὁ δι' αὐτὸν ἀπολλύμενος, δοκεῖ δ'

I. 1. Aristotle's excellent account of liberality represents it as the balance between illiberality and prodigality. On the characters produced by these different qualities the most discriminating and happy remarks are made in the present chapter.

1 οὐδ' αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν] 'Nor again in decisions.' The Paraphrast adds ὥσπερ ὁ δίκαιος. Κρίσις here is used in a general sense; it may or may not be a legal decision. Cf. *Eth.* v. vi. 4: ἡ γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου.

2 χρήματα δὲ—μετρεῖται] 'Now we call "property" all things whose value is measured by money.' In other words 'all things with an exchangeable value.'

3 τὴν δ' ἀσωτίαν—καλοῦμεν] 'But the term "prodigality" we sometimes apply in a complicated sense, for we call those who are incontinent and who lavish money on intemperance—prodigals.' Exactly the same usage has been confirmed in modern language by the associations of the parable of 'the Prodigal Son.'

5 οὐ δὴ οἰκείως—ἐκδεχόμεθα]

ἀπώλειά τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά, ὡς τοῦ
 ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος. οὕτω δὴ τὴν ἀσωτίαν ἐκδεχόμεθα.
 6 ὧν δ' ἐστὶ χρεία, ἔστι τούτοις χρῆσθαι καὶ εὖ καὶ κακῶς·
 ὁ πλοῦτος δ' ἐστὶ τῶν χρησίμων· ἐκάστω δ' ἄριστα
 χρῆται ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τοῦτο ἀρετὴν· καὶ πλούτῳ δὴ
 χρησεται ἄριστα ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἀρετὴν.
 7 οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος. χρῆσις δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ χρημά-
 των δαπάνη καὶ δόσις· ἡ δὲ λήψις καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ κτήσις
 μᾶλλον. διὸ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου τὸ διδόναι οἷς
 δεῖ ἢ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ.
 τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ
 τὰ καλὰ πράττειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ αἰσχροὰ μὴ πράττειν·
 8 οὐκ ἄδηλον δ' ὅτι τῇ μὲν δόσει ἔπεται τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ
 καλὰ πράττειν, τῇ δὲ λήψει τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ
 αἰσχροπραγεῖν. καὶ ἡ χάρις τῷ διδόντι, οὐ τῷ μὴ λαμ-
 9 βάνοντι, καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος δὲ μᾶλλον. καὶ ῥᾶον δὲ τὸ μὴ

'This application of the name is improper; for "prodigal" ought to denote a man who has *one* fault, the habit of wasting his substance. The word literally means "he who destroys himself," and the wasting of one's substance may well be thought a kind of self-destruction, for life depends upon substance. This accordingly is the sense in which we take the word "prodigality." Aristotle attributes some weight here to the etymology of *ἄσωτος*, arguing that the man who destroys his property, destroys himself, and he who destroys himself is beyond salvation (*ἄσωτος*). *Βούλεται εἶναι* is exactly analogous to the English word 'means.' Cf. *Eth.* iii. i. 15, *Τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι κ.τ.λ.* In *Eth.* v. v. 14, *βούλεται* is used in a slightly different sense to denote not the 'meaning' of a word, but a 'tendency' in things, *δμως δὲ βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον*.

7 Liberality or 'the virtue connected with property' consists more in right giving and spending than in

right receiving. The former is the positive and active side, the latter is the negative and passive side. Giving is the 'use' of money, receiving and keeping is mere 'possession.' And 'use', as Aristotle tells us in the *Rhetoric* (i. v. 7), constitutes wealth proper, as being a sort of life and reality (*ἐνέργεια*), which mere possession is not. *Ὅλως δὲ τὸ πλουτεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ κεκτῆσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστι τῶν τοιοῦτων καὶ ἡ χρῆσις πλούτος*.

8 οὐκ ἄδηλον δ'—*αἰσχροπραγεῖν*] 'It is not hard to see that giving is an avenue to the doing of good and to noble action, while in taking we only receive a benefit or at most avoid a base position.' *Αἰσχροπραγεῖν* here seems to be on the analogy of *εὐπραγεῖν*, and hence to have partly a passive, and at all events an indefinite sense: see above, *Eth.* i. iv. 2, note. *Δικαιοπραγία* is used similarly *Eth.* v. v. 17.

9 καὶ ῥᾶον δὲ—*ἀλλότριον*] 'And it is easier too to abstain from taking

λαβεῖν τοῦ δοῦναι. τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἤττον προΐενται
 μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι τὸ ἀλλότριον. καὶ ἐλευθέριοι δὲ ¹⁰
 λέγονται οἱ διδόντες· οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐκ εἰς ἐλευ-
 θεριότητα ἐπαινοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἤττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην·
 οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ' ἐπαινοῦνται πάνυ. φιλοῦνται δὲ ¹¹
 σχεδὸν μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς. ὠφέλιμοι
 γάρ, τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις ¹²
 καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα. καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει
 τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα καὶ ὀρθῶς· οἷς γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε,
 καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα ἔπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει. καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως ¹³
 ἢ ἀλύπως· τὸ γὰρ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡδὺ ἢ ἄλυπον, ἥκιστα δὲ
 λυπηρόν. ὁ δὲ διδοὺς οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα ¹⁴
 ἀλλὰ διὰ τιν' ἄλλην αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλ' ἄλλος τις
 ῥηθήσεται. οὐδ' ὁ λυπηρῶς· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἔλοιτ' ἂν τὰ
 χρήματα τῆς καλῆς πράξεως, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἐλευθερίου.
 οὐδὲ λήψεται δὲ ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστι τοῦ μὴ τιμῶν- ¹⁵
 τος τὰ χρήματα ἢ τοιαύτη λῆψις. οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ' ¹⁶
 αἰτητικός. οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τοῦ εὔποιούντος εὐχερῶς εὐεργε-

than it is to give; for men are less willing to give away (*ἤττον προΐενται μᾶλλον*) what is their own, than they are to abstain from taking what belongs to others.' *Μᾶλλον* is redundant, it goes to strengthen the comparative force of *ἤττον*.—*Οὐ λαμβάνουσι* corresponds to *μὴ λαβεῖν* just before, and makes up a positive notion to 'abstain from taking.' Aristotle attributes to men in general a character the reverse of that attributed by Sallust to Catiline, 'alieni appetens, sui profusus.'

11 οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ' ἐπαινοῦνται πάνυ] 'But they who receive are not praised at all.' Πάνυ means 'quite': οὐ πάνυ in the sense of 'hardly' is frequent in Aristotle; cf. *Eth.* iii. ii. 12-13: λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνυ δοξάζομεν—δοξάζομεν δὲ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν: and οὐδὲ πάνυ appears to mean 'not at all,' the οὐδέ being joined with the verb.

16 οὐκ ἂν εἴη—εὐεργετῆσθαι] 'Nor would he be ready to ask favours, for it does not belong to the benefactor to be easily a receiver of benefits.' This is a manifestation of the spirit which runs through the virtuous characters of Aristotle—the spirit of manliness and nobility (*ἀνδρώδης καὶ φιλόκαλος*, cf. *Eth.* iv. iv. 3). It appears most strongly in the character of the high-minded man; see below, ch. iii. § 24. The principle of individuality, a sense of life and free action (*ἐνέργεια*), are with Aristotle the basis of morality, and the first requisite to nobleness seems to be self-respect. Now, a slight difference in the way in which this truth is stated will make it appear a pure or a selfish principle. Christianity says, 'It is more blessed to give than to receive,' implying that to gratify a feeling of love and kindness is better than any pleasure that the sense of gain could afford.

- 17 *τεῖσθαι*. ὅθεν δὲ ὁεῖ, λήψεται, οἷον ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων, οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, ὅπως ἔχῃ διδόναι. οὐδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν ἰδίων, βουλούμενός γε διὰ τούτων τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν. οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει, ἵνα ἔχῃ διδόναι οἷς δεῖ
 18 καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ καλόν. ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶ σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δώσει, ὥστε καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω·
 19 τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπιβλέπειν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίου. κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ διδόντος ἔξει, αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δίδωσιν. οὐθὲν δὲ κωλύει ἐλευθεριώτερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω διδόντα, ἐὰν ἀπ' ἐλαττόνων
 20 διδῷ. ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησάμενοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄπειροί τε γὰρ τῆς

But at the same time, if we analyse the Christian sentiment of love and charity, we cannot by any means separate it from the development of the personality of him that feels it. For as all knowledge implies a subject as well as an object, so does every moral act or feeling imply the will and individuality of the actor. In the Christian sentiment there is so great a harmony between the object and subject, that the subjective side appears to be lost; but in reality it is only lost to be found again, it is diminished to be enhanced. Aristotle's statement would be 'It is better to give than to receive, because it is more noble.' This has a slight tendency to give too much weight to the subjective side. In Aristotle's whole account we do not find a word about benevolence or love to others as prompting acts of liberality. We find no other motive but the 'splendour' (*καλόν*) of the acts themselves. What is said in the present section verges towards the selfish theory, which would ascribe such acts to the love of power inherent in man. In Hobbes (*Leviathan*, Book i. Chap. xi.) we find

a bitter statement of the feelings with which benefits may be received. 'To have received from one, to whom we think ourselves equal, greater benefits than there is hope to requite, disposeth to counterfeit love; but really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor, that in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitly wishes him there, where he might never see him more. For benefits oblige, and obligation is thralldom; and unrequitable obligation, perpetual thralldom, which is to one's equal, hateful.' Cf. *Eth.* ix. vii.

17-19 Points in the character of the liberal man: he will take care of his own property in order that he may have means for his liberality. Hence, too, he will be discriminating in the objects of his favours; yet his tendency is to forget himself, to give largely, to leave hardly anything for himself; yet again, liberality does not depend on the largeness of the gift, it is in proportion to the means of the giver, a less gift may be more liberal than a large one.

20 *ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ—ποιηταί*] 'We see that those are the most liberal who

ἐνδεΐας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί. πλουτεῖν δ' οὐ ῥάδιον τὸν ἐλευθερίον, μήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα μήτε φυλακτικόν, προσετικὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι' αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τῆς δόσεως. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ²¹ ἄξιοι ὄντες ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν. συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε χρήματ' ἔχειν μὴ ἐπιμελούμενον ὅπως ἔχῃ, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ μὲν δώσει γέ ²² οἷς οὐ δεῖ οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πρᾶττοι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ²³ εἴρηται, ἐλευθερίος ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δαπανῶν καὶ εἰς ἃ δεῖ· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων ἄσματος. διὸ τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγομεν ἀσώτους· τὸ γὰρ πλήθος τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ ῥάδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν. τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος δὲ μεσότητος οὔσης περὶ χρημάτων ²⁴ δόσιν καὶ λῆψιν, ὁ ἐλευθέριος καὶ δώσει καὶ δαπανήσῃ εἰς ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ, ὁμοίως ἐν μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλοις, καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως· καὶ λήψεται δ' ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ. τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ ἄμφω οὔσης μεσότητος, ποιήσῃ ἀμφότερα ὡς δεῖ· ἔπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικεῖ δόσει ἢ τοιαύτῃ λήψις, ἢ δὲ μὴ τοιαύτῃ ἐναντία ἐστίν. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπόμεναι γίνονται ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι δῆλον ὡς οὐ. ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ ²⁵ τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον συμβαίῃ αὐτῷ ἀναλίσκειν, λυπήσεται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ

have not themselves acquired their property, but have inherited it; for they have never known what want is, nor are they restrained by that love of what we have ourselves produced, which belongs to all men, and is well exemplified in parents and poets.' On the philosophy of this remark, cf. *Eth.* ix. vii. 2-7. The remark itself comes almost *verbatim* from Plato's *Republic*, p. 330 B-C. Socrates asks Cephalus whether he made his money or inherited it, and gives as a reason for the question, οὐ τοι ἕνεκα ἡρόμην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι μοι ἔδοξας οὐ σφόδρα

ἀγαπᾶν τὰ χρήματα. Τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὡς τὸ πολὺ οἱ ἂν μὴ αὐτοὶ κτήσωνται· οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῇ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά· ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπῶσι, ταύτῃ τε δὴ καὶ χρηματισάμενοι περὶ τὰ χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν, ὡς ἔργον ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν, ᾗ περ οἱ ἄλλοι.

²¹ With perfect good sense Aristotle says that a very natural explanation may be given of the common railings you hear against fortune for not making 'the right people' (*i.e.* the liberal) rich. People can't expect

26 ἥδ' ἐσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὥς δεῖ. καὶ εὐκοινώ-
 27 νητος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθερίος εἰς χρήματα· δύναται γὰρ ἀδι-
 κεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος
 εἴ τι δέον μὴ ἀνάλωσεν ἢ λυπούμενος εἰ μὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσε,
 28 καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδῃ οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος. ὁ δ' ἄσωτος καὶ ἐν
 τούτοις διαμαρτάνει. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδέεται ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ οὐδὲ ὥς
 29 δεῖ οὔτε λυπεῖται· ἔσται δὲ προϊούσι φανερώτερον. εἴρηται
 δ' ἡμῖν ὅτι ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ
 ἀνελευθερία, καὶ ἐνδυσίν, ἐν δόσει καὶ λήψει· καὶ τὴν δαπάνην
 γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀσωτία τῷ διδόναι
 καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνειν ἐλλείπει,
 ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία τῷ διδόναι μὲν ἐλλείπει, τῷ λαμβάνειν
 30 δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας
 οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾶδιον μηδαμῶθεν λαμβάνοντα
 πᾶσι διδόναι· ταχέως γὰρ ἐπιλείπει ἡ οὐσία τοὺς ἰδιώτας
 31 διδόντας, οἵπερ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἄσωτοι εἶναι, ἐπεὶ ὁ γε τοιοῦτος
 δόξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῷ βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου. εὐατάτος

to be rich who have hardly any care for money, and this is the characteristic of the liberal.

26-27 καὶ εὐκοινώνητος—ἀρεσκόμενος] 'Further, the liberal man is easy to deal with in business transactions; for there is no difficulty in cheating him, owing to his disregard of money, and he is more annoyed at having omitted any proper expense than vexed at spending what is needless, nor does he approve the precepts of Simonides.' These remarks show a penetrating knowledge of mankind, but they do not exhibit liberality in the highest light. The gratification of a personal feeling is made rather too prominent, hence we miss the beauty of 'charity seeketh not her own.' With the present passage we may compare the description of equity in the *Rhetoric* (I. xiii. 15-19), part of which is τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι ἀδικοῦμενον. Various sentiments are attributed to Simonides, all testifying

to the solid advantage of riches. Cf. Ar. *Rhetoric*, II. xvi. 2: ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Σιμωνίδου εἴρηται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πλουσίων πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα τὴν Ἰέρωνος ἐρομένην πότερον γενέσθαι κρείττον πλούσιον ἢ σοφόν· πλούσιον εἰπεῖν· τοὺς σοφοὺς γὰρ ἔφη ὄραν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πλουσίων θύραις διατρέβοντας. Again, there is quoted from Plutarch a saying that 'the money-chest is always full, and the chest of the graces always empty;' and another, that 'avarice is the proper pleasure of old age.' On the philosophy of Simonides, see Essay II. pp. 62-4.

29 τῷ λαμβάνειν—μικροῖς] 'Illiberality exceeds in taking, only it must be in petty matters.' Grasping on a large scale gets another name than illiberality; cf. §§ 41-42.

30 τὰ μὲν οὖν—ἀνελευθέρου] 'The two sides of prodigality can hardly exist together; for it is not easy to give to everybody and receive from nobody; private persons, whom alone

τε γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν. ἔχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου· καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει, οὐδέτερον δ' ὡς δεῖ οὐδ' εὔ. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο ἐθισθεῖη ἢ πως ἄλλως μεταβάλοι, εἴη ἂν ἐλευθερίος· ὥσπερ γὰρ οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οὐ λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαῦλος τὸ ἥθος· οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ οὐδ' ἀγεννοῦς τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν δίδόντα καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα, ἡλιθίου δέ. ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἄσωτος πολὺ δοκεῖ³² βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι διὰ τε τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλούς, ὁ δὲ οὐθένα, ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὐτόν. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀσώτων, καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ λαμ-³³ βάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰςὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνελεύθεροι. ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν ἀναλίσκειν,³⁴

we reckon prodigals, soon find their substance failing them. Therefore the prodigal man may well be thought in no small degree superior to the illiberal.' The commentators, from not seeing the train of thought in this passage, have made a difficulty about ἐπεὶ, which refers to the beginning of the sentence, the intermediate clauses οὐ γὰρ βᾶδιον—εἶναι being parenthetical. With ὥστερ καὶ δοκοῦσιν, cf. § 23.

31-32 Reasons are given why the prodigal is better than the illiberal man, namely, he may be cured by time, or by the failure of his means. His tendency to give is a principle which requires only to be harmonised to become a virtue. Lastly, he does more good than the illiberal man. Aristotle here is speaking of a better sort of prodigality (τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἄσωτος) which is only a slight overstepping of the bounds of liberality; but even with this restriction, it is much to be doubted whether prodigality does more good than illiberality. From wise acts of liberality much good may arise, but the common sort of prodigality, as Aristotle himself says, § 35, being prompted by folly

and vanity, almost invariably goes to enrich the wrong people. If the case be even not so bad as this, the solid benefit which accrues from any tendency to capitalize money may surely be set against the chance good done by money given away indiscriminately or spent unproductively.

33 ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ—ἀνελεύθεροι.] 'But most prodigals, as we have implied already, take whence they ought not, and in this way are illiberal.' This is an instance of a phenomenon often to be observed in Aristotle's virtues and vices, that the 'extremes meet' (cf. iv. vii. 15, ii. vii. 15). The *rationale* of this phenomenon appears to be that the extremes are both the result of the same principle, they are both different forms of selfishness. Selfishness can equally produce prodigal giving and meanness in receiving. Hence, if a man be selfish, though his tendency is to be prodigal, yet on occasion selfishness, which is his governing principle, will lead him to become illiberal. The fact is noticed by Eudemus, *Eth. Eud.* iii. vii. 12: 'Ἔστι δ' ἐναντιώτερον τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ μέσον ἢ

εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι· ταχὺ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἐτέρωθεν πορίζειν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ τὸ καλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλιγώρως καὶ πάντοθεν λαμβάνουσιν· διδόναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τὸ
 35 δὲ πῶς ἢ πόθεν οὐθέν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. διόπερ οὐδ' ἐλευθεριοὶ αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ καλαί, οὐδὲ τούτου αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα, οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε οὓς δεῖ πένεσθαι, τούτους πλουσίους ποιοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἥγη οὐδὲν ἂν δοῖεν, τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἢ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πορίζουσι πολλά. διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας δαπανηροὶ εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν
 36 ζῆν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτος ἀπαιδαγώγητος γενόμενος εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχὼν
 37 δ' ἐπιμελείας εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ δέον ἀφίκοιτ' ἂν. ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία ἀνιάτός ἐστιν· δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πᾶσα ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν. καὶ συμφυέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀσωτίας· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι
 38 μᾶλλον ἢ δοτικοί. καὶ διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολὺ, καὶ πολυειδές ἐστιν· πολλοὶ γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευθερίας εἶναι. ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ οὖσα, τῇ τ' ἐλλείψει τῆς δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερ-

ἐκεῖνα ἀλλήλοις, διότι τὸ μὲν μετ' οὐδέτερον γίνεται αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ πολλάκις μετ' ἀλλήλων καὶ εἰσὶν ἐνίοτε οἱ αὐτοὶ θρασυδαίμονες, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄσωτοι τὰ δὲ ἀνελεύθεροι καὶ ὅλως ἀνώμαλοι κακῶς.

37 καὶ συμφυέστερον—δοτικοί] 'This vice runs more in our blood than prodigality: the mass of men love to keep money, rather than to give it.' It may be doubted whether this assertion is universally true. Would it, for instance, be true of the Irish? Again, Aristotle hardly acknowledges enough the *kindness* that exists among men, and which made Kant wonder that there was 'so much kindness and so little justice' in the world. Aristotle, from his dislike to all that is sordid, and his admiration for the brilliant and noble qualities, takes

perhaps too favourable a view of the vice of prodigality. Its connexion with vanity, selfishness, and often utter heartlessness, he does not sufficiently notice, nor does he observe that lavish giving often proceeds from the want of a faculty—from an incapacity for estimating the worth of objects. Thus if illiberality be incompatible with a magnanimous spirit, prodigality is incompatible with absolute truth and justice.

38 Illiberality is widely spread, and has many forms; it contains two elements—excess of taking and defect of giving; but it does not always manifest itself in its entirety (οὐ πᾶσιν ὁλόκληρος παραγίνεται), sometimes one element exists separately from the other.

βολῇ τῆς λήψεως, οὐ πᾶσιν ὁλόκληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε χωρίζεται, καὶ οἱ μὲν τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἱ δὲ τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις 39 προσηγορίαις ὅσον Φειδῶλοι γλίσχροι κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσι, τῶν δ' ἄλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδὲ βούλονται λαμβάνειν, οἱ μὲν διὰ τινὰ ἐπιείκειαν καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν αἰσχυρῶν. δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἔνιοι ἢ φασί γε διὰ τοῦτο φυλάττειν, ἵνα μὴ ποτ' ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσχυρόν τι πρᾶξαι. τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁ κυμινοπρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος· ὠνόμασται δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηθεὶ ἀνδοῦναι. οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ φόβον ἀπέχονται τῶν ἄλλοτρίων ὡς 40 οὐ ῥᾶδιον τὸ αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἐτέρων λαμβάνειν, τὰ δ' αὐτοῦ ἐτέρους μὴ· ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ μήτε λαμβάνειν μήτε διδόναι, οἱ δ' αὖ κατὰ τὴν λήψιν ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, ὅσον οἱ τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργασίας ἐργαζόμενοι, πορνοβασκοὶ καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλῶ. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ὁπόσον οὐ δεῖ. κοινὸν δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰσχυρο- 41 κέρδεια φαίνεται· πάντες γὰρ ἕνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὁνείδη ὑπομένουσιν. τοὺς γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα μὴ ὅθεν 42 δὲ δεῖ λαμβάνοντας, μηδὲ ἅ δεῖ, οὐ λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους, ὅσον τοὺς τυράννους πόλεις πορθεῖντας καὶ ἱερὰ συλῶντας,

39-40 οἱ μὲν γὰρ—οὐ δεῖ] ‘Men of one class, those who go by such names as “stingy,” “closefisted,” “curmudgeons,” all fall short in what they give away, but they neither covet their neighbours’ goods, nor wish to take them. With some of them this arises from a certain sense of equity and shrinking from what is base: for their motive, either supposed or professed, in being careful of their means, is to prevent the possibility of their being compelled by want to do base actions. To this set belong the “skinflint,” and all his like, a name derived from superlative unwillingness to give to anybody. But others again abstain from their neighbours’ goods through fear, since it is

not easy to take what belongs to others, and not have others take what belongs to oneself—they are content, therefore, neither to take nor give. A second class are excessive in taking everything and from all quarters, as for instance, those who ply illiberal trades, brothel-keepers, and all such like, and lenders of small sums at high interest. For all these take whence they ought not, and more than they ought.’ This passage falls into two parts, οἱ δ' αὖ κατὰ τὴν λήψιν corresponding to οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις. There are two subordinate divisions of the first part, namely, οἱ μὲν διὰ τινὰ ἐπιείκειαν, and οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ φόβον.

- 43 ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀσεβεῖς καὶ ἀδίκους. ὁ μέντοι
 κυβευτῆς καὶ ὁ λαποδύτης καὶ ὁ ληστῆς τῶν ἀνελευθέρων
 εἰσίν. αἰσχροκερδεῖς γάρ. κέρδους γὰρ ἔνεκεν ἀμφοτέροι
 πραγματεύονται καὶ ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ οἱ μὲν κινδύνους
 τοὺς μεγίστους ἔνεκα τοῦ λήμματος, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων
 κερδαίνουσιν, οἷς δεῖ διδόναι. ἀμφοτέροι δὲ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ κερ-
 δαίνειν βουλόμενοι αἰσχροκερδεῖς, καὶ πᾶσαι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦται
 44 λήψεις ἀνελεύθεροι. εἰκότως δὲ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἀνελευ-
 θερία ἐναντίον λέγεται· μεῖζόν τε γάρ ἐστι κακὸν τῆς
 ἀσωτίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀμαρτάνουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν
 45 λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν
 ἀντικειμένων κακιῶν τοσαῦτ' εἰρήσθω.
 2 Δόξειε δ' ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας

44 μεῖζόν τε γάρ ἐστι κακὸν τῆς ἀσωτίας] Before (§ 32) Aristotle made the doubtful statement that prodigality does more good than illiberality. He now makes the positively untrue statement that illiberality does more harm than prodigality. His view is fallacious from an ignorance of the principles of political economy, and from not looking at the question with sufficient breadth. He regards prodigality as a short-lived evil which will be cured by time, and illiberality as inveterate. But in their consequences it is rather prodigality that is incurable, and illiberality transitory. Illiberality can always be remedied, and indeed it brings its own remedy, for saving produces wealth and capital, and these lift a man naturally, and necessarily into a more expensive style of living, however much he may haggle over details. But prodigality causes personally, to the family, and to the nation, a loss of resources which is absolutely incurable.

II. Magnificence, the virtue next discussed, is a higher kind of libe-

rality. It consists in spending money on a great scale with propriety (ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν). Thus there are two elements, greatness and propriety. The greatness is relative, being limited by the propriety, and the propriety is relative to the person, the circumstances, and the object. Magnificence will of course be prompted by a desire for what is noble. There will be something imaginative and striking about the effect it produces (τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν). Great and solemn occasions will be its proper sphere, the services of religion, the entertaining of foreigners, public works, gifts, and return-gifts. The well-born and illustrious will be the proper persons to exercise it. The house of the magnificent man will be of suitable splendour, everything he does will show taste and propriety: even in a gift to a child he will exhibit the idea of magnificence. The vulgar man, missing this happy nicety, will jar on our taste with his excessive splendour (λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος), his object being evidently mere ostentation. The petty man, on the other hand,

διελθεῖν· δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ περὶ χρήματά τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι. οὐχ ὥσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνει περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν χρήμασι πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον· ἐν τούτοις δ' ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος μεγέθει. καθάπερ γὰρ τοῦνομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει, ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρὸς τι· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ² δαπάνημα τριηράρχῳ καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ. τὸ πρέπον δὲ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ αὐτόν. ὁ δ' ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις³ κατ' ἀξίαν δαπανῶν οὐ λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπής, οἷον τὸ 'πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτη·' ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐλευθέριος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπής. τῆς τοιαύτης δ' ἕξις ἢ μὲν⁴ ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια καλεῖται, ἢ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι τῷ μεγέθει περὶ αὐτὴν δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ λαμ-

from timidity and constant fear of expense, will be always below the mark, and even after considerable expense will mar the whole effect by meanness in some point of detail.

2 τὸ δὲ μέγεθος—ἀρχιθεωρῷ] 'Now the greatness is relative, for there is not the same expense for a trierarch as for the head of a sacred legation.' This latter office would of course demand peculiar splendour. The λειτουργίαι at Athens were exactly fitted to exercise the magnificence of the citizens.

τὸ πρέπον δὲ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ αὐτόν] 'The propriety accordingly must be relative to the person, the circumstances, and the object.' We have here nearly the same categories as were given, *Eth.* iii. i. 16, where the points connected with an action are enumerated, τίς τε δὲ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι πράττει. On the suitableness of the person see below §§ 12–14. The circumstances are touched upon §§ 11, 15. The object

(which cannot be definitely separated from the circumstances) §§ 16–18.

πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτη] *Homer Odys.* xvii. 420.

4 ἡ δὲ ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται] 'The corresponding excess is called "vulgarity," and "bad taste," and the like.' Βάναυσος is said to be derived from βαῖνος 'a forge' and αἷω. Thus it means a metal-worker, or artisan. From the contempt felt by the Athenians for this kind of craft, βάναυσος came to imply 'mean,' 'vulgar,' analogously to φορτικός. In Aristotle's *Politics* there is a definition of what kind of work is strictly to be considered βάναυσος (*viii.* ii. 4). Βάναυσον δ' ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. The word βαναυσία is excellently applied here to denote vulgarity in expenditure.

5 πρυνόμεναι· ὕστερον δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν. ὁ δὲ μεγα-
 λοπρεπῆς ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν· τὸ πρόπον γὰρ δύναται θεω-
 6 ρῆσαι καὶ δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν
 ἀρχῇ εἵπομεν, ἡ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὀρίζεται, καὶ ὧν ἐστίν.
 αἱ δὴ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ πρόπουσαι.
 τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα δαπάνημα καὶ
 πρόπον τῷ ἔργῳ. ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δαπάνης ἄξιον
 δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἡ καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν.
 7 δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπῆς τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα·
 8 κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς. καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ προετι-
 9 κῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπές. καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον
 καὶ πρεπωδέστατον, σκέψαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ πῶς
 10 ἐλαχίστου. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλοπρεπῆ
 εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἂν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ.
 ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος,
 περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης
 δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. οὐ γὰρ ἡ
 αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου· κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλεί-
 στου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα

5 ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπῆς—ἐμμελῶς]
 ‘The magnificent man is a kind of
 artist, because he has an eye for the
 becoming, and can spend great sums
 tastefully.’ The word ἐπιστήμονι here
 conveys the association of those quali-
 ties which were said to belong to a
 perfect work of art, *Eth.* II. VI. 9: Εἰ
 δὴ πάντα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ
 ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα,
 κ.τ.λ.

6 ὥσπερ γὰρ—τῷ ἔργῳ] ‘For as
 we said at the outset, a moral state is
 determined by its acts and its objects.
 Therefore the outlays of the magnifi-
 cent man will be great and suitable.
 And the works on which he employs
 them will be of the same character,
 for only thus it will be possible to
 have a great outlay suitable to the
 work.’

ἐν ἀρχῇ] The allusion seems to be

generally to the beginning of Book II.;
 perhaps *Eth.* II. II. 8 is the nearest
 reference that can be given. But in
 the present place Aristotle is not
 speaking of the formation of habits
 out of acts, but rather of moral habits
 or states having a definite existence
 and reality only in acts and in the
 objective circumstances (ὧν ἐστίν) to
 which they (the moral states) refer.
 This view regards a moral state as a
 mere potentiality, which only attains
 definite and conscious reality by
 emerging into an act. The remark
 is apparently made to account for a
concrete treatment of the virtue of
 magnificence. We have above
 noticed (*Eth.* III. XII. 3 note) a sepa-
 ration made between the habit and
 the act, which looks much less philo-
 sophical.

10 ἀναγκαῖον δὴ—ἐν μεγέθει] ‘It

καὶ καλόν. τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή, τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν. καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετὴ μεγαλοπρέπεια ἐν μεγέθει. ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων οἷα ¹¹ λέγομεν τὰ τίμια, οἷον τὰ περὶ θεοὺς ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσα περὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητά ἐστιν, οἷον εἴ που χορηγεῖν οἴονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἔστιαν τὴν πόλιν. ἐν ᾗ πασι δ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ πρὸς ¹² τὸν πράττοντα ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς ὢν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων·

follows therefore that the magnificent man must also be liberal, for the liberal man spends what he ought and in the way he ought. But it is in these same particulars, which are common to magnificence and liberality, that the element of greatness which there is in the magnificent man appears, as for example in vastness of proportions, and with the same expense he will make the result more splendid. For a work is not to be esteemed for the same qualities as a possession. That possession is most prized which is worth most, as for instance gold, but that work which is great and noble. When we contemplate such a work, we admire; but the magnificent is always admirable; and the highest excellence of a work, as far as scale is concerned, is magnificence.' The words *οἷον μέγεθος* have vexed the commentators. One device that has been adopted is to omit the stop after *μέγεθος* and to translate the passage, 'Sed in his magnum est magnifici, veluti magnitudo liberalitatis circa hæc (reading *ταῦτα*) versantis' (Michelet). Or, without altering the punctuation, we might construe, taking *οἷον μέγεθος* as epexegetic of *τὸ μέγα*, 'But the greatness of the magnificent man, as it were a certain grandeur of scale, appears in these same particulars, which are common to magnificence

and liberality.' But the point Aristotle insists on is that magnificence differs from liberality not in degree, but in kind, being a display of more genius and imagination on the same objects, and thus with the same expense producing a more striking result. He gives as an instance of the means employed, 'vastness of size.' *Τὸ μέγα* is the moral greatness of the magnificent man, this takes as its exponent *μέγεθος* or physical bulk. The Paraphrast carries out the comparison in the text rather neatly. *Οἷον, φέρε εἰπεῖν, θεραπεῦσαι τὸ θεῖον δεῖσαν, ὁ μὲν ἐλευθέριος χρυσοῦν τι σκεῦος ποιήσει, καὶ λίθους τιμίους ἐγκολλήσει τῷ σκεύει· ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ναὺν μέγαν καὶ καλὴν οἰκοδομήσει ἢ ἀνδριάντας ἀναστήσει ἢ γεφύρας οἰκοδομήσει ἢ ἄλλο τι μέγα καὶ θαυμαστόν διὰ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης ἐργάσεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς ἔργον κυρίως ἔργον ἔσται, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου κτήμα μᾶλλον ἢ ἔργον.*

II εὐφιλοτίμητα] 'favourite objects of rivalry.' Dr. Cardwell (upon § 2 above) quotes *Lycurgus Orat. contra Leocr.* p. 167: *Οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἱποτετρόφῃσιν ἢ κεχορήγηκε λαμπρῶς — ἄξιός ἐστι παρ' ἡμῶν τοιαύτης χάριτος — ἀλλ' εἴ τις τετρηράρχῃσιν λαμπρῶς ἢ τείχῃ τῇ πατρίδι περιέβαλεν, ἢ πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν σωτηρίαν ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων συνευπόρησε.*

- ἄξια γὰρ δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ
 13 τῷ ποιοῦντι πρέπειν. διὸ πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλο-
 πρεπής· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν πολλὰ δαπανήσῃ πρεπόντως·
 ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἡλίθιος· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον,
 14 κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς. πρέπει δὲ καὶ οἷς τὰ τοιαῦτα
 προὔπαρχει δι' αὐτῶν ἢ διὰ τῶν προγόνων ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς
 μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι καὶ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις καὶ ὅσα
 τοιαῦτα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ ἀξίωμα.
 15 μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὥσπερ εἴρηται·
 μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιμότεστα· τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα εἰσάπαξ
 γίνεται, ὅσον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ εἰ περί τι πᾶσα ἡ
 πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑπο-
 δοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολάς, καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς· οὐ γὰρ
 εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ κοινά, τὰ
 16 δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἔχει τι ὅμοιον. μεγαλοπρεπεῦς δὲ
 καὶ οἶκον κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως τῷ πλούτῳ· κόσ-
 μος γάρ τις καὶ οὗτος. καὶ περὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον δαπανᾷν
 ὅσα πολυχρόνια τῶν ἔργων· κάλλιστα γὰρ ταῦτα. καὶ ἐν
 17 ἐκάστοις τὸ πρέπον· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτ' ἀρμόζει θεοῖς καὶ ἀν-
 θρώποις, οὐδ' ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων
 ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον μὲν τὸ
 18 ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα. καὶ
 διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι·
 σφαῖρα μὲν γὰρ ἢ λήκυθος ἢ καλλίστη ἔχει μεγαλοπρέπειαν
 παιδικοῦ δώρου, ἢ δὲ τούτου τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ ἀνελεύθερον.
 19 διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεπεῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ γένει,

14 πρέπει δὲ—ἀξίωμα] 'The under-
 taking of such expenses is proper for
 persons already distinguished by mag-
 nificence, either in themselves, or their
 ancestors, or their connections, and
 for the noble, the illustrious, and such
 like persons: for in all those cases
 greatness and dignity are present.'
 The use of προὔπαρχειν here to denote
 that which exists already as an achieve-
 ment in one's family is not unlike its
 use, *Eth.* i. xi. 4, to denote those

events which in a play are supposed
 to have been done before the com-
 mencement of the action.

18—19 καὶ διαφέρει—δαπανήματος]
 'And the "greatness," which is ex-
 hibited in the work, differs from the
 "greatness" of the expense; for the
 most beautiful of balls or of bottles is
 magnificent as a present to a child,
 though its price be small and paltry.
 Hence the magnificent man, whatever
 kind of thing he be producing, will

μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν· τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐπέρβλητον, καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ 20
μεγαλοπρεπής, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάνυστος τῷ παρὰ τὸ
δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς
μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρύνε-
ται παρὰ μέλος, ὅν ἔρανιστὰς γαμικῶς ἐστιῶν, καὶ κωμω-
δοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων, ὥσπερ οἱ
Μεγαρεῖς. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ
ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα
οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὗ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀναλῶσαι,
ὀλίγα δαπανῶν, οὗ δ' ὀλίγα, πολλά. ὁ δὲ μικροπρεπής 21
περὶ πάντα ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν μικρῷ
τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ποιῇ μέλλων, καὶ σκοπῶν
πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλῶσαι, καὶ ταῦτ' ὀδυρόμενος, καὶ

produce it magnificently; for the character of such work is that it cannot be easily outdone, its magnificence being always in proportion to the outlay.' The first part of this passage is almost a repetition of what was said § 10, on the difference between 'greatness' and 'costliness' in a work of art. The 'ball' and the 'bottle' seem to have been common toys. Dr. Fitzgerald compares the description of Cupid's toy in Apollonius Rhodius, *Arg.* III. 135, and Plato, *Phædo*, p. 110 B, ὥσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι, ποικίλη, χρώμασι διελημμένη. Also Theophrastus' *Characters*, Περὶ ἀρεσκείας, where the ἀρεσκος is said to purchase Θυριακὰς τῶν στρογγύλων ληκύθους—καὶ σφαιριστήριον.

20 τοιοῦτος—πολλά] 'Such now is the magnificent man, but he who exceeds and is vulgar exceeds because, as was said before, he spends more than is necessary. He spends much upon trifles, and preserves no harmony in his splendour; he entertains his club-fellows with a wedding-feast, and when he has charge of a comic chorus, he makes them appear in purple, as

the Megarians do. In all this extravagance he never aims at a noble end, but only seeks to parade his riches, in the hope of being stared at; where he should spend much, he draws his purse-strings, where he should spend little, he squanders.' The last sentence shows that in vulgarity extremes meet, selfishness prompting both too much expense and too little, see above, chap. i. § 33 note. With παρὰ μέλος we may compare Shakspeare, *Merry Wives*, Act i. sc. 3. 'His filching was like an unskilful singer: he kept not time.'

ὅν ἔρανιστὰς] ἔρανος being a club where each member entertained in turn, or an entertainment where each guest contributed, it was of course bad taste to eclipse the rest in splendour.

ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ] The parade was the first song of the chorus sung at its entry. Naturally the comic chorus would not require rich purple dresses. The expense of a comic chorus at Athens appears to have been sixteen minæ (48l.), that of a tragic chorus thirty minæ (90l.); see Bentley on *Phalaris*,

- 22 πάντ' οἰόμενος μείζω ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ. εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἑξῆεις αὗται κακίαι, οὐ μὲν ὀνειδῆ γ' ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ μήτε βλαβεραὶ τῷ πέλας εἶναι μήτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες.
- 3 Ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μέγала μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος

p. 360. The Megarians were noted among the Greeks for stupidity.

22 εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν—ἀσχήμονες] 'Now these (*i.e.* vulgarity and pettiness) are vices, but they do not entail disgrace, because they are neither hurtful to one's neighbour, nor are they very unseemly.'

III. Aristotle's famous description of the virtue of high-mindedness (which he places as a mean between vanity and want of spirit) throws great light upon the whole bearing of his moral system.

We must notice in it rather an admiring picture of what *is* than an investigation into what ought to be. High-mindedness is nothing else than a certain loftiness of spirit possessed by great men. It can only (in its fullest sense) belong to great men, for unless accompanied by qualities superior to those of the rest of the world, it would be simply ridiculous.

Aristotle takes this loftiness of spirit, and, considering it fine and admirable, points out the various traits in which it exhibits itself. And nothing can be more subtle or felicitous than many of his observations on this head. But it is plain that high-mindedness, as here represented, is not something which is prompted by duty, rather it stands quite beside the idea of duty. Greatness and the sense of moral obligation are essentially distinct, however much they may accidentally coincide.

The high-minded man has all virtues, says Aristotle (§§ 14—15).

But we find on nearer inspection that this means that the high-minded man is above all those minor interests which might induce to vice; he does not care about money, so he will never cheat, he does not value even life very high, so he will not be a coward. Here then there is no self-subjection to a law. The high-minded man does not avoid vice because it is 'wrong' (in the modern sense), but simply because it is unworthy of him. Thus he is most essentially a law to himself and above all other law. Aristotle spoke of high-mindedness as being a sort of culmination of the virtues (§ 16), and justly so, for it is the culmination of his moral system. As we before remarked (ch. i. § 16, note), his system is based on the idea of self-respect. Loftiness of spirit is the highest form of self-respect (μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ, ἀξιος ἔν). This principle goes a long way in elevating the character and purifying the conduct, but its natural development is also a dislike (§§ 24—26) of all limitations of the individuality; in short, its natural development is a sort of noble pride.

High-mindedness, however fine may be the qualities that go to make it up, is essentially not a human attitude. As we have observed already, it is something exceptional, and in Aristotle's account of it we have a psychological portrait of a great man. Yet still this account shows Aristotle not to have been familiar with that conception of 'moral goodness' which has arisen out of later associations.

ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν. διαφέρει²
 δ' οὐθὲν τὴν ἔξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν σκοπεῖν. δοκεῖ δὲ³
 μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μέγαλων αὐτὸν ἀξίων ἄξιος ὢν. ὁ
 γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἡλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν
 οὐδείς ἡλίθιος οὐδ' ἀνόητος. μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ
 εἰρημένος. ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξίων ἑαυτὸν⁴
 σώφρων, μεγαλόψυχος δ' οὐ. ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἢ μεγαλο-⁵
 ψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ
 δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὐ. ὁ δὲ μέγαλων⁶
 ἑαυτὸν ἀξίων ἀνάξιος ὢν χαῦνος. ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἄξιος
 οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος. ὁ δ' ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, ἐάν⁷
 τε μέγαλων ἐάν τε μετρίων, ἐάν τε καὶ μικρῶν ἄξιος ὢν ἔτι
 ἐλαττόνων αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ. καὶ μάλιστα ἀνδρόξευεν ὁ μέγαλων
 ἄξιος. τί γὰρ ἀνέποιε, εἰ μὴ τοσοῦτων ἦν ἄξιος; ἔστι⁸
 δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ
 μέσος. τοῦ γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ. οἱ δ' ὑπερβάλ-
 λουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν. εἰ δὲ δὴ μέγαλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος⁹
 ὢν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ ἐν μάλιστα ἀνέη.
 ἢ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ'¹⁰
 ἀνθίστηεν ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὐ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται
 οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἄθλον.

² διαφέρει δ' οὐθὲν—σκοπεῖν] 'Now it does not make the least difference whether we consider the state of mind, or the character that is produced by the state of mind.' The procedure adopted by Aristotle throughout is that of describing virtues in the concrete, though in no other case does he give so complete a personality as in describing the high-minded man. This procedure, while it gives graphic liveliness to his discussions, tends to make us forget that these virtues are not so much different *kinds* of character as different *elements* in the same character. A later development of Aristotle's ethical system calls attention to this point (cf. *Eth.* vi. xiii. 6). It has been said that the

picture of a high-minded man here given to us must have been taken from life. Probably Aristotle traced different manifestations of the high-minded element in different people, and has here combined them.

⁵ ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ—οὐ] 'For high-mindedness implies greatness, just as beauty implies a large body; little people may be pretty and elegant, but not beautiful.' This was the Greek idea, cf. *Politics*, vii. iv. 8: τό γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἶωθε γίνεσθαι. *Poetics*, vii. 8: τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστὶ. Cf. also the story of Phye in Herodotus, i. c. 60. Against such critics of beauty as the Greeks, nothing is to be said.

τοιούτον δ' ἡ τιμή· μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. περὶ τιμᾶς δὴ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν
 11 ὡς δεῖ. καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι
 περὶ τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ μάλισθ' οἱ μεγάλοι ἀξιούσιν
 12 ἑαυτούς, κατ' ἀξίαν δέ. ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ
 13 πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα. ὁ δὲ
 χαῦνος πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τὸν γε μεγαλό-
 14 ψυχον. ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἀξιος,
 ἄριστος ἂν εἴη· μείζονος γὰρ αἰὶ ὁ βελτίων ἀξιος, καὶ
 μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος. τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον
 δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. καὶ δόξειε δ' ἂν εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν
 15 ἐκάστῃ ἀρετῇ μέγα. οὐδαμῶς τ' ἂν ἀρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ
 φεύγειν παρασείσαντι, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα πρά-
 ξει αἰσχρά, ὃ οὐθὲν μέγα; καθ' ἕκαστα δ' ἐπισκοποῦντι
 πάμπαν γελοῖός φαίνεται ἂν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς
 ὧν. οὐκ εἴη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἀξιος φαῦλος ὧν· τῆς
 ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἄθλον ἡ τιμή, καὶ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.
 16 ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος τις εἶναι τῶν
 ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ
 ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον

10—11 τοιούτον δ'—κατ' ἀξίαν δεῖ] 'Such a prize is honour, which is the greatest of all outward goods. Therefore the highminded man bears himself as he ought with regard to honour and dishonour. But why should we prove what is obvious, that the study of magnanimous minds is honour? And great men lay especial claim to honour, yet according to their desert.' Aristotle here fixes external honour as the object with which highmindedness deals. Afterwards he sets it above all external honour (§ 17), ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμή. Honour is not good enough, but the world has nothing better to give.

15 οὐδαμῶς—παρασείσαντι] 'It would never suit the highminded man to fly in ungaceful haste.' Γα-α-

σεῖειν (i.e. τὰς χεῖρας) meant 'to work the hands in running.' Cf. *De Incess. Animal.* iii. 4, where the principle of the lever is shown to be involved in this motion. Διὸ καὶ οἱ πένταθλοι ἄλλονται πλεῖον ἔχοντες τοὺς ἀλτῆρας ἢ μὴ ἔχοντες, καὶ οἱ θέοντες θάπτον θέουσι παρασείοντες τὰς χεῖρας· γίνεται γὰρ τις ἀπέρεσις ἐν τῇ διατάσει πρὸς τὰς χεῖρας καὶ τοὺς καρπούς.

16 ἔοικε μὲν οὖν—καλονἀγαθίας] 'Now highmindedness appears to be, as it were, a sort of crown of the virtues; it enhances them, and it cannot come into existence without them. Hence it is hard to be highminded in the true sense of the term, for this is impossible without accomplished excellence.' The word 'magnanimity' is the conventional

εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας. μάλιστα μὲν¹⁷
οὖν περὶ τιμᾶς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστι, καὶ ἐπὶ
μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως ἡσθή-
σεται, ὥς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων· ἀρετῆς
γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμῇ· οὐ μὲν ἀλλ' ἀπο-
δέξεται γὰρ τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν. τῆς
δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλιγωρήσει·
οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιός. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας. οὐ γὰρ
ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ¹⁸
εἴρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμᾶς, οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ
πλοῦτον καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν
μετρίως ἔξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὗτ' εὐτυχῶν περιχαρῆς
ἔσται οὗτ' ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν οὕτως
ἔχει ὥς μέγιστον ὄν. αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος
διὰ τὴν τιμὴν ἐστὶν αἰρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶ-
σθαι δι' αὐτῶν βούλονται. ὧ δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστι,
τούτω καὶ τᾶλλα. διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. δοκεῖ¹⁹
δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν.
οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ οἱ
πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπερέχον πᾶν
ἐντιμότερον. διὸ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ.
τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ τινῶν. κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ' ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος²⁰
τιμητέος· ὧ δ' ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς.
οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως

representative of μεγαλοψυχία, but it does not really answer to it. 'Magnanimity' often implies rather generosity, and what Aristotle calls ἐπιείκεια, than that loftiness of spirit which he attributes to the μεγαλόψυχος. The difficulty of finding English words to answer to the terms of Aristotle has given rise to a practice, not to be commended, of constantly using Greek terms while speaking of the system of Aristotle. It is better to paraphrase if we cannot translate.

καλοκαγαθίας] This abstract noun does not occur in Plato, who fre-

quently uses the words καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθός (written separately) in the common Athenian sense, denoting very much what we mean by 'a gentleman.' By Aristotle the word is used with no peculiar moral import; τῶν ἐν βίῳ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν occurs *Eth.* i. viii. 9, to denote generally 'what is noble and excellent in life.' Eudemus appears to have developed the idea of καλοκαγαθία, and to have understood by it the perfection of moral virtue combined with the service and contemplation of God. Cf. *Eth. Eud.* viii. iii. 15, and see Essay i. p. 23.

ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιούσιν οὔτε ὀρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγον-
 21 ται. ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. ὑπερ-
 όπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρίζονται καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ
 γίνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ῥάδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ
 εὐτυχήματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν
 ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ' ὅ τι
 ἂν τύχῃσι πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον
 οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν
 οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν
 22 ἄλλων. ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ (δοξάζει
 23 γὰρ ἀληθῶς), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ
 μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμαῖν, μεγα-
 λοκίνδυνος δέ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, ἀφειδῆς τοῦ βίου ὡς οὐκ
 24 ἄξιον ὄν πάντως ζῆν. καὶ οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος
 δ' αἰσχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ' ὑπερεχο-
 μένου. καὶ ἀντευεργετικὸς πλείονων· οὕτω γὰρ προσ-
 25 οφλήσει ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονηθῶς. δοκοῦσι δὲ
 καὶ μνημονεύειν οὓς ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, ὧν δ' ἂν πάθωσιν
 οὐ· ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὖ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται
 δ' ὑπερέχειν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκούει, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ
 καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διί· οὐδ' οἱ
 Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἃ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ.

22 ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος—τυχόντως]
 'But the highminded man despises
 justly (for his estimate is true), but
 most people do so at haphazard.'
 Throughout, the great man is justified
 in the high position he assumes by
 reason of the correctness of his
 estimate. Modern ideas of delicacy, to
 say the least, would proscribe this
 accuracy of self-appreciation, and the
 claims founded upon it.

24—26 He is glad to do a benefit
 and ashamed to receive one; he will
 wipe out a favour by doing a greater
 one in return; he will remember
 those whom he has benefited, but
 not those by whom he has been
 benefited; he will be in want of no

one; he will serve any readily; he
 will be proud to the great, and easy
 with the lowly, &c. On the principle
 of independence, which appears here
 in an extreme form, see above, note
 on ch. i. § 16.

διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν] Homer, *Iliad* i.
 503—4. She only says—

εἴποτε δὴ σε μετ' ἀθανάτοισιν ὄνησα
 ἢ ἔπει ἢ ἔργῳ.

οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες] This is said to
 have been on the occasion of a The-
 ban invasion into Laconia. Aspasius
 quotes from Callisthenes a mention of
 the circumstance. Xenophon is thought
 to allude to the same event (*Hell.* vi.
 v. 33), where, however, he makes the
 Spartans enumerate their services.

μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ μηθενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόγῃς, ὑπηρετεῖν²⁶
 δὲ προθύμως, καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις
 μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μέσους μέτριον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ
 ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ σεμνόν, τῶν δὲ ῥάδιον, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις
 μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικόν,
 ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα²⁷
 μὴ ἵεναι, ἢ οὐ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι· καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι καὶ
 μελλητὴν ἀλλ' ἢ ὅπου τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλίγων
 μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστών. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ²⁸
 καὶ φανερόμισον εἶναι καὶ φανερόφιλον· τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν
 φοβούμενον. καὶ μέλειν τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης,
 καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν φανερώς· παρρησιαστῆς γὰρ διὰ
 τὸ καταφρονεῖν. διὸ καὶ ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ
 δι' εἰρωνείαν· εἰρωνεα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς. καὶ πρὸς²⁹
 ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἀλλ' ἢ πρὸς φίλον· δουρικὸν γάρ,
 διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες.
 οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός· οὐθὲν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν. οὐδὲ³⁰
 μνησικάκος· οὐ γὰρ μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν,
 ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. οὐδ' ἀνθρω-³¹
 πολόγος· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἐτέρου·
 οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῇται μέλει αὐτῷ οὐδ' ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι
 ψέγωνται, οὐδ' αὖ ἐπαινετικός ἐστίν· διόπερ οὐδὲ κακο-
 λόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι' ὕβριν. καὶ περὶ³²
 ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν ἥκιστα ὀλοφυρτικός καὶ δεητικός·

27—34 A list of characteristics follows, completing the picture of the lofty-minded man. He will not compete for the common objects of ambition (τὰ ἔντιμα); he will only attempt great and important matters, he will seem otherwise inactive; he will be open in friendship and hatred; really straightforward and deeply truthful, but reserved and ironical in manner to common people. Will live for his friend alone, will wonder at nothing, will bear no malice, will be no gossip (οὐκ ἀνθρωπολόγος), will not be anxious about trifles, and will care

more to possess that which is fine, than that which is productive. His movements are slow, his voice is deep, and his diction stately.

28 εἰρωνεα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς] Bekker has introduced this reading on the authority of one MS. alone; all the rest read εἰρωνεῖα. Εἰρωνεα is not strictly grammatical, but it is in accordance with the Aristotelian mode of writing; it comes in despite the nominative ἀληθευτικός, as a carrying on of the accusatives before used, καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι—καὶ ὀλίγων πρακτικόν, &c.

33 σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα. καὶ οἷος
 κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν καρπίμων καὶ
 34 ὠφελίμων· αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ κίνησις δὲ βραδεῖα
 τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξις
 στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπευστικὸς ὁ περὶ ὀλίγα σπουδάζων,
 οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μηθὲν μέγα οἰόμενος· ἡ δ' ὀξυφωνία καὶ
 35 ἡ ταχυτὴς διὰ τούτων. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος, ὁ
 δ' ἐλλείπων μικρόψυχος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων χαῦνος. οὐ κακοὶ
 μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι οὐδ' οὗτοι· οὐ γὰρ κακοποιοὶ εἰσιν·
 ἡμαρτημένοι δέ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρόψυχος ἄξιός ὢν ἀγαθῶν
 ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ὧν ἄξιός ἐστι, καὶ ἔοικε κακὸν ἔχειν τι ἐκ
 τοῦ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὃ ἑαυτὸν·
 ὠρέγετο γὰρ ἂν ὧν ἄξιός ἦν, ἀγαθῶν γε ὄντων. οὐ μὴν
 ἡλίθιοί γε οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀκνηροί.

35 οὐ κακοὶ—ἡμαρτημένοι δέ] 'Now it is true that these again are not bad, for they do no harm, but are only in error.' Οὐδέ refers to ch. ii. § 22. Vanity and want of spirit are, like pettiness and vulgarity, not very serious vices. Of the latter pair, speaking of the qualities and not the persons possessing them, he said they are κακίαι, but not disgraceful.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ—ἀγαθῶν] 'For the mean-spirited man, though worthy of good things, deprives himself of his deserts, and seems to be harmed by not appreciating his claims, and by ignorance of himself; else he would have aimed at the good things he had a claim to. Such characters, however, are not to be called foolish, but it is rather their energy that is deficient. Still this way of thinking seems to have a bad effect upon the character: for men's aims are regulated by their opinions of their merits, but these men draw back from noble actions and pursuits, thinking themselves unworthy; and in the same way they cut themselves off from external advantages.' From

these considerations, and from the whole tendency of his system, Aristotle decides that want of spirit is worse than vanity (§ 37), and he also asserts that it is more common. Want of elevated aims, want of effort, of will, of individuality, these are indeed fatal deficiencies as regards the attainment of what is fine and noble in character. The conception of 'humility' is of course quite beside the system of Aristotle, but we may observe that it does not come into necessary collision with a condemnation of μικροψυχία. For this latter implies a want of moral aspiration. Now it is desirable to combine with humility the greatest amount of moral aspiration.

ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀκνηροί] Another reading, supported by several MSS., is νοεροί, which the Scholiast explains by δριμεῖς καὶ ἐπισοητικοί. The Paraphrast, however, gives νωθροί, which supports the present reading. Νοεροί makes good sense, since it is true that want of spirit often accompanies an intellectual turn of mind, men's 'native hue of resolution' being

ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ χείρους ποιεῖν· ἕκαστοι γὰρ ἐφίενται τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν, ἀφίστανται δὲ καὶ τῶν πράξεων τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι ἡλίθιοι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς³⁶ ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπιφανῶς· ὡς γὰρ ἄξιοι ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἴτα ἐξελέγχονται· καὶ ἐσθῆτι κοσμοῦνται καὶ σχήματι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ βούλονται τὰ εὐτυχήματα φανερὰ εἶναι αὐτῶν, καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς διὰ τούτων τιμηθῆσόμενοι. ἀντιτίθεται δὲ τῇ³⁷ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ ἡ μικροψυχία μᾶλλον τῆς χαυνότητος· καὶ γὰρ γίνεταί μᾶλλον καὶ χεῖρόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγα-³⁸λοψυχία περὶ τιμὴν ἐστὶ μεγάλην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.

Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετὴ τις, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς 4 πρώτοις ἐλέχθη, ἡ δόξειεν ἂν παραπλησίως ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν. ἄμφω γὰρ αὗται τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφεστᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰ μικρὰ διατιθέασιν ἡμᾶς ὡς δεῖ. ὥσπερ δ' ἐν λήψει καὶ δόσει χρημάτων μεσότης ἐστὶ καὶ 2 ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τιμῆς ὀρέξει τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἥττον, καὶ τὸ ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. τὸν τε 3 γὰρ φιλότιμον ψέγομεν ὡς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ τῆς τιμῆς ἐφιεμένον, τὸν τε ἀφιλότιμον ὡς οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς προαιρούμενον τιμᾶσθαι. ἐστὶ δ' ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον 4

'sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought.' Yet, on the other hand, it is possible that νοεροί has come to supplant δοκηροί from a mistake arising from a fancied antithesis to ἡλίθιοι.

IV. Descending now from what is extraordinary to the common level, Aristotle discusses another virtue which bears the same relation to high-mindedness as liberality does to magnificence, namely, the virtue of a laudable ambition. This is concerned with the desire for honour as it exists in ordinary men. There is no name for this virtue, but language testifies to the existence of extremes, hence

we may infer a mean. There are two words, ambitious and unambitious; both these are made terms of reproach, thus implying that there must be a middle quality, in relation to which they are each extremes. Again, both are used as terms of praise, which shows that each in turn lays claim to the mean place, as setting itself off against its opposite.

1 καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις] Cf. *Eth.* II. vii. 8. This expression might seem to suggest that the present passage was written after an interval; it is repeated in § 4.

4 ἐστὶ δ' ὅτε—μέσον] 'But sometimes we praise the ambitious man as

- ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον, τὸν δὲ ἀφιλότιμον ὡς μέτριον καὶ σώφρονα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἶπομεν. ὁῦλον δ' ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιοῦτου λεγομένου οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αἰεὶ φέρομεν τὸν φιλότιμον, ἀλλ' ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. ἀωνύμου δ' οὔσης τῆς μεσότητος, ὡς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἅκρα· ἐν οἷς δ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ 5 ἑλλειψις, καὶ τὸ μέσον. ὀρέγονται δὲ τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἡττον, ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ ὡς δεῖ· ἐπαινεῖται γοῦν ἡ ἕξις αὕτη, μεσότης οὔσα περὶ τιμὴν ἀνώνυμος. φαίνεται δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἀφιλοτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀφιλοτιμίαν φιλοτιμία, πρὸς ἀμφοτέρα δὲ ἀμφοτέρᾳ πως. 6 ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ' εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. ἀντικεῖσθαι δ' ἐνταῦθ' οἱ ἅκροι φαίνονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ὠνομάσθαι τὸν μέσον.
- 5 Πραότης δ' ἐστὶ μὲν μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς, ἀωνύμου δ' ὄντος τοῦ μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἁκρων, ἐπὶ τὸν μέσον

manly and noble-spirited, and sometimes we praise the unambitious man as moderate and soberminded, as mentioned in our first remarks. Now it is plain that as the term "lover of anything" is used in more senses than one, we do not always apply the term "lover of honour" to express the same thing, but when we praise, we praise that ambition which is more than most men's, and when we blame, we blame that which is greater than it should be. The mean state having no name, the extremes contend, as it were, for this unoccupied ground; but still it exists: for where there is excess and defect there must also be a mean.'

6 ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ' εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς] Cf. *Eth.* II. viii. 1-2.

V. The regulation of the temper (μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς) is the next subject for discussion. Aristotle con-

fesses that there is no name for this, but he provisionally calls it mildness, though this term is also used to express a deficiency in the feeling of anger. Excess in this feeling has various forms, and accordingly various names; the passionate (ὀργίλοι), the hasty (ἁκρόχολοι), the sulky (πικροί), the morose (χαλεποί), all come under the same category as showing excessive or ill-directed anger. Aristotle does not here enter upon the philosophy of anger, inquire its final cause, and in accordance with this determine its right manifestation. He says it is human to avenge oneself (§ 12), and not to resent certain things is slavish (§ 6) and a moral defect, hence we must have a certain amount of anger. This amount must be duly regulated, but where the true mean is cannot be laid down in the abstract (οὐ βῆδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι); it depends on the particular circum-

τὴν πραότητα φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἀποκλίνουσιν, ἀνώνυμον οὖσαν. ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιλότης τις λέγοιτ' ἂν. 2 τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή, τὰ δ' ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ διαφέροντα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος, 3 εἴτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται· πρᾶος δὲ οὗτος ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ ἡ πραότης ἐπαινεῖται. βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾶος ἀτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν. ἀμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ 4 μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν. οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικὸς ὁ πρᾶος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον συγγνωμονικός. ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις, εἴτ' ἀοργησία 5 τίς ἐστὶν εἴθ' ὅ τι δὴ ποτε, ψέγεται. οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ ἡλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ οἱ μὴ ὡς δεῖ μὴδ' ὅτε μὴδ' οἷς δεῖ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ 6 λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργιζόμενός τε οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός. τὸ δὲ προπηλακίζομενον ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιόρᾶν

stances, and must be left to the intuitive judgment of the mind (ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις).

3-6 βούλεται γὰρ—ἀνδραποδῶδες] 'For the term "mild man" means one that should be dispassionate and not carried away by his feeling, but should be angry in the way, at the things, and for so long a time, as the mental standard may have appointed. Yet this character seems rather to incline to error on the side of deficiency, for the mild man is more apt to pardon than to resent. But the deficiency is a moral fault (ψέγεται), whether it be called perhaps (τις) want of anger, or whatever else. For men seem fools who do not feel anger at things at which they ought to feel it, or in the manner they ought, or at the time they ought, or with the persons they ought. Such a man seems to be devoid of feeling and of the sense of pain, and since nothing provokes him, he seems not to know how to defend himself: but to suffer

insult or to stand by and see one's friends insulted is servile.'

βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾶος] βούλεται appears to be used here in a doubtful sense, something between 'the word mild means,' &c., and 'the mild man has a tendency to,' &c.; cf. ch. i. § 5, note.

τὸ δὲ προπηλακίζομενον] Had the *Ethics* been composed on a psychological plan, what is said here might have been arranged under the head of θυμός, and would have been connected with the relation of θυμός to courage, which is discussed above, *Eth.* iii. viii. 10-12. The present passage is admirably illustrated by Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, Act II. Scene 2:

'Am I a coward?

Who calls me villain? breaks my pate across?

Plucks off my beard and blows it in my face?

Tweaks me by the nose? gives me the lie i' the throat

- 7 ἀνδραποδῶδες. ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται· καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ θάττον, καὶ πλείω χρόνον· οὐ μὴν ἅπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτ' εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, καὶ ὁλόκληρον ἦ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται.
- 8 οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν ὀργίζονται καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, παύονται δὲ ταχέως· ὁ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν. συμβαίνει δ' αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ' ἀνταποδιδόασιν ἢ φανεροί
- 9 εἰσι διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, εἴτ' ἀποπαύονται. ὑπερβολῇ δ' εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκρόχολοι ὀξεῖς καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ὀργίλοι καὶ ἐπὶ
- 10 παντί· ὕβεν καὶ τῶνομα. οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσδιάλυτοι, καὶ

As deep as to the lungs? Who does me this?

Ha! why I should take it: for it cannot be

But I am pigeon-liver'd, and lack gall

To make oppression bitter.'

7 ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ—γίνεται] 'Now the excess is possible under all heads, the wrong people, the wrong things, more, quicker, longer, than is right. However, these excesses cannot all coexist in the same man. This would be impossible. For evil destroys even itself, and if it exist in its entirety, it becomes unbearable.' Psychological reasons might be assigned why the same person cannot be passionate, peevish, and sulky. But Aristotle here gives an abstract generalization—that the different forms of evil are mutually destructive, and that it is only by tempering evil with a certain admixture of good that its existence can be borne.

8 συμβαίνει δ'—ἀποπαύονται] 'This happens because they do not keep in their anger, but make immediate reprisals, so that their anger is betrayed by their hastiness, and then they are done.' The words ἢ φανεροί

εἰσι can have nothing to do with the principle given in the *Rhetoric*, II. II. 1, that anger desires to make itself manifestly felt, else we must have had ἢ φανεροί ἂν εἶσαν. The Paraphrast simply renders οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν, οὐδὲ κρύπτουσιν, ἀλλὰ ἐξάγονται καὶ ἀμύνονται εὐθύς.

9 οἱ ἀκρόχολοι] 'The hasty.' The older form of this word is ἀκράχολοι. The etymology appears to be ἄκρος and χολή, as if 'on the point' or 'extreme verge of anger.' On the same analogy we find the word ἀκροσφαλής, 'on the verge of being overturned,' 'rickety,' cf. Plato, *Repub.* p. 404 n. Plato speaks of passionate and peevish people as having become so through the enervating of an originally noble and spirited temperament. Cf. *Repub.* p. 411 b—413: ἐὰν δὲ θυμοειδῇ (ἐξ ἀρχῆς λάβῃ), ἀσθενῇ ποιήσας τὸν θυμὸν ὑξύρροπον ἀπειργάσατο, ἀπὸ σμικρῶν ταχὺν ἐρεθιζόμενόν τε καὶ κατασβεννύμενον. ἀκρόχολοι οὖν καὶ ὀργίλοι ἀντὶ θυμοειδοῦς γεγέννηται, δυσκολίας ἐμπλεοί. κ.τ.λ.

10 οἱ δὲ πικροί—φίλοις] 'But the sulky are hard to bring round, and are angry a long time, for they keep in their wrath. Now there is a

πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι γὰρ τὸν θυμόν. παῦλα δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῶ· ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα· τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπεῖθει αὐτοὺς οὐδεὶς, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ πέσαι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖ. εἰσὶ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότατοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις. χαλεποὺς δὲ λέγομεν τοὺς ἐφ' οἷς τε μὴ¹¹ δεῖ χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ πλείω χρόνον, καὶ μὴ διαλλαττομένους ἄνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως. τῇ¹² πραότητι δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν· καὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται· ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι. καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβιοῦν οἱ χαλεποὶ χεῖρους. ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν¹³ τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον, καὶ τὸ μέχρι τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιεῖ τις ἢ ἁμαρτάνει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττον. ἐνίοτε γὰρ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, καὶ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν. ὁ δὲ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκβαίνων ψεκτός, οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. ἀλλὰ τό γε τοσοῦτον δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν μέση¹⁴ ἕξις ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμεθα καὶ ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις ψεκταί, καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν γινόμεναι ἡρέμα, ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ μᾶλλον, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφόδρα. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι

natural termination, when one has wreaked one's resentment, since revenge stops anger by substituting a feeling of pleasure for that of pain. But if this does not take place, these people continue to feel their burden. Their feeling is not manifest, and so no one reasons them out of it, while to digest it internally requires time. Therefore such persons are exceedingly vexatious both to themselves and to their best friends.' An admirable

account of sulkiness, on which nothing more need be said.

13 ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἰρηται] This refers to *Eth.* II. ix. 7-9, which passage is with some amplification almost exactly repeated here. This part of the *Ethics* is written with a constant reference to Book II., and yet as if the subject had been taken up again to be worked out after an interval.

- 15 τῆς μέσης ἕξως ἀνθεκτέον. αἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἕξεις εἰρήσθωσαν.
- 6 Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν καὶ λόγων καὶ πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν οἱ μὲν ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ πάντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οὐθὲν ἀντιτείνοντες, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄλυποι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας τούτοις πρὸς πάντα ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν φροντίζοντες δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες καλοῦνται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἕξεις ψεκταὶ εἰσιν, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μέση τούτων ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν ἀποδέχεται ἅ δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ. ὄνομα δ' οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ τι, ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα φιλία· τοιοῦτος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν μέσην ἕξιν ὅον βουλόμεθα λέγειν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ φίλον, τὸ στέργειν προσλαβόντα. διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ ἐχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι. ὁμοίως γὰρ πρὸς ἀγνώτας καὶ γνωρίμους καὶ συνήθεις καὶ ἀσυνήθεις αὐτὸ ποιήσει, πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις ὡς ἀρμόζει. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει

VI. The next subject is the regulation of one's deportment in society, with regard especially to complacency or the reverse. This also is a balance between extremes, avoiding on the one side surliness (τὸ δύσκολον), and on the other side the conduct both of the weak assentor (ἄρεσκος), and of the interested flatterer (κόλαξ). The balance has no name, it is most like friendship, but differs from it in being devoid of affection, and being extended to all in proper degrees. There is a slight departure here from Book II. vii. 11-13, and it may be said that the present treatment is an improvement. Before (*l.c.*) it was said, there are three virtues connected with speech and action in society: the first is about what is true, the others about what is pleasant. But here the quality which concerns the deport-

ment and whole spirit of a man in society is rightly treated as most generic, and placed first. In Book II. the name φιλία is unreservedly given to the quality in question, but here no name is assigned, and only a resemblance to friendship is pointed out.

5 οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως—λυπεῖν] 'For it is not fitting that we should pay the same regard to familiars and to strangers, nor again have we an equal title to put them to pain.' This latter clause is explained in §§ 7-9, where it is laid down that though the general object will be to give pleasure, yet that a man must bring himself to give pain on occasion, with a view to important moral consequences in the future. He would, of course, feel himself more bound to exercise this duty with regard to friends. Φροντίζειν is a

συνήθων καὶ ὀθνείων φροντίζειν, οὐδ' αὖ λυπεῖν. καθόλου 6
 μὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὅτι ὡς δεῖ ὁμιλήσει, ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ
 καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον στοχάζεται τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖν ἢ
 συνηθύνειν. ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι 7
 τὰς ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις γινομένας, τούτων δ' ὅσας μὲν αὐτῷ
 ἐστὶ μὴ καλὸν ἢ βλαβερὸν συνηθύνειν, δυσχερανεῖ, καὶ
 προαιρήσεται λυπεῖν. καὶ τῷ ποιοῦντι δ' ἀσχημοσύνην
 φέρη, καὶ ταύτην μὴ μικράν, ἢ βλάβην, ἢ δ' ἐναντίωσις
 μικράν λύπην, οὐκ ἀποδέξεται ἀλλὰ δυσχερανεῖ. διαφε- 8
 ρόντως δ' ὁμιλήσει τοῖς ἐν ἀξιώμασι καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι, καὶ
 μᾶλλον ἢ ἥττον γνωρίμοις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας
 διαφοράς, ἐκάστοις ἀπονέμων τὸ πρέπον, καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν
 αἰρούμενος τὸ συνηθύνειν, λυπεῖν δ' εὐλαβούμενος, τοῖς δ'
 ἀποβαίνουσιν, ἐὰν ᾗ μείζω, συνεπόμενος, λέγω δὲ τῷ καλῷ
 καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι. καὶ ἡδονῆς δ' ἕνεκα τῆς εἰσαυθις
 μεγάλης μικρὰ λυπήσει. ὁ μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, 9
 οὐκ ὠνόμασται δέ, τοῦ δὲ συνηθύνοντος ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἡδῦς εἶναι
 στοχαζόμενος μὴ δι' ἄλλο τι ἄρεσκος, ὁ δ' ὅπως ὠφέλειά
 τις αὐτῷ γίγνηται εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων,
 κόλαξ· ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων εἴρηται ὅτι δύσκολος καὶ

general expression, implying as much care to please, as care for the welfare of the persons in question.

6-7 καθόλου — δυσχερανεῖ] 'We have said generally that (the good man) will associate with people as he ought, but we may add (δε) that, with a constant reference to what is noble and good, he will aim at not giving pain, or at contributing pleasure. The province of his virtue lies among the pleasures and pains that arise out of social intercourse, and wherever in giving pleasure he would dishonour or injure himself, he will make a difficulty, and rather choose to give pain than such gratification. And if there be something which will bring, to any considerable degree, disgrace or harm on the doer, while opposition will give him slight pain, he will not approve it, but will show his repug-

nance.' (1) It may be derogatory to oneself to show complacency. (2) It may be hurtful to some member of the company. These cautions show the moral and thoughtful spirit by which Aristotle would have conduct in society regulated. The following section prescribes the bearing of a finished gentleman, giving to all their due. It must not be forgotten that Aristotle himself had played the part, not only of a philosopher, but also of a courtier.

9 δύσκολος] Eudemus uses the word ἀνιδόνης to denote this character (*Eth. Eud.* iii. vii. 4), in which he is followed by Theophrastus (*Characters*, c. 15) and the author of the *Magna Moralia* (i. xxix.). Eudemus makes the mean state σεμνότης, which is a departure from the present treatment.

δύσερις. ἀντικεισθαι δὲ φαίνεται τὰ ἄκρα ἑαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ μέσον.

- 7 Περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχεδὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας μεσότης· ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὕτη. οὐ χεῖρον δὲ καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπελθεῖν· μαλλὸν τε γὰρ ἂν εἰδείημεν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἥθος, καθ' ἕκαστον διελθόντες, καὶ μεσότητας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς πιστεύσαιμεν ἂν, ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχον συνιδόντες. ἐν δὲ τῷ συζῆν οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες εἴρηνται, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀληθεύοντων τε καὶ ψευδομένων εἴπωμεν ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι καὶ τῷ προσποιή-
 2 ματι. δοκεῖ δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζὼν προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων
 3 εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἴρων ἀνάπαλιν ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν,
 4 ὁ δὲ μέσος αὐθέκαστός τις ὢν ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ

VII. There follows another nameless excellence closely connected with the former, having still to do with demeanour in society; this, by a curious formula, is termed the regulation of boastfulness (ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας μεσότης). The boastful man lays claim to honourable qualities which he does not possess, or to a greater degree than he possesses them (δοκεῖ προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι κ.τ.λ.), while the ironical man denies or understates his own merits. The balance between these two is found in the straightforward character (αὐθέκαστός τις), who in word and deed neither diminishes nor exaggerates his own good qualities. In *Eth.* II. vii. 12, the provisional name ἀλήθεια was given to this virtue, but here Aristotle points out that it is to be distinguished from 'truth,' in the more serious sense of the word, that 'truth' which makes the difference between justice and injustice. What he is at present concerned with is merely a truthfulness of manner, though he confesses (§ 8) that this has a moral worth (ἐπιεικής), and

that the man who is truthful in little things will also be truthful in more important affairs.

3 εἴρων] This is an excessively difficult word to express in English. 'Ironical' has acquired an association of bitterness and taunting,—'Dissembler' of craft. If we render it by 'over-modest' we trench upon the qualities of the μικρόψυχος, and imply too much that is connected with the whole character. Εἰρωνεία as here spoken of is simply an affair of the manner; there appear to be two forms of it, one that refined species exhibited by Socrates, the other an affectation of humility which is really contemptible. There is perhaps no one English word to express these two forms, the only resource appears to be to use the word 'Ironical' in a restricted sense. Εἴρων in Theophrastus (*Char.* I.) is already used in a worse sense than in Aristotle, to denote one who dissembles for selfish motives, and whose whole life is artificial and deceitful.

αὐθέκαστος] probably from αὐτὸ ἕκαστον 'everything exactly as it is,'

τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογῶν εἶναι περὶ αὐτόν, καὶ οὔτε μερίζω οὔτε ἐλάττω. ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα καὶ ἕνεκά 5 τινος ποιεῖν καὶ μηθενός. ἕκαστος δ' οἷός ἐστι, τοιαῦτα λέγει καὶ πράττει καὶ οὔτω ζῇ, ἐὰν μὴ τινος ἕνεκα πράττῃ. καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ' 6 ἀληθές κάλον καὶ ἐπαινετόν. οὔτω δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀληθευτικός μέσος ὧν ἐπαινετός, οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι ἀμφοτέροι μὲν ψεκτοί, μᾶλλον δ' ὁ ἀλαζών. περὶ ἑκατέρου δ' εἴπωμεν, πρότερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀληθευτικοῦ. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν 7 ταῖς ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος λέγομεν, οὐδ' ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ δικαιοσύνην συντείνει (ἄλλης γὰρ αὖν εἴη ταῦτ' ἀρετῆς), ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς μηθενός τοιούτου διαφέροντος καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἔξιν τοιοῦτος εἶναι. δόξεις δ' 8 αὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ φιλαλήθης, καὶ ἐν οἷς μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθεύων, ἀληθεύσει καὶ ἐν οἷς διαφέρει ἔτι μᾶλλον. ὥς γὰρ αἰσχροὺς τὸ ψεῦδος εὐλαβήσεται, ὃ γε καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ ἠύλαβεῖτο· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἐπαινετός. ἐπὶ τὸ ἐλάττον δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀποκλίνει· 9

and hence a 'matter-of-fact' or 'straightforward' man.

5—6 ἔστι δὲ—ἀλαζών] 'Now it is possible to practise both irony and boastfulness either with or without a particular motive. But in general a man speaks, acts, and lives, in accordance with his character, unless he have a particular motive. Falsehood is in itself base and reprehensible, and truth is noble and praiseworthy. And thus the truthful man, who occupies the mean, is praiseworthy, while those who strive to give a false impression of themselves are both reprehensible, and especially the boaster.' Aristotle first appears to assert that both irony and boastfulness are prompted generally by a particular motive, for, if it were not so, men would be simple and natural. Afterwards we are told that boastfulness is a condition of the will (ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει), that it aims at either gain or reputation,—that irony may

spring from a motive of refinement, or again from vanity itself. These things however may aim at reputation and yet be instinctive, the desire for reputation forming part of men's natural impulses.

8 δόξεις δ' αὖν—ἐπαινετός] 'But this character appears to possess a moral excellence. For the lover of truth, who adheres to what is true even in things where it does not matter, will be still more truthful in affairs of importance, for he will surely avoid a lie when it appears as something base, when he avoided it before merely for its own sake.' The writing here is a little careless, since above, all lies were declared to be essentially base, but here a contrast seems to be drawn between the 'white lie' in society, and the base lie in affairs of importance. It throws great light upon the nature of Aristotle's table of the so-called 'virtues'

ἐμμελέστερον γὰρ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς ὑπερ-
 10 βολὰς εἶναι. ὁ δὲ μείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος
 μηθεὶς ἔνεκα φαύλῳ μὲν ἔοικεν (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχαιρε τῷ
 11 ψεύδει), μάταιος δὲ φαίνεται μᾶλλον ἢ κακός. εἰ δ' ἔνεκά
 τινος, ὁ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λίαν ψεκτός, τῶς ὁ ἀλαζών,
 12 ὁ δὲ ἀργυρίου, ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀργύριον, ἀσχημονέστερος. οὐκ
 ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ὃ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει·
 κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστιν,
 ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης ὁ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, ὁ δὲ
 13 δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους. οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν
 ἀλαζονεύοντες τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιοῦνται ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαινος
 ἢ εὐδαιμονισμός, οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσις ἐστι τοῖς
 πέλας καὶ ἂ διαλαθεῖν ἔστι μὴ ὄντα, ὅον μάντιν σοφὸν ἢ
 14 καὶ ἀλαζονεύονται· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα. οἱ
 δ' εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἦθη
 φαίνονται· οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἔνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ

to observe that he excludes from them truth proper, and admits truthfulness of manner.

10—12 ὁ δὲ μείζω—κέρδους] 'But the man who pretends to better qualities than he really possesses, if he has no motive, shows like a mean man, for else he would not have delighted in the falsehood, though he seems foolish rather than bad. Supposing there is a motive, if it be reputation or honour, the boaster is not to be severely blamed, but if it be money, directly or indirectly, his conduct is more discreditable. The boaster is not constituted by a given faculty, but by a particular condition of the will; for it is in accordance with his moral state, and by reason of his character, that he is a boaster, just as a man is a liar,—though the latter takes pleasure in falsehood itself, while the former aims at either reputation or gain.'

τῶς ὁ ἀλαζών] This makes no sense.

The Paraphrast omits ὥς altogether, rendering the passage, εἰ δὲ τινος ἔνεκα προσποιεῖται, εἰ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λίαν ψεκτός ὁ ἀλαζών. To follow his example seems the simplest remedy. One of the MSS. omits δ, which would give the sense 'he is not very blameable considering that he is a boaster.'

12 οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει—ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει] Cf. the well-known passage *Rhet.* I. i. 14, where the Sophist is said to be distinguished from the Dialectician not intellectually but morally, ὁ γὰρ σοφιστικὸς οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει.

13 This is a very happy observation, that desire for reputation makes men pretend to virtue, power and the like; but desire for gain makes them pretend to useful arts the possession of which cannot be tested; thus a man will give himself out to be a clever soothsayer or doctor.

14—15 οἱ δ' εἴρωνες—ἀλαζονικόν]

φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίει. οἱ δὲ καὶ τὰ ¹⁵ μικρὰ καὶ τὰ φανερὰ προσποιούμενοι βαυκοπανοῦργοι λέγονται καὶ εὐκαταφρόνητοί εἰσιν. καὶ ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεῖα φαίνεται, οἷον ἡ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθής· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ λίαν ἔλλειψις ἀλαζονικόν. οἱ δὲ μετρίως χρώμενοι ¹⁶ τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ καὶ περὶ τὰ μὴ λίαν ἐμποδῶν καὶ φανερὰ εἰρωνεύόμενοι χαρίεντες φαίνονται. ἀντικεισθαι δ' ὁ ἀλαζῶν ¹⁷ φαίνεται τῷ ἀληθευτικῷ· χείρων γάρ.

Οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ ⁸

‘Ironical persons, in depreciating themselves, exhibit it is true a certain refinement of character, for they do not appear to speak in that way for the sake of gain, but to avoid pomposity. These persons are especially given to disclaiming the possession of honourable qualities, just as Socrates used to do. But they who make a pretence about things petty and obvious are called “affected fops,” and are despised by every one. Sometimes this kind of conduct appears to be really pretension, as in the case of the Lacedaemonian dress; for both the excess and the extreme of deficiency are of the nature of boasting.’

φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν] Cf. above § 9: ἐμμελέστερον γὰρ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς εἶναι.

τὰ ἔνδοξα] Such as wisdom and the like, cf. § 2, where τὰ ἔνδοξα is used in the same sense, an unusual one in Aristotle. Cf. *Eth.* vii. i. 5, and note.

οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης] On the Irony of Socrates, see Vol. I., Essay II., p. 114.

15 προσποιούμενοι] It is impossible to understand this in the sense of ‘disclaiming’ which the context requires. The Paraphrast supplies μὴ δύνασθαι, and explains it very clearly, as follows, *ὅς δὲ οὐ μόνον τὰ μεγάλα*

καὶ ἔνδοξα ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μικρὰ ἀπαρνέεται, καὶ ἡ δὴ δῆλός ἐστι δυνάμενος ταῦτα προσποιεῖται μὴ δύνασθαι. But προσποιούμενος can never have been consciously meant to stand for this. There must have been some slip about the writing. Two of the MSS. read μὴ προσποιούμενοι. This sort of variation in MSS. does not show what was the original reading, but only that the transcribers felt a difficulty.

VIII. 1 Οὔσης δὲ—τοιούτων ἀκούειν] ‘Rest also being a part of human life, and an element of this being playful diversion, we find here likewise the sphere for a certain harmonious manner of intercourse, and the possibility of both speaking and hearing the right sort of things in the right way; though there will be a difference as to whether one is the speaker in such matters or listens to what is said.’

Aristotle considers the virtue of wit or tact (εἶτ' ἐπιδέξιος εἶτ' εὐτράπελος λέγεται) to be concerned with the amusing and sportive element in society, and to be a balance between buffoonishness that sacrifices all propriety to the ludicrous, and dullness that is incapable of either making or appreciating a joke. Aristotle does not here enter into the philosophy of the ludicrous, or inquire what is a

διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ὁμιλία τις ἐμμελῆς, καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὥς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκούειν. διοίσει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοιοῦτοις λέγειν ἢ τοιοῦτων ἀκούειν. 2 δῆλον δ' ὥς καὶ περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις 3 τοῦ μέσου. οἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες βωμολόχοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοί, γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λέγειν εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον· οἱ δὲ μήτ' αὐτοὶ ἂν εἰπόντες μηθὲν γελοῖον τοῖς τε λέγουσι δυσχεραίνοντες ἄγριοι καὶ σκληροὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. οἱ δ' ἐμμελῶς παίζοντες εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται, οἷον εὐτροποὶ· τοῦ γὰρ ἥθους αἱ τοιαῦται δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτω καὶ 4 τὰ ἥθη. ἐπιπολάζοντος δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαιρόντων τῇ παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ οἱ βωμολόχοι εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται ὥς χαρίεντες. ὅτι 5 δὲ διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐ μικρόν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον. τῇ μέσῃ δ' ἕξει οἰκεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδεξιότης ἐστίν· τοῦ δ' ἐπι-

joke and why it pleases. Nor does he lay down any canons for the regulation of wit, except such general ones as that 'nothing should be said which is unworthy of a gentleman' (*πότερον οὖν τὸν εὐ σκώποντα ὀριστεόν τῷ λέγειν & πρέπει ἐλευθερίῳ*); that the hearer must not be shocked, &c. On the whole he leaves it indefinite, saying that tastes differ, and the educated man will be a law to himself. His account of wit then is negative and abstract, though perfectly just as far as it goes.

διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς] διαγωγή is the passing of time, hence 'diversion.' Cf. *Metaphys.* i. i. 15: *πλειόνων δ' εὗρισκομένων τεχνῶν, καὶ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τὰναγκαῖα τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν οὐσῶν.* *Eth.* x. vi. 3: *καταφεύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμονιζομένων οἱ πολλοί.*

βωμολόχοι] This name seems originally to have belonged to the vile

creatures who lay in wait at the altars to purloin the offerings, and hence to have been applied to those who thought nothing too low for them, buffoons who would descend to anything.

3 οἱ δ' ἐμμελῶς—τὰ ἥθη] 'But they whose jocularity is in good taste are called men of elegant wit, as if it were nimble, by a name that signifies nimble-witted; for such motions of wit seem to belong to the moral character, and characters, like bodies, are judged by their movements.' Aristotle here calls attention to the etymology of *εὐτράπελος*, as he did before to that of *ἄσωτος*. Ch. i. § 5.

4 ἐπιπολάζοντος—χαρίεντες] 'But as the ludicrous meets us at every turn (*ἐπιπολάζοντος*, cf. *Eth.* i. iv. 4), and most people take pleasure in sport and jesting more than they ought, even buffoons get the name of witty just as though they were fine wits.'

δεξίου ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα τῷ ἐπεικεῖ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἀρμόττει· ἔστι γὰρ τινα πρέποντα τῷ τοιοῦτῳ λέγειν ἐν παιδιᾷς μέρει καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου παιδιὰ διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους, καὶ αὖ τοῦ πεπαιδευμένου καὶ ἀπαιδεύτου. ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν 6 κωμωδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἢ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπόνοια· διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρὸν ταῦτα πρὸς εὐσχημοσύνην. πότερον 7 οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὀριστεύον τῷ λέγειν ἢ πρέπει ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν ἀκούοντα, ἢ καὶ τέρπειν; ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀόριστον; ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ μισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ. τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ἀκούσεται· ἢ γὰρ ὑπομένει ἀκούων, 8 ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ. οὐ δὲ πᾶν ποιήσει· τὸ γὰρ 9 σκῶμμα λοιδόρημά τί ἐστιν, οἱ δὲ νομοθέται ἔνια λοιδορεῖν κωλύουσιν· ἔδει δ' ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν. ὁ δὲ χάριεις καὶ 10 ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἔξει, οἷον νόμος ὢν ἑαυτῷ. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μέσος ἐστίν, εἴτ' ἐπιδέξιός ἐστ' εὐτράπελος λέγεται· ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ

6 ἴδοι δ' ἂν—εὐσχημοσύνην] 'This we may see from a comparison of the old and the new comedy. In the former it is coarse language that provokes laughter, in the latter it is rather inuendo; which makes no small difference with respect to decorum.' This interesting remark is in accordance with what we know from other sources, of the comparative tameness of the new comedy in relation to the license of the old. Cf. Horace, *A.P.* 281 sqq.

9 οὐ δὲ πᾶν—σκώπτειν] 'Therefore he will not give utterance to every jest, for the jest is a sort of reviling, and the lawgivers forbid certain kinds of reviling—they ought doubtless to have forbidden (certain) jests.' ἔνια must be understood as carried on from λοιδορεῖν to σκώπτειν. Aristotle could never have wished that jesting altogether should be forbidden by the law.

ὁ δὲ χάριεις—ἑαυτῷ] 'This then will be the attitude of the refined and liberal man, he being as it were a law to himself.' Aristotle usually escapes from pure indefiniteness and relativity by asserting that the standard in each case is to be found in the good, the wise, the refined man. This standard is evidently the expression of the universal reason of man. It is not to be supposed that wit, beauty, or goodness are mere matters of taste, as Aristotle would seem for a moment to imply (ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀόριστον; ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ μισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ). When he adds afterwards that the educated man must be the standard of appeal, he means that the laws of reason must decide. And these might, had Aristotle thought it worth his while, have been more drawn out in reference to the question under discussion.

10—12 These sections are an

οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος, εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσῃ, καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων ὧν οὔτεν ἂν εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις, ἔνια δ' οὐδ' ἂν ἀκούσαι. ὁ δ' ἄγριος εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὀμιλίας ἀχρεῖος· οὔτεν γὰρ
 11 συμβαλλόμενος πᾶσι δυσχεραίνει. δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ἀνάπαυσις
 12 καὶ ἡ παιδιὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον. τρεῖς οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες, εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ λόγων τινῶν καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν. διαφέρουσι δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὀμιλίαις.

9 Περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν·

almost verbal repetition of what was said, *Eth.* II. vii. 11—13. They appear like an afterthought as compared with *Eth.* IV. vi. 1.

We perhaps ought hardly to quit the present subject without alluding to the remarks which Aristotle has elsewhere thrown out on the nature of wit and of the ludicrous. The most striking are *Rhet.* II. xii. 16, where he defines wit as 'chastened insolence,' ἡ γὰρ εὐτραπεία πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις ἐστίν, and his account of the ludicrous, that it consists in a thing being out of place, anomalous, ugly and faulty, though not in such a way as to cause any sense of apprehension or pain. *Poet.* V. 2: Τὸ γὰρ γελοῖον ἐστὶν ἀμάρτημά τι καὶ αἰσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν, οἷον εὐθὺς τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον ἄνευ ὀδύνης. This definition, which is to the highest degree penetrating, has been made by Coleridge the text for his admirable dissertations on wit and humour. See *Literary Remains*, Vol. I.

IX. 1—2 Περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς—εἶναι] 'Modesty we can scarcely with propriety describe as a virtue; for it has more of the feeling than of the state. It may, however, be defined as a kind

of fear of evil report; and in its effects it greatly resembles the fear of danger, for persons who are ashamed blush, and those who are in terror of death grow pale. Both therefore appear to be in a manner corporeal, which again approximates them to feelings rather than states.' Aristotle, following out the programme given, *Eth.* II. vii. 14—15, arrives now at the place for discussing two instances of the law of the balance existing in the instinctive feelings of the mind (ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι μεσότητες), namely modesty and indignation. But from some cause his work is interrupted here; indignation (Νέμεσις) is not treated of at all, and the discussion on modesty is left unfinished. There is no mention of the extremes, shamelessness (ἀναισχυντία) and shamefacedness (κατάπληξις), which are specified in Book II. (*l. c.*) and in *Eth. Eud.* III. vii. 2. After stating that only to certain ages is 'modesty' suitable, and that only in a certain provisional sense (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) can it be called a virtue, the chapter abruptly ends, a sentence having been added by some later hand which gives an appearance of finish to the book and awkwardly connects it with the opening of Book V.

πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἔξει. ὀρίζεται γοῦν φόβος τις ἀδοξίας, ἀποτελεῖται δὲ τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παρα-² πλήσιον· ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι, οἱ δὲ τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενοι ὠχρίῳσιν. σωματικὰ δὲ φαίνεται πως εἶναι ἀμφότερα, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξεως εἶναι. οὐ πάσῃ δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἀρμύζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ·³ οἰόμεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἀμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύ-
εσθαι. καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων τοὺς αἰδήμονας, πρεσβύτερον δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυνηλός· οὐθὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν πράττειν ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνῃ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνῃ, εἴπερ γίγνε-⁴ ται ἐπὶ τοῖς φαύλοις· οὐ γὰρ πρακτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα. εἰ⁵ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰσχυρὰ τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν, οὐθὲν διαφέρει· οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα, ὥστ' οὐκ αἰσχυ-
τέον. φαύλου δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πράττειν τι⁶ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν. τὸ δ' οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ' εἰ πράξειέ τι τῶν τοιούτων αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' οἴεσθαι ἐπιεικὴ εἶναι, ἄτοπον· ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδώς, ἐκὼν δὲ ὁ ἐπιει-
κὴς οὐδέποτε πράξει τὰ φαῦλα. εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδώς ἐξ⁷ ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικής· εἰ γὰρ πράξαι, αἰσχύνοιτ' ἂν. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. εἰ δ' ἡ ἀναισχυνητία φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχυρὰ πράττειν, οὐθὲν μᾶλλον τὸ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικές. οὐκ⁸

-3—5 αἰδώς is the apprehension of shame, joined of course with a capacity for strongly feeling it; neither modesty nor any other English word seems adequately to convey the force of αἰδώς. Aristotle speaks of it as a desirable quality in tender age, before the character is formed. But in maturer life the necessity for it, and therefore its merit, ceases to exist. It might be said that sensibility to shame ought to be preserved with regard to acts that are conventionally (κατὰ δόξαν) and not really (κατ' ἀλήθειαν) disgraceful; but Aristotle says that any possibility of feeling

shame must be avoided altogether, so that the former acts must not be done.

7—8 'Modesty can only be good hypothetically: if a person were to do so and so, he would be ashamed. But this is not the way with the virtues. Though shamelessness and the having no sensibility about base acts is bad, it does not follow that to do such things and feel shame is good. Just so continence is not a virtue, but a sort of mixed quality.' Ἐξ ὑποθέσεως 'conditionally' is opposed to ἀπλῶς 'absolutely.' While the virtues are absolutely good, modesty is only conditionally so.

ἔστι ὃ οὐδ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλὰ τις μικτή. †δειχθή-
σεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον. νῦν δὲ περὶ
δικαιοσύνης εἵπωμεν.

οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς]
The same formula occurs before, *Eth.*
I. vii. 20: ἱκανὸν ἐν τισι τὸ ὅτι δεῖχθῆναι
καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.

† δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς
ὑστερον. Nῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης
εἵπωμεν] Aristotle's MS. of the

fourth book having ended abruptly at
the word *μικτή*, Nicomachus or the
editor, whoever he was, in all proba-
bility added these clauses in order to
give the book a seeming union with
the three Eudemian books which were
now to be grafted on.

PLAN OF BOOK V.

HITHERTO all has been perfectly coherent and regular in the *Ethics* of Aristotle. Down to the ninth Chapter of Book IV., though all the parts may not have been composed at the same time, yet all belong to the same plan, and bear every mark of being the work of the same author. But the MS. of Book IV. seems suddenly to have broken off in the middle of a subject. Whether this was owing to mutilation, or to original incompleteness, there is now no means of saying. What is clear to us from internal evidence is, that the editor has at this point commenced supplying a *lacuna*; and accordingly three whole books are now introduced, which, though bearing a close resemblance to the style of Aristotle, and probably conveying, with only slight modifications, his actual system, yet belong to the *Ethics* of Eudemus, Aristotle's disciple, and thus have only an imperfect coherence with the present work. The chief arguments by which it is demonstrated that Books V., VI., VII., are only 'copies' from Aristotle by one of his school have been given, Essay I., pp. 33-43. These arguments may be briefly recapitulated as follows.

(1.) It is established both by probability and by internal evidence, that the *Eudemian Ethics*, and the *Magna Moralia*, are not works of Aristotle, but expositions of his system by his disciple Eudemus and by some later Peripatetic.

(2.) The three books in question form part of the *Eudemian*, as well as of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

(3.) They belong naturally to the *Eudemian Ethics* and fit into them without causing the slightest irregularity.

(4.) In the *Nicomachean Ethics* they are the cause of extreme irregularity, and of collisions and discrepancies which would be a disgrace to Aristotle as an author, if it could be supposed that he

had allowed them to remain in a work written by himself as a whole.

(5.) In style they possess all the peculiarities of Eudemus as far as his writing can be distinguished from that of Aristotle. These peculiarities are a sort of confusion of expression, as if philosophical thoughts were slurred in the repeating—a want of method and a frequent tautology—a fondness for logical formulæ—and an abundance of quotations from different kinds of literature.

(6.) In various philosophical questions, especially in psychology, these books contain an advance beyond the point arrived at in other parts of Aristotle's works, the *Politics*, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, &c., but they are consistent with the views in the *Eudemean Ethics*. This last argument is the most important, but also the most subtle, and it can only be followed up in detail by a careful examination of different passages as they occur.

(7.) Lastly, it may be said that there is no really strong argument in favour of attributing these books to the direct authorship of Aristotle, beyond a habit of belief which has depended on the question never being mooted. All arguments drawn from apparent quotations in the *Politics*, &c., on examination come to nothing.

The present Eudemian book on Justice bears probably the same relation to Aristotle's theory of Justice now lost, as the Eudemian theory of Pleasure in Book VII. bears to Aristotle's theory of Pleasure given in Book X. The Eudemian books have all a peculiar indistinctness which taxes the reader's thought to divine their exact bearing. But on consideration, the outlines of a method appear to show themselves through the mist. And accordingly, the following parts may perhaps be discerned in Book V.

(1.) Justice having been defined to be 'a state of mind that wills to do what is just,' the first part of the book is concerned with determining, what is the just? (*τὸ δίκαιον* as distinguished from *δικαιοσύνη*). The abstract principle of 'the just' may either be identified with all law and therefore with all morality; or it may be restricted to its proper sense, fair dealing with regard to possessions, &c. (*τὸ ἴσον*). In this restricted sense 'the just' finds its sphere either in distributions of the state, or in correcting the wrongs done in dealings between man and man. Though justice is not retaliation, yet in all commerce, &c., there is a sort of retaliation.

Ch. I.—V. § 16.

(2.) Having settled the nature of 'the just,' it follows to discuss 'justice,' or this same principle manifested in the mind of the individual. This part of the subject is very imperfectly carried out. We miss the graphic impersonations of the virtues with which the fourth book of Aristotle's *Ethics* is filled. We find nothing but a few barren remarks on voluntariness as necessary to make an act unjust, and deliberate purpose to constitute an unjust character. There is a large digression here on the proper sense of the word 'justice.' Justice, it is said, can only properly exist between citizens; it is a mere metaphor to talk of justice in families, &c. Ch. V. § 17.—Ch. VIII.

(3.) A set of questions are added, the answers to which go to supply deficiencies in the definition hitherto given of justice. The leading question is, Can one be injured voluntarily? and the answer to this shows that justice implies a relation between two distinct wills and interests. It is again repeated that justice must be a settled state of the character; thus the just man could not at will be unjust. The subject is concluded by an assertion that justice is essentially a human quality. Ch. IX.

(4.) An appendix follows on the nature of Equity, which is a higher and finer justice, dealing with exceptional cases and acting in the spirit not in the letter of the law. Ch. X.

(5.) Ch. XI. is evidently superfluous and out of place. It touches on the already settled question, Can a man injure himself? The *Eudemian Ethics* were probably never finished, and this is the only account that can be given of the irregularity.

This book, imperfect as it is if we look at it as a whole, is yet full of interesting suggestions, especially those in the fifth chapter on subjects which belong to political economy. It disappoints the reader, however, by seeming to approach questions, without absolutely dealing with them. Thus in Ch. III., there is very nearly a theory of the division of property; in Ch. IV., there is nearly a theory of punishment; and in Ch. V. nearly a theory of value and price. No one can say, however, that these questions are really met. There is considerable confusion in the treatment of cases of 'voluntary contracts,' and it is left entirely uncertain to what head of justice these belong. But even were the political questions more satisfactorily treated in this book, it must be said that the moral view of justice as an individual virtue is left strangely deficient.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ [ΕΥΔΗΜΙΩΝ] V.

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ΠΕΡΙ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκεπτέον, περὶ ποίας
 τε τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι πράξεις, καὶ ποία μεσότης
 2 ἔστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τίνων μέσον. ἡ δὲ
 σκέψις ἡμῖν ἔστω κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον τοῖς προειρημέ-
 3 νοις. ὁρῶμεν δὴ πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἔξιν βουλομένους

I. This chapter proposes and opens the discussion upon the nature of justice and injustice. The chief points it contains are as follows. (1) Justice and injustice must stand opposed to each other, as being two contrary states of mind. From the nature of one, we may infer its contrary the nature of the other, and if the one term be used in a variety of senses, the other term will be used in a corresponding variety of senses. (2) The term 'unjust man' is used in two senses, to denote one who is lawless, and one who is unfair. Therefore the term 'just' must denote both lawful and fair. (3) The lawful (τὸ νόμιμον) is simply all that the state has enacted for the welfare of its citizens. Therefore, in one sense, 'justice' means fulfilling all the requirements of law. Thus it is nothing else than perfect and consummate virtue. In this general sense justice is different from virtue only in the point of view which one would take in defining it.

1 ποία μεσότης] Aristotle proposed the question about the two kinds of

justice, 'in what sense are they mean states?' πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν (*Eth.* II. vii. 16), which is slightly different from the above. Cf. ch. v. § 17 of this book.

2 ἡ δὲ σκέψις—προειρημένοις] 'And let our inquiry be according to the same method as what has preceded.' This probably refers to the way in which the moral virtues have been treated in the preceding Book of the *Eudemian Ethics*. There is nothing distinctive about this method, or different from the procedure of Aristotle. What is most specially alluded to at present must be the fixing of the meaning of terms, which is now resorted to with regard to justice, and which was more or less employed before. Cf. *Eth. Eud.* III. v. 1—3, where the general method and the style of the writing has great affinity to the present opening. Περὶ δὲ μεγαλοψυχίας ἐκ τῶν τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις ἀποδιδομένων δεῖ διορίσαι τὸ ἴδιον (c conj. Bonitz. *Ceteri αἵτιον*). Ὡς περ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τὴν γειννάσιν καὶ ὁμοιότητα μέχρι τοῦ λανθάνειν πόρρω προΐοντα, καὶ περὶ

λέγειν δικαιοσύνην, ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ καὶ ἀφ' ἧς δικαιοπραγοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας, ἀφ' ἧς ἀδικοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ ἄδिका. διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν πρῶτον ὡς ἐν τύπῳ ὑποκείσθω ταῦτα. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν ἐπι-4 στημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔξισιν. δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι, ἔξις δ' ἢ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὐ, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγείας οὐ πράττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ μόνον· λέγομεν γὰρ ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν, ὅταν βαδίζῃ ὡς ἂν ὁ ὑγιαίνων. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται ἢ ἐναντία ἔξις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναν-5 τίας, πολλάκις δὲ αἱ ἔξεις ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων· ἐάν τε γὰρ ἢ εὐεξία ἢ φανερά, καὶ ἢ καχεξία φανερά γίνεται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν εὐεκτικῶν ἢ εὐεξία καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὰ εὐεκτικά. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἢ εὐεξία πυκνότης σαρκὸς, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν καχεξίαν εἶναι μανότητα σαρκὸς καὶ τὸ εὐεκτικὸν τὸ ποιητικὸν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκί. ἀκολουθεῖ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἐὰν 6 θάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, καὶ θάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγε-

τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ταῦτ' συμβέβηκεν.—
Λέγομεν δὲ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον κατὰ τὴν
τοῦ ὀνόματος προσηγορίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν
μεγέθει τινὶ ψυχῆς καὶ δυνάμει.
κ.τ.λ.

4 οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν—μόνον]
'(And I have specified them thus)
for it is not the same with developed
states as it is with sciences and
faculties. A faculty or a science
appears to be the same of contraries,
but a contrary state does not include
its contraries, as, for instance, from
health only healthful things and not
the contraries of health are produced.'
Γὰρ refers to the mention of both
justice and injustice separately, and
as opposed to each other. The writer
accounts for this by saying that a
δύναμις admits of contraries, but a
ἔξις not (see Vol. I. Essay IV. p.
187, 190). The style above is some-
what careless, for we first have ἐπιστήμη

τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ αὐτῇ, and then, to
answer to it, ἔξις ἢ ἐναντία τῶν
ἐναντίων οὐ.

5—6 Though a state does not include its contrary, yet its contrary may be inferred from it; and the state itself may be known by its particular manifestations (ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων), just as a bodily condition is known from the symptoms. If the name of a state be used in more senses than one (πλεοναχῶς), it follows usually that the name of its contrary will be used in more senses than one.

ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων] As we might say, 'from its facts,' the ὑποκείμενα being the singular instances in which a general notion is manifested. The meaning is, that τὰ δίκαια are to δικαιοσύνη as good symptoms are to good health. Τῶν ὑποκειμένων is an instance of the logical formulæ with which the writing of Eudemus abounds.

- 7 σθαι, ὅσον εἰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. ἔοικε δὲ πλεονα-
χῶς λέγεσθαι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ
σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν αὐτῶν λανθάνει καὶ οὐχ ὥσ-
περ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω δῆλη μᾶλλον· ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλή
ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν, ὅσον ὅτι καλεῖται κλείς ὁμωνύμως ἡ
τε ὑπὸ τὸν αὐχένα τῶν ζώων καὶ ἡ τὰς θύρας κλείουσιν.
8 εἰλήθω δὴ ὁ ἄδικος ποσαχῶς λέγεται. δοκεῖ δὲ ὁ τε
παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ ὁ ἄνιστος,
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἔσται ὁ τε νόμιμος καὶ ὁ
ἴσος. τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ δ'

Cf. *Ar. Met.* i. ii. 4 (ὁ ἔχων τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην) οἷδ' ὅπως πάντα τὰ ὑποκειμένα.

7 ἔοικε δὲ—κλείουσιν] 'Now the term "justice" appears to be used in more senses than one, and so does the term injustice, but, because there is a close resemblance between the ambiguous senses, the ambiguity escapes notice, and the case is not the same as with things widely differing, where the ambiguity is comparatively plain (δῆλη μᾶλλον). A physical difference appealing to the eye (κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν) is widest, as for instance the word 'key' is used ambiguously to denote the clavicular bone of animals, and that with which men lock doors.' While the general upshot of this passage is clear enough, the writing is in itself very indistinct. Hence in translation it has been necessary to use expansion. To say that 'their equivocation escapes notice because it is close' goes beyond the legitimate bounds of compression. Cf. the obscure and probably corrupt passage above cited from *Eth. Eud.* iii. v. 1: ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τὴν γειννῆσιν καὶ ὁμοιότητα μεχρὶ τοῦ λανθάνειν πόρρω προΐοντα.

κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν] This seems to mean 'in external form.' Cf. *Eth.* i. viii. 16: ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παλαίσχης.

κλείς] There is a pun attributed to Philip of Macedon—cf. Plutarch, *Reg. et Imp. Apophth.*, *Philippi* ix.—which it has been thought that Aristotle here alludes to: τῆς κλειδὸς αὐτῷ κατε-
αγείσης ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ τοῦ θεραπεύοντος
ἱατροῦ πάντως τι καθ' ἡμέραν αἰτούντος,
λάμβανε, ἔφη, ὅσα βούλει, τὴν γὰρ
κλείν ἔχεις.

8—11 The word 'unjust' is used in three different senses to denote the lawless man, the greedy man, and the unfair man. The word 'just' may mean either the lawful man or the fair man. In this statement there is something illogical, for we notice at once that there are only two senses of the word 'just' to match the three senses of 'unjust.' We find in § 10, that unfairness (τὸ ἄνιστον) is a generic term, including both greediness (πλεονεξία) and also the collateral notion of selfishly avoiding evil. In short, to divide 'unjust' into lawless, greedy, and unfair, is a cross division. Evidently there are on each side two terms: (1) justice is divided into lawfulness or universal justice, and (2) fairness about property, or particular justice. Injustice is divided into (1) lawlessness or universal injustice, and (2) unfairness about property, or particular injustice.

ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ πλεονέ-
κτης ὁ ἄδικος, περὶ τὰγαθὰ ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ
ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, ἃ ἐστὶ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἀεὶ ἀγαθὰ,
τινὶ δ' οὐκ ἀεὶ. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εὖχονται καὶ διώ-
κουσιν· δεῖ δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' εὖχεσθαι μὲν τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ
αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, αἰρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ. ὁ δ'¹⁰
ἄδικος οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ πλεόν αἰρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἐπὶ
τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ μείον κακὸν
ἀγαθόν πως εἶναι, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ πλεονεξία, διὰ
τοῦτο δοκεῖ πλεονέκτης εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἄνισος· τοῦτο γὰρ¹¹
περιέχει καὶ κοινόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν ὁ δὲ¹²
νόμιμος δίκαιος, ὁ δὴλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστί πως
δίκαια· τὰ τε γὰρ ὠρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά
ἐστί, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων δίκαιον εἶναι φαμέν. οἱ δὲ¹³
νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἀπάντων, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ
κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις,

9 ἐπεὶ δὲ—ἀγαθὰ] 'Now, since the unjust man is greedy, he will be concerned with things good, not all, but the "goods of fortune," which abstractedly are always goods, but which are not so always to the individual. (Men pray for these and follow after them, but they ought not to do so; they ought to pray that what are abstractedly goods may be so to *them*, and they ought to choose the things which are good for them.)' The goods of fortune are those which all men desire, though it is not certain that they will prove goods to *them*. The phrase τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ becomes a set formula in this book, cf. ch. vi. § 4; ch. ix. § 17. The difficulties connected with prayer, arising out of human ignorance, form the subject of Plato's *Second Alcibiades*. They are also alluded to, *Laws*, iii. p. 637. At the end of the *Phædrus* is given the prayer of Socrates (279 B): ὦ φίλε Πᾶν τε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇδε θεοί, δόλητέ μοι καλῶ γενέσθαι τάνδοθεν· ἔξωθεν δ'

ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναι μοι φίλια. πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν· τὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πλήθος εἴη μοι ὅσον μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν δύναται ἕλλος ἢ ὁ σῶφρων.

12—15 In one sense all that is lawful is just; the law aiming at the good of all, or of a part, of the citizens, speaks on *all* subjects, and more or less rightly enjoins the practice of all the virtues. Justice, then, in this sense, may be said to be the practice of entire virtue towards one's neighbour.

13 στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος κ.τ.λ.] Cf. *Ar. Pol.* iii. vii. 5: ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννὶς ἐστὶ μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος, ἡ δ' ὀλιγαρχία πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἡ δὲ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων. The term νομοθετικὴ (§ 12) occurs again in the *Eudemian* book, *Eth.* vi. viii. 2. The view given here of law, which is expressed still more strongly below, ch. xi. § 1, is quite different from modern views. Law is here represented as a positive system

κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον· ὥστε ἓνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ.
 14 προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ ῥίπτειν τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοιχεύειν μηδ' ὑβρί-
 ζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πράου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθηρίας τὰ μὲν κελεύων τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων, ὁρθῶς μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὁρθῶς,
 15 χεῖρον δ' ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μὲν ἐστὶ τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ

(though the instances quoted of its formulæ are all negative, *μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν*, &c.), aiming at the regulation of the whole of life, sometimes, however, with a bias of class-interests, and sometimes only roughly executed (*ἀπεσχεδιασμένος*). This educational and dogmatic character of the law was really exemplified to the greatest extent in the Spartan institutions. Athens rather prided herself (according to the wise remarks which Thucydides puts into the mouth of Pericles) on leaving greater liberty to the individual. But Plato and Aristotle both made the mistake of wishing for an entire state-control over individual life.

14 τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου] Cf. *Eth.* III. viii. 1—2. Enactments of the kind here mentioned form part of the system given in Plato's *Laws*, pp. 943—4. Modern statutes of military discipline against desertion, &c., furnish an exact parallel to these ancient laws, if we only consider that in the Greek cities the whole state was more or less regarded as an army.

15 αὕτη μὲν οὖν—ἕτερον] 'Now this justice is complete virtue, not

absolutely, however, but in relation to one's neighbour.' There is a careless transition here from τὰ νόμιμα and τὰ δίκαια to ἡ δικαιοσύνη. Correct writing would have required ἡ κατὰ ταῦτα δικαιοσύνη or a similar phrase. Generally speaking, this first part of the Book is about τὰ δίκαια as distinguished from ἡ δικαιοσύνη (see Plan of Book V.). Τελεία is here used apparently with no trace of the Aristotelian or philosophic sense, but simply as denoting 'complete.'

15—20 Hence justice is often thought the best of the virtues, brighter than the evening or the morning star, the sum of all other excellence. It is the *use* of virtue, and not in relation to oneself alone, but also towards others. Hence it has been defined 'others' profit.' As he is the worst man who is bad both to himself and others, so he is the best who is good to himself and to others. This kind of justice is not a part of virtue, but the whole; it can only be distinguished from virtue when you come to define it, and discover that you must take a different point of view for each.

δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὐθ' ἔσπερος οὐθ' ἐφῶς οὕτω θαυμαστός·
καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοί φαμεν

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶς ἀρετὴ ἐνι.

καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετὴ, ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσις
ἐστίν. τελεία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον
δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον κατ' αὐτόν.
πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆ-
σθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀδυνατοῦσιν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο 16
εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ὅτι ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείξει·
πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη ὁ ἄρχων. διὰ δὲ τὸ 17
αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη
μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν· ἄλλω γὰρ τὰ
συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῶ. κάκιστος μὲν 18
οὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρώμενος τῇ
μοχθηρίᾳ, ἄριστος δ' οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὐτὸν τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀλλὰ
πρὸς ἕτερον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπόν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν 19
ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ὅλη ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἡ
ἐναντία ἀδικία μέρος κακίας ἀλλ' ὅλη κακία. τί δὲ διαφέ- 20
ρει ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὕτη, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

οὐθ' ἔσπερος κ.τ.λ.] This may have
allusion to something in literature,
now lost. At all events it is a fine
saying.

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ] Given among the
verses of Theognis (147 sq.) in the
following couplet:

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶς ἀρετὴ
'στίν,
πᾶς δὲ τ' ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, Κύρνε, δίκαιος
ἑών.

πρὸς ἕτερον] Fritzsche quotes Eurip.
Heracl. 2:

ὁ μὲν δίκαιος τοῖς πέλας πέφυκ' ἀνὴρ.
ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ κέρδος λῆμ' ἔχων ἀνείμενον,
πόλει τ' ἄχρηστος καὶ συναλλάσσειν
βαρύς,
αὐτῷ δ' ἄριστος.

And Ar. *Pol.* iii. xiii. 3: κοινωνικὴν
γὰρ ἀρετὴν εἶναι φαμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην,

ἢ πᾶσας ἀναγκαῖον ἀκολουθεῖν τὰς
ἄλλας.

16 ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα] The same senti-
ment is expressed by Sophocles,
Antig. 175 sq.

17 ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν] Repeated
below, ch. vi. § 6. Cf. Plato's
Repub. i. p. 343 c: ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι ἡ μὲν
δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον
ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄντι, τοῦ κρείττονός τε καὶ
ἄρχοντος συμφέρον, οἰκία δὲ τοῦ
πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπερεοῦντος βλάβη
(see Vol. I. Essay II. p. 109). The
sophistical and sneering definition of
justice is here repeated without com-
ment, being accepted as a testimony
to the unselfish character of justice.

20 τί δὲ διαφέρει—ἀρετῇ] 'But
what the difference is between virtue
and this kind of justice is clear from
what we have said already. They
are the same, only conceived diffe-

ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὐτή, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἥ μὲν πρὸς ἕτερον, δικαιοσύνη, ἥ δὲ τοιάδε ἔξις ἀπλῶς, ἀρετή.

- 2 Ζητοῦμεν δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην· ἔστι γὰρ τις, ὡς φαμέν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ
2 μέρος. σημείον δ' ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας

rently; viewed as a relation to others the state is justice, viewed as a state of the mind simply, it is virtue.'

τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό] This logical formula occurs again *Eth.* vi. viii. 1, where it is said that wisdom and politics are the same state of mind, only their essence is differently conceived (τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταῦτόν αὐταῖς). On the force of εἶναι, see *Eth.* ii. vi. 17, note. In both of these Eudemian passages, where it is said of two things that 'they are the same, only their εἶναι is different,' we must understand that the results are the same, but the essential nature, the causes, and what the Germans would call the *Grund-begriff*, or fundamental conception, are different. Thus the first idea about justice (in the widest sense) is, that it is a relation to others. The first idea about virtue is, that it is a regulation of the mind. There is a slightly different application of the formula, Arist. *De Animā*, iii. ii. 4: ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ μία, τὸ δὲ εἶναι οὐ ταῦτόν αὐταῖς. 'Now the consciousness of an object is identical with and inseparable from the consciousness of the sensation of it, but yet in conception these differ from each other fundamentally.' Here we have two distinct sides or 'moments' represented as, though logically distinct, yet inseparable.

Plato in discussing justice had first to clear the subject of sophistical notions, and to prove that justice did not depend alone upon human insti-

tutions, but far more on the nature of the human soul. Thus he concluded by defining it to be a just balance in the mind itself. The Aristotelian starting-point is different. It is assumed that justice proceeds from the development of man's nature as a 'political creature.' Also it is assumed that in political institutions there is something which is absolute and not merely conventional (*Eth.* v. vii. 1—5). Then the only question is, what are the exact limits of justice itself? To which the answer is, that we may either regard it in the broadest sense as including the whole of right dealing with others, or, more restrictedly, as right dealing in respect of property and advantages of all kinds.

II. This chapter consists of three parts. (1) It brings arguments to prove the existence of a particular kind of injustice, relating chiefly to property, from which the existence of a particular kind of justice might also be inferred, §§ 1—6. (2) It sets aside universal justice as not being the object of discussion to the present book, §§ 7—11. (3) It divides particular justice into two kinds, distributive and corrective, §§ 12—13.

1—6 The arguments brought to prove the existence of a particular kind of injustice reduce themselves apparently to an appeal to language.

(1) We speak of the coward as 'doing wrongly' (ἀδικεῖν); also we speak of the man who takes more than his share, as 'doing wrongly;'

μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μὲν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οὐδέν, οἷον ὁ
 ῥίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν ἢ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπό-
 τητα ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι δι' ἀνελευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ
 πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις κατ' οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ
 μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δέ γε τινὰ (ψέγομεν
 γάρ) καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν. ἔστιν ἄρα γε ἄλλη τις ἀδικία 3
 ὡς μέρος τῆς ὅλης, καὶ ἀδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου
 τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον. ἔτι εἰ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα 4
 μοιχεύει καὶ προσλαμβάνων, ὁ δὲ προστιθεῖς καὶ ζημιούμε-
 νος δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι
 μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης, ἐκείνος δ' ἀδίκος, ἀκόλαστος δ' οὐ·
 ὁ γὰρ ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν. ἔτι περὶ μὲν τᾶλλα 5
 πάντα ἀδικήματα γίνεται ἢ ἐπαναφορὰ ἐπὶ τινι μοχθη-
 ρίαν αἰεί, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν, ἐπ' ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλιπε
 τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δειλίαν, εἰ ἐπάταξεν, ἐπ' ὀργήν· εἰ δ'

the latter use of the terms is evidently different from the former.

(2) A crime committed for the sake of gain is called a 'wrong' distinctively, rather than by the name it would have had, were this motive of gain not present.

(3) While all other wrongs (ἀδικήματα) are referred each to some evil principle, such as cowardice, intemperance, and the like; acts of unjust gain are referred to no other principle except 'injustice,' which accordingly must be used in a special sense and denote a special vice in the mind.

The statement of the first of these arguments in the text is extremely confused. It is put in such a way that it would as well prove any other vice as πλεονεξία to be particular injustice. Suppose we substituted 'idleness' in the text for 'grasping'; it would then be true to say, 'When a man is idle, he often errs in none of the other vices, certainly not in all, but yet he acts with a certain faultiness (for we blame him) and wrongly

(κατ' ἀδικίαν). Hence there is a kind of wrong separate from universal injustice,' &c. However this is only a matter of statement; there is no doubt that ἀδικία with regard to property means something special, and different from ἀδικία in the sense of wrong-doing in general. In English 'injustice' is not used to mean vice generally; though its opposite 'just' is occasionally used in the translation of the Bible as equivalent to 'righteous,' and in a sense answering pretty nearly to that of νόμιμος.

4 ἔτι εἰ ὁ μὲν—κερδαίνειν] 'Again if one man commits an adultery for the sake of gain, making a profit by it, and another man does the same for lust, lavishing money (προστιθείς) and incurring loss; the latter would rather be deemed intemperate than covetous, the former would be called unjust, but not intemperate; evidently because of his gaining by it.' Fritzsche (upon i. 14) quotes Aeschines Socraticus, II. 14: δοκεῖ δ' ἂν σοι ἄνθρωπος εἰ μοιχεύει τὰς τῶν πέλας

- ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ' οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπ' ἀδικίαν.
 6 ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλη ἐν
 μέρει, συνώνυμος, ὅτι ὁ ὀρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει· ἄμφω
 γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν
 περὶ τιμὴν ἢ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν, ἢ εἴ τιτι ἔχοιμεν ἐνὶ
 ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ
 τοῦ κέρδους, ἢ δὲ περὶ ἅπαντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖος.
 7 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ δικαιοσύναι πλείους, καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τις
 καὶ ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν, ὁῖον· τίς δὲ καὶ ὁποῖα
 8 τις, ληπτέον. διώρισται δὴ τὸ ἄδικον τό τε παράνομον
 καὶ τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τό τε νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον.
 κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ παράνομον ἢ πρότερον εἰρημένη ἀδικία
 9 ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ πλεόν οὐ ταῦτόν ἀλλ'
 ἕτερον ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεόν ἅπαν
 ἄνισον, τὸ δ' ἄνισον οὐ πᾶν πλεόν), καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ
 ἀδικία οὐ ταῦτά ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ δ'
 ὡς ὅλα· μέρος γὰρ αὕτη ἡ ἀδικία τῆς ὅλης ἀδικίας, ὁμοίως
 δὲ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς δικαιοσύνης. ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν

γυναικας ἐπ' ἀργυρίῳ, ἀδικεῖν ἂν ἢ οὐ,
 καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι καὶ τῆς πόλεως καὶ
 τῶν νόμων κωλυόντων;

6 ὥστε—σπουδαῖος] 'So that it
 is plain that there is a particular kind
 of injustice distinct from the uni-
 versal kind, having the same name by
 reason of a kindred nature (συνώνυ-
 μος), because its definition falls under
 the same genus. For both have
 their whole force consisting in a rela-
 tion to others, but the one is con-
 cerned with honour, property, or
 safety (or by whatever one name one
 might sum up all such things), and is
 prompted by the pleasure of gain,
 but the other has to do with the
 whole sphere of virtue.'

συνώνυμος] What logic calls 'ana-
 logical.' We before had the word
 ὁμωνυμία to denote 'equivocation'
 (c. i. § 7), see *Eth.* i. vi. 12, and note;
 and cf. *Ar. Categor.* i. 3: Συνώνυμα δὲ

λέγεται ὧν τό τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ
 κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός.

9 ἐπεὶ δὲ—δικαιοσύνης] 'But as
 (ἐπεὶ) 'unequal' and 'more' are not
 the same, but stand related to each
 other as part to whole (for 'more' is
 a species of 'unequal'), so (καὶ) the
 unjust principle and habit belonging
 respectively to the two kinds we have
 mentioned are not the same but dif-
 ferent, this from that, the one being as
 part, the other as whole. For this injus-
 tice (about property) is a part of uni-
 versal injustice, and the correspondent
 justice is a part of universal justice.'
 The only way to give any meaning to
 this indistinct passage is to consider
 what is said about 'more' and
 'unequal' to have nothing to do with
 πλεονεξία, but simply to be an illu-
 stration of a part included by a whole.
 Particular justice includes all the
 generic qualities of universal justice,

μέρει δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει ἀδικίας λεκτέον, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου ὡσαύτως. ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ 10 τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία, ἡ μὲν τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς οὕσα χρῆσις πρὸς ἄλλον, ἡ δὲ τῆς κακίας, ἀφείσθω. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον τὸ κατὰ ταύτας φανερόν ὡς διοριστέον· σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς πραττόμενά ἐστιν· καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἀρετὴν προστάττει ζῆν καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην μοχθηρίαν κωλύει ὁ νόμος. τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὅλης 11 ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομίμων ὅσα νενομοθέτηται περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν. περὶ δὲ τῆς καθ' ἕκαστον παιδείας, καθ' ἣν ἀπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι, πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἢ ἐτέρας, ὕστερον διοριστέον· οὐ γὰρ ἴσως ταύτων

no less than as a particular virtue it includes all the generic qualities of universal virtue. Some MSS. read *ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ παράνομον*, from not understanding the force of the illustration applied in *ἐπεὶ*. It is no wonder that confusion should have been caused when the writer was at so little pains to avoid it.

10—11 We may set aside justice in the wider sense as being identical with the exercise of virtue, and also the principle on which it depends (*καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ*), this being simply the inculcation of virtue by the state. (The question as to whether private education is the same as public, whether the good man is the same as the good citizen, may be discussed hereafter).—This seems to be the train of thought, the whole of § 11. being parenthetical. *σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ κ.τ.λ.* is a mere repetition of ch. i. § 14.

τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ—παντ[ί] 'Now the enactments productive of entire virtue are those which have been made with regard to education for public life. With regard to individual education, according to which one is not a good

citizen, but simply a good man, we must afterwards determine whether it belongs to politics or some other province. For perhaps the idea of the good man is not the same as that of the citizen in every case.'

ὕστερον διοριστέον] This is an unfulfilled promise in the *Eudemian Ethics* as they stand. Nor can this exact question be said to be touched upon in the *Nicom. Eth.* In the *Politics* Aristotle very decisively pronounces that education should be all public, *i.e.*, under the control of government and reduced to one standard, cf. *Pol.* viii. i. 3: 'Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τῷ τέλει τῇ πόλει πάση, φανερόν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντων καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι κοινὴν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰδίαν, ὅν τρόπον νῦν ἕκαστος ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ μάθησιν ἰδίαν, ἣν ἂν δόξῃ, διδάσκων. He also after a discussion pronounces that on the whole the virtue of the man and of the citizen is the same, cf. *Pol.* iii. iv. and iii. xviii. Eudemus then in the present place appears to depart to some extent from the views of Aristotle.

- 12 ἀνδρί τ' ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτῃ παντί. τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου ἐν μὲν ἐστὶν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέρου), ἐν δὲ τὸ
- 13 ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν. τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο· τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσιά ἐστι τὰ δ' ἀκούσια, ἐκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον πρᾶσις ὠνὴ δανεισμός ἐγγύη χρήσις παρακαταθήκη μίσθωσις· ἐκούσια δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἐκούσιος. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπὴ μοιχεία φαρμακεία προαγωγεία δουλαπατία δολοφονία ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία δεσμός θάνατος ἀρπαγὴ πῆρσις κακηγορία προπηλακισμός.
- 3 Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ τ' ἄδικος ἄνισος καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον,

ἀνδρί τ' ἀγαθῷ εἶναι] 'The essential idea of a good man.' On this formula, see *Eth.* II. vi. 17, note.

12—13 Particular justice is now divided into distributive and corrective justice. For all details connected with these two forms, see the following chapters. It must be observed at present that there is some confusion in the account at its outset, for 'voluntary transactions' (τὰ ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα) 'such as buying, selling, lending, pledging, using, depositing, and hiring,' are said to come under the head of corrective justice, as well as 'involuntary transactions.' But this is not entirely the case; we find that in all bargains the principle of geometrical proportion comes in (which does not belong to corrective justice), and we find in fact that voluntary transactions are not touched upon in the chapter which treats of corrective justice. They are discussed to some extent in chapter v., but not assigned to any particular head.

III. This chapter, without for-

mally announcing its subject, treats of distributive justice. The main points with regard to it are as follows. Justice implies equality, and not only that two things are equal, but also two persons between whom there may be justice. Thus it is a geometrical proportion in four terms; if A and B be persons, C and D lots to be divided, then as A is to B, so must C be to D. And a just distribution will produce the result that A + C will be to B + D in the same ratio as A was to B originally. In other words, distributive justice consists in the distribution of property, honours, &c., in the state, according to the merits of each citizen.

With regard to this principle, though the text is not explicit, yet it appears to be (1) really applicable in all cases of awards made by the state, (2) ideally to be capable of a wider application as a regulative principle for the distribution of property and all the distinctions of society. As to the history of the doctrine, we find it shadowed out by

δῆλον ὅτι καὶ μέσον τί ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀνίσου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἴσον· ἐν ὁποίᾳ γὰρ πράξει ἐστὶ τὸ πλεον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἴσον. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄδικον ἀνισον, τὸ δίκαιον 3

Plato in the great idea of a harmony and proportion ruling in the world, cf. *Gorgias*, p. 507 E: φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωσίαν συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν, οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν. σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὢν, ἀλλὰ λέληθέ σε ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται· σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἶε δεῖν ἄσκειν· γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς. There is a still nearer approach to the present doctrine in the *Laws*, p. 757 B, where it is said that there are two kinds of equality; one is a mere equality of number and measure, the other is the 'award of Zeus,' the equality of proportion. τὴν δὲ ἀληθεστάτην καὶ ἀρίστην ἰσότητα οὐκέτι βέβαιον παντὶ ἰδεῖν. Διὸς γὰρ δὴ κρίσις ἐστὶ· καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰεὶ σμικρὰ μὲν ἐπαρκεῖ· πᾶν δὲ ὅσον ἂν ἐπαρκέσῃ πόλεσιν ἢ καὶ ἰδιώταις, πάντ' ἀγαθὰ ἀπεργάζεται. τῷ μὲν γὰρ μείζονι πλείω, τῷ δὲ ἐλάττωι σμικρότερα νέμει, μέτρια διδοῦσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἑκατέρω· καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμὰς μείζουσι μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν αἰεὶ μείζους· τοῖς δὲ τοῦναντίον ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς τε καὶ παιδείας τὸ πρέπον ἑκατέροις ἀπονέμει κατὰ λόγον.

It is remarkable that the terms 'distributive and corrective justice' are not found in the *Politics* of Aristotle, though this distinction and the various points connected with it in reality belong much more to political than to ethical science. However, though the name of distributive justice does not occur, yet the idea of

it is fully developed in *Politics*, III. c. ix.—a passage from which it is not improbable that the present chapter may be partly taken, though an interpolated reference (καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς) gives the passage in the *Politics* a fallacious appearance of having been written later, and of having accepted conclusions from the present book. Far rather it is likely that the conception of 'distributive justice,' having been received as a conception from Plato, and farther worked out by Aristotle in his *Politics*, only became stereotyped into a phrase in the after-growth of his system, at the end of his own life, or in the exposition of his views made by Eudemos. It is in speaking of the 'oligarchical and democratical principles of justice' that Aristotle says: (§ 1) πάντες γὰρ ἅπτονται δικαίου τινός, ἀλλὰ μέχρι τινὸς προέρχονται, καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πᾶν τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον. Οἷον δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἴσοις. καὶ τὸ ἀνισον δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνίσοις. οἱ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀφαιροῦσι, τὸ οἷς, καὶ κρίνουσι κακῶς. τὸ δ' ἀτίον ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ κρίσις· σχεδὸν δ' οἱ πλείστοι φαῦλοι κριταὶ περὶ τῶν οἰκείων. "Ὅστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ δίκαιον τισίν, καὶ διήρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς, † καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ἰσότητα ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμειβομένουσι. The conclusion is (*Pol.* III. ix. 15) that they who contribute most to the joint-stock of virtue and good deeds in the state are entitled to a larger share in the control of affairs than those who base their claims upon any other kind of superiority.

4 ἴσον· ὅπερ καὶ ἀνευ λόγου δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν μέσον, τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τι ἂν εἴη. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσὶν· ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τε καὶ ἴσον εἶναι [καὶ πρὸς τι] καὶ τισίν, καὶ ἥ μὲν μέσον, τινῶν (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον), ἥ δ' ἴσον ἐστί, δυσὶν, 5 ἥ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις εἶναι τέτταρσιν· οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν, δύο ἐστί, 6 καὶ ἐν οἷς τὰ πράγματα, δύο. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς· ὥς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει τὰ ἐν οἷς, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, οὐκ ἴσα ἔξουσιν, ἀλλ' ἐντεῦθεν αἰ μάχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἡ ἴσοι μὴ ἴσα ἢ μὴ 7 ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχωσι καὶ νέμονται. ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦτο δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ πλοῦτον, οἱ δ' 8 εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ' ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετήν. ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι. τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ

1—4 These sections are full of confused writing. It is said 'since the unjust is unequal, there must be a mean, which is equal; justice must be equal; the equal is a mean, therefore justice must be a mean. As being equal justice implies two terms, as being a mean two extremes, as being just two persons, therefore it must be in four terms, &c.' The general meaning is clear, but the statement, especially in § 4, is very faulty. A confusion is made by the introduction of the idea of μέσον with regard to justice, which at the present part of the argument was not required.

6 εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, κ.τ.λ.] Cf. *Ar. Pol.* iii. ix. 1 sq. *l. c.*

7 ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ—ἀρετήν] 'Again this is clear from the principle of equality according to standard; for all agree that justice in distributions must be according to standard, but men are not unanimous in declaring the same

standard. While the democrats declare liberty, those who are for an oligarchy declare wealth or birth, and those who are for an aristocracy (in the highest sense) declare virtue.' This is apparently taken from the saying in Aristotle's *Pol.* iii. ix. 4: Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἂν κατὰ τι ἄνιστοι ᾄσιν, οἷον χρήμασιν, ὧς οἷονταί ἄνιστοι εἶναι, οἱ δ' ἂν κατὰ τι ἴσοι, οἷον ἐλευθερίᾳ, ὧς ἴσοι. Cf. *Ib.* iii. ix. 15. It is observable that Aristotle (*l. cc.*) twice speaks of men being equal in point of liberty, unequal in point of wealth or virtue; but the above writer confuses this, and speaks of liberty being made the standard for distinctions.

8—14 ἔστιν ἄρα—ἀγαθόν] 'The just then is something proportionate. The proportionate is not restricted to pure number alone, but applies to everything that admits the idea of number. Proportion is an equality of ratios, and implies four terms at the least. Now

μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ· ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις. ἡ μὲν οὖν διηρημένη ὅτι ἐν τέτταρσι, δῆλον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ⁹ συνεχής· τῷ γὰρ ἐνὶ ὡς δυσὶ χρήται καὶ δις λέγει, οἷον ὡς ἡ τοῦ α πρὸς τὴν τοῦ β, οὕτως καὶ ἡ τοῦ β πρὸς τὴν τοῦ γ. δις οὖν ἡ τοῦ β ἔρηται· ὥστ' ἐὰν ἡ τοῦ β τεθῇ δις, τέτταρα ἔσται τὰ ἀνάλογα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον¹⁰ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός· διηρηνται γὰρ ὁμοίως, οἷς τε καὶ ἄ. ἔσται ἄρα ὡς ὁ α ὅρος πρὸς τὸν¹¹ β, οὕτως ὁ γ πρὸς τὸν δ, καὶ ἐναλλάξ ἄρα, ὡς ὁ α πρὸς τὸν γ, ὁ β πρὸς τὸν δ. ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· ὅπερ ἡ νομὴ συνδυάζει· καὶ οὕτως συντεθῇ, δικαίως συνδυάζει. ἡ ἄρα τοῦ α ὅρου τῷ γ καὶ ἡ τοῦ β τῷ δ σύζευξις τὸ ἐν¹² διανομῇ δίκαιόν ἐστι, καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τοῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον μέσον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἀνάλογον· καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν γεωμε-¹³

it is plain that "discrete proportion" is in four terms; but so also is "continuous proportion," for it uses the one of its terms as two, and names it twice over, thus,—as A is to B, so is B to C. B then is twice named, and if it be set down twice over, the proportionate terms will be four. But justice also implies four terms at least, and an equality of ratios: for the two persons and the two things are divided in similar proportion. (The formula) then will be, "as the term A is to B, so is C to D;" and *alternando*, "as A is to C, so is B to D," and so too the whole to the whole, which the distribution couples, and if the terms be thus united, it couples them justly. The joining therefore of A to C and of B to D in distribution is just, and this justice is a mean between violations of proportion. For proportion is a mean, and the just is proportionate. Mathematicians call this kind of proportion geometrical, for in geometrical proportion the whole is to the whole as each separate term

is to each. This proportion is not "continuous," for it has no one term standing in a double relationship: Now this justice is the proportionate, and injustice is a violation of proportion, which takes place either on the side of more or less. And this is actually the case, for he that does an injury has more than his share, while he that is injured has less than his share of what is good.' This passage gives a formula for distributive justice in mathematical language, which comes in short to this, that in all awards of the state the result should be proportionate to the separate worth of the citizens.

8 μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ] 'number expressed in ciphers, 'abstract number,' in German, *unbenannte Zahl*. Fritzsche refers to Euclid *El.* VII. *def.* I.

9 ἐὰν ἡ τοῦ β] ἡ is indefinite and probably meant to be so. It may stand for *στιγμή*, *γραμμῇ*, or the like.

13 γεωμετρικὴν] Cf. Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 508, quoted above, p. 109.

- τρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί· ἐν γὰρ τῇ γεωμετρικῇ συμβαίνει καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὅπερ ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον.
- 14 ἔστι δ' οὐ συνεχῆς αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται εἰς ἀριθμῷ ὅρος, ὧ καὶ ὁ. τὸ μὲν οὖν δίκαιον τοῦτο τὸ ἀνάλογον, τὸ δ' ἀδίκον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. γίνεται ἄρα τὸ μὲν πλεόν τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμβαίνει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν πλεόν ἔχει, ὁ δ' ἀδικούμενος
- 15 ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀνάπαλιν· ἐν ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ λόγῳ γίνεται τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον
- 16 κακόν· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν μᾶλλον αἰρετὸν τοῦ
- 17 μεῖζονος, τὸ δ' αἰρετὸν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον μεῖζον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐν εἶδος τοῦ δικαίου τοῦτ' ἐστίν.
- 4 Τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐν τὸ διορθωτικόν, ὃ γίνεται ἐν τοῖς συναλ-

15—16 A repetition of ch. i. § 10.

IV. This chapter is on corrective justice, which is said to apply to the transactions between men whether voluntary or involuntary. Corrective justice goes on a principle, not of geometrical, but of arithmetical proportion; in other words it takes no account of persons, but treats the cases with which it is concerned as cases of unjust loss and gain, which have to be reduced to the middle point of equality between the parties. Justice is a mean, and the judge a sort of impersonation of justice, a mediator, or equal divider. The operation of justice, bringing plaintiff and defendant to an equality, may be illustrated by the equalizing of two unequal lines. The names, 'loss,' and 'gain,' are however often a mere metaphor borrowed from commerce.

The term 'corrective justice' (τὸ διορθωτικόν or, as it is afterwards called, § 6, τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον) is itself an unfortunate name, because it appears only to lay down principles for restitution, and therefore implies wrong. Thus it has a tendency to confine the view to 'involuntary trans-

actions,' instead of stating what must be the principle of the just in all the dealings between man and man. In the present chapter, it is remarkable that although we are told at first that 'voluntary transactions' belong to corrective justice, yet all that is said applies only to the 'involuntary transactions;' and at last we are told that the terms used are 'a metaphor from voluntary transactions'—as if these were something quite distinct. It may be said indeed that bargains, and voluntary dealings in general, have no respect of persons (κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητ. ἀναλ.), and thus have something in common with civil and criminal law. Also that the next chapter supplies some of the principles for the regulation of commerce. In short we might deduce some sort of a theory from various suggestions in the text. But the statement in the text itself is undeniably confused.

1 τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐν] This excludes all possibility of the writer having conceived another kind of justice, to be called 'catallactic' or some such name, as it has been sometimes fancied. Τὸ διορθωτικὸν δικ. implies not merely 'regulative,' but strictly 'remedial'

λάγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις. τοῦτο δὲ² τὸ δίκαιον ἄλλο εἶδος ἔχει τοῦ προτέρου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον τῶν κοινῶν αἰεὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐστὶ τὴν εἰρημένην· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων κοινῶν ἐὰν γίγνηται ἡ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα· καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ δικαίῳ τούτῳ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν. τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δίκαιον ἐστὶ μὲν ἴσον τι, καὶ³ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐκείνην ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικήν. οὐθέν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἰ ἐπιεικὴς φαῦλον ἀπεστέρησεν ἢ φαῦλος ἐπιεικῇ, οὐδ' εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν ἐπιεικὴς ἢ φαῦλος· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφορὰν μόνον βλέπει ὁ νόμος, καὶ χρῆται ὡς ἴσοις, εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀδικεῖ ὁ δ' ἀδικεῖται, καὶ εἰ ἔβλαψεν ὁ δὲ βέβλαπται. ὥστε τὸ ἄδικον τοῦτο ἄνισον ὃν ἰσάζειν πειρᾶται⁴ ὁ δικαστής· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ὁ μὲν πληγῇ ὁ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ ὁ δ' ἀποθάνῃ, διήρηται τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πράξις εἰς ἄνισα· ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν

justice; διόρθωμα is used to signify a remedy in Arist. *Pol.* iii. xiii. 23, where it is said of ostracism, βέλτιον μὲν οὖν τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὕτω συστήσαι τὴν πολιτείαν ὥστε μὴ δεῖσθαι τοιαύτης ἱατρείας· δεύτερος δὲ πλοῦς, ἂν συμβῇ, πειρᾶσθαι τοιούτῳ τινὶ διορθώματι διορθῶν.

2 τὸ μὲν γὰρ—εἰσενεχθέντα] 'For distributive justice deals always with the goods of the state according to the proportion we have described; for if the distribution be of common goods, it will be according to the proportion which the different contributions bear to one another.' Τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα is thus explained by the Paraphrast, ἀναλόγως ἐκάστω δίδωσι κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν· ἐκάστου καὶ τὴν εἰσφοράν, ἣν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν συνετέλεσεν· ἐπεὶ οὐ πάντες ὅμοιοι, οὐδὲ πάντες ὁμοίως εἰσφέρουσιν. Probably the remark in the text was taken from Aristotle, *Pol.* iii. ix. 15: διόπερ ὅσοι συμβάλλονται πλείστον εἰς

τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, τούτοις τῆς πόλεως μέτεστι πλεῖον.

3 κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικήν] This term occurs *Eth.* ii. vi. 7. 'Arithmetical proportion' denotes a middle term, or point of equality, equidistant from two extreme terms, thus, 6 is the mean, according to arithmetical proportion, between 4 and 8. In *Eth.* ii. (*l.c.*) it is called μέσον τοῦ πράγματος, which implies that it has no respect of persons. So corrective justice is here said to regard each case impersonally as an affair of loss and gain, and between these it strikes the middle point. It is the moral worth of persons that is ignored (εἰ ἐπιεικὴς φαῦλον κ.τ.λ.), for we find afterwards, *ch.* v. §§ 3—4, that a consideration of the position and circumstances of persons *does* come in to modify the estimate of the loss sustained from an indignity, &c.

5 τοῦ κέρδους. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς
 τοιούτοις, καὶ εἰ μὴ τισιν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος,
 6 οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι, καὶ ἡ ζημία τῷ παθόντι· ἀλλ' ὅταν
 γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία τὸ δὲ κέρδος.
 ὥστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δὲ
 κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλεόν τὸ δ' ἐλάττον ἐναντίως,
 τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλεόν τοῦ κακοῦ δ' ἐλάττον κέρδος, τὸ
 δ' ἐναντίον ζημία· ὣν ἦν μέσον τὸ ἴσον, ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι
 7 δίκαιον· ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη τὸ μέσον
 ζημίας καὶ κέρδους. διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ἐπὶ
 τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἵεναι
 ἵεναι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι
 οἷον δίκαιον ἔμφυχον· καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ
 καλοῦσιν ἔνιοι μεσιδίους, ὡς ἐὰν τοῦ μέσου τύχῃ, τοῦ
 8 δικαίου τευξόμενοι. μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ
 δικαστὴς. ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς ἐπανισοῖ, καὶ ὥσπερ γραμμῆς
 εἰς ἄνισα τετμημένης, ὃ τὸ μεῖζον τμήμα τῆς ἡμισείας
 ὑπερέχει, τοῦτ' ἀφείλε καὶ τῷ ἐλάττονι τμήματι προσέ-
 9 θηκεν. ὅταν δὲ δίχα διαιρεθῇ τὸ ὅλον, τότε φασὶν ἔχειν
 τὰ αὐτῶν, ὅταν λάβῃσι τὸ ἴσον. τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον ἐστὶ
 τῆς μεζζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀνα-
 λογίαν. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὀνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν,
 ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἴποι δίσχαιον, καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς διχαστὴς.

7 ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον] Cf. Thucyd. iv. 83: Ἀρριβαῖος ἐπεκηρυκεύετο, ἐτοῖμος ὢν Βρασιδά μίσφ δικαστῇ ἐπιτρέπειν. Ar. Pol. iv. xii. 5: πανταχοῦ πιστότατος ὁ διαιτητής, διαιτητής δ' ὁ μέσος.

μεσιδίου] Used in rather a different sense, Pol. v. vi. 13: ἐν δὲ τῇ εἰρήνῃ διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐγχειρίζουσι τὴν φυλακὴν στρατιώταις καὶ ἄρχοντι μεσιδῷ.

9 δ.ὰ τοῦτο—δικαστής] 'Hence, too, justice gets its name, because it is a dividing in twain (δίχα), as though it were written not δίκαιον, but δίσχαιον, and the judge is one who divides in twain.' This etymology, though in-

genious, is false. The earlier notion connected with δίκη seems not to have been one of decision, arbitration, or justice, but rather of 'showing,' 'instruction,' 'rule,' 'manner.' The word is derived from a root δικ-, which appears in δεικνυμι, and the Latin *indico*, *index*, *iudex* (the law-shower), &c. Plato, in the *Cratylus*, p. 412 D, gives a sportive etymology of δίκαιον, in accordance with the spirit of the work. Justice is there said to be the 'permeating,' τὸ διὰ ἰόν, with a κ added for euphony. Ἐπεὶ ἐπιτροπύει τὰ ἄλλα πάντα διαίον, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἐκλήθη ὁρθῶς δίκαιον, εὐστομίαις ἕνεκα τὴν τοῦ κ δύναμιν προσλαβόν.

ἐπὶ ἂν γὰρ δύο ἴσων ἀφαιρεθῇ ἀπὸ θατέρου, πρὸς θάτερον δὲ ¹⁰
 προστεθῇ, δυσὶ τούτοις ὑπερέχει θάτερον· εἰ γὰρ ἀφηρέθη
 μὲν, μὴ προστεθῇ δέ, ἐνὶ ἅν μόνον ὑπερεῖχεν. τοῦ μέσου
 ἄρα ἐνί, καὶ τὸ μέσον, ἀφ' οὗ ἀφηρέθη, ἐνί. τούτῳ ἄρα ¹¹
 γνωριοῦμεν τί τε ἀφελεῖν δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλέον ἔχοντος, καὶ
 τί προσθεῖναι τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι· ὃ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέσον
 ὑπερέχει, τοῦτο προσθεῖναι δεῖ τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι, ὃ δ'
 ὑπερέχεται, ἀφελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ μεγίστου. ἴσαι αἱ ἐφ' ὧν ¹²
 ΑΑ ΒΒ ΓΓ ἀλλήλαις· ἀπὸ τῆς ΑΑ ἀφηρήσθω τὸ ΑΕ,
 καὶ προσκείσθω τῇ ΓΓ τὸ ἐφ' ὧν ΓΔ, ὥστε ὅλη ἡ ΔΓΓ
 τῆς ΕΑ ὑπερέχει τῷ ΓΔ καὶ τῷ ΓΖ. τῆς ἄρα ΒΒ τῷ
 ΓΔ. ἴσῃ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν τοῦτο· ἀνι-
 ροῦντο γὰρ ἅν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἶον,
 καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον.
 ἐλήλυθε δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα, ἧς τε ζημία καὶ τὸ κέρδος, ¹³
 ἐκ τῆς ἐκουσίους ἀλλαγῆς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν ἢ τὰ

10—12 ἐπὶ ἂν γὰρ—ΓΔ] 'For, of
 two equal lines, if a part be taken
 from the one and added to the other,
 that other will exceed the first by
 twice this part; for if it had been
 subtracted only from the one and not
 added to the other, that other would
 have exceeded the first by only once
 this part. Therefore the line which
 is added to exceeds the mean by once
 the part added, and the mean exceeds
 the line subtracted from by once the
 part added. By this we learn what
 we must take from the term which
 has more, and what we must add to
 that which has less. We must add
 to that which has less the amount by
 which the mean exceeds it, and we
 must take from the largest term the
 amount by which the mean is ex-
 ceeded. Let AA, BB, and CC be equal
 to one another; from AA take AE, and
 add CD to CC; then the whole DCC
 exceeds EA by CD and CZ; and
 therefore it exceeds BB by CD.' The
 figure required is as follows:

E

A A

B B

Z

C C D

ἴσῃ δὲ—τοιοῦτον] This clause
 exists in all the MSS. The Para-
 phrast explains it here to signify that
 the same principles of corrective
 justice are applicable to the arts and
 commerce, &c. But when the clause
 is repeated with a different context in
 the next chapter, the Paraphrast, no
 doubt feeling a difficulty about the
 repetition, does not again touch it.
 In its present position the clause has
 no meaning, in the next chapter it is
 an important remark. All we can
 say about its appearance here is that
 it is an evidence of the same want of
 completeness about the book which
 shows itself in chapter xi, and also
 in sundry other parts of the *Eudemian*
Ethics.

13—14 ἐλήλυθε δὲ—ἕστερον] 'Now
 these names, "loss and gain," have

- ἑαυτοῦ κερδαίνειν λέγεται, τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
ζημιοῦσθαι, ὅσον ἐν τῷ ἀνεῖσθαι καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν ὅσοις
14 ἄλλοις ἄδειαν ἔδωκεν ὁ νόμος. ὅταν δὲ μήτε πλέον μήτ'
ἔλαττον ἀλλ' αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὐτῶν φασὶν
ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε ζημιοῦσθαι οὔτε κερδαίνειν· ὥστε κέρδους
τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐκού-
σιον, τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.
- 5 Δοκεῖ δέ τισι καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς εἶναι ἀπλῶς δίκαιον,
ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔφασαν· ὠρίζοντο γὰρ ἀπλῶς τὸ
2 δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλω. τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθὸς οὐκ

come from voluntary exchange. For having more than one's own is called "gaining," and having less than at the commencement is called "losing," as, for instance, in buying and selling, and all the other things in which the law gives one immunity. But when the things are neither more nor less, but on a level (αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν), then men say they have their own, and neither lose nor gain. Thus justice is a mean between a sort of gain and loss in involuntary things, it is the having the same afterwards as before.'

ἐν ὅσοις ἄδειαν] In commerce of all kinds, the law allows one to gain as much as one can. In involuntary transactions, the law allows no gain to be made, but brings things always back to their level. This non-interference of the law with bargains becomes, if carried out, the principle of free-trade.

ἀλλ' αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν γένηται] This has puzzled the commentators. Felicianus interprets it 'sed sua cuique per se ipsa evaserint;' Argyropulus, 'sed sua per se ipsa sunt facta;' Lambinus, 'sed paria paribus respondent.' What the phrase *must* mean is plain, whether grammatically it *can* mean this is another question. It *must* mean 'neither more, nor less, but equal to itself.' Perhaps it may

be construed 'but remain themselves by means of reciprocity,' i.e. by mutual giving and taking, ἑαυτῶν being equivalent to ἀλλήλων.

V. This chapter, commencing with a critical notice of the Pythagorean definition of justice, that 'justice is retaliation,' shows it to be inadequate, and then goes off into an interesting discussion upon the law of retaliation as it exists in the state. Proportionate retaliation, or an interchange of services, is said to be the bond of society. The law of proportion regulates exchange, and settles the value of the most diverse products. Money measures and expresses value, and turns mere barter into commerce. The chapter concludes with some general remarks on the relation of justice as a quality to the just as a principle.

1 δοκεῖ δὲ—ἄλλω] 'Now some think that retaliation without further qualifying (ἀπλῶς) is justice, as the Pythagoreans said, for they defined justice simply as retaliation on one's neighbour.' On the rude and inadequate attempts at definition made by the Pythagoreans, cf. Ar. *Metaph.* I. v. 16: ὠρίζοντό τε γὰρ ἐπιπολᾶως, καὶ ᾧ πρῶτῳ ὑπάρξειεν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος, τοῦτ' εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ πράγματος

ἐφαρμόττει οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτικόν· καίτοι βούλονται γε τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ τὸ 3 'Ραδαμάνθυος δίκαιον·

εἰ κε πάθοι τά κ' ἔρεξε, δίκη κ' ἰθεὶα γένοιτο.

πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ· οἷον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν, 4 οὐ δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπάταξεν, οὐ πληγῆναι μόνον δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι. ἔτι τὸ ἐκούσιον 5 καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον διαφέρει πολύ. ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοινωνίαις 6 ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς συνέχει τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητα· τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἢ πόλις. ἡ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς ζητοῦσιν· εἰ δὲ μή, δουλεία δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσῃ· ἡ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δὲ μή, μετάδοσις οὐ γίνεται, τῇ μεταδόσει δὲ

ἐνόμιζον, ὥσπερ εἴ τις οἶοιτο ταῦτόν εἶναι διπλάσιον καὶ τὴν δυνάδα, διότι πρῶτον ὑπάρχει τοῖς δυοῖς τὸ διπλάσιον. Their inadequate account of justice was doubtless owing not only to an imperfect logical method, but also to the immature political and social ideas of the day. Demosthenes mentions a law of retaliation given by Zaleucus to the Locrians (*Timocr.* p. 744): ὅντος γὰρ αὐτόθι νόμου, ἔαν τις ὀφθαλμὸν ἐκκόψῃ, ἀντεκκόψαι παρασχεῖν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ. In the Mosaic code the same rude principle appears, *Exod.* xxi. 24, *Levit.* xxiv. 20, *Deuteron.* xix. 21.

2 It is obvious that simple retaliation cannot be the principle of distributive justice; the state does not win battles for its generals, &c. Nor is it that of corrective justice; (1) because the same treatment is different to different individuals; (2) because an involuntary harm must not be requited like a voluntary one.

3 τὸ 'Ραδαμάνθυος] Necessarily a primitive idea of justice.

εἰ κε πάθοι] Of uncertain authorship, attributed to Hesiod.

4 οἷον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων] Cf. ch. iv. § 3,

note. Rank is here looked at as a kind of property. It is not a question of individual goodness or badness, but an officer being struck loses more than a common soldier being struck in return, so that retaliation is in that case not justice.

6 ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν—συμμένουσιν] 'But in commercial intercourse, at all events, this kind of justice, namely, retaliation, is the bond of union—on principles, not of equality, but proportion, for by proportionate requital the state is held together. Men seek to requite either evil or good; to omit the one were slavery, to omit the second were to fail in that mutual interchange by which men are held together.' On mutual need as the basis for civil society, cf. Plato, *Repub.* p. 369 B: γίγνεται τοίνυν πόλις, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής. A recognition of this principle might be called the first dawning of political economy; from it several deductions are made in the text above as to the nature of value, price, and money. These, though rudimentary, are able


7 συμμένουσιν. διὸ καὶ Χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμποδῶν ποιοῦνται, ἵν' ανταπόδοσις ᾗ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον χάριτος· ἀνθυπηρετῆσαι τε γὰρ δεῖ τῷ χαρισαμένῳ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἄρξαι
8 χαριζόμενον. ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν τὴν κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις, οἷον οἰκοδόμος ἐφ' ᾧ A, σκυτοτόμος ἐφ' ᾧ B, οἰκία ἐφ' ᾧ Γ, ὑπόδημα ἐφ' ᾧ Δ. δεῖ οὖν λαμβάνειν τὸν οἰκοδόμον παρὰ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τοῦ ἐκείνου ἔργου, καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ μεταδιδόναι τὸ αὐτοῦ. ἐὰν οὖν πρῶτον ᾗ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, εἴτα τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς γένηται, ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον. εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἴσον, οὐδὲ συμμένει· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ θατέρου

and interesting, but the relation of the law of value (τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς κοιν. ταῖς ἀλλ.) to the other kinds of justice is not stated.

7 διὸ—χαριζόμενον] 'Hence, too, it is that men build a temple of the Graces in their streets, that there may be reciprocity. For this is the property of grace, one must serve in return one who has done a favour, and again be in turn the first to confer favours.' Pausanias (ix. 35) says that the Athenians originally worshipped two Graces, Auxo and Hegemone; afterwards, from Eteocles the Boeotian, they learned to worship three, and called them Euphrosyne, Aglaia, and Thalia. There was a statue of the three Graces (clothed), the work of Socrates, which stood before the entrance of the Acropolis. Seneca (*Benef.* i. 3) mentions with some disdain the various symbolical meanings which were supposed to be expressed by the figures of the Graces, and on which Chrysippus appears to have written an elaborate treatise. Of course no English word will exactly answer to χάρις.

8 ποιεῖ δὲ—σύζευξις] 'Now the joining of the diagonal of a square gives us proportionate return.' The

diagram supposed to be drawn is as follows:



The joining of the diagonal gives each producer some of the other's work, and thus an exchange is made, but the respective value of the commodities must be first adjusted, else there can be no fair exchange. What, then, is the law of value? It is enunciated a little later (§ 10). δεῖ τοίνυν—τροπήν. 'As an architect (or a farmer it may be) is to a shoemaker, so many shoes must there be to a house or to corn.' That is, the value of the product is determined by the quality of the labour spent upon it. The sort of comparison here made between the quality of farmer and shoemaker seems connected with a Greek notion of personal dignity and a dislike of βαναυσία. Such feelings are opposed to the impartial views of political economy, and are

ἔργον ἢ τὸ θατέρου, δεῖ οὖν ταῦτα ἰσασθῆναι. ἔστι δὲ 9' τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἀνηροῦντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἶον, καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ δύο ἱατρῶν γίνεται κοινωνία, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἱατροῦ καὶ γεωργοῦ καὶ ὅλως ἐτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων· ἀλλὰ τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι. διὸ πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως εἶναι, ὧν ἐστὶν ἀλλαγή. 10 ἐφ' ὃ τὸ νόμισμ' ἐλήλυθε, καὶ γίνεται πως μέσον· πάντα γὰρ μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἑλλειψιν, πόσα ἅττα δὴ ὑποδήματ' ἴσον οἰκία ἢ τροφῇ. δεῖ τοίνυν ὅπερ οἰκοδόμος πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τσαοὶ ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἰκίαν ἢ τροφήν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγή οὐδὲ κοινωνία. τοῦτο δ', εἰ μὴ ἴσα εἴη πῶς, οὐκ ἔσται. δεῖ ἄρα 11 ἐνὶ τινι πάντα μετρεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ ἢ χρεΐᾳ, ἢ πάντα συνέχει· εἰ γὰρ μὴθὲν δέοιντο ἢ μὴ ὁμοίως, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγή ἢ οὐχ ἢ αὐτῇ. οἶον δ' ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρεΐας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε

quite superseded by the law of supply and demand. If it be asked what is to determine the quality of labour, it will soon be seen that *quality* resolves itself into *quantity*, that the excellence of labour must be measured also by supply and demand. We cannot be sure that we have above the full statement of Aristotle's ideas upon 'value,' but if we have, they are imperfect.

9 ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο—ἰσασθῆναι] Cf. ch. iv. § 12, note. 'Now this is the case with the other arts also (*i.e.* beside those of the architect and shoemaker), for they would have been destroyed if there had not been the producer producing so much, and of a certain kind, and the consumer (τὸ πάσχον) consuming just the same quantity and quality. For out of two physicians no commerce arises, but out of a physician and a farmer it does, and, in short, out of persons who are different from one another,

and not equal; these, then, require to be brought to an equality.' The division of labour, the mutual dependence of the arts, and the correspondence of supply and demand, are here well stated. It is a pity that these principles were not further carried out. The terms *ποιοῦν* and *πάσχον* may probably have some reference to the *ἀντιπεπονθός*, which is the subject of the chapter.

11 οἶον δ' ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρεΐας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην] 'Now money is a sort of representative of demand conventionally established.' This excellent definition was not altogether new; Plato had already said (*Repub.* p. 371 B): ἀγορὰ δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ νόμισμα ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκα γενήσεται ἐκ τούτου. The present chapter is disfigured by repetitions. Thus cf. § 15: τοῦτο δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται. The saying (§ 10) τὸ νόμισμ' ἐλήλυθε καὶ γίνεται πως μέσον, is repeated

κατὰ συνθήκην· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ ἐστί, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μεταβαλεῖν
 12 καὶ ποιῆσαι ἄχρηστον. ἔσται δὲ ἀντιπεπονθός, ὅταν ἰσα-
 σθῇ, ὥστε ὅπερ γεωργὸς πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ
 σκυτοτόμου πρὸς τὸ τοῦ γεωργοῦ. εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας
 οὐ δεῖ ἄγειν, ὅταν ἀλλάξωνται· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀμφοτέρας
 ἔξει τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον. ἀλλ' ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ
 αὐτῶν, οὕτως ἴσοι καὶ κοινωνοί, ὅτι αὕτη ἡ ἰσότης δύναται
 ἐπ' αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι. γεωργὸς Α, τροφή Γ, σκυτοτόμος

§ 14: τὸ δὲ νόμισμα ὥσπερ μέτρον σύμμετρα ποιήσαν ἰσάζει. The law of value is given twice, § 10 and § 12, &c.

12 ἔσται δὲ ἀντιπεπονθός—γίνεσθαι.] 'Retaliation, then, will take place when the terms have been equalized, and the production of the shoemaker has been made to bear the same relation to that of the farmer, as a farmer himself does to a shoemaker. We must not, however, bring the parties to a diagram of proportion after the exchange has taken place, else one of the terms will have both superiorities assigned to it. When the parties have got their fair share (ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ αὐτῶν), then are they on an equal and mutual footing, it having been possible to establish this kind of equality between them.' This vexed passage appears to describe the steps in a commercial transaction. There being a mutual need between producers of a different kind, their products require to be equalized. This is done by reducing the goods to a standard of inverse proportion. As a farmer to a shoemaker, so shoes to corn; thus, if a farmer's labour be 5 times better than a shoemaker's, then 5 pair of shoes = a quarter of corn; or if a pair of shoes = 10 shillings, then a quarter of corn = 50 shillings. When this

process of equalization has been effected (ὅταν ἰσασθῇ), then simple retaliation, or 'tit for tat,' begins. After an exchange has been made, or, in short, after the price of an article has once been expressed in money, it is no longer the time to talk of 'the quality of labour,' or for either side to claim an advantage on this account. If he did he would have 'both superiorities,' or his superiority reckoned twice over. Having enjoyed the superiority of price already, in which the quality of labour was an element, he would now proceed to claim the superiority of labour by itself, which would thus be reckoned to him twice over. Ὅταν ἀλλάξωνται can mean nothing else than 'when they have exchanged,' ὅταν with the aorist implying a completed act. It seems unnecessary to say that the value of a thing is not to be settled after it is sold. Rather it is after the goods have come to market, and had a market price put upon them, that considerations of their production must cease. The expression, therefore, is not clear, but the above interpretation seems the most natural that can be given of the passage. The commentators, driven to extremity, have resorted to violent measures, (1) omitting οὐ with no authority of MSS.; (2) interpreting ἀμφοτέρας τὰς

Β, τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ τὸ ἰσασμένον Δ. εἰ δ' οὕτω μὴ ἦν ἀντιπεπονηέναι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν κοινωνία. ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία συνέ-¹³ χει ὥσπερ ἓν τι ὄν, δηλοῖ ὅτι ὅταν μὴ ἐν χρεία ὣσιν ἀλλήλων, ἢ ἀμφοτέροι ἢ ἄτερος, οὐκ ἀλλάττονται, ὥσπερ ὅταν οὗ ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηταί τις, οἷον οἴνου, διδόντες σίτου ἐξαγωγῆς. δεῖ ἄρα τοῦτο ἰσασθῆναι. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς μελ-¹⁴ λούσης ἀλλαγῆς, εἰ νῦν μηδὲν δεῖται, ὅτι ἔσται ἐὰν δεηθῇ, τὸ νόμισμα οἷον ἐγγυητῆς ἐστ' ἡμῖν· δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι εἶναι λαβεῖν. πᾶσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτό· οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ ἴσον δύναται· ὅμως δὲ βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον. διὸ δεῖ πάντα τετιμηθῆναι· οὕτω γὰρ αἰεὶ ἔσται ἀλλαγῇ, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κοινωνία. τὸ δὲ νόμισμα ὥσπερ μέτρον σύμμετρα ποιῆσαν ἰσάζει· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν μὴ οὕσης ἀλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἦν, οὔτ' ἀλλαγῇ ἰσότητος μὴ οὕσης, οὔτ' ἰσότης μὴ οὕσης συμμετρίας. τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ¹⁵ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδέχεται ἰκανῶς· ἐν δὲ τι δεῖ εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται. τοῦτο γὰρ πάντα

ὑπεροχὰς, 'both extremes,' i.e. excess and deficiency; (3) asserting that the principle enunciated is one not of commerce, but of friendship, &c. Fritzsche understands it as if ἄλλ' ὅταν ἔχωσι were in opposition to ὅταν ἀλλάζωνται,—but we learn from ch. iv. § 8 what the former phrase must mean, τότε φασὶν ἔχειν τὰ αὐτῶν, ὅταν λάβωσι τὸ ἴσον. Cf. also ch. iv. § 14.

13 ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία—ἰσασθῆναι] 'And that mutual want like a principle of unity binds men together, this fact demonstrates, namely, that when men are not in want of each other, whether both parties or one be thus independent, they do not exchange; whereas, when some one else wants the commodity that a man has (they effect an exchange), one party wanting, for instance, wine, and the other being willing to give it for an export of corn: and then an equality has to be brought about.' Some MSS., and the Para-

phrast, read ἐξαγωγῆν, which would invert the relation of the parties. Διδόναι ἐξαγωγῆν, 'to grant an exportation,' occurs in Theophrast. *Char.* xx.: διδομένης ἐαυτῷ ἐξαγωγῆς ξύλων ἀτελεοῦς.

14 ὑπὲρ δὲ—μᾶλλον] 'But with a view to future exchange, supposing one does not want an article at present, money is a security that one will be able to get the article when one wants it, for with money in his hand a man must be entitled to take whatever he wishes. It is true that money is under the same law as other commodities; for its value fluctuates, but still its tendency is to remain more fixed than other things.' On these excellent remarks nothing farther need be said. The term ἐγγυητῆς is quoted from the sophist Lycophron by Aristotle, *Pol.* iii. ix. 8, in application to the law.

15 τοῦτο δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως] 'Conven-

- ποιεῖ σύμμετρα· μετρεῖται γὰρ πάντα νομίσματι. οἰκία Α, μυαῖ δέκα Β, κλίνη Γ. τὸ δὲ Α τοῦ Β ἥμισυ, εἰ πέντε μῶν ἀξία ἡ οἰκία, ἡ ἴσον· ἡ δὲ κλίνη δέκατον μέρος τὸ Γ τοῦ Β· δῆλον τοίνυν πόσαι κλῖναι ἴσον οἰκία, ὅτι
- 16 πέντε. ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἡ ἀλλαγὴ ἦν πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι, δῆλον· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ κλῖναι πέντε ἀντὶ οἰκίας, ἢ ὅσου αἱ πέντε κλῖναι.
- 17 Τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδίκον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, εἴρηται. διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεόν ἔχειν τὸ δ' ἔλαττον ἐστίν. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης ἐστὶν οὗ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ταῖς πρότερον ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσου

tionally' opposed to ἀπλῶς, cf. *Eth.* iv. ix. 7. The merely conventional character of money is strongly stated by Aristotle, *Pol.* i. ix. 11: "Ὅτε δὲ πάλιν λῆρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασι, φύσει δ' οὐθέν, ὅτι μεταθεμένων τε τῶν χρωμένων οὐθενὸς ἄξιον οὐδὲ χρήσιμον, κ. τ. λ.

16 ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἡ ἀλλαγὴ] The origin of commerce seems taken from this place by Paulus, cf. *Digest.* i. *De Contr. Empt.*: 'Origo emendi vendendique a permutationibus cœpit; olim enim non ita erat nummus, neque aliud merx aliud pretium vocabatur, sed unusquisque secundum necessitatem rerum ac temporum utilibus inutilia permutabat, quando plerumque evenit ut quod alteri superest alteri desit; sed quia non semper nec facile concurrebat ut, quum tu haberes quæ ego desiderarem, invicem ego haberem quod tu accipere velles, electa materia est ejus publica ac perpetua æstimatione difficultatibus permutationum æqualitate quantitatis subveniret.'

17 τί μὲν οὖν—εἴρηται] 'We have now stated what is the nature of the unjust and the just abstractedly.' A fresh division of the book commences here; after discussing the various kinds of justice objectively, that is, as principles which manifest themselves in

society, the writer proceeds to consider justice subjectively, that is, as manifested in the character of individuals.

ἡ δικαιοπραγία—ἀδικεῖσθαι] 'Just treatment is plainly a mean between injuring and being injured.' Δικαιοπραγία is formed on the analogy of εὐπραγία (cf. also αἰσχροπραγεῖν *Eth.* iv. i. 8), and as εὖ πράττειν is used ambiguously to denote both 'doing' and 'faring well' (cf. *Eth.* i. iv. 2), so δικαιοπραγία includes both the doing and the receiving justice.

ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης κ.τ.λ.] Justice is a mean state or balance in a different sense from the other virtues. It is not a balance in the mind, but rather the will to comply with what society and circumstances pronounce to be fair (τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν). Justice, according to this view, is compliance with an external standard. While in courage, temperance, and the like, there is a blooming of the individual character, each man being a law to himself, in justice there is an abnegation of individuality, in obedience to a standard which is one and the same for all. It must be remembered that the account of ἐπιείκεια in this book supplements that of justice and takes off from its otherwise over-legal character.

ἐστὶν· ἡ δ' ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων. καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ὁ δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ διανεμητικὸς καὶ αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον, οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε τοῦ μὲν αἵρετοῦ πλέον αὐτῷ ἔλαττον δὲ τῷ πλησίον, τοῦ βλαβεροῦ δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἡ δ' ἀδικία τὸναναντίον τοῦ ἀδίκου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν¹⁸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλείψις τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἢ βλαβεροῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. διὸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλείψις ἡ ἀδικία, ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἑλλείψεως ἐστίν, ἐφ' αὐτοῦ μὲν ὑπερβολῆς μὲν τοῦ ἀπλῶς ὠφελίμου, ἑλλείψεως δὲ τοῦ βλαβεροῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὲν ὅλον ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὁποτέρως ἔτυχεν. τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος τὸ μὲν ἔλαττον τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ μεῖζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν. περὶ μὲν οὖν¹⁹ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας, τίς ἐκατέρας ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις, εἰρήσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καθόλου.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἀδικοῦντα μήπω ἄδικον εἶναι, ὁ ποῖα 6 ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν ἤδη ἄδικός ἐστιν ἐκάστην ἀδικίαν, οἷον κλέπτῃς ἢ μοιχὸς ἢ ληστὴς; ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει; καὶ

¹⁸ διὸ ὑπερβολὴ—ὁποτέρως ἔτυχεν]
'Hence too, injustice is an excess and a defect, because it is a principle that aims at excess and defect, in one's own case the excess of what is beneficial absolutely, and the defect of what is hurtful; but in the case of others, while the general result will be similar, it will not matter in which of these two ways proportion is violated.' That is, an unjust award may be made by giving a person too much good as well as too little, and too little evil as well as too much. Injustice is here said to be an extreme *ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς ἐστίν*, just in the same way as justice was before said to be a mean state *ὅτι μέσου ἐστίν*.

VI. This chapter, which is written confusedly after the manner of

Eudemus, apparently has for its object to restrict the term justice yet more definitely than has hitherto been done. We are now entering on the second division of the book, and the question is, what will constitute an individual unjust? This question tends to elucidate the nature of justice and injustice as individual qualities. But before answering it, there is a digression. It must be remembered, says the writer, that we are treating of justice in the plain sense of the word, that is, civil justice, not that metaphorical justice which might be spoken of as existing in families. On the nature of this justice, proper or civil justice, and on the metaphorical kinds, some remarks are given.

γὰρ ἂν συγγένοιτο γυναικὶ εἰδῶς τὸ ἧ, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ προαι-
 2 ρέσεως ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος. ἀδικεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἀδικος δ'
 οὐκ ἔστιν, οἷον οὐδὲ κλέπτῃς, ἔκλεψε δέ, οὐδὲ μοιχός,
 3 ἐμρίχυστε δέ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. πῶς μὲν οὖν
 ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, εἴρηται πρότερον.
 4 δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι τὸ ζητούμενόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς
 δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ κοι-
 νωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἢ
 κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμὸν· ὥστε ὅσοις μὴ ἐστὶ τοῦ-
 το, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον,
 ἀλλὰ τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα. ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον,
 οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς· νόμος δ', ἐν οἷς ἀδικία· ἢ γὰρ

3 πῶς μὲν οὖν—πρότερον] The allusion is to ch. v. § 4—6, and the meaning appears to be simply, in the variety of cases that may occur, punishment by simple retaliation will not do. The sentence however appears irrelevant.

4 δεῖ δὲ μὴ—κατ' ἀριθμὸν] 'Now we must not forget that the object of our inquiry is at once justice in the plain sense of the word (ἀπλῶς) and justice as existing in the state. But this exists amongst those who live in common, with a view to the supply of their mutual wants, free and equal, either proportionately or literally.' Τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον is opposed to καθ' ὁμοιότητα. It is not meant here to separate τὸ ἀπ. δίκ. from τὸ πολ. δίκ., rather it is implied that they are both the same. The only justice that can be called so without a figure of speech is that between fellow-citizens, who have mutual rights and some sort of equality. Proportionate equality belongs to aristocracies and constitutional governments, numerical or exact equality to democracies. Cf. *Ar. Pol.* vi. ii. 2: καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικὸν τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἐστὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν, τούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου τὸ πλῆθος ἀναγκάειον εἶναι κύριον.

4—5 ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον—τύραννος] 'For what is just exists among those who live under a common law, and law is where there is injustice, (for legal judgment is a decision between the just and the unjust). Now wherever there is injustice there is wrong dealing, but it does not follow that where there is wrong dealing there is injustice. Wrong dealing consists in allotting oneself too much absolute good and too little absolute evil; and hence it is that we do not suffer a man to rule, but the impersonal reason, for a man does this for himself (*i.e.* rules, cf. *ἐτέρῳ ποιεῖ* below), and becomes a tyrant.' This passage does not give the origin of justice, but the signs by which you may know it. Justice could not be said to depend on law (especially as law is said to depend on injustice, for we should thus argue in a circle), but where law exists you may know that justice exists. The argument then is that justice exists between citizens who have a law with each other, and not between father and children between whom there is no law. Law implies justice because it springs out of cases where a sense of wrong has been felt.

δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου. ἐν οἷς δ' ἀδικία, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐν τούτοις, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδικία· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλεόν αὐτῷ νέμειν τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν· διὸ οὐκ ἐῷμεν 5 ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ καὶ γίνεται τύραννος. ἔστι δ' ὁ ἄρχων φύλαξ τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ Ἰσου. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐθεν αὐτῷ πλεόν 6 εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἴπερ δίκαιος· οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλεόν τοῦ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν· διὸ ἐτέρῳ ποιεῖ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναί φασιν ἀγαθὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον. μισθὸς ἄρα 7 τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας· ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τύραννοι. τὸ δὲ δεσποτικὸν 8 δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πατρικὸν οὐ ταῦτόν τούτοις ἀλλ' ὅμοιον· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπλῶς, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἕως ἂν ᾗ πηλίκον καὶ μὴ χωρισθῇ, ὥσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸν δ' οὐθεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν· διὸ 9 οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν. οὐδ' ἄρα ἀδίκον οὐδὲ δίκαιον

ἐν οἷς δ' ἀδικία κ.τ.λ.] This seems to mean that law has not arisen merely from the *fact* of unequal dealings (ἀδικεῖν), but from a sense of the violation of a principle (ἀδικία). Thus the principle of justice is prior to all law and not created out of it. Τοῦτο δ', i.e. τὸ ἀδικεῖν. Following up this conception of the *a priori* character of justice, the writer says we must be governed not by a man, who may act selfishly, but by an impersonal standard of the right. That selfish rule is tyranny. Aristotle asserts in *Pol.* III. vii. 5: ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννὶς ἐστὶ μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχούντος. Cf. also *Pol.* III. xvi. 3: τὸν ἄρα νόμον ἄρχειν αἰρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἕνα τινά.—ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόον κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθῃσι καὶ θηρίον. ἢ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ

τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας. διόπερ ἄνευ δρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν.

6 ἐπεὶ δ' οὐθεν—γέρας] The apodosis to ἐπεὶ is μισθὸς ἄρα. From οὐ γὰρ to πρότερον is parenthetical. 'But since he does not seem to gain at all, if he is a just man (for he does not allot to himself more of the absolutely good than to others, unless it be proportional to his own merits, and hence he acts for others, and justice thus is said to be the good of others), we must give him some reward, and this comes in the shape of honour and reverence.'

καθάπερ ἐλέχθη τὸ πρότερον] The reference is to ch. i. § 17.

8 τὸ δὲ—ὅμοιον. 'Now the justice of masters and parents is not identical with what we have gone through (τούτοις i.e. ἀπ. καὶ πολιτ. δίκ.), but is only analogous to it.'

9 διὰ—ἄρχεσθαι] 'Hence a man cannot have a spirit of wrong towards

τὸ πολιτικόν· κατὰ νόμον γὰρ ἦν, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει εἶναι νόμος· οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν οἷς ὑπάρχει ἰσότης τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. διὸ μᾶλλον πρὸς γυναικὰ ἐστι δίκαιον ἢ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτήματα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον· ἕτερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ πολιτικοῦ.

- 7 Τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν φυσικόν ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ νομικόν, φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν, καὶ οὐ τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ μή, νομικὸν δὲ ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐθέν διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως, ὅταν δὲ θῶνται, διαφέρει, οἷον τὸ

himself; nor civil justice or injustice; for this is, as we have said (ἦν), according to law and among those who can naturally have law; namely, those, as we said (ἦσαν), who have an equality of ruling and being ruled.'

VII. Continues the discussion as to the nature of civil justice, in which there are two elements, the natural (φυσικόν) and the conventional (νομικόν). They are distinguished, and arguments are brought against the sophistical position that all justice is merely conventional. The chapter as above is not conveniently divided. We need not have had a fresh commencement with § 1, τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ, which is a carrying on of the same digression before made; and we might well have had the end of a chapter at § 5, κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ἀρίστη, after which there is a return to the main question as to justice and injustice in the acts and the characters of individuals. In his later edition Bekker makes one undivided chapter including Chaps. VI., VII., VIII., of the present edition.

1 τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ—διαφέρει] 'Now in civil justice there is a natural element and a conventional element; that is natural which has the same force everywhere, and does not depend on being adopted or not adopted (τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ μή); while that is conventional which at the outset does not matter

whether it be so or differently, but when men have instituted it, then matters.' The distinction here drawn is like that between ἴδιος and κοινὸς νόμος in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* I. xiii., and also that between moral and positive laws in modern treatises. Natural justice is law because it is right, conventional justice is right because it is law. Τὸ νομικόν is not to be confused with τὸ νόμιμον (cf. ch. i. § 8), which is justice expressed in the law, and which is nearly equivalent to πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, containing therefore both the natural and conventional elements. In the early stages of society all law is regarded with equal reverence. Afterwards, in the sceptical period, the merely conventional character of many institutions is felt, and doubt is thrown on the validity of the whole fabric. Afterwards the proper distinction is made, and the existence of something above all mere convention is recognised. The idea of 'nature' as forming the basis of law, which was started in the school of Aristotle, was afterwards developed by the Stoics, and still further drawn out by Cicero and the Roman jurists. It became a leading formula in the Roman law, and hence has influenced the modern school of continental jurists, until a reaction was made against it by Bentham.

μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι, ἣ τὸ αἶγα θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο πρόβατα, ἔτι ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ θύειν Βρασίδα, καὶ τὰ ψηφισματώδη. δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοις εἶναι ² πάντα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καίει, τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινούμενα ὁρῶσιν. τοῦτο δ' ³

τὸ μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι] Herod. (vi. 79) speaks of *two minæ* as the ransom, ἀποινὰ ἔστι Πελοποννησίοις δύο μνᾶι τεταγμένοι κατ' ἄνδρα αἰχμάλων ἐκτίνειν.

τὸ αἶγα θύειν] Cf. Herod. ii. 42: ὅσοι μὲν δὴ Διὸς Θηβαίεος Ἰδρυται ἱρὸν ἢ νομοῦ Θηβαίου εἰσί, οὗτοι μὲν νυν πάντες οὕτων ἀπεχόμενοι αἶγας θύουσι.

τὸ θύειν Βρασίδα] i.e. in Amphipolis, cf. Thucyd. v. xi.: καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οἱ Ἀμφιπολίται περιέρξαντες αὐτοῦ τὸ μνημεῖον, ὥς ἡρώϊ τε ἐντέμνουσι καὶ τιμὰς δεδώκασιν ἁγῶνας καὶ ἐτησίους θυσίας νομίσαντες τὸν Βρασίδαν σωτήρα σφῶν γεγενῆσθαι.

² δοκεῖ δὲ—ὁρῶσιν] 'Now some think that all institutions are of this character, because, while the natural is fixed and has everywhere the same force (as fire burns equally here and in Persia), they see the rules of justice altered.' Καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν τοῖς Πέρσαις. This appears to have been a common formula, cf. Plato, *Minos*, p. 315 E: ἐγὼ μὲν (νομίζω) τὰ τε δίκαια δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα ἄδικα. οὐκοῦν καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν οὕτως ὥς ἐνθάδε νομίζεται;—ναί.—οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις;—καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις. In the same dialogue, p. 315, are given specimens of the different laws and customs in different times and places (D): Μυρία δ' ἂν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα εἰπεῖν. πολλὰ γὰρ εὐρυχωρία τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ὥς οὔτε ἡμεῖς ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα νομίζομεν οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἄνθρωποι. The variety of customs and ideas is brought for-

ward by Locke and Paley to disprove the existence of an innate 'moral sense.' This variety is generally overstated, and the list of aberrations is mainly obtained from the usages of barbarous tribes. On the origin of the opposition between 'nature' and 'convention,' and on the use made of this by the Sophists, see Vol. I. Essay II., p. 107-8.

³ τοῦτο δ'—οὐ φύσει] 'But this is not the case (i.e. that justice is mutable), though it is so to a certain extent. May be among the gods justice is immutable; but with us, although there is somewhat that exists by nature, yet all is mutable. Though this does not do away with the distinction between what is by nature and what is not by nature.' The writing here is very compressed, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὥς, i.e. τὰ δίκαια κινοῦνται, to which also οὐδαμῶς afterwards must be referred. The answer given to the sophistical argument against justice consists in denying the premiss that 'what is by nature is immutable.' This might be the case, it is answered, in an ideal world (παρὰ γε τοῖς θεοῖς), but in our world laws are interrupted, and the manifestation of them is less perfect (κινητὸν μέντοι πᾶν). Again 'nature' must be taken to mean not only a law but a tendency (see note on *Eth.* ii. i. 3), as, for instance, the right hand is 'naturally,' but not always, stronger than the left, while merely conventional institutions exhibit no natural law (οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ

οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὥς. καίτοι παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς ἴσως οὐδαμῶς· παρ' ἡμῖν δ' ἐστὶ μὲν τι καὶ φύσει, κινήτὸν μέντοι πᾶν. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει
 4 τὸ δ' οὐ φύσει. ποῖον δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ ποῖον οὐ ἀλλὰ νομικὸν καὶ συνθήκη, εἴπερ ἄμφω κινήτὰ ὁμοίως, δῆλον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς ἀρμόσει διορισμός· φύσει γὰρ ἡ δεξιὰ κρείττων,
 5 καίτοι ἐνδέχεται τινὰς ἀμφιδεξίους γενέσθαι. τὰ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῶν δικαίων ὁμοιά ἐστι τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἴσα τὰ οἰνηρὰ καὶ σιτηρὰ μέτρα, ἀλλ' οὐ μὲν ὠνοῦνται, μερίζω, οὐ δὲ παλοῦσιν, ἐλάττω. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπινα δίκαια οὐ ταῦτ' ἀπανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι, ἀλλὰ
 6 μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἀρίστη. τῶν δὲ δικαίων καὶ νομίμων ἕκαστον ὥς τὰ καθόλου πρὸς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἔχει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα πολλά, ἐκείνων δ' ἕκαστον ἓν· καθόλου γάρ. διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ ἄδικον

συνθήκη), and are like weights and measures, which entirely depend on the convenience of men.

παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς] Of course there is nothing theological in this allusion. In *Eth.* x. viii. 7, the notion of attributing justice to the gods is ridiculed. The present mention of the gods is not meant to convey anything about their nature, it merely contrasts a divine or ideal state with the human and actual. An exactly similar mention of the gods is made below, ch. ix. § 17.

4 ἐνδέχεται τινὰς] Bekker reads *τινας*, Zell and Cardwell *πάντας*, all without mentioning any variation in their MSS. The latter of the two readings is supported by the Paraphrast and also by the author of the *Magna Moralia* (i. xxxiv. 21): λέγω δ' ὅλον εἰ τῇ ὀριστερᾷ μελετῶμεν πάντες δεῖ βάλλειν, γινοίμεθ' ἂν ἀμφιδέξιοι. In either case, the sense is nearly the same, *πάντας* implying 'any one

out of all,' as above, κινήτὸν μέντοι πᾶν.

5 ὅμοια τοῖς μέτροις] The meaning appears to be, that measures differ in size in the producing (οὐ μὲν ὠνοῦνται) and the consuming (οὐ δὲ παλοῦσιν) countries.

ὁμοίως δὲ—ἀρίστη] 'So, too, those institutions which are not based on nature, but on human will, are not the same in all places, for not even are forms of government the same, though there is one alone which for all places is naturally the best.' From the primary difference in governments will follow manifold other differences in conventional usages. For the Aristotelian idea of the one best government, see *Politics* iii. vii., iii. xv., &c.

6 τῶν δὲ δικαίων—καθόλου γάρ] 'Now every just and lawful rule stands like the universal in relation to the particulars, for while actions are manifold, the rule is one, being universal.'

καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἄδικον μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῇ φύσει ἢ τάξει. τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅτανπραχθῇ, ἀδίκημά ἐστι, πρὶν δὲπραχθῆναι, οὐπω, ἀλλ' ἄδικον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα. καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγημα τὸ κοινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ ἀδικήματος. καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν, ποῖά τε εἶδη καὶ πόσα καὶ περὶ ποῖα τυγχάνει ὄντα, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.

Ὅντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀδικεῖ 8 μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ, ὅταν ἐκὼν τις αὐτὰ πράττῃ· ὅταν δ' ἄκων, οὐτ' ἀδικεῖ οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖ ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷς γὰρ συμβέβηκε δικαίοις εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκους, πράττουσιν. ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ δικαιοπράγημα ὠρίσται τῷ 2 ἐκούσιῳ καὶ ἀκούσιῳ· ὅταν γὰρ ἐκούσιον ᾖ, ψέγεται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδίκημα τότε ἐστίν· ὥστ' ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν, ἀδίκημα δ' οὐπω, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἐκούσιον προσῇ. λέγω δ' 3 ἐκούσιον μὲν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, ὃ ἂν τις τῶν

We have a transition of subject now, a return from the digression on civil justice, to inquire into individual responsibility, &c. The transition is made by saying that the principles of justice and injustice (τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ ἄδικον) are universals and differ from just and unjust acts. At first the writer makes δικαίωμα stand to δίκαιον, as ἀδίκημα to ἄδικον. Afterwards he substitutes δικαιοπράγημα as a more correct word, inasmuch as δικαίωμα had another special meaning to denote the setting right of injustice—legal satisfaction. It is not improbable that Eudemus here is correcting the phraseology of Aristotle, who at all events in his *Rhetoric*, I. xiii. 1, uses δικαίωμα as the opposite of ἀδίκημα, merely to denote a just action. Τὰ δ' ἀδικήματα πάντα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διέλωμεν, κ. τ. λ.

VIII. The general principles of justice having now been defined, the question is what constitutes justice and injustice in the individual? In

one word the will. This chapter adds some needless remarks on the nature of the voluntary, and distinguishes between the different stages of a wrong done, according to the amount of purpose which accompanied it. The same act externally might be a misfortune, if happening beyond calculation; a mistake, if through carelessness; a wrong, if through temptation; the act of an unjust man, if through deliberate villany (§§ 6—8). This distinction is illustrated by the legal view with regard to acts done in anger (§§ 9—10). All voluntary just acts are just. Some involuntary acts are still unpardonable.

3 λέγω δ' ἐκούσιον μὲν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται] The reference is to the *Eudemian Ethics* II. ix. 1, where voluntariness is defined to depend on knowledge. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔχει τέλος, καὶ οὔτε τῇ ὁρέξει οὔτε τῇ προαιέσει τὸ ἐκούσιον ὠρίσται, λοιπὸν δὴ ὁρίσασθαι τὰ κατὰ διάνοιαν. δοκεῖ δὲ ἐναντίον εἶναι τὸ ἐκούσιον τῷ ἀκούσιῳ, καὶ τὸ

ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄντων εἰδῶς καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν πράττει μήτε ὄν
 μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὗ ἕνεκα, ὅσον τίνα τύπτει καὶ τίνι καὶ τίνος
 ἕνεκα, καὶ κείνων ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μηδὲ βία,
 ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ τύπτει ἕτερον, οὐχ
 ἐκὼν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ. ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον
 πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ' ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις
 γινώσκειν, ὅτι δὲ πατὴρ ἀγνοεῖν. ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον
 διωρίσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ὅλην.
 τὸ δὲ ἀγνοούμενον, ἢ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ'
 ὄν, ἢ βία, ἀκούσιον· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόν-
 των εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, ὧν οὐθεν οὐθ'
 ἐκούσιον οὐτ' ἀκούσιόν ἐστιν, ὅσον τὸ γηρᾶν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν.
 4 ἔστι δ' ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τὸ
 κατὰ συμβεβηκός· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀπο-
 δοίη τις ἄκων καὶ διὰ φόβον, ὃν οὐτε δίκαια πράττειν οὐτε
 δικαιοπραγεῖν φατέον ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ὁμοίως
 δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζόμενον καὶ ἄκοντα τὴν παρακαταθήκην
 μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ
 5 ἄδικοι πράττειν. τῶν δὲ ἐκούσιων τὰ μὲν προελόμενοι
 πράττομεν τὰ δ' οὐ προελόμενοι, προελόμενοι μὲν ὅσα προ-
 6 βουλευσάμενοι, ἀπροαίρετα δὲ ὅσα ἀπροβούλευτα. τριῶν
 ὃν οὐσῶν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις, τὰ μὲν μετ'

εἰδότες ἢ ὄν ἢ ᾧ ἢ οὗ ἕνεκα—τῷ δ' ἀγνοοῦντι καὶ ὄν καὶ ᾧ καὶ οὗ, δι' ἄγνοίαν, μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα κ.τ.λ.] The same illustration is given in the *Eudemian Ethics* II. viii. 10, where the discussion has a great affinity to the present chapter.

ἐπὶ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα] See the note on *Eth.* III. i. 18.

πολλὰ γὰρ—ἀποθνήσκειν] 'Since we knowingly both do and suffer many of those things that happen to us by nature, none of which are either voluntary or involuntary, as for instance growing old or dying.' To constitute voluntariness we must do knowingly things that are within the sphere of the will (ἐφ' ἡμῶν). Physical things

are not within this sphere. It would have been more accurate to say that we do not *do* them. It is characteristic of Eudemus to turn to the consideration of physiological facts; see the notes below, on *Eth.* VII. ch. xiv.

6 τριῶν δὲ οὐσῶν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις] 'Therefore there being three kinds of harm that may be done in the intercourse of men,' &c. Really four kinds are specified, but the last (διὰ μοχθηρίαν) seems to be an addition to the old list, consisting of the misfortune, the error, and the wrong, which division is to be found in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, I. ch. xiii. The present discussion is promised in *Eth. Eud.* II. x. 19: ἄμα

ἀγνοίας ἀμαρτήματά ἐστιν, ὅταν μήτε ὃν μήτε ὁ μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξει· ἡ γὰρ οὐ βαλεῖν ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ἢ οὐ τοῦτον ἢ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα ᾤήθη, ἀλλὰ συνέβη οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα ᾤήθη, οἷον οὐχ ἵνα τρώσῃ ἀλλ' ἵνα κεντήσῃ, ἢ οὐχ ὅν, ἢ οὐχ ὥς. ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως ἢ βλάβῃ ⁷ γένηται, ἀτύχημα, ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἄνευ δὲ κακίας, ἀμάρτημα· ἀμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ τῆς αἰτίας, ἀτυχεῖ δ' ὅταν ἔξωθεν. ὅταν δὲ εἰδῶς μὲν μὴ ⁸ προβουλεύσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, οἷον ὅσα τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικά, συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες ἀδικοῦσι μὲν, καὶ ἀδικήματά ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι πῶς ἀδικοὶ διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἢ βλάβῃ· ὅταν ⁹ δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀδικος καὶ μοχθηρός. διὸ καλῶς τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀργίσας. ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ ¹⁰ μὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου· ἐπὶ φαινομένη γὰρ ἀδικία ἡ ὀργή ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς συναλλαγμασι περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὣν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν, ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ἀλλ' ὁμολογοῦντες περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ τοῦ ποτέρως δίκαιον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν. ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ, ὥστε ὁ μὲν οἶεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δ' οὐ. ἂν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάβῃ, ἀδικεῖ. καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ ¹¹

δ' ἐκ τούτων φανερόν καὶ ὅτι καλῶς διορίζονται οἱ τῶν παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσια τὰ δ' ἀκούσια τὰ δ' ἐκ προνοίας νομοθετοῦσιν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ διακριβοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἀππονταί γέ πῃ τῆς ἀληθείας· ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐροῦμεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐπισκέψει.

9—10 διὸ καλῶς—ἀδικεῖ] 'Hence too acts done from anger are well judged not to proceed from purpose, for not he who acts in anger, but he who provoked the anger is the beginner. Again, the question is not about the act having taken place or not, but about the justice of it; for anger

arises on the appearance of injustice. It is not as in contracts, where men dispute about the thing having been done, and where (if the thing has been done) one of the parties must be a villain, unless they have done it in forgetfulness. But (in the present case) agreeing about the fact, they dispute on which side justice is. Now he that has attacked another cannot plead ignorance, so that (the issue lies on this) one party thinks he has been injured, the other denies it. But if a man has harmed another on purpose, he is guilty of injustice.' Owing to the obscurity of expression,

ἀδικῶν ἄδικος, ὅταν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἢ ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἴσον.
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δίκαιος, ὅταν προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ.
 12 δικαιοπραγεῖ δέ, ἂν μόνον ἐκὼν πράττῃ. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων
 τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ συγγνωμονικά τὰ δ' οὐ συγγνωμονικά· ὅσα
 μὲν γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀμαρ-

this passage has given great trouble to the commentators. The context is a carrying on of the distinction between ἀμάρτημα, ἀδίκημα, and ἔδικον. What distinguishes these is the amount of purpose they contain. This, says the writer, is illustrated by the way in which acts of anger are treated legally. Such acts are not denied, but the plea is that they were caused by an injustice, that they did not proceed from purpose, but were caused by an injury which gave rise to them. Thus the question is moved off from the acts themselves, and is entirely concerned with their antecedents. Was it a real injustice that gave rise to them? Whereas with regard to harmful acts done on purpose (ἂν δ' ἐκ προαιρ. βλάβῃ) there is no doubt that in themselves they constitute a wrong. The chief difficulty is about the words ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἄγνοεῖ, ὥστε ὁ μὲν οἶεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δ' οὐ. Who is ὁ ἐπιβουλεύσας? and who are ὁ μὲν, ὁ δ' οὐ? Apparently οὐκ ἄγνοεῖ is merely in reference to διὰ λήθην. Cases of anger differ from other civil cases (ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι), (1) because the acts of anger are not denied; (2) because ignorance is not pleaded to justify them. 'Ὁ ἐπιβουλεύσας, accordingly, must mean 'he that made the attack,' though the word is not very appropriate to denote an attack made in anger. 'Ὁ μὲν refers to the same person, namely, to him who, having done a violent act in anger, now pleads that he was injured before, which plea the one

who has suffered from his violence denies. The sentence ἂν δ' ἐκ προαιρ. is in contrast to the whole of the preceding passage—to all that is said about deeds of anger. If it appears to any impossible that ὁ ἐπιβουλ. can refer to the angry man, there are several other meanings that can be assigned to it. (1) It may mean the person who by an injury provoked the attack, and then the second clause would mean, 'so that the angry man thinks he has suffered a wrong, the unjust man does not.' (2) The first clause may be parenthetical, the 'plotter' being contrasted with the angry man, and the second clause may be taken to mean 'so that the sufferer thinks he is wronged, and the angry man thinks he is not.' The first clause would then have been inserted to show that where, in cases of this kind, intentional provocation has been given, the parties are in the same relation as in cases ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι, i.e. one of them knows upon which side justice is, because he is conscious of his own wrong.

12 τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων] The word is used less sternly here than it is by Aristotle in *Eth.* III. i. 21, &c., where acts of passion are excluded from the class of the involuntary. On the difference between ἀγνοοῦντες and δι' ἄγνοιαν, see *Eth.* III. i. 14, and note. The view here given of physical temptation as constituting an excuse for wrong acts is similar to that in the later Eudemian Book, VII. xiv. 6.

τάνουσι, συγγνωμονικά, ὅσα δὲ μὴ δι' ἄγνοϊαν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ πάθος δὲ μήτε φυσικὸν μήτ' ἀνθρώπινον, οὐ συγγνωμονικά.

Ἀπορήσει δ' ἂν τις, εἰ ἱκανῶς διώρισταί περὶ τοῦ 9 ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστιν ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης εἴρηκε, λέγων ἀτόπως

μητέρα κατέκτα τὴν ἐμήν, βραχὺς λόγος,
ἐκὼν ἐκοῦσαν, ἢ θέλουσαν οὐχ ἐκὼν.

IX. This chapter, by means of mooting and answering certain difficulties and objections with regard to the nature of justice and injustice, completes and deepens the conception of them that has hitherto been given. These questions are as follows: (1) Can one be injured voluntarily? §§ 1—2. (2) Is the recipient of an injury always injured? §§ 3—3. The latter question is first generally answered, and then, §§ 9—13, it is re-stated in the form of two other questions, namely, Is the distributor of an unjust distribution, or he that gains by it, unjust? and, Can a man injure himself? By mooting these points it is at once shown that justice implies a relationship of two wills, and that an act of injustice implies a collision of two wills: a loss on one side and a gain on the other. The chapter ends with some remarks correcting popular errors, and deepening the conception of justice. (1) Justice is no easy thing consisting in an external act. It consists in an internal spirit, § 14. (2) To know it is not like knowing a set of facts. It implies a knowledge of principles, § 15. (3) The just man could not at will act unjustly. The character of the act depends on the state of mind, § 16. (4) Justice is limited to a human sphere, § 17.

1 ἀπορήσει δ' ἂν—ἐκόντες] 'Now one might doubt whether we have

adequately defined being injured and injuring; in the first place, whether it be as Euripides says, in his strange language, A. "I killed my mother, and there's an end of it." B. "Was it with the will of both, or was she willing while you were unwilling?" In short, is it as a matter of fact possible that one should be voluntarily injured, or, on the contrary, is that always involuntary, just as all injuring is voluntary? And is all injustice, like all injuring, to be summed up under the one category or the other, or is it sometimes voluntary and sometimes involuntary? The same may be said about being justly treated, for all just doing is voluntary, so that it might be supposed that being injured and being justly treated would be opposed to each other as to being voluntary or involuntary correspondingly to the two active terms (ἀντικ. ὁμοίως καθ' ἐκάτερον). But it would be absurd to say of being justly treated that it is always voluntary, for some are treated justly against their will.'

εἰ ἱκανῶς διώρισταί] This shows the purpose of the chapter, to complete the definition of justice and injustice by looking at them on the passive side.

ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης] Wagner (*Eur. Fragm.* p. 40) says the lines come from the *Alcæmon* of Euripides. The Scholiast refers them to the

πότερον γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔστιν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ οὐ ἀλλ'
 ἀκούσιον ἅπαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον. καὶ
 ἄρα πᾶν οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἐκού-
 2 σιον, ἢ τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ
 τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι· τὸ γὰρ δικαιοπραγεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον, ὥστ'
 εὐλογον ἀντικεῖσθαι ὁμοίως καὶ ἐκάτερον τό τ' ἀδικεῖσθαι
 καὶ τὸ δικαιοῦσθαι ἢ ἐκούσιον ἢ ἀκούσιον εἶναι. ἄτοπον δ'
 ἂν δόξειε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι, εἰ πᾶν ἐκούσιον· ἔνιοι γὰρ
 3 δικαιοῦνται οὐχ ἐκόντες. ἐπεὶ καὶ τόδε διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις,
 πότερον ὁ τὸ ἄδικον πεπονθὼς ἀδικεῖται πᾶς ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ
 ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν ἐστίν· κατὰ συμ-
 βεβηκὸς γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν
 δικαίων. ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων· οὐ γὰρ
 ταύτῳ τὸ τᾶδिका πράττειν τῷ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδिका πά-
 σχειν τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν
 καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι μὴ ἀδικούντος ἢ
 4 δικαιοῦσθαι μὴ δικαιοπραγούντος. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τὸ

Bellerophon. Wagner writes them as a dialogue, supposing the persons to be Alcmaeon and Phegeus. He conjectures κατέκταν, which appears more probable than the usual reading κατέκτα, and which accordingly has been adopted in the above translation.

2 The passive terms are not opposed to each other in respect of voluntariness in the way that might be expected from the opposition between the active terms under which they stand.

ἀδικεῖν—δικαιοπραγεῖν
 ἀδικεῖσθαι—δικαιοῦσθαι.

For ἀδικεῖσθαι is always involuntary, but δικαιοῦσθαι is not always voluntary. A man may be 'treated justly' by being hanged.

3 Not every one who suffers what is unjust is injured, for injury implies intention on the part of the injurer. Cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* i. xiii. 5: ἔστι δὲ

τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ ἐκόντος τὰ ἄδिका πάσχειν.

4—6 εἰ δ' ἐστὶν—πράττει] 'Now if to injure is simply defined "to hurt any one willingly," and "willingly" means "knowing the person, and the instrument, and the manner," and the incontinent man hurts himself willingly, then it follows that one can be willingly injured, and it will be possible to injure oneself. But this was one of the points in question, whether it is possible to injure oneself. Again, one might from incontinence be hurt willingly by another who was acting willingly, so that in that way it would be possible to be injured willingly. But shall we not rather say that the definition is not correct, but that we must add to the formula "hurt any one willingly, knowing person, instrument, and manner," the terms "against that person's wish?" It is true one is hurt and one suffers injustice willingly, but no

ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα τινά, τὸ δ' ἐκόντα εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ὧ καὶ ὥς, ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ἐκὼν βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὐτόν, ἐκὼν τ' ἂν ἀδιοκῆτο καὶ ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτόν αὐτόν ἀδικεῖν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τι τῶν ἀπορουμένων, εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτόν αὐτόν ἀδικεῖν. ἔτι ἐκὼν ἂν τις δι' ἀκрасίαν ὑπ' ἄλλου βλάπτοιτο ἐκόντος, ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἐκόντ' ἀδικεῖσθαι. ἡ οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ διορισμὸς, ἀλλὰ προσθετέον τῷ βλάπτειν εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ὧ καὶ ὥς τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν; βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν τις ἐκὼν καὶ τὰδίκῃ πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐθεὶς ἐκὼν· οὐθεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, οὐδ' ὁ ἀκρατὴς, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττει· οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται οὐθεὶς ὁ μὴ οἶεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ὃ τε ἀκρατὴς οὐχ ἂ οἶεται δεῖν πράττειν πράττει. ὁ δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ διδούς, ὥσπερ Ὀμηρὸς φησι δοῦναι τὸν Γλαῦκον τῷ Διομήδεϊ

χρύσεια χαλκείων, ἐκατόμβοι' ἐννεαβοίων,

one is injured willingly. For no one wishes (harm), nor does the incontinent man, but he acts against his wish. For no one wishes for what he does not think to be good, and the incontinent man does not what he thinks to be good.'

4 ἀπλῶς is opposed to κατὰ πρόσθεσιν as implied in προσθετέον. Cf. vii. iv. 2—3.

τὸ βλάπτειν] Harm does not constitute injustice without a violation of the will. Cf. *Ar. Rhet.* i. xiii. 6: ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀδικούμενον βλάπτεσθαι, καὶ ἀκούσιως βλάπτεσθαι.

ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς] The incontinent man may harm himself, or be led into ruin by others. The phenomena of incontinence appear to have constantly occupied the attention of Eudemus. They not only form the main subject of *Eth.* Book vii. (*Eth. Eud.* vi.), but they are also mixed up with the discussion on the voluntary, *Eth. Eud.* ii. viii.

6 οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται κ. τ. λ.] In his inmost self every one wishes for what he thinks good. Thus the

incontinent man, following his desire, acts against his own real wish. This is the same point of view as is taken in the *Gorgias* of Plato (p. 466 sqq.). It is rather different from that in *Eth.* iii. ch. iv. (on which see notes), though the word οἶεται prevents an absolute collision. The terms παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν are rather awkwardly introduced in the text, for it is said they are necessary to turn mere harm into injustice, but with regard to the incontinent man, while acting voluntarily he receives 'harm—against his wish.' Yet he is not injured voluntarily, because the terms 'against his wish' constitute him an involuntary agent. In short, in this case παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν is made to qualify, not the harm, but the voluntariness of the recipient. There is a slight confusion in the expression, but on the whole the tendency here is to attribute a less degree of voluntariness to weak and foolish acts than was done by Aristotle in his discussions on the voluntary; *Eth.* iii. i. 14, &c.

οὐκ ἀδικεῖται· ἐπ' αὐτῷ γάρ ἐστι τὸ διδόναι, τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν.

8 περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἐκούσιον, δῆλον.

Ἔτι δ' ὧν προειλόμεθα δὴ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, πότερόν ποτ' ἀδικεῖ ὁ νείμας παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὸ πλεῖον ἢ ὁ ἔχων, καὶ εἰ
9 ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν· εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρότερον λεχθὲν καὶ ὁ διανεμὼν ἀδικεῖ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ ἔχων τὸ πλεόν, εἴ τις πλεόν ἐτέρῳ ἢ αὐτῷ νέμει εἰδὼς καὶ ἐκὼν, οὗτος αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖ. ὅπερ δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέτριοι ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἐπιεικὴς ἐλαττωτικός ἐστιν. ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀπλοῦν; ἐτέρου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἐπλεονέκτει, οἷον δόξης ἢ τοῦ ἀπλῶς καλοῦ. ἔτι λύεται καὶ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν· οὐθὲν γὰρ παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖται διὰ γε τοῦτο, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, βλάπτεται μόνον.

10 φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ὁ διανεμὼν ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ τὸ πλεόν ἔχων αἰεί· οὐ γὰρ ὅτ' ἀδικον ὑπάρχει ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' ὅτ' ἐκόντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν· τοῦτο δ' ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, ἢ

11 ἔστιν ἐν τῷ διανεμόντι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ λαμβάνοντι. ἔτι ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιεῖν λέγεται, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα κτείνει καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης ἐπιτάξαντος, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ

12 μὲν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδिका. ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν ἔκρινεν, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον οὐδ' ἄδικος ἢ κρίσις ἐστίν, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἄδικος· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· εἰ δὲ γινώσκων ἔκρινεν ἀδίκως, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ

8—13 ἔτι δ' ὧν προειλόμεθα δὴ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν] 'But of the questions which we determined on there remain two to discuss,' namely, (1) whether the distributor of an unjust distribution does the wrong, or he who gains by it? (2) Can a man injure himself, as for instance by taking less than his share? These questions are as good as answered already; it is already clear that no one can injure himself. Again the *act* belongs to the distributor and not to the receiver. If the distributor acts from corrupt motives he is unjust, if unconsciously and by accident he is not unjust, though jus-

tice may have been violated by his decision.

11—12 ἔτι ἐπεὶ—πρῶτον] 'Again, as the word *doing* is used in more senses than one, and there is a sense in which inanimate things kill—or one's hand—or the slave who does his master's bidding—so the distributor may be the instrument of doing injustice, without himself injuring. Again, if he decided in ignorance, in the eye of the law he is not guilty of injuring, nor is his decision unjust, though from another point of view it is unjust, for justice according to law is distinct from abstract justice.' The

αὐτὸς ἢ χάριτος ἢ τιμωρίας. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ εἴ τις μερί-¹³
 σαιτο τοῦ ἀδικήματος, καὶ ὁ διὰ ταῦτα κρίνας ἀδίκως
 πλέον ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνων ὁ τὸν ἀγρὸν κρίνας οὐκ
 ἀγρὸν ἀλλ' ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν. οἱ δ' ἀνθρωποι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς¹⁴
 οἴονται εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν, διὸ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι ῥᾶδιον.
 τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· συγγενέσθαι μὲν γὰρ τῇ τοῦ γείτονος καὶ
 πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον καὶ δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον
 ῥᾶδιον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠδὶ ἔχοντας ταῦτα ποιεῖν
 οὔτε ῥᾶδιον οὔτ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ γινῶναι τὰ¹⁵
 δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀδίκα οὐδὲν οἴονται σοφὸν εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ὧν
 οἱ νόμοι λέγουσιν οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιέναι. ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτ'
 ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ πῶς πρατ-
 τόμενα καὶ πῶς νεμόμενα δίκαια· τοῦτο δὲ πλέον ἔργον ἢ
 τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ κεῖ μέλι καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἐλλέβορον
 καὶ καῦσιν καὶ τομῇν εἰδέναι ῥᾶδιον, ἀλλὰ πῶς δεῖ νεῖμαι
 πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ τίνι καὶ πότε, τοσοῦτον ἔργον ὅσον ἱατρὸν
 εἶναι. δι' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ δικαίου οἴονται εἶναι οὐθὲν¹⁶
 ἥττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐθὲν ἥττον ὁ δίκαιος ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον
 δύναιτ' ἂν ἕκαστον πράξαι τούτων· καὶ γὰρ συγγενέσθαι

first case supposes the distributor to act as the instrument of others, the second that he makes a mistake through ignorance. In the latter case abstract justice (τὸ πρῶτον δίκαιον) is violated, and yet legally (κατὰ τὸ νομικόν) no injustice can be complained of. πρῶτον here appears used analogously to πρώτη φιλοσοφία, πρώτη ἔλη, &c., to denote that which is most real and necessary, and also most abstract as being most removed from individual modifications. The Paraphrast and many of the commentators understand § 11 to refer to the receiver, not to the distributor. It might also be taken in a quite general sense, as applying to all such subservient acts. But it seems simplest to refer it to the distributor.

14—17 These sections contain remarks concluding the subject of jus-

tice. As they correct popular errors regarding its nature, they may be considered a continuation of the ἀπορία, with which the chapter commenced. The views which are here combated are (1) a shallow and external notion about justice and injustice as if they merely consisted in outward acts; (2) a sophistical opinion that to know justice merely consists in knowing the details of the laws, cf. *Eth.* x. ix. 20; (3) an opinion that justice implies its contrary, as if it were an art (*δύναμις*); see above ch. i. § 4. This opinion would be a consequence of the Socratic doctrine that justice is knowledge. Plato saw what this doctrine led to and drew out the paradoxical conclusion, *Repub.* p. 334 A, *Hipp. Min.* pp. 375—6. The Aristotelian theory that justice is a moral state (ἔξις) set the difficulty at rest.

- γυναικὶ καὶ πατάξαι, καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀφεῖναι καὶ στραφεῖς ἐφ' ὅποτεραοῦν τρέχειν. ἀλλὰ τὸ δειλαίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν οὐ τὸ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐστί, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠδὶ ἔχοντα ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἰατρύειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν οὐ τὸ τέμνειν ἢ μὴ τέμνειν ἢ
- ¹⁷ Φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ Φαρμακεύειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠδί. ἔστι δὲ τὰ δίκαια ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέτεστι τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἔλλειψιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ αὐτῶν, οἷον ἴσως τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς δ' οὐθὲν μόριον ὠφέλιμον, τοῖς ἀνιάτως κακοῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντα βλάπτει, τοῖς δὲ μέχρι τοῦ· διὰ τοῦτ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν.
- ΙΟ Περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει ἢ μὲν ἐπιείκεια πρὸς δικαιοσύνην τὸ δ' ἐπιεικὲς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον,

17 ἔστι δὲ—ἐστιν] 'Now the relations of justice exist between those who share in what are commonly called goods, but with regard to them can have both too much and too little. For some cannot have too much, as perhaps the gods; and to others again no portion is advantageous, but all is hurtful—I mean the utterly bad; while there is a class who can receive goods up to a certain point. Hence justice is human.' Two ideal states, one of the absolutely good, the other of the absolutely bad, are here depicted in contrast to the condition of human society. The idea of property cannot of course be connected with God (cf. *Eth.* x. viii. 7), who has and is all good (cf. *Eth.* i. vi. 3, ix. iv. 4); nor again with those who are so degraded that they could not receive any benefit at all from what are called goods (cf. ch. i. § 9). The passage is a curious one, and may remind us of the position assigned by Aristotle (cf. *Pol.* i. ii. 14) to man in his social condition, as something between the beast and the god.

(ἐπιείκεια) forms a suitable complement to the theory of justice, and we find the subject so treated in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, i. xiii., from which it is not improbable that the present chapter may be partly borrowed. Professor Spengel is mistaken in saying that this chapter is out of place, being introduced into the midst of the *ἀπορία* on justice. Evidently it is chapter xi., and not chapter x., that is out of place. Spengel thinks that the words *περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας* would come in well after the words *πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθὸς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, εἴρηται πρότερον* (which occur ch. vi. § 3), as if first retaliation and then equity should be discussed in relation to justice. But it is evident that they stand on a different footing, as treated in this book. Retaliation is a principle existing *in* justice and with certain modifications constituting it; equity is something outside justice and correcting it.

Ἐπιείκεια has a close connexion with what is called *γνώμη* (consideration), *Eth.* vi. xi. 1, cf. *Rhet.* i. xiii. And thus it is treated of by the author of the *Magna Moralia* amongst the intel-

ἐχόμενον ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ταῦτόν ἀπλῶς οὔτ' ὡς ἕτερον τῷ γένει φαίνεται σκοπούμενοις, καὶ ὅτε μὲν τὸ ἐπεικὲς ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπεικέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες· ὅτε δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι φαίνεται ἄτοπον εἰ τὸ ἐπεικὲς παρὰ τὸ δίκαιόν τι ὃν ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν· ἡ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ σπουδαῖον, ἡ τὸ ἐπεικὲς οὐ δίκαιον, εἰ ἄλλο· ἡ εἰ ἄμφω σπουδαῖα, ταῦτόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀπορία σχεδὸν συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ἐπεικὲς, ἔχει δ' ἅπαντα τρόπον τινὰ ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐθὲν ὑπεναντίον ἑαυτοῖς· τό τε γὰρ ἐπεικὲς

lectual qualities, and is coupled with what he calls *εὐγνωμοσύνη*, *Magna Moralia*, II. i. 1, sqq.

To us the contents of this chapter appear natural and easy to apprehend. The idea of equity as the complement of law and justice is to us perfectly familiar, but the writer saw a difficulty in saying how logically (τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι) equity could be praised if it contradicted justice. The answer is well given above, that equity is a higher and finer kind of justice coming in where the law was too coarse and general. The best illustration of this conception is to be found in the beautiful description given in *Rhet.* I. xiii. 'It is equity to pardon human failings, and to look to the lawgiver and not to the law; to the spirit and not to the letter; to the intention and not to the action; to the whole and not to the part; to the character of the actor in the long run and not in the present moment; to remember good rather than evil, and good that one has received, rather than good that one has done; to bear being injured (τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι ἀδικούμενον); to wish to settle a matter by words rather than by deeds; lastly, to prefer arbitration to judgement, for the arbitrator sees what is

equitable, but the judge only the law, and for this an arbitrator was first appointed, in order that equity might flourish.'

Ι ὅτε μὲν—ἀγαθοῦ] 'Sometimes we praise what is equitable and the equitable character in such a way, that we transfer the term and use it instead of the term good in praising people for all other qualities besides.' The word *ἐπεικὲς* is constantly used merely in the sense of 'good,' cf. *Eth.* IV. ix. 7, ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπεικὲς, and above, ch. iv. § 3, &c., but it is a mistake to consider this the *later* sense of the word, as if 'equitable' were the primary sense. *Ἐπεικὲς* (from *εἰκός*) first means 'customary,' as in Homer; then 'seemly,' then 'good' in general; afterwards it is probable than an association of *εἰκώ*, 'to yield,' became connected with the word, and hence the notion of moderation and of waiving one's rights arose, and τὸ ἐπεικὲς was constantly contrasted with τὸ δίκαιον. Thus in Herod. III. 53: πολλοὶ τῶν δικαίων τὰ ἐπεικέστερα προτιθέασι. Cf. Plato, *Laws*, p. 757 D: τὸ γὰρ ἐπεικὲς καὶ ξύγγνωμον τοῦ τελέου καὶ ἀκριβοῦς παρὰ δίκην τὴν ὀρθὴν ἐστὶ παρατεθρασμένον, &c. Out of this contrast the idea of equity was developed.

δικαίου τινὸς ὃν βέλτιόν ἐστι δίκαιον, καὶ οὐχ ὥς ἄλλο τι γένος ὃν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δικαίου. ταῦτόν ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ ἐπεικές, καὶ ἀμφοῖν σπουδαίοιν ὄντοιν κρεῖττον τὸ ἐπεικές.
 3 ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅτι τὸ ἐπεικές δίκαιον μὲν ἐστίν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπανόρθωμα νομίμου δικαίου.
 4 αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς, περὶ ἐνίων δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. ἐν οἷς οὖν ἀνάγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου, μὴ οἷόν τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεόν λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἀμαρτανόμενον· καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἥττον ὀρθῶς· τὸ γὰρ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματός
 5 ἐστίν· εὐθὺς γὰρ τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστίν. ὅταν οὖν λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῇ δ' ἐπὶ τούτου παρὰ τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἢ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης καὶ ἡμαρτεν ἀπλῶς εἰπών, ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλείφθεν, ὃ καὶ ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς οὕτως ἂν εἴποι ἐκεῖ παρών, καὶ εἰ ᾗδει, ἐνομοθέτησεν ἂν. διὸ δίκαιον μὲν ἐστίν, καὶ βέλτιόν τινος δικαίου, οὐ τοῦ ἀπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀμαρτήματος. καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπεικικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου, ἢ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου. τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ μὴ πάντα κατὰ νόμον εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων
 7 ἀδύνατον θέσθαι νόμον, ὥστε ψηφίσματος δεῖ. τοῦ γὰρ ἀορίστου ἀόριστος καὶ ἡ κανὼν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομῆς ὁ μολίβδινος κανὼν· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λίθου μετακινεῖται καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ κανὼν, καὶ τὸ ψή-
 8 φισμα πρὸς τὰ πράγματα. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπεικές,

4 περὶ ἐνίων δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε κ.τ.λ.] That law is necessarily imperfect and unable to cope with details, Aristotle constantly admits, cf. *Polit.* III. xi. 19: περὶ ὧν ἐξადυνατοῦσιν οἱ νόμοι λέγειν ἀκριβῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥᾶδιον εἶναι καθόλου περὶ πάντων. *Pol.* II. viii. 23: ἐπατέον εἶλας ἀμαρτίας καὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν. *Pol.* III. xv. 9: μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον πράττοντες, ἀλλ' ἢ περὶ ὧν ἐκλείπειν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτόν.

6 ὥστε ψηφίσματος δεῖ] 'There are some cases for which it is impossible

to legislate, you require a special decree to meet them.' The ψήφισμα, like the exercise of equity, was a remedy to make up the insufficiency of laws. On its special character, cf. *ch.* vii. § 1, and *Eth.* VI. viii. 2, see also Arnold on *Thucyd.* III. 36.

7 τοῦ γὰρ—πράγματα] 'For the rule for what is indefinite must be itself indefinite, like the leaden rule in the Lesbian architecture—the rule is not fixed, but shifts itself according to the shape of the stone, and so does

καὶ ὅτι δίκαιον, καὶ τίνος βέλτιον δικαίου, δῆλον. Φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτου καὶ ὁ ἐπεικὴς τίς ἐστίν· ὁ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων προαιρετικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς, καὶ ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικὸς, καίπερ ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθόν, ἐπεικὴς ἐστίν, καὶ ἡ ἕξις αὕτη ἐπιείκεια, δικαιοσύνη τις οὕσα καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρα τις ἕξις.

Πότερον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν ἢ οὐ, φανερόν ἐκ I I τῶν εἰρημένων· τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῶν δικαίων τὰ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου τεταγμένα, οἷον οὐ κελεύει ἀποκτινύναι ἑαυτὸν ὁ νόμος, ἀ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει· ἔτι ὅταν παρὰ τὸν νόμον βλάβη μὴ ἀντιβλάπτων, ἐκὼν 2 ἀδικεῖ, ἐκὼν δὲ ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ. ὁ δὲ δι' ὀργὴν ἑαυτὸν σφάττων ἐκὼν τοῦτο δρᾷ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὁ οὐκ ἔᾳ ὁ νόμος· ἀδικεῖ ἄρα. ἀλλὰ τίνα; ἢ τὴν πόλιν, αὐτὸν δ' οὐ; 3 ἐκὼν γὰρ πᾶσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐθεις ἐκὼν. διὸ καὶ ἡ πόλις ζημιοῖ, καὶ τις ἀτιμία πρόσσεστι τῷ ἑαυτὸν διαφθείραντι ὡς τὴν πόλιν ἀδικοῦντι. ἔτι καθ' ὃ ἀδικος, ὁ μόνον 4

the decree according to the nature of the case.' 'Lesbian architecture' appears to have been a kind of Cyclopiian masonry, which may have remained in Lesbos from the early Pelasgian occupiers of the island. Polygon stones were used in it, which could not be measured by a straight rule, cf. *Æsch. Fragm.* 70,

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν τις Λέσβιον
κῦμ' ἐν τριγώνοις ἐκπεραίνεται βυθοῖς,
where κῦμα means a waved moulding.

XI. This chapter, which is evidently superfluous (cf. Vol. I., Essay I., page 41), discusses an already settled question, Can a man injure himself? There is no merit in the present discussion. Amidst the feeble reasonings and the repetitions which it presents, the only points the least interesting are the view that is taken of suicide, §§ 2, 3, and the saying that it is a mere metaphor to speak of justice

between the higher and lower parts of a man.

I ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων] *i. e.* ch. i. §§ 12—20. The question is complicated by introducing a mention of universal justice (τὰ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν), and the extraordinary assertion is made that 'whatever the law does not command it forbids.' We might well ask, Did the Athenian law command its citizens to breathe, to eat, to sleep, &c.?

2—3 The suicide sins against the state, not against himself. This is proved by the fact that the state affixes infamy to the deed. In *Æschines, Ctesiph.* p. 636, § 64, it is mentioned that the hand of a suicide was buried apart from himself. And in Plato's *Laws*, ix. p. 873 c, sqq., regulations are laid down for the burial of suicides. In the words ἀδικεῖ ἄρα. ἀλλὰ τίνα; there is a change of meaning from the intransitive ἀδικεῖν, to 'do wrong,' to the transitive verb to 'injure.'

ἀδικῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλως φαῦλος, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικῆσαι ἑαυτὴν.
 τοῦτο γὰρ ἄλλο ἐκείνου. ἔστι γάρ πως ὁ ἀδικὸς οὕτω
 πονηρὸς ὥσπερ ὁ δειλός, οὐχ ὡς ὅλην ἔχων τὴν πονηρίαν,
 ὥστ' οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην ἀδικεῖ· ἅμα γὰρ ἂν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴη
 ἀφρηῆσθαι καὶ προσκεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτό· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον,
 ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἐν πλείοσιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδικόν.
 5 ἔτι δὲ ἐκούσιόν τε καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως καὶ πρότερον. ὁ γὰρ
 διότι ἔπαθε, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀντιποιῶν οὐ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν· αὐτὸς
 6 δ' ἑαυτὸν, τὰ αὐτὰ ἅμα καὶ πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ. ἔτι εἴη ἂν
 ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἄνευ τῶν κατὰ μέρος
 ἀδικημάτων οὐθεὶς ἀδικεῖ, μοιχεύει δ' οὐδεὶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲ
 τοιχωρυχεῖ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τοῖχον οὐδὲ κλέπτει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ.
 ὅλως δὲ λύεται τὸ ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τὸν
 7 περὶ τοῦ ἐκούσιως ἀδικεῖσθαι. φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἄμφω
 μὲν φαῦλα, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ
 ἔλαττον τὸ δὲ πλεόν ἔχειν ἐστὶ τοῦ μέσου καὶ ὥσπερ
 ὑγιεινὸν μὲν ἐν ἰατρικῇ, εὐεκτικὸν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ· ἀλλ'
 ὅμως χεῖρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν μετὰ κακίας

4 ἅμα γὰρ—ἄδικον] 'For it would be thus possible for the same thing to be gained and lost by the same person; but this is not possible, justice and injustice must always take place between more persons than one,' cf. ch. iii. § 4.

6 ὅλως δὲ λύεται κ. τ. λ.] A verbal repetition of what was said above, ch. ix. § 9.

7—9 The chapter ends by touching upon two points which have an apparent reference to Plato, (1) the assertion that to injure is worse than to be injured, which the writer here qualifies with a consideration; (2) the conception of justice existing between the different parts in the mind of an individual, which is here pronounced to be a metaphor.

καὶ ὥσπερ—γυμναστικῇ] This sentence is parenthetical and elliptic. The train of thought appears to be: 'Injuring and being injured are both

bad, they are both departures from the mean, and it is (with justice) as with health in medicine and good condition in training,' namely, it is a state of balance between excess and defect, cf. *Eth.* II. ii. 6.

ἀλλ' ὅμως χεῖρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν] This is exactly the point which is urged by Socrates in the *Gorgias* of Plato (p. 473 A, 509 c), and seems to his hearers a paradox. It is qualified above by the admission that being injured might be in its consequences (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) a worse evil than injuring; just as a stumble might cause a man's death, and so be accidentally worse than a pleurisy. Is it then worse to be ruined by the cheating of others, or to cheat some one of a sixpence? The writer above acknowledges that moral science will maintain the severity of its verdict, and say cheating is the worse (ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ κ. τ. λ.). Of

καὶ ψεκτίν, καὶ κακίας ἢ τῆς τελείας καὶ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐγγύς (οὐ γὰρ ἅπαν τὸ ἐκούσιον μετὰ ἀδικίας), τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι ἄνευ κακίας καὶ ἀδικίας. καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι 8 ἥττον φαῦλον, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δ' οὐθὲν κωλύει μεῖζον εἶναι κακόν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ, ἀλλὰ πλευρῖτιν λέγει μεῖζω νόσον προσπτάισματος· καίτοι γένοιτ' ἂν ποτε θάτερον κατὰ συμβεβηκός, εἰ προσπτάισαντα διὰ τὸ πεσεῖν συμβαίῃ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ληφθῆναι καὶ ἀποθανεῖν. κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ καὶ ὁμοιότητά ἐστιν οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς 9 αὐτὸν δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τισίν, οὐ πὰν δὲ δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τὸ δεσποτικόν ἢ τὸ οἰκονομικόν· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις διέστηκε τὸ λόγον ἔχον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον. εἰς ἃ δὴ βλέπουσι καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις ἔστι πάσχειν τι παρὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ὁρέξεις· ὥσπερ οὖν ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ εἶναι πρὸς ἀλληλα δίκαιόν τι καὶ τούτοις. περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ 10 τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

course being depraved in mind is the worst of all evils. It is not this (*ἀδικος εἶναι*), but a single act of wrong (τὸ ἀδικεῖν), that will bear comparison with the evil of being injured.

9 κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ—τούτοις] 'Now metaphorically and by analogy one is capable of justice, not towards one's own self, but towards certain parts of oneself, not every kind of justice, but despotic or household justice. For in the theories alluded to there is a separation made between the reasonable and unreasonable part of man's nature. Regarding this, people consider that one can have injustice towards oneself, because these separate parts may be made to suffer something contrary to one's proper

tendencies; so then, like ruler and ruled, they have a sort of justice with each other.'

ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις] It can hardly be doubted that there is a reference here to Plato, *Repub.* p. 441 A, 443 D, 432 A, &c. However, the reference may be second hand, having been first made by Aristotle. To deny the appropriateness of the term 'justice' to express a harmony between the different parts of man's nature is unlike the point of view taken *Eth.* ix. c. iv., where the friendship which the good man has with himself is described at length. Eudemus, however, was much busied with problems as to the unity of the will, and probably advanced to some extent the Peripatetic psychology.

PLAN OF BOOK VI.

TURNING to the contents of this Sixth Book, we see at once that it includes two subjects, and that the intermixture of these two has given rise to some little confusion. The questions are (1) What is the moral standard? (2) What are the intellectual *ἀρεαί*?

Commencing with the former question, the writer goes off into the latter. And thus Wisdom (*φρόνησις*) is treated of at some length as a perfection of the moral intellect, but is hardly touched upon with regard to its operation as the moral standard.

After the two above-mentioned questions have been proposed, without any statement of their connexion, the discussion of the intellectual *ἀρεαί* commences by a division of the reason into scientific and calculative. Ch. I.

Truth is the object of both, but truth is divided into practical and speculative. The former enters into and becomes an element in the decisions of the will. Ch. II.

Truth of whatever kind is attained by only five organs of the mind—Science, Art, Wisdom, Reason, and Philosophy. These then are severally discussed; and Philosophy, after being treated independently, has Wisdom brought in again in contrast to itself. Ch. III.—VII.

The relation of Wisdom to Economy and Politics is then discussed. Ch. VIII.

Prudence (*εὐβουλία*), Apprehension (*σύνεσις*), and Considerateness (*γνώμη*), as being component elements of Wisdom, are severally treated of, and some remarks are added on the natural and intuitive character of these practical qualities. Ch. IX.—XI.

The book ends by the statement and solution of difficulties with

regard to Wisdom and Philosophy, their respective *use*, and their relation to each other in point of superiority.

With regard to the *use* of Wisdom some important though not very clear remarks are made on its inseparable connexion with Virtue. Though inseparable, it is not, however, identical with Virtue, as Socrates wrongly asserted. In relation to Philosophy, Wisdom is the means, while Philosophy is the end. Ch. XII.—XIII.

The upshot of the book, then, is, that it treats of the intellectual *âperai*. These are two—not *five*, as some would say, reckoning as such the five organs of truth, nor again an indefinite number, as Aristotle would seem to say, admitting ‘Apprehension,’ &c. (*Eth.* I. xiii. 20); but two essentially, Philosophy and Wisdom. These are contrasted with each other, but in such a way that Wisdom, though the least excellent, is brought into prominence, and is the real theme of the book. With all the discrepancies of statement which we have already alluded to (Vol. I. Essay I. p. 40), Wisdom comes out in its general outlines as the perfection of the practical reason combined with the will; as inseparable, if distinguishable, from Virtue itself. The picture of this quality and of its growth in the mind is made the occasion of many interesting remarks; but the question how the mind acts in determining the mean, and what is the nature of the moral standard, is left still unanswered.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ [ΕΥΔΗΜΙΩΝ] VI.

ΕΠΕΙ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι δεῖ τὸ μέσον αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ τὴν ἑλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, τοῦτο διέλωμεν. ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἔξεσι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἔστι τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν, καὶ τις

I. This chapter states, though somewhat indefinitely, the question which is to be answered in the ensuing book. Referring back to a previous mention of 'the mean,' it proposes now to discuss 'the right law' by which the mean is determined. For only to know that action must be 'in the mean, and according to the right law,' is a mere blank formula which requires filling up (ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές). What then is the right law, and what is the standard of it (τίς τ' ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος)? In answering this question, the procedure must be to discuss the most perfect developments of the intellectual faculties, for by so doing we shall learn the proper function of each (ληπτέον ἅρ' ἑκατέρου τούτων τίς ἡ βελτίστη ἔξις· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρου, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον). As the inner nature of man was before divided into two parts, the rational and irrational, so we may now subdivide the rational part into two elements, the scientific and the cal-

culative, in accordance with the two classes of objects which are presented to the mind, and which we may conclude are dealt with by separate faculties, namely, the permanent, which is dealt with by the scientific element in us, and the contingent, which is the object of calculation or deliberation.

1 ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες] The reference is to *Eth. Eud.* II. V. 1: ἐπεὶ δ' ὑπόκειται ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη ἔξις ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν βελτίστων καὶ καθ' ἣν ἄριστα διακείνται περὶ τὸ βέλτιστον, βέλτιστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστον τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ μέσον ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς κ.τ.λ.

ἐν πάσαις γὰρ—λόγον] 'For in all the states of mind which we have described, as also in all others, there is a certain mark to which he who is in possession of 'the law' (ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων) looks, and tightens or relaxes (the strings) accordingly, and there is a certain standard of those mean states which we say are between

ἐστὶν ὁρος τῶν μεσοτήτων, ἃς μεταξύ φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, οὕσας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐβὲν δὲ σαφές· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὧν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥαθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἂν τις οὐβὲν ἂν εἰδεῖν πλέον, οἷον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεισθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα,

excess and deficiency, being in accordance with the right law.' 'Ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίσιν is a metaphor from tuning the strings of a lyre. Cf. Plato, *Lysis*, p. 209 B: καὶ ἐπειδάν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, τὴν λύραν λάβης, οὐ διακωλύουσί σε οὐθ' ὁ πατήρ οὐθ' ἡ μήτηρ ἐπιτείνειν τε καὶ ἀνείναι ἢν ἂν βούλη τῶν χορδῶν. *Phædo*, p. 98 C: καὶ τὰ μὲν ὅσα ἐστὶ στερεά, καὶ διαφυὰς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ νεῦρα οἷα ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνίσθαι. This metaphor is not quite in accordance with that other metaphor of 'looking to the mark,' but in fact the term σκοπός seems to have become so regular a formula with Eudemus as to have lost its metaphorical association. By Aristotle σκοπός was used as a pure metaphor, the application of which was borrowed from Plato (cf. *Eth. i. ii. 2*, note). But in the writing of Eudemus it seems used as a scientific term equivalent to τέλος; cf. *Eth. Eud. ii. x. 20*: ἐπεὶ δὲ βουλευεται αἰεὶ ὁ βουλευόμενος ἕνεκά τινος, καὶ ἐστὶ σκοπός τις αἰεὶ τῷ βουλευομένῳ πρὸς ὃν σκοπεῖ τὸ συμφέρον, περὶ μὲν τοῦ τέλους οὐθεὶς βουλευεται. *Ib. ii. xi. 2*: λέγομεν δὲ προαπορήσαντες. Ἔστι γὰρ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ὀρθὸν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν διαμαρτάνειν· ἔστι δὲ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ἡμαρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἐκείνον περαινόντα ὀρθῶς ἔχειν, καὶ μηδέτερον. In like manner the use of ὅρος by Eudemus is quite different from

anything that we find in Aristotle, and is no doubt an innovation. Cf. *Eth. Eud. ii. v. 8* (which is especially referred to in the present passage), τίς δ' ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ πρὸς τίνα δεῖ ὅρον ἀποβλέποντας λέγειν τὸ μέσον, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον. *Ib. viii. iii. 12*: δεῖ τινὰ εἶναι ὅρον καὶ τῆς ἔξεως καὶ τῆς αἰρέσεως καὶ περὶ φυγῆς χρημάτων πλήθους καὶ ὀλιγότητος καὶ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων. *Ib. viii. iii. 15* (quoted Vol. I. p. 23).

2 ἔστι δὲ—σαφές] 'Now to say this is to say what is true enough, but not explicit.' This same expression, with the same illustration of the medical art, is repeated *Eth. Eud. viii. iii. 13*: ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρότερον ἐλέχθη τὸ ὡς ὁ λόγος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν τροφήν εἴπειν ὡς ἡ ἱατρικὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτης. τοῦτο δ' ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐ σαφὲς δέ. Cf. *Ib. i. vi. 2*: ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένων οὐ σαφῶς δὲ προϊοῦσιν ἔσται καὶ τὸ σαφῶς. Throughout the *Eudemian Ethics* one can trace an inclination to make small corrections and improvements upon Aristotle. Cf. the notes on *Eth. iii. viii. 6* and *v. vii. 7*. In the present place there is an apparent protest against the indefiniteness and relativity of Aristotle's moral theory of 'the mean' and 'the law.' Eudemus does not seem (according to the statement here) content to give greater explicitness to the idea of the 'law' by the develop-

εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἱατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς ὁ ταύτην
 3 ἔχων. διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεις μὴ μόνον
 ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτ' εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον τίς τ'
 ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὁρος.

4 Τὰς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι τὰς μὲν εἶναι τοῦ
 ἡθους ἔφαιμεν τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοίας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν
 ἡθικῶν διεληλύθαμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, περὶ ψυχῆς
 5 πρῶτον εἰπόντες, λέγωμεν οὕτως. πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη
 ὅτ' εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον·
 νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διαιρετέον.
 καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἓν μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν
 τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως

ment of the idea of the wise man who is its impersonation. But he asks (separating σκοπός and ὁρος from the λόγος) 'What is the mark to which one possessing the law must look?' What is the standard of the law? In reality these questions get no answer. They only cloud the subject by introducing a confusion of formulæ.

4 τὰς μὲν εἶναι τοῦ ἡθους ἔφαιμεν] Cf. *Eth. Eud.* II. i. 18: ἀρετῆς δ' εἶδη δύο, ἡ μὲν ἡθικὴ ἡ δὲ διανοητικὴ· ἐπαινοῦμεν γὰρ οὐ μόνον τοὺς δικαίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς συνετοὺς καὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς.

5 πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη ὅτ' εἶναι] Cf. *Eth. Eud.* II. i. 15: ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνθρωπίνην ἀρετὴν ζητοῦμεν, ὑποκείσθω δύο μέρη ψυχῆς τὰ λόγον μετέχοντα, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον μετέχειν λόγου ἄμφω, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῷ ἐπιτάττειν τὸ δὲ τῷ πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν πεφυκέναι· εἰ δέ τι ἐστὶν ἐτέρως ἄλογον, ἀφείσθω τοῦτο τὸ μόνιον. It will be seen that in the passage quoted Eudemus did not exactly divide man's nature into two parts, 'rational and irrational,' but said that these are 'two parts part-taking of reason' in different ways. Thus he gave a compressed summary of the results of Aristotle's discussion in

Eth. I. ch. xiii. But here he speaks as if he had repeated *verbatim* the popular division into rational and irrational which was provisionally accepted by Aristotle. Thus, by a slip of the memory, he confuses his own statement with Aristotle's.

καὶ ὑποκείσθω—αὐτοῖς] 'And let us suppose that the parts possessing reason are two, one by which we apprehend such existences as depend on necessary principles, and one by which we apprehend contingent matter, for to objects differing in genus there must be different members of the mind severally adapted, if it be true that these members obtain their knowledge by reason of a certain resemblance to and affinity with the object of knowledge.' We have here a division of the mind in accordance with a division of the objects of which the mind is cognizant. And as a justification of this we have the assumption that knowledge implies a resemblance and affinity between object and subject. With regard to this, Aristotle (*De Animâ*, I. ii. 10) says that 'those philosophers who wished to account for knowledge and perception identified the ψυχὴ with

εχειν, ἐν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα· πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει
ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ γένει τὸ πρὸς
ἐκάτερον πεφυκός, εἴπερ καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα καὶ οἰκειό-
τητα ἢ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων τὸ ⁶
μὲν ἐπιστημονικόν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλευέσθαι
καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταυτόν, οὐθὲς δὲ βουλευέται περὶ τῶν μὴ

the principles of things, because like is known by like.' 'Οσοι δ' ἐπὶ τὸ γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων (ἀποβλέπουσιν), οὗτοι δὲ λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὰς ἀρχάς, οἱ μὲν πλείους ποιούντες, οἱ δὲ μίαν ταύτην, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων πάντων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον ψυχὴν τούτων, λέγων οὕτω

γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὁπάπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ,
αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα διαν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ
αἰθέλον,
στοργῇ δὲ στοργήν, νείκος δέ τε νείκει
λυγρῷ.

τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ· γινώσκεισθαι γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι. Sir W. Hamilton says (*Discussions on Philosophy*, p. 60): 'Some philosophers (as Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, Alcmaeon) maintained that knowledge implied even a *contrariety* of subject and object. But since the time of Empedocles, no opinion has been more universally admitted than that the *relation of knowledge* inferred the *analogy of existence*. This analogy may be supposed in two potences. What knows and what is known are either, first, *similar*, or second, the *same*; and if the general principle be true, the latter is the more philosophical.' The fact is, that every act of knowledge is a unity of contradictions. It would be absurd to deny that the subject is contrary to the object, and it would be equally

absurd to deny that the subject is the same as the object. As Empedocles says, the mind only knows fire by being fire, but, on the other hand, if, in knowing fire, the mind only *were* fire, and were not contrary to fire, then to know fire would only be to add fire to fire. But it is *qua* 'knowing' that the mind is contrary to its object, not *qua* knowing any particular object. Thus from the diversity of objects we are justified in concluding a diversity in the mind. But we must be sure that objects are really different from one another in *genus* (τῷ γένει ἕτερα), before we conclude the existence of different parts, faculties, or elements corresponding to them, else we may attribute to different principles in the mind phenomena that were only modifications of each other, and not by any means implying a diversity of principle.

6 λεγέσθω δὲ — ἐχοντος] 'Of these let one be called the 'scientific,' the other the 'calculative' part, for deliberating and calculating are the same, and no one deliberates about necessary matter. The calculative part, then, is one division of the rational.' The psychology here is an advance in dogmatic clearness of statement beyond what we find in the writings of Aristotle. The terms τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν and τὸ λογιστικόν are not opposed to each other in the *De Animâ*. Λογιστικόν has not there taken the definite meaning which it wears in the present book. Rather it is used in a general

ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. ὥστε τὸ λογιστικόν ἐστὶν ἓν τι
7 μέρος τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. ληπτέον ἄρ' ἐκατέρου τούτων
τίς ἢ βελτίστη ἔξῃς· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἐκατέρου, ἢ δ'
ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον.

2 Τρία δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια πράξεως καὶ

sense to denote 'rational.' Thus in asking how the ψυχή is to be divided, Aristotle says (*De An.* iii. ix. 2): ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν εὐθὺς πῶς τε δεῖ μόρια λέγειν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πόσα. Τρόπον γὰρ τινα ἄπειρα φαίνεται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἃ τινες λέγουσι διορίζοντες, λογιστικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν (*i.e.* Plato, *Republic*, pp. 436—441), οἱ δὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον. Cf. *Ib.* iii. ix. 5: ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις γίνεται. *Ib.* iii. x. 10: φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἡ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητικὴ. Cf. *Topics*, v. v. 4, where in stating the various ways in which the logical *property* may be predicated of a substance, it is said, ἡ ἀπλῶς καθάπερ ζῴου τὸ ζῆν, ἢ κατ' ἄλλο, καθάπερ ψυχῆς τὸ φρόνιμον, ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον, καθάπερ λογιστικοῦ τὸ φρόνιμον (φρόνιμον and λογιστικόν being here both used most probably in a general sense for 'wisdom' and 'reason'). Again, τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν is used, not as here opposed to τὸ λογιστ., but generally. *De Anim.* iii. xi. 3: τὸ δ' ἐπιστημονικὸν οὐ κινεῖται ἀλλὰ μένει. However, the distinction here given is already prepared in the *De Animā*, and is even stated (though less dogmatically) in a place which was probably borrowed by the present writer. *Ib.* iii. x. 2: νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός· διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει.

οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται, κ. τ. λ.] Cf. *Eth. Eud.* ii. x. 9: περὶ ὧν οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδ' ἐγχειρήσειε βουλεύεσθαι μὴ ἀγνοῶν. Περί ὧν δ' ἐνδέχεται μὴ μόνον τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. We before

observed (cf. *Eth.* iii. iii. 3, note) that Aristotle, in the parallel passage, did not use the terms τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα and τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα. To combine logical with psychological formulæ is the characteristic of Eudemus.

II. The last chapter having divided the reason into scientific and calculative, the present chapter proceeds to bridge over the interval between the intellect and moral action. This is done by assuming three principles in man—sensation, reason, and desire. Sensation merges into the other two, and then it is shown that in purpose, the cause of action, there is the meeting point of desire and reason, not of the pure or speculative reason (answering to the 'scientific part' of the last chapter), but the practical reason aiming at an end (which answers to the 'calculative part' in the former division). Thus there are two kinds of truth, one pure, the other having a relation to the will, and 'agreeing with right desire.' This distinction is a great step towards answering the question with which the present book is concerned. Truth having been divided into pure and practical, it only remains to see the forms under which the mind deals with these two kinds, and the highest developments of the mind will be disclosed, arranged under a twofold head.

I τρία δ' ἐστίν] Cf. *Ar. De Animā*, iii. x. 1: φαίνεται δὲ γε δύο ταῦτα κινούμενα, ἡ ὕρεξις ἢ νοῦς, εἴ τις τὴν

ἀληθείας, αἰσθησις νοῦς ὁρεξίς. τούτων δ' ἡ αἰσθησις² οὐδεμιάς ἀρχὴ πράξεως· ὁῦλον δὲ τῶ τὰ θηρία αἰσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν, πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. ἔστι δ' ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτ' ἐν ὁρέξει διώξις καὶ φυγή· ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἔξις προαιρετικὴ, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὁρεξίς βουλευτικὴ, δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα τὸν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ διώκειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια πρακτικὴ. τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς³ διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς μηδὲ ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς τ' ἀληθές ἐστι καὶ ψεῦδος· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ παντὸς διανοητικοῦ ἔργον, τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ ἡ ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ ὁρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ. πράξεως μὲν οὖν⁴ ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις, ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα, προαι-

φαντασίαν τιθεῖν ὡς νόησιν τινα·
ἄμφω ἄρα ταῦτα κινητικὰ κατὰ τόπον, νοῦς καὶ ὁρεξίς. Νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός· διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει. . . . Καὶ ἡ φαντασία δὲ ὅταν κινῇ οὐ κινεῖ ἄνευ ὁρέξεως. It is highly probable that Eudemus had this passage before his eyes. The only alteration he has made is to substitute αἰσθησις for φαντασία, and to speak of the determinators of truth and action as three, with one merged in the other two, instead of calling them two with a third implied. Τούτων δ' ἡ αἰσθησις κ.τ.λ. answers to καὶ ἡ φαντασία κ.τ.λ.

2 δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία—πράξεως μὴ κοινωνεῖν] The definite meaning of πράττειν and πράξις to denote 'moral action' appears perhaps rather more strongly in Eudemus than in Aristotle. Cf. *Eth. Eud.* II. vi. 2: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις β' γ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ πράξεων τινῶν ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ μόνον τῶν ζῶων· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων οὐθὲν εἰποιμεν ἂν πράττειν. *Ib.* II. viii. 6: οὐ γὰρ φαμέν τὸ παιδίον πράττειν, οὐδὲ τὸ θηρίον, ἀλλ' ὅταν ᾗ διὰ λογισμὸν πράττοντα.

ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κ.τ.λ.] All this is a compressed result of Aristotle's discussions, *De Animâ*, III. x.—xi.

ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ] Cf. *Eth. Eud.* II. x. 28: ἀνάγκη τοίνυν—τὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν ἠθικὴν ἔξιν προαιρετικὴν μεσότητος τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐν ἡδέσι καὶ λυπηροῖς.

ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις] Cf. *Eth. Eud.* II. x. 14: δῆλον ὅτι ἡ προαίρεσις μὲν ἐστὶν ὁρεξίς τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ βουλευτικῇ.

τὸν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁρεξιν ὀρθήν] 'The decision of the reason must be true, and the desire must be right.' The terminology here used is rather more accurate than that of Aristotle, *De An.* III. x. 4: νοῦς μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁρθός· ὁρεξίς δὲ καὶ φαντασία καὶ ὀρθή καὶ οὐκ ὀρθή. Cf. *Eth.* III. ii. 13, where it is said that ὁρθός is the proper epithet for purpose (i.e. as a function of the will), ἀληθής for the functions of the intellect.

4—5 πράξεως μὲν οὖν—ἄνθρωπος] 'Now of moral action purpose is the cause (I mean the efficient cause, not the final), and the efficient cause of purpose is desire, and that reason

ορέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος· διὸ οὐτ' ἄνευ
 νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὐτ' ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξεως ἢ προαίρεσις·
 εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ
 5 ἠθους οὐκ ἔστιν. διάνοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἕνεκά
 του καὶ πρακτικὴ· αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἀρχεῖ·
 ἕνεκα γάρ του ποιεῖ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ
 πρὸς τι καὶ τινὸς τὸ ποιητόν. ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν· ἡ γὰρ
 εὐπραξία τέλος, ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τούτου· διὸ ἡ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς
 ἡ προαίρεσις ἡ ὄρεξις διανοητικὴ, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ
 6 ἀνθρώπου. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐθὲν γεγονός, οἶον

which takes cognisance of an end. Hence purpose can neither be separated from intellect and thought, nor from a particular state of the moral nature. Well-doing and its contrary imply thought and moral character. Now thought by itself moves nothing, only thought aiming at an end, that is, practical thought. This controls the productive thought as well, since he that produces, produces for the sake of some end, and the thing produced is not an end in and for itself, but is only an end relatively and belongs to something. But the thing done is an End-in-itself, since well-doing is an end, and this is what we desire. Hence purpose may be defined as desiring reason, or as rational desire, and such a principle as this is man.' We have here a *resumé* of Aristotle's views in *De Animâ*, l.c. Another division of the intellect, however, is introduced, that into practical, productive, and speculative, which is to be found implied in *Eth.* i. i. 1, and is stated *Metaphys.* v. i. 5: ὥστε εἰ πᾶσα διάνοια ἢ πρακτικὴ ἢ ποιητικὴ ἢ θεωρητικὴ κ.τ.λ. It is here shown that the productive faculties of man are subordinate to the practical thought, since no artist produces anything purely and solely for its own sake; however much he may seem to do so, still his art as a

part of his life falls under the control of his will and reason.

διάνοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἕνεκά του] There is a slight confusion here. Aristotle had said (*De An.* iii. ix. 10, iii. x. 2, iii. x. 4), that the reason dealing with ends differed from the speculative reason, that reason neither speculative nor practical was the moving cause of action (iii. ix. 10: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ κινῶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεωρητικὸς οὐθὲν νοεῖ πρακτόν—οὐδ' ὅταν θεωρῇ τι τοιοῦτον κ.τ.λ.), and that intellect could not move anything without desire conjoined (iii. x. 4: νῦν δὲ ὁ μὲν νοῦς οὐ φαίνεται κινῶν ἄνευ ὀρέξεως), but Eudemus mixes up these points. He said that 'thought by itself moves nothing,' and then as if in opposition to thought by itself he puts 'but practical thought does.' He should have said 'practical thought *plus* desire.'

καὶ πρακτικῇ] Καὶ is used here denoting identity. Cf. *Eth.* v. vi. 4: τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. Ar. *De An.* iii. x. 2: νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του λογισόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός.

εὐπραξία] On the ambiguity of this term, cf. *Eth.* i. iv. 2, note.

6 οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐθὲν γεγονός] 'Now nothing that is past is ever the object of purpose.' This

οὐθεις προαιρεῖται Ἴλιον πεπορθηκέναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ γεγονότος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι· διὸ ὁρθῶς Ἀγάθων

μόνον γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς στερίσκεται,
ἀγέννητα ποιεῖν ἄσ' ἂν ἢ πεπραγμένα.

ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔργον. καθ' ὅς οὖν μάλιστα ἔξεις ἀληθεύσει ἐκάτερον, αὐταὶ ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν.

Ἀρξάμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν. 3
ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τέχνη ἐπιστήμη

assertion, with the quotation from Agathon to illustrate it, appears certainly to be a digression. The nature of purpose had been quite sufficiently explained already, especially in reference to the present context. However, to exclude the past, and circumstances which though contingent have become historical, from the sphere of deliberation, is an addition to Aristotle's list of exclusions (*Eth.* III. iii. 1—10), and on this account probably Eudemus was glad to introduce the above remarks.

III. This chapter proposes to consider the two parts of the reason (scientific and calculative) from a fresh point of view (*ἀρξάμενοι—πάλιν*). It accordingly gives a list of five modes under which the mind attains truth; namely, art, science, wisdom, philosophy, and reason. It then proceeds to give some account of science. This account will be found to be a mere *cento* of remarks from the logical writings of Aristotle. The chief points specified are as follows. Science deals only with necessary matter. It is demonstrative, starting from truths already known, and pro-

ceeding by means of induction or syllogism. Its premises are obtained by induction, but they must be more certain than the conclusion, else the knowledge of the conclusion will be not scientific, but merely accidental.

Ι πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν] It seems in the highest degree probable that this list was suggested by a passage in Aristotle's *Post. Analytics* (I. xxxiii. 8), where, after a discussion on the difference between science and opinion, it is said: τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πῶς δεῖ διανεῖμαι ἐπὶ τε διανοίας καὶ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ σοφίας, τὰ μὲν φυσικῆς τὰ δὲ ἠθικῆς θεωρίας μᾶλλον ἐστίν. It will be observed that Aristotle in this passage does not propose six terms to be distinguished from each other, but three pairs of terms which are to be separately discussed, part of them (*i.e.* probably the two first pairs) by psychology (*φυσικῆς θεωρίας*), and part of them (*i.e.* σοφία and φρόνησις) by ethics. Eudemus, taking up the whole list, has omitted διάνοια, which he does not distinguish from νοῦς, and has given the rest as an exhaustive division of the modes by which the mind apprehends truth. By so doing

φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς· ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ δόξῃ ἐνδέχεται
 διαψεύδεσθαι. ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τί ἐστιν, ἐντεῦθεν
 φανερόν, εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς
 ὁμοιότησιν. πάντες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα,
 μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν· τὰ δ' ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως,
 ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται, λαμβάνει εἰς τὴν ἡ μὴ. ἐξ
 ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν. αἰτίδιον ἄρα· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ
 ἀνάγκης ὄντα ἀπλῶς πάντα αἰτίδια, τὰ δ' αἰτίδια, ἀγέννητα
 3 καὶ ἄφθαρτα. ἔτι διδακτὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι,
 καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν μαθητόν. ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα

he has made a cross division, for σοφία does not stand apart from νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη, but includes them, and surely so complex an idea as 'philosophy' ought not to be placed on the same level with the intuitions of the reason, the simplest and deepest forms of the mind. In ch. vi. § 2, however, the logical exhaustiveness of the division is made the only ground for proving that the principles of science are apprehended by reason.

ὑπολήψει γὰρ—διαψεύδεσθαι] 'For conception and opinion may be false.' This is suggested probably by Ar. *Post. Anal.* II. XIX. 7: 'Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξεω, αἷς ἀληθεύομεν, αἱ μὲν ἀεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιδέχονται τὸ ψεῦδος, ὅλον δόξα καὶ λογισμός, ἀληθὴ δ' ἀεὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, κ.τ.λ. In Ar. *De. An.* III. III. 7, ὑπόληψις is used in so general a sense for the apprehensions of the mind as to include ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, and φρόνησις. If opposed (as here) to scientific certainty, it comes to very much the same as δόξα.

2 ἐπιστήμη μὲν—ἐπιστητόν] 'Now what science is, will be clear from the following considerations, if we wish to speak exactly and not be misled by resemblances. We all conceive that what we know is necessarily what it is—if it be so only contingently, as

soon as it is out of our ken, we cannot tell whether it be so or not. Therefore the object of science is necessary matter.'

ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν] i.e., the various analogical and inaccurate uses of the word 'knowledge.' 'Ἐπιστήμη is to be defined ἀπλῶς and not καθ' ὁμοιότητα, cf. *Eth.* V. VI. 4. The present passage is taken from *Post. Anal.* I. II. 1: 'Ἐπίστασθαι δὲ οἰόμεθ' ἕκαστον ἀπλῶς—ὅταν τὴν τ' αἰτίαν οἰώμεθα γινώσκειν δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐστίν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστὶ, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ' ἄλλως ἔχειν.—ὥστε οὐδ' ἀπλῶς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἔχειν.

ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν] 'Out of the reach of our observation.' *Theor.* here retains more of its original sense of 'seeing' than generally; cf. e.g. ch. I. § 5: ἐν μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ ταυῦτα κ.τ.λ. *Eth.* I. VII. 21. In the following chapter, § 4, θεωρεῖν is used for to 'consider,' or 'speculate,' though not in the special sense of philosophical speculation.

τὰ δ' αἰτίδια κ.τ.λ.] For a specimen of 'things eternal' cf. *Eth.* III. III. 3, and see note.

3 ἔτι διδακτὴ—συλλογισμῷ] 'Again all science appears capable of being imparted by demonstration, and the matter of science appears capable of

διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἡ δὲ συλλογισμῶ. ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγή ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου. εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμὸς, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς· ἐπαγωγή ἄρα. ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη⁴ ἐστὶν ἕξις ἀποδεικτική, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιορίζομεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς· ὅταν γάρ πως πιστεύῃ καὶ γνώριμοι

being so apprehended. But all demonstration depends on pre-existent knowledge (as we say in analytics also), for it proceeds either by induction or syllogism.'

ὥσπερ λέγομεν] This is a general mode of expression, not a particular reference; some MSS. however read ἐλέγομεν. Eudemus, as we know, wrote a book on analytics (cf. Vol. I., Essay I. p. 21). In his *Ethics*, II. vi. 5, he speaks, as here, *generally* of analytics, δῆλον δ' ὅτι ἐπιχειροῦμεν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον, ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν. In the present passage he is borrowing, not quoting, from the opening of Aristotle's *Post. Anal.* Πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προὑπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως. It is the first proof of knowing a thing, to be able to impart it, cf. *Metaphys.* I. i. 12: ὅλως τε σημεῖον τοῦ εἰδότος τὸ δύνασθαι διδάσκειν ἐστίν. Hence, by association with the idea of science, διδασκαλία comes to be almost identical with demonstration, cf. *Sophist. Elench.* II. 1: Ἔστι δὴ τῶν ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι λόγων τέτταρα γένη, διδασκαλικοὶ καὶ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ πειραστικοὶ καὶ ἐριστικοί, διδασκαλικοὶ μὲν οἱ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ἁρχῶν ἐκάστου μαθήματος καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου δοξῶν συλλογισζόμενοι, δεῖ γὰρ πιστεύειν τὸν μαθάνοντα. Cf. *ib.* X. 11.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς κ.τ.λ.] This is taken from *Post. Anal.* I. i. 2: where Aristotle, having said that all demonstration depends on previous

knowledge, adds that this is true with regard to the mathematics, and also in dialectical arguments, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους οἳ τε διὰ συλλογισμῶν καὶ οἱ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς ἀμφότεροι γὰρ διὰ προγινωσκομένων ποιοῦνται τὴν διδασκαλίαν, οἱ μὲν λαμβάνοντες ὡς παρὰ ξυνιέντων, οἱ δὲ δεικνύντες τὸ καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δῆλον εἶναι τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον. What Aristotle had said of dialectical arguments, Eudemus applies to science, which he accordingly asserts to be sometimes inductive. His further assertion that the principles of deductive science are obtained by induction is inconsistent with the conclusion of ch. vi., though it agrees with *Ar. Post. Anal.* II. xix. 6. In fact ἐπαγωγή seems to be used by Aristotle in the *Post. Anal.* as equivalent to that amount of experience which is the *condition*, not the *cause*, of necessary truths. Cf. *ib.* I. i. 4.

4 ἡ μὲν—ἀναλυτικοῖς] 'Science, then, is a demonstrative state of mind, with all the other qualifications which we add in analytics.' Cf. *Ar. Post. Anal.* I. ii. 2: Ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐξ ἀληθῶν τ' εἶναι καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος. Aristotle, in his account of science, represents it from its objective side as a deduction of ideas rather than as a state of mind.

ὅταν γὰρ—ἐπιστήμην] 'For a man *knows* when he is convinced, and is

αὐτῷ ὧσιν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἐπίσταται, εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ συμπεράσματος, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

- 4 Τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν καὶ
 2 πρακτόν, ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις· πιστεύομεν δὲ
 περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. ὥστε καὶ ἡ μετὰ
 λόγου ἔξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιη-
 τικῆς ἔξεως. διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχονται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οὔτε γὰρ
 3 ἡ πρᾶξις ποίησις οὔτε ἡ ποίησις πρᾶξις ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ
 οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τις ἐστὶ καὶ ὅπερ ἔξις τις μετὰ λόγου
 ποιητικῆ, καὶ οὐδεμία οὔτε τέχνη ἐστὶν ἣτις οὐ μετὰ λόγου
 ποιητικῆ ἔξις ἐστίν, οὔτε τοιαύτη ἡ οὐ τέχνη, ταύτῃ ἂν

sure of the premises; since if he is not more sure of them than of the conclusion, the knowledge which he has will be only accidental.' Taken from *Post. Anal.* i. ii. 1: 'Ἐπίστασθαι δὲ οἰόμεθ' ἕκαστον ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν σοφιστικὸν τρόπον κατὰ συμβεβηκός, κ. τ. λ. To know results without the proofs Aristotle called 'accidental' knowledge, and this mode of knowledge he attributed to the Sophists; cf. *Metaphys.* v. ii., &c.

πιστεύει] Cf. *Sophist. Elench.* ii. 1 (*l.c.*): δεῖ γὰρ πιστεύειν τὸν μαθάνοντα. *Infra*, ch. viii. § 6: τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν οἱ νέοι, ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν.

IV. Eudemus altered the list of mental operations given by Aristotle (*Post. Anal. l.c.*) only by the position of *νοῦς*, which in first stating his list Eudemus places at the end, probably because, having separated it from *διάνοια*, he was uncertain about its admission; afterwards he discusses it before *σοφία*, as being prior to it in order of time. The list then appears in Aristotle, *διάνοια νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη τέχνη, φρόνησις σοφία*; in Eudemus, *ἐπιστήμη, τέχνη, φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς* (afterwards *νοῦς, σοφία*). This

chapter, in treating of art, gives but a scanty account, apparently borrowed from different passages in the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. Art, like action, belongs to the sphere of the contingent, but its difference from action is universally recognised (*πιστεύομεν καὶ τοῖς ἐξ. λόγ.*). As shown by an instance, it consists in 'a productive state of mind in harmony with a true law.' It has to do with producing and contriving the production of things that fall neither under the law of nature nor necessity. Rather art deals with the same objects as chance, by which it is often assisted.

1—2 τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου—λόγοις] 'Now contingent matter includes the objects both of production and action, but production and action are different. On this point even popular notions sufficiently bear us out.' With regard to *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*, cf. *Eth.* i. xiii. 9, and see Vol. I. *Essays*, Appendix B, pp. 328—332.

3 ἐπεὶ δ'—ποιητικῇ] 'But since architecture is an art, and may be defined as (*ὅπερ*) a certain state of mind rationally (*μετὰ λόγου*) productive, and there is no art which is not a rationally productive state of

εἴη τέχνη καὶ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική. ἔστι δὲ 4
 τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν, καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν, καὶ θεωρεῖν
 ὅπως ἂν γένηται τι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι,
 καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ·
 οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γινομένων ἢ τέχνη ἐστίν,
 οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν
 ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη τὴν
 τέχνην ποιήσεως ἀλλ' οὐ πράξεως εἶναι. καὶ τρόπον τινὰ 5

mind, nor again any such state which is not an art: art must be the same as "productive state of mind rightly directed." The procedure here is to take a species of art, and, abstracting what is peculiar, to leave the generic conception remaining, which thus is taken as the definition of the genus.

δπερ] A logical formula implying identity, convertibility of terms, cf. *Eth.* VII. xiii. 1: οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη δπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν.

οὔτε τοιαύτη ἢ οὐ τέχνη] This is a slight discrepancy from Aristotle, who speaks of three modes of production, art, faculty, and thought, without, however, specifying the difference between them, *Metaphys.* VI. vii. 3: πᾶσαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ποίησεις ἢ ἀπὸ τέχνης ἢ ἀπὸ δυνάμεως ἢ ἀπὸ διανοίας. *Ib.* X. vii. 3: ποιητικῆς μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι καὶ οὐ τῷ ποιουμένῳ τῆς κινήσεως ἢ ἀρχῆς, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν εἴτε τέχνη τις εἴτ' ἄλλη τις δύναμις.

4 ἐστὶ δὲ—ποιουμένῳ] 'Now all art is about creation, and the contriving and considering how something may be created of those things whose existence is contingent, and whose efficient cause exists in the producer and not in the thing produced.' There is not any distinction intended between τεχνάζειν and θεωρεῖν. The absence of the article before θεωρεῖν shows that these belong to the same idea; they are

both only an expansion of the term γένεσιν, and are not to be separated from it, as if the writer was describing different stages in the process of art. We find τεχνάζειν used by Aristotle simply in the sense of 'contriving,' *Pol.* I. xi. 12: ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς ἐτέχνασαν γενέσθαι μονοπωλίαν *Ib.* VI. V. 8: τεχναστέον οὖν ὅπως ἂν εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνιος.

ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ.] Taken from Aristotle, *Metaphys.* X. vii. 3 (*l.c.*). Cf. V. i. 5: τῶν μὲν ποιητικῶν ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἡ ἀρχὴ ἢ νοῦς ἢ τέχνη ἢ δύναμις τις, τῶν δὲ πρακτικῶν ἐν τῷ πράττοντι ἢ προαίρεσις. There is the same classification of causes here as in *Eth.* III. iii. 7, into nature, necessity, chance, and the human intellect. On Aristotle's conception of nature, see Vol. I. Essay V. pp. 221-6.

5 καὶ τρόπον τινὰ—τέχνη] 'And in a way chance and art are concerned with the same objects.' Eudemos, taking this observation from Aristotle, illustrates it, after his own fashion, with a quotation from Agathon. Cf. *Metaphys.* VI. vii. 4: τούτων (ποιήσεων) δὲ τινες γίνονται καὶ ἀπὸ ταῦτο-μάτου καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης παραπλησίως ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ φύσεως γινομένοις. Cf. *Ib.* VI. ix. 1, where the following question is started: ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις διὰ τί τὰ μὲν γίγνεται καὶ τέχνη καὶ ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου, οἷον ὑγίεια, τὰ δ' οὐ, οἷον οἰκία. The answer is, that there is a

περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐστὶν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ

τέχνη τύχην ἔσπερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην.

ἢ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητικὴ ἐστὶν, ἡ δ' ἀτεχνία τούναντίον μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ ἕξις, περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν.

5 Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες

principle of self-movement in the matter to be operated on in the one case, but not in the other. That the devices of art are often suggested, and its results assisted, by chance, need not be confirmed by examples; but while art is thus assisted by chance, on the other hand, it is the main object of art to eliminate chance. Cf. *Metaphys.* i. i. 5: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ὡς φησὶ Πῶλος, ὁρθῶς λέγων, ἡ δ' ἀπειρία τύχην. The theory of art is but meagre in the writings of Aristotle. His great defect with regard to the subject is, his not having entered into the philosophy of the imagination. Yet still he gives us remarks of far greater interest than what is contained in the brief *resumé* of Eudemus, cf. especially the saying, *Metaphys.* vi. vii. 4, that 'all things are done by art, of which the idea exists in the mind,' ἀπὸ τέχνης δὲ γίγνεται ὅσων τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, and add *Post. Anal.* ii. xix. 4: ἐκ δ' ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἡρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἐνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλά, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἐν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἂν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἂν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὕν, ἐπιστήμης.

V. Wisdom (φρόνησις) is next discussed. Its nature we learn from the use of the word 'wise' (φρόνιμοι) to denote those who take good counsel

with regard to the general ordering of life. This subject admits of no scientific demonstration; again, it is different from art. We see the quality of 'wisdom' exemplified in such men as Pericles, who know what is good for themselves and others. This knowledge and insight is preserved by temperance, which hence gets its name (σωφροσύνη). Art admits of degrees of excellence, but 'wisdom' does not. Voluntary error in art is better than non-voluntary, but the reverse in 'wisdom,' which thus is shown to be more than a mere quality of the intellect,—it becomes part of ourselves (φρονήσεως οὐκ ἔστι λήθη).

I περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως] From Socrates to Eudemus we may trace a distinct progress with regard to the doctrine of φρόνησις. Socrates said 'virtue is knowledge' (ἐπιστήμη). Plato first 'virtue is,' afterwards 'virtue implies wisdom' (φρόνησις). Cf. *Meno*, p. 98 D: διδασκὸν ἔδοξεν εἶναι, εἰ φρόνησις ἢ ἀρετὴ. *Theatet.* p. 176 B: ὁμοίωσις δὲ (τῷ θεῷ) δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. *Phædo*, p. 69 A: ἐκείνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὁρθόν, ἀνθ' οὗ δεῖ ἅπαντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις, καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ἀνοούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἦ, καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ ξυλλήβδην ἀληθὴς ἀρετὴ ἦ μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων

τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους. δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλευέσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ² τοὺς περὶ τι φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μὴ ἐστὶ τέχνη. ὥστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός. βουλευέται δ' οὐβείς περὶ³

καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων· χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων, μὴ σκιαγραφία τις τῇ ἢ τοιαύτῃ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώδης. This 'wisdom,' however, he defined as the contemplation of the absolute (*Phædo*, p. 79 D), and thus identified the moral consciousness with philosophy (see Vol. I. Essay III. p. 144—5). Aristotle, as we have already seen (*Post. Anal.* i. xxxiii. 8, quoted on ch. iii. 1), proposed as a subject for discussion the distinction between φρόνησις and σοφία. With him φρόνησις was gradually coming to assume its distinctive meaning as practical wisdom; but this was not always clearly marked. Cf. *Topics*, v. vi. 10, where it is said to be the essential property of φρόνησις (wisdom) to be the highest condition of the reasoning faculty (τὸ λογιστικόν), just as it is of temperance to be the highest condition of the appetitive part. In another place of the *Topics* (iv. ii. 2) it is incidentally mentioned that some think φρόνησις to be both a virtue and also a science, but that it is not universally conceded to be a science. Δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοις ἡ φρόνησις ἀρετὴ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, καὶ οὐδέτερον τῶν γενῶν ὑπ' οὐδέτερου περιέχεσθαι· οὐ μὲν ὑπὸ πάντων γε συγχωρεῖται τὴν φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. In the *Politics*, iii. iv. 17, it is said to be the only virtue properly belonging to a ruler. Ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἄρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετὴ μόνη· τὰς γὰρ

ἄλλας ἔοικεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων. Ἀρχομένου δέ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθής. Thus it is used for practical wisdom, but in a broad general sense, with reference to state affairs rather than to individual life, implying, however, an absolute consciousness as opposed to ἀληθής δόξα. Frequently Aristotle uses φρόνησις simply to denote 'thought' or 'wisdom,' without reference to its sphere. Cf. *Eth.* i. vi. 11, i. viii. 6, &c. Finally, it appears in its distinctive sense, *De An.* i. ii. 9. 'Anaxagoras says that all animals possess νοῦς, they certainly do not all possess equally the reason that gives "wisdom." οὐ φαίνεται δ' ὅ γε κατὰ φρόνησιν λεγόμενος νοῦς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν. *Rhet.* i. ix. 13: φρόνησις δ' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ διανοίας, καθ' ἣν εὖ βουλευέσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν. *Eth.* x. viii. 3, where there is a contrast between the life of contemplation and of practical virtue, φρόνησις is spoken of as inseparably connected with the latter, while the happiness of contemplation by the pure reason is something apart. In the present book we have the Eudemian exposition and development of Aristotle's theory, which entirely contrasts φρόνησις with σοφία, and limits the former to the regulation of individual life.

3 βουλευέται δ' οὐβείς] A verbal

τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ
 πρᾶξαι· ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετ' ἀποδείξεως, ὣν δ'
 αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τούτων μὴ ἔστιν ἀπό-
 δεξις (πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι
 βουλευσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων), οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ
 φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται
 τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ γένος
 4 πρᾶξεως καὶ ποιήσεως. λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι ἔξιν
 ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ καὶ
 κακά· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ
 5 πρᾶξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. διὰ
 τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα
 εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται
 θεωρεῖν· εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ
 τοὺς πολιτικούς. ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσα-
 6 γορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς σώζουσιν τὴν φρόνησιν. σώζει
 δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν. οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν

repetition of ch. i. § 6. Cf. *Eth. Eud.*
 II. x. 9 (*l.c.*).

4 τῆς μὲν γὰρ] A repetition of ch.
 ii. § 5.

5 διὰ τοῦτο—πολιτικούς] ‘Hence
 we consider such men as Pericles
 “wise,” because they have a faculty of
 perceiving what is good for themselves
 and good for men in general. And
 we attribute the same character to
 those who have a turn for the manage-
 ment of households and of state af-
 fairs.’ On φρόνησις as a quality for
 the ruler of a state, cf. *Ar. Pol.* III. iv.
 17 (*l.c.*), and on the connexion estab-
 lished by Eudemus between wisdom for
 the individual, for the family, and for
 the state, see below, ch. viii. § 1, note.

ἐνθεν—ὑπόληψιν] ‘Hence it is that
 we call temperance by its present
 name (σωφροσύνη) as preserving wis-
 dom (σώζουσιν τὴν φρόνησιν), and
 this is the kind of conception which it
 preserves,’ *i.e.*, a moral conception
 (περὶ τὸ πρακτὸν) about the right and

wrong, or, as it is here put, about
 ‘the end’ (τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα) of actions.
 The false etymology here given comes
 from Plato’s *Cratylus*, p. 411 D,
 where, after a sportive derivation of
 φρόνησις, that of σωφροσύνη is added:
 ‘Ἡ φρόνησις· φορᾶς γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ροῦ
 νόησις. Εἴη δ’ ἂν καὶ ὕνησιν ὑπολα-
 βεῖν φορᾶς· ἀλλ’ οὐν περὶ γε τὸ φέρεσθαι
 ἔστιν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἡ γνώμη παντάπασι
 δημοῖ γονῆς σκέψιν καὶ νόμησιν· τὸ
 γὰρ νομᾶν καὶ τὸ σκοπεῖν ταῦτόν. εἰ
 δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸ ἡ νόησις τοῦ νέου ἔστιν
 ἔσις· τὸ δὲ νέα εἶναι τὰ ὄντα σημαίνει
 γιγνόμενα αἰε εἶναι· τούτου οὖν ἐφέεσθαι
 τὴν ψυχὴν μηνύει τὸ ὄνομα ὃ θέμενος
 τὴν νεέειν. οὐ γὰρ νόησις τὸ ἀρχαῖον
 ἐκαλεῖτο, ἀλλ’ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡ εἰ εἶδε λέγειν
 δύο νεέειν. σωφροσύνη δὲ σωτηρία οὐ
 νῦν δὴ ἐσκέμμεθα, φρονήσεως. Of
 course σωφροσύνη merely means
 ‘sound-mindedness.’ On the ἀρχαὶ
 τῶν πρακτῶν see below, ch. xii. § 10,
 note, and Vol. I. Essay IV. p. 217—
 218.

διαφθείρει οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν, οἶον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτά· τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται ἡ ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ' αἰρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς· ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἕξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ, περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικῇ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης μὲν ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· 7 καὶ ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ ὁ ἐκὼν ἁμαρτάνων αἰρετώτερος, περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν ἥττον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετὴ τίς ἐστι καὶ οὐ τέχνη. δυοῖν δ' ὄντοιν μεροῖν 8

7 ἀλλὰ μὴν—τέχνη] 'It must be added that while in art there are degrees of excellence, there are none in wisdom; and while in art he that errs voluntarily is the better, he that does so in wisdom is the worse, as is the case with the virtues also. Therefore it is plain that wisdom is a sort of virtue, and not an art.' ἥττον, as contrasted with αἰρετώτερος, stands for ἥττον αἰρετός. The phrase ἀρετὴ τέχνης occurs again ch. vii. § 1. The present passage probably has reference to *Topics*, iv. ii. 2 (*l.c.*), δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοις ἡ φρόνησις ἀρετὴ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, where ἐπιστήμη answers to τέχνη in the place before us. To say that there are no degrees of excellence in 'wisdom' gives it an absolute character, just as it is said that there are degrees in the understanding, but not in the reason. Common language would admit of degrees in wisdom. Cf. *Ar. Metaphys.* i. i. 2: διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτα φρονιμώτερα καὶ μαθητικώτερα τῶν μὴ δυναμένων μηχανοῦναι ἐστίν. *De An.* i. ii. 9, *l.c.* But here 'wisdom' is considered as something ideal, just as afterwards, ch. xiii. § 6, it is said to imply all the virtues. ὁ ἐκὼν ἁμαρτάνων] Eudemus seems often inclined to betake himself to

a small antagonism against Platonic doctrines; whether in detail this was original, or borrowed from oral remarks or lost writings of Aristotle, we cannot tell. Cf. *Eth.* v. ix. 16, v. xi. 9, vi. xiii. 3, &c. Here there seems to be an allusion to the Socratico-Platonic paradox which forms the subject of the *Hippias Minor*, that to do injustice voluntarily was better than doing it involuntarily (see Vol. I. Essay II. p. 125). Here the contrary is assumed with regard to 'wisdom,' and the conclusion drawn is, that wisdom is not an art, in other words (as is said more distinctly afterwards), not merely intellectual. If wisdom were merely intellectual, then voluntary error in action would not be error at all, because knowledge would remain behind unimpaired; but if wisdom is a state of the will as well as of the intellect, then voluntary error, as implying a defect of the will, is the worst kind of error. The worst kind of error, morally, is thought to be sinning against knowledge, knowing the right and doing the wrong, which some philosophers deny to be possible. See below, Book vii. ch. iii.

8 δυοῖν δ'—ἔστιν] 'And as there

τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγον ἔχόντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετή, τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ· ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἔξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι λήθη τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης ἔξωός ἐστι, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.

6 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις

are two parts of man's nature which possess reason, wisdom will be the highest state of one of these, namely, the opinative part, for opinion and wisdom both deal with the contingent. We must add that it is not merely an intellectual state (*ἔξις μετὰ λόγου*), the proof of which is that while such states admit forgetfulness, wisdom does not.' Τὸ δοξαστικόν answers to τὸ λογιστικόν, ch. i. § 6. That opinion deals with contingent matter, we are told, *Ar. Post. Anal.* i. xxxiii. 2: *λείπεται δόξαν εἶναι περὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς μὲν ἢ ψεῦδος, ἐνδεχόμενον δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν*. After associating opinion with wisdom, the writer separates them just as Aristotle separates *προαίρεσις* from *δόξα*, *Eth.* iii. ii. 11. In the present passage there is a great want of clearness. We are told that wisdom is an excellence, or highest state, of a part of the intellect. Hence we should naturally conclude that it was *λόγος τις* (cf. ch. xiii. § 5), but the formula throughout used is, that wisdom is *ἔξις μετὰ λόγου*. This formula is itself an inaccuracy, since it implies not a state of intellect, but a state of the will under the law of the intellect (see Vol. I, Essay I. p. 39). But on the top of this another inaccuracy is laid, for we are now told that wisdom is not simply a *ἔξις μετὰ λόγου*, by which the writer evidently means to say, that wisdom is not a mere state of the intellect. It may be indeed true that the moral intellect cannot be

separated from the will and personality (cf. ch. xii. § 10), but what is to be complained of is, that the formulæ used for expressing all the truths connected with this subject are so very imperfect. *Μετὰ λόγου* is used in the present place probably to mean nothing more than 'rational.' Cf. *Eth. Eud.* viii. ii. 3: *οὐ γὰρ ἄλογος ἡ φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἔχει λόγον διὰ τί οὕτω πράττει*. It is used differently ch. iv. § 3, and again ch. vi. § 1.

σημεῖον δ' ὅτι λήθη] Cf. *Eth.* i. x. 10: where it is said that 'the moments of virtuous consciousness in the mind are more abiding than the sciences,' and see note. To *φρόνησις* in the Platonic and general sense, of course forgetfulness might attach. Cf. *Laws*, p. 732 B: *ἀνάμνησις δ' ἐστὶν ἐπιρροή φρονήσεως ἀπολείπουσας*.

VI. This chapter treats of reason, but goes no further into the subject than as follows,—science implies principles, and we cannot apprehend these principles by science itself nor by three out of the other four modes of mind which give us truth. It therefore remains, on the grounds of exhaustive division, that reason must be the organ by which we apprehend first principles.

On examination it will be found that the contents of the chapter are borrowed almost *verbatim* from Aristotle's *Post. Analyt.* ii. xix. 7: *Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξεων, αἷς ἀληθεύομεν, αἱ μὲν αἰεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσὶν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιδέ-*

καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, εἰσὶ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης (μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἢ ἐπιστήμη), τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὐτ' ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε φρόνησις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδεικτόν, αἱ δὲ τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. οὐδὲ δὴ σοφία τούτων ἐστίν· τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνίων ἔχειν ἀποδειξύν ἐστιν. εἰ δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευ-^α δόμεθα περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησις ἐστι καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τούτων δὲ τῶν τριῶν μὴθὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι (λέγω δὲ τρία φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν), λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν.

Τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις 7

χονται τὸ ψεῦδος, οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμός, ἀληθὴ δ' αἰεὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλο γένος ἢ νοῦς, αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων γνωριμώτεραι, ἐπιστήμη δ' ἅπανα μετὰ λόγου ἐστί, τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ἐπεὶ δ' οὐδὲν ἀληθέστερον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἐπιστήμης ἢ νοῦν, νοῦς ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἕκ τε τούτων σκοποῦσι καὶ ὅτι ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ὥστ' οὐδ' ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη. Εἰ οὖν μὴδὲν ἄλλο παρ' ἐπιστήμην γένος ἔχομεν ἀληθές, νοῦς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμης ἀρχή. Aristotle argues that principles must be apprehended either by science or reason; they cannot be apprehended by science, therefore they must be by reason. Eudemus, it will be observed, follows this mode of arguing, only he applies it to all the five organs of truth, which he had before arbitrarily laid down as an exhaustive list. In following implicitly the passage above cited, he has ignored for the time the earlier part of the same chapter, in which Aristotle attributes the origin of universals rather to induction; *ib.* § 6: Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἡμῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαγωγῇ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον. καὶ γὰρ καὶ αἰσθησις οὕτω τὸ καθόλου

ἐμποιεῖ. Also he is at variance with his own statement above, ch. iii. § 3.

μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἢ ἐπιστήμη] 'For science implies inference.' This is evidently the meaning of the present sentence, taken as it is from *Post. Anal. l.c.* Λόγος is frequently used to denote 'inference.' Cf. ch. viii. § 9: ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὐκ ἐστι λόγος: xi. 4, τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, &c.

οὐδὲ δὴ—ἐστίν] 'Nor of course does philosophy apprehend these principles, for it is the part of the philosopher to possess demonstration about some things.' It need hardly be said that this is a very poor ground for establishing the point in question.

VII. What 'philosophy' is may be learnt from the use of the word *σοφός*, as applied to the arts. It denotes 'nicety,' 'subtlety,' 'exactness.' Philosophy, then, is the most subtle of the sciences. It embraces not only deductions, but also principles. It is 'a science of the highest objects with the head on.' It is above all practical wisdom and science. It is one and permanent, while they

τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, οἷον Φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ
 Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν ἄλλο
 2 σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν· εἶναι δέ
 τινας σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος οὐδ' ἄλλο τι
 σοφοὺς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργίτῃ

τὸν δ' οὐτ' ἄρ σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὐτ' ἀροτῆρα
 οὐτ' ἄλλως τι σοφόν.

ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ
 3 σοφία. δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν
 εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν
 ἡ σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπι-
 στήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων. ἄτοπον γὰρ εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν

are manifold, relative, and change-
 able. It is higher, as the cosmos is
 higher than man. Philosophy and
 not wisdom was the reputed property
 of men like Thales and Anaxagoras,
 who were thought to know strange
 and out-of-the-way, but useless things.
 On the other hand, wisdom (*φρόνησις*)
 is good counsel about human things.
 It implies knowledge of particulars as
 well as of universals. Indeed, the
 knowledge of the particular gained
 by experience is its most important
 element, though it includes the
 universal also, and in its own sphere,
 namely, that of action, it is supreme
 and paramount (*ἀρχιτεκτονική*).

1—2 τὴν δὲ σοφίαν—σοφία] 'The
 term *σοφία* we apply in the arts to
 those who are the most finished
 artists, as, for instance, we call
 Phidias a consummate (*σοφός*) sculp-
 tor, and Polycleetus a consummate
 statuary, and in this application we
 mean nothing else by *σοφία* than the
 highest excellence in art. But we
 conceive that some men possess the
 quality in a general and not a
 particular way—'nor in aught else
 accomplished,' as Homer says in
 the *Margites*—

'Not skilled to dig or plough the gods
 have made him,
 Nor in aught else accomplished.'

We may argue, then, that *σοφία*, in
 the sense of philosophy, is the most
 consummate of the sciences.' On the
 meaning of *ἀκρίβεια* as applied to the
 arts, and on the transition of meaning
 when it is applied to philosophy, see
Eth. i. vii. 18, note, and ii. vi. 9,
 note.

3 ὥστ' εἴη—τιμιωτάτων] 'So that
 philosophy must be the union of
 reason and science, as it were a
 science of the highest objects with *its*
 head on.' This excellent definition
 does not appear to have anything in
 Aristotle exactly answering to it.
 There are two chief places where
 Aristotle treats of *σοφία*, namely,
Metaphysics, Book i. i.—ii., and *ib.*
 Book x. ch. i.—vii. *Metaphys.*
 Book i. opens by showing an ascend-
 ing scale in knowledge,—perception,
 experience, art, and the theoretic
 sciences, or philosophy. Of philo-
 sophy we are told that it is the
 science of first causes, it is most
 universal, most exact, and most en-
 tirely sought for its own sake, &c.

ἢ τὴν φρόνησιν σπουδαιοτάτην οἵεται εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀνθρώπος ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ ὑγιεινὸν⁴ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἕτερον ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰχθύσι, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ εὐθὺ ταῦτόν ἀεὶ, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν ταῦτόν πάντες ἂν εἴποιεν, φρόνιμον δὲ ἕτερον· τὸ γὰρ περὶ αὐτὸ ἕκαστα εὔ

(*Met.* i. ii. 2—6). Philosophy begins in wonder, wonder at first about things near at hand, afterwards about the sun, moon, and stars, and the creation of the universe (*Ib.* § 9). It ends in certainty and a sense of the necessity of certain truths (*Ib.* § 16). We may see that this account is perfectly general—it does not distinguish in philosophy between mathematics, physics, and metaphysics. It even attributes a practical scope to philosophy, saying that philosophy, by taking cognisance of the good, determines the object of the other sciences (*Ib.* § 7), ἀρχικωτάτη δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρχικὴ τῆς ὑπηρετούσης, ἢ γνωρίζουσα τίος ἕνεκέν ἐστι πρακτέον ἕκαστον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὰγαθὸν ἐν ἐκάστοις, ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἄριστον ἐν τῇ φύσει πάσῃ. From a certain immaturity thus shown, it would be difficult to believe that the account in *Metaphys.* Book i. was written after that in the present chapter of the *Ethics*. In *Metaphys.* Book x. the subject is taken up anew, and treated much more fully. Physics, practical science, and mathematics, are now separated from philosophy proper. *Ib.* i. 4: οὐδὲ περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς εἰρημένας αἰτίας τὴν ζητούμενην ἐπιστήμην θετέον. Οὐτε γὰρ περὶ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκεν τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὰγαθόν, τοῦτο δ' ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν κινήσει. *Ib.* i. 7: οὐδὲ μὴν περὶ τὰ μαθηματικά—χωριστὸν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐθέν. These, however, are branches of philosophy, *Ib.* iv. 3: διὸ καὶ ταύτην (τὴν φυσικὴν) καὶ τὴν μαθηματικὴν ἐπιστήμην μέρη τῆς σοφίας εἶναι θετέον.

Cf. *Met.* iii. iii. 4: ἔστι δὲ σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ, ἀλλ' οὐ πρώτη. Hence we get the famous division of speculative sciences, *Met.* x. vii. 9: δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τρία γένη τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐστὶ, φυσικὴ, μαθηματικὴ, θεολογικὴ. Βέλτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν γένος, τούτων δ' αὐτῶν ἡ τελευταία λεχθεῖσα· περὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων, βελτίων δὲ καὶ χείρων ἐκάστη λέγεται κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐπιστητόν. Philosophy, then, in the highest sense, may be called theology, or the science of the divine, that is, of pure, transcendental (χωριστὴ), immutable being. It is the science of being *qua* being (τοῦ ὄντος ᾧ ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ). Eudemus, following in the wake of this discussion, has adopted as much of its results as suited his purpose. He speaks of philosophy as having the highest objects (τῶν τιμιωτάτων, cf. *Met.* x. vii. 9, *l.c.*), but he does not distinguish its different branches. He includes in it both physical and mathematical ideas (§ 4, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ εὐθὺ ταῦτόν ἀεὶ: *ib.* ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν), though he uses *σοφός* once in its special sense to denote a metaphysical, as opposed to mathematical or physical, philosopher. Ch. viii. § 6: μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἂν, σοφὸς δ' ἢ φυσικὸς οὐ. In short, his object is rather to contrast philosophy with practical thought than exactly to define it. His attributing to it a union of intuition with reasoning seems however a happy result of his present method of discussion.

θεωροῦν φαῖεν ἂν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιτρέψειαν αὐτά. διὸ καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἔνια φρόνιμά φασιν εἶναι, ὅσα περὶ τὸν αὐτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικὴν. φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἡ αὐτή· εἰ γὰρ τὴν περὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα τὰ αὐτοῖς ἐρῶσι σοφίαν, πολλαὶ ἔσονται σοφαί· οὐ γὰρ μία περὶ τὸ ἀπάντων ἀγαθὸν τῶν ζώων, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα περὶ ἕκαστον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἱατρικὴ μία περὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων. εἰ δ' ὅτι βέλτιστον ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα πολὺ θειότερα τὴν φύσιν, ὅσον φανερώτατά γε
 5 ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν. ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῇ φύσει. διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους σοφοὺς μὲν φρονίμους δ' οὐ φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμφέροντα ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ μὲν καὶ

4 εἰ δ' ὅτι βέλτιστον—συνέστηκεν] 'And if it be said that man is the best of the animals, this will make no difference, for there are besides other things far diviner in their nature than man, such as, to quote the most obvious instance, the parts out of which the symmetry of the heavens is composed.' On the Aristotelian view of man's position in the scale of dignity in the universe, see Vol. I. Essay V. p. 226-9. On Aristotle's doctrine of the divine nature of the stars, &c., cf. *De Caelo*, I. ii. 9: 'Ἐκ τε δὴ τούτων φανερόν ἐστι πέφυκέν τις οὐσία σώματος ἄλλη παρὰ τὰς ἐνταῦθα συστάσεις, θειότερα καὶ προτέρα τούτων ἀπάντων (this has given rise to the notion of the 'quintessence'). *Ib.* I. ii. 11, which repeats the same. *Ib.* II. iii. 2: 'Ἐκαστὸν ἐστίν, ὧν ἐστὶν ἔργον, ἔνεκα τοῦ ἔργου. Θεοῦ δ' ἐνέργεια ἀθανασία· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ζωὴ αἰδίου. Ὡςτ' ἀνάγκη τῷ θείῳ κίνησιν αἰδίου ὑπάρχειν. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ οὐρανὸς τοιοῦτος (σῶμα γὰρ τι θεῖον) διὰ τοῦτο ἔχει τὸ ἐγκύκλιον σῶμα, ὃ φύσει κινεῖται

κύκλῳ αἰεὶ. Cf. *Metaphys.* xi. viii. 5: 'Ἡ τε γὰρ τῶν ἀστρῶν φύσις αἰδίου οὐσία τις. *Ib.* x. vi. 8: 'Ὅλως δ' ἄτοπον ἐκ τοῦ φαίνεσθαι τὰ δεῦρο μεταβάλλοντα καὶ μηδέποτε διαμένοντα ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ἐκ τούτων περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν κρίσιν ποιεῖσθαι. Δεῖ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντων καὶ μηδεμίαν μεταβολὴν ποιουμένων τάληθες θηρεύειν. τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον.

5 διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆν] Cf. *Eth.* x. viii. 11; Plato, *Theaetetus*, p. 174 A: 'Ὡςπερ καὶ Θαλῆν ἀστρονομούντα, ὃ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄνω βλέποντα, πεισόντα εἰς φρέα, Θραῦττά τις ἐμμελὴς καὶ χαρίεσσα θεραπαινὶς ἀποσκῶψαι λέγεται, ὥς τὰ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι, τὰ δ' ἐμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ πόδας λανθάνει αὐτόν. Ταῦτόν δὲ ἀρκεῖ σκῶμμα ἐπὶ πάντας ὅσοι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγουσι. On the other hand, Aristotle (*Politics*, I. xi. 9) tells a story of Thales turning his philosophy to practical account, foreseeing by astronomical observations that there would be a good crop of olives, buying up the crop in Miletus

θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτοὺς φασιν, ἄχρηστα δ', ὅτι οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν. ἡ δὲ 6 φρόνησις περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἔστι βουλευέσθαι· τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἔργον εἶναι φάμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλευέσθαι, βουλευέται δ' οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδ' ὅσων μὴ τέλος τί ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτο πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. ὁ δ' ἀπλῶς εὐβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν. οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ 7 καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν· πρακτικὴ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πράξις περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι οὐκ εἰδότες ἐτέρων εἰδότες πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ ἔμπειροι· εἰ γὰρ εἰδῆίη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὐπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθια κοῦφα καὶ ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσει μᾶλλον. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτικὴ. ὥστε δεῖ ἅμφω ἔχειν, ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον. εἴη δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική.

*Εστὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν 8

beforehand, and having sold at his own price, πολλὰ χρήματα συλλέξαντα ἐπιδείξει ὅτι ῥαδίον ἐστὶ πλουτεῖν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, ἂν βούλωνται, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ περὶ ὃ σπουδάξουσιν.

6 βουλευέται δ' οὐθεὶς] A repetition for the third time of the same remark, cf. ch. i. § 6, ch. v. § 3.

7 Owing to its practical character, wisdom (φρόνησις) necessarily implies a knowledge of particulars. The particular, indeed, would seem for action the more important element, as appears also in other things, if we compare science with empirical knowledge.

διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι οὐκ εἰδότες] Cf. *Ar. Met.* i. i. 7—8 (whence this passage may probably be borrowed), πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυχάνοντας ὀρῶμεν τοὺς ἐμπείρους τῶν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἔχοντων. Αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ' ἕκαστόν ἐστι γνώσις, ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν

καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστόν εἰσιν.

VIII. This chapter fulfils a promise made before in the *Eudemian Ethics* (i. viii. 18), by distinguishing wisdom from other modifications of the same practical thought, namely, economy and the various forms of politics. This distinction would at first sight tend to reduce wisdom to mere egotism (§ 3, δοκεῖ μάλιστα εἶναι ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα. § 4: τὸ αὐτῷ εἰδέναι), and thus to isolate the individual within himself. In order to obviate this, the writer brings forward arguments to show that the welfare of the individual is bound up with that of the family and the state (§ 4). He urges the difficulty of knowing one's own interest, hence concluding that wisdom is no mere instinct of selfishness. Wisdom implies a wide experience, on which account boys

² ἔξις, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταυτόν αὐταῖς. τῆς δὲ περὶ πόλιν ἢ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις νομοθετική, ἣ δὲ ὡς τὰ κατ' ἕκαστα τὸ κοινὸν ἔχει ὄνομα, πολιτικὴ· αὕτη δὲ πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτικὴ· τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα πρακτὸν ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον. διὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τούτους μόνους λέγουσιν· μόνοι

cannot attain to it, no more than they can to philosophy, though they are often clever in mathematics (§§ 5—6). Wisdom is a sort of deduction with a universal and a particular element (§ 7), and yet we must distinguish it from science on this very account, that it deals with particulars (§ 8). It is the opposite to reason, which is of first principles, while wisdom is rather an intuition of particular facts (analogous to apprehending a mathematical figure). At all events, *one* form of wisdom is of this character.

1—3 ἔστι δὲ—δικαστικὴ] 'Now politics and wisdom are really the same faculty of mind, though they form quite distinct conceptions. Wisdom dealing with the state is divided into—first, legislation, which is the master-spirit as it were; and secondly, politics in detail, which is practical as being deliberative (for a 'measure' is like the practical application of a general principle) and which usurps the common name of politics; hence too they who are concerned with particular measures alone get the name of politicians, for these alone *act*, like workmen under a master. Just so that appears to be especially wisdom which is concerned with the individual self. And this kind usurps the common name of wisdom, while the other kinds I have alluded to may be specified as—first, economy; second, legislation; and third, politics (in the restricted sense), which may be subdivided into the deliberative and the judicial.' This distinction was pro-

mised before, *Eth. Eud.* I. viii. 8: "Ὅστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρακτῶν. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κυρίαν πασῶν. Αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ πολιτικὴ καὶ οἰκονομικὴ καὶ φρόνησις. Διαφέρουσι γὰρ αὗται αἱ ἔξεις πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας τῷ τοιαῦται εἶναι· πρὸς δ' ἀλλήλας εἴ τι διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον λεκτέον. It would appear that Eudemus by a sort of afterthought united the conception of φρόνησις, which was developed later, to that of πολιτικὴ to which Aristotle had assigned the apprehension of the chief good for man (cf. *Eth.* I. ii. 5). But in so doing he had to bring together two different things; for φρόνησις was a psychological term expressing a faculty of the mind, but πολιτικὴ was merely one of the divisions of the sciences. In order to make them commensurate, Eudemus alters the signification of πολιτικὴ. He treats it as a state of mind (ἔξις), as a mode of φρόνησις, dealing with the state either universally or in details. From the same later point of view he adds also οἰκονομικὴ; cf. *Ar. Pol.* I. iii. 1: 'Ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερόν ἐξ ὧν μορίων ἡ πόλις συνέστηκεν, ἀναγκαῖον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν πρότερον, &c.


2 ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον] The ψήφισμα or particular measure is here compared to the minor term in a syllogism, *i. e.* it constitutes the application of a general principle. Cf. *Eth.* v. x. 6. On the use of ἔσχατον in this purely technical and logical sense, cf. §§ 8—9: *Ar. Met.* x. i. 9: πᾶς γὰρ λόγος καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου

γὰρ πράττουσιν οὗτοι ὥσπερ οἱ χειροτέχναι· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ 3
 Φρόνησις μάλιστ' εἶναι ἢ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἓνα. καὶ ἔχει
 αὕτη τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα, Φρόνησις· ἐκείνων δὲ ἡ μὲν οἰκονομία
 ἡ δὲ νομοθεσία ἡ δὲ πολιτική, καὶ ταύτης ἡ μὲν βουλευτική
 ἡ δὲ δικαστική. εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη γνώσεως τὸ αὐτῷ 4
 εἰδέναι· ἀλλ' ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν· καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ τὰ περὶ

καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐσχάτων. *Post. Anal.* I. i.
 4: οὐ διὰ τὸ μέσον τὸ ἐσχάτον γνωρί-
 ζεται.

3 The classification here intended is
 as follows,—φρόνησις or wisdom being

first a general term and including
 politics with the other faculties men-
 tioned, and second a special kind
 contrasted with the other faculties—



4 εἶδος μὲν οὖν—πολιτείας] 'Now
 it must be considered a species of
 knowledge to know one's own interest,
 but this is widely different (from true
 wisdom). A man who knows his
 own concerns and occupies himself
 with these is commonly thought wise,
 while politicians are thought med-
 dlesome fellows, and hence Euripides
 wrote:—

Small wisdom was it in me to
 aspire,
 When well I might, mixed with the
 common herd,
 Enjoy a lot full equal with the best.
 But ah! how full of vanity is man!
 The restless meddling spirits in the
 state

Are gaped at still and made the
 country's gods.

Men with these selfish principles seek
 their own advantage, and this, they
 consider, is what they have to do.
 From this notion the idea has grown
 that *they* are the wise. And yet,
 perhaps, the welfare of the individual
 is inseparable from the regulation of
 the household and from the existence
 of a state.'

τὸ αὐτῷ εἰδέναι] Fritzsche reads τὸ
 τὰ αὐτῷ with the authority of two
 MSS., adding 'Ceterum in hac quoque
 præfractâ orationis brevitate qui mul-
 tum Eudemi Moralia diurnâ noctur-
 nâque manu volutavit Eudemi stilum
 agnoscat necesse est.'

αὐτὸν εἰδὼς καὶ διατρίβων φρόνιμος εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ
πολυπράγμονες· διὸ Εὐριπίδης

πῶς δ' ἂν φρονοῖν, ᾧ παρῇν ἀπραγμόνως
ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖς ἡριθμημένῳ στρατοῦ
ἴσον μετασχεῖν ;

τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καὶ τι πράσσοντας πλέον. . .

ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἶονται τοῦτο δεῖν
πράττειν. ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθε τὸ τούτους
φρόνιμους εἶναι· καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ
οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας· ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ πῶς δεῖ
διοικεῖν, ἁθλὸν καὶ σκεπτέον. σημεῖον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρη-
μένου καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ
γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ' οὐ δοκεῖ γίνε-
σθαι. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι τῶν κατ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ
γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δ' ἐμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν·
6 πλήθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἂν
τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἂν,
σοφὸς δ' ἢ φυσικὸς οὐ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δι' ἀφαιρέσεώς

πολυπράγμονες] This is often opposed
to τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν. Cf. Plato,
Gorgias p. 526 c: φιλοσόφου τὰ αὐτοῦ
πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος
ἐν τῷ βίῳ. *Repub.* p. 433 A: τὸ τὰ
αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν.

Εὐριπίδης] In the *Philoctetes*; the
later lines are thus filled up by
Wagner, *Fragm. Eur.* p. 401:—

ἴσον μετασχεῖν τῷ σοφωτάτῳ τύχης;
οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτω γαῦρον ὡς ἀνὴρ ἔφυ.
τοὺς μὲν περισσοὺς καὶ τι πράσσοντας
πλέον
τιμῶμεν ἄνδρας τ' ἐν πόλει νομίζομεν.

The Scholiast and Paraphrast both
conjecture Ζεὺς μισεῖ to govern
περισσοὺς. This would give no metre,
and only a very inferior sense.

4—5 ἔτι—γίνεσθαι] 'Moreover the
directing one's own affairs is by no
means simple, it is a subject for much
consideration. In proof whereof we
may allege that while boys learn

geometry and mathematics, and be-
come clever in such things, no boy
seems to attain to "wisdom." The
writer is arguing against the identi-
fication of 'wisdom' with an instinct
of selfishness. If it were so simple,
why should not boys possess it? διότι
is for ὅτι, as in *Eth. Eud.* vii. x. 20:
Αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μάχεσθαι, διότι καλλίων
μὲν ἡ ἠθικὴ φιλία, ἀναγκαιοτέρα δὲ ἡ
χρησίμη. Cf. *Ar. Meteor.* iii. iii. 5:
Σημεῖον δὲ τούτου διότι ἐντεῦθεν γίνε-
ται ὁ ἄνεμος ὅθεν ἂν ἡ κυρία γίγνηται
διάσπασις. *Ib.* i. xiii. 23: Τό τε ὑπὸ
τοῖς ὕρεσιν ἔχειν τὰς πηγὰς μαρτυρεῖ
διότι τῷ συρρεῖν ἐπ' ὀλίγον καὶ κατὰ
μικρὸν ἐκ πολλῶν νοτίδων διαδίδωσιν ὁ
τόπος καὶ γίνονται οὕτως αἱ πηγαὶ τῶν
ποταμῶν.

6 σοφὸς δ' ἢ φυσικὸς οὐ] 'But not a
metaphysician or physical philoso-
pher.' Σοφός is here used in a dis-
tinctive sense, 'philosopher,' *par*
excellence, with a science above physics

ἐστιν, τῶν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας· καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν οἱ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον; ἔτι ἡ ἀμαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλευσασθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ 7 βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα, ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ βαρύσταθμον. ὅτι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου 8 ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον. ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὄρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι 9

and mathematics, cf. ch. vii. § 3, note.

ἢ ὅτι—ἀδηλον] 'The reason surely is that the former matters (i.e. mathematics) are abstract, while the principles of the latter (physics and philosophy) are got by experience; thus boys repeat truths of the latter kind, without being really convinced of them; while the nature of the other subjects is easy to comprehend.'

δι' ἀφαιρέσεως] The form in Aristotle is either ἐν ἀφαιρέσει or ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως. He constantly applies these terms to denote the mathematics. The *locus classicus* on this subject is *Metaphys.* x. iii. 7: Καθίπερ δ' ὁ μαθηματικὸς περὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως τὴν θεωρίαν ποιεῖται, περιελὼν γὰρ πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ θεωρεῖ, οἷον βάρους καὶ κουφότητα καὶ σκληρότητα καὶ τοῦναντίον, ἔτι δὲ καὶ θερμότητα καὶ ψυχρότητα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς αἰσθητὰς ἐναντιώσεις, μόνον δὲ καταλείπει τὸ ποσὸν καὶ συνεχές, κ.τ.λ. Cf. *De Caelo*, iii. i. 11: διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λέγεσθαι τὰ μαθηματικά, τὰ δὲ φυσικὰ ἐκ προσθέσεως. *De Animā*, iii. vii. 10: οὕτω τὰ μαθηματικά οὐ κεχωρισμένα ὡς κεχωρισμένα νοεῖ, ὅταν νοῇ ἐκεῖνα.

πιστεύουσιν] Cf. ch. iii. § 4, note, and *Eth.* vii. iii. 8: οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι δ' οὐκ.

7 Another argument to prove the complex and difficult character of

'wisdom' is that it implies a kind of syllogism, wherein both the major premiss and the minor equally admit of error.

τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα] This was probably a medical notion of the day. Cf. *Problems*, i. xiii. where a similar superstition is maintained: Διὰ τί τὸ τὰ ὕδατα μεταβάλλειν νοσῶδες φασιν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τὸν ἀέρα οὐ;—ὕδατος μὲν πολλὰ εἶδη ἐστὶ καὶ διάφορα καθ' αὐτά, ἀέρος δὲ οὐ, ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο αἴτιον.

8 ὅτι δ'—τοιοῦτον] 'But (though implying a syllogism) it is plain that wisdom is not science, for it deals with the particular, as we have said, the action being of this kind.'

9 ἀντίκειται—εἶδος] 'To reason, indeed, it forms the opposite pole; for while reason deals with those terms which are above all inference, wisdom on the other hand deals with the particular, which is below demonstration, and is apprehended by perception; not the perception of the separate senses, but analogous to that faculty by which we perceive that the immediate object presented to us in mathematics is a triangle. For on this side also demonstration must cease. However it is rather this particular mode of wisdom which is a perception, the other presents a different form.'

ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ] Having

λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχατοῦ, οὐ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἰσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' οἷα αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ καὶ κεῖ.

alluded to the syllogistic nature of wisdom, the writer seems to have been reminded to distinguish it from science; and thus, having before (ch. v. § 8: ch. vii. § 6) contrasted it with art and philosophy, he is led on to finish the round by placing it in contrast with reason.

οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' οἷα αἰσθανόμεθα] This is the same as Aristotle's famous distinction between the 'separate senses' and the 'common sense.' His own words are clear on the point, cf. *De Animā*, II. vi. 2: λέγω δ' ἴδιον μὲν (αἰσθητὸν) ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἐτέρᾳ αἰσθῆσαι αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀπατηθῆναι, ὡς οὐκ ὅψις χρώματος καὶ ἀκοὴ ψόφου καὶ γεῦσις χυμοῦ.—Τὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα λέγεται ἴδια ἐκάστου, κοινὰ δὲ κινήσεις, ἡρεμία, ἀριθμὸς, σχῆμα, μέγεθος· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα οὐδεμίᾳ ἔστιν ἴδια, ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάσαις· καὶ γὰρ ἀφ' ἡ κινήσεως τίς ἐστιν αἰσθητὴ καὶ ὅψις. It will be seen that figure (σχῆμα) is one of the objects of the 'common sense;' the text gives as an instance of this the perception of a triangle. In *De An.* III. i. 6, Aristotle adds 'unity' to the list of 'common sensibles,' but he reduces them all to modifications of the perception of motion: ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα κινήσει αἰσθανόμεθα, ὡς οὐκ μέγεθος κινήσει. Ὡστε καὶ σχῆμα· μέγεθος γάρ τι τὸ σχῆμα. Τὸ δ' ἡρεμοῦν τῷ μὴ κινεῖσθαι· ὃ δ' ἀριθμὸς τῇ ἀποφάσει τοῦ συνεχοῦς, κ.τ.λ. He admits (*De An.* II. vi. 4) that 'common sensibles' can scarcely be said to be apprehended by sense at all, τῶν δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ αἰσθητῶν τὰ ἴδια κυρίως ἔστιν αἰσθητά, cf. *Ib.* III. i. 6, where it is said these are apprehended ac-

cidental or concomitantly by the senses. This is surely the true view; we see in the apprehension of number, figure, and the like, not an operation of sense, but the mind putting its own forms and categories, *i. e.* itself, on the external object. It would follow then that the senses cannot really be separated from the mind; the senses and the mind each contribute an element to every knowledge. Aristotle's doctrine of κοινὴ αἴσθησις would go far, if carried out, to modify his doctrine of the simple and innate character of the senses, *e.g.* sight (cf. *Eth.* II. i. 4), and would prevent its absolute collision with Berkeley's *Theory of Vision*. On the general subject of κοιν. αἴσθ. see Sir W. Hamilton, *Reid's Works*, pp. 828–830.

ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον] This has been frequently understood to mean that 'the ultimate or simplest possible figure is a triangle.' But the Paraphrast does not so explain it; his words are τοῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον καὶ οἱ μαθηματικοὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν γινώσκουσι τρίγωνον, κ.τ.λ. And referring to *Ar. Post. Analyt.* I. i. 4, we find exactly this instance given of a particular knowledge, the result of observation, ὅτι μὲν γὰρ πᾶν τρίγωνον ἔχει δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας, προῆδει· ὅτι δὲ τὸδε τὸ ἐν τῷ ἡμικυκλίῳ τρίγωνόν ἐστιν, ἅμα ἐπαγόμενος ἐγνώρισεν. The term ἔσχατον is used in the very next line: ἐνίων γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἡ μάθησις ἐστίν, καὶ οὐ διὰ τοῦ μέσου τὸ ἔσχατον γνωρίζεται. It is true that in different places Aristotle uses ἔσχατον in different senses, as denoting with various applications

ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον αἰσθησις ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος.

Τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλευέσθαι διαφέρει· τὸ γὰρ βου- 9
λεύεσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν. δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ εὐβουλίας
τί ἐστι, πότερον ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ δόξα ἢ εὐστοχία ἢ ἄλλο
τι γένος. ἐπιστήμη μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ζητοῦσι²
περὶ ὧν ἴσασιν, ἢ δ' εὐβουλία βουλή τις, ὃ δὲ βουλευόμενος²
ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' εὐστοχία. ἄνευ τε

the end of a series, thus cf. *De. An.* III. x. 2, where it means 'final cause,' *Eth.* III. iii. 11, 'the last step in analysis;' *Metaph.* VI. iii. 6, 'matter,' &c. But in the place before us τὸ ἔσχατον has been already appropriated to the logical meaning of 'particular,' 'minor term,' 'immediate truth,' cf. § 2 and § 8.

στήσεται γὰρ κακεῖ] 'For on that side too (*i. e.* in dealing with an object of the sense as well as an intuition of reason) demonstration must stop.' Ἰστασθαι is a common logical form, it is opposed to προῖναι εἰς ἄπειρον, and is frequently impersonal, cf. *Post. Anal.* I. iii. 1: ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὰ ἄπειρα διελθεῖν. Εἰ τε ἴσταται καὶ εἰσὶν ἀρχαί, κ. τ. λ. *Met.* II. iv. 22, &c.

ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον αἰσθησις ἢ φρόνησις] Three of Bekker's MSS. read ἡ φρόνησις, and this seems most natural, and to give the best sense (though ἡ is supported by the Paraphrast). What the writer means is apparently to add that only one kind of wisdom can be called analogous to the apprehension of a triangle; αὕτη refers to ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα φρόνησις, mentioned above, ch. vii. § 7: δεῖ ἅμω εἶναι ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον. There is another kind (ἐκείνης), namely, the possession of universal ideas (τῶν καθόλου) (*l.c.*), which is of a different nature.

examination of a set of faculties cognate to wisdom, or forming part of it. The first of these is good counsel (εὐβουλία). This, says the writer, is to be distinguished from science, which does not deliberate; from guessing (εὐστοχία), which is too quick; from sagacity (ἀγχίνοια), which is a kind of guessing; and from opinion, which is too definite. It is, then, a certain rightness of thought, it chooses the right means to a good end. The conception of this end wisdom itself must supply. There is a great assumption here of the manner of Aristotle. The chapter seems formed after *Eth.* III. ii.; § 6 reminds us of many similar passages in Book IV., and § 7 is after the manner of *Eth.* I. iii. 5. There is an advance upon Aristotle's account of deliberation (*Eth.* III. iii.) in two points, (1) the process is illustrated here by the logical formula of the syllogism, (2) there is a mention here of the faculty whereby ends are apprehended, which Aristotle had left unnoticed. See *Eth.* III. iii. 1, note.

1 It is an abrupt, awkward commencement of the chapter to say, 'enquiring and deliberating are different, for deliberating is a species of enquiring.' But what is meant apparently is, to bring 'good counsel' under the head of enquiring, which separates it at once from both science and opinion.

IX. This chapter commences the

γὰρ λόγου καὶ ταχύ τι ἢ εὐστοχία, βουλευόμενοι δὲ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχὺ τὰ βουλευθέντα, 3 βουλευέσθαι δὲ βραδέως. ἔτι ἡ ἀγχίνουα ἕτερον καὶ ἡ εὐβουλία· ἔστι δ' εὐστοχία τις ἡ ἀγχίνουα. οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἡ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ μὲν κακῶς βουλευόμενος ἀμαρτάνει, ὁ δ' εὖ ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται, ὁ γὰρ ὅτι ὀρθότης τις ἡ εὐβουλία ἐστίν, οὗτ' ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὔτε δόξης· ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀμαρτία), δόξης δ' ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια· ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὠρίσται ἤδη πᾶν οὗ δόξα ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἡ εὐβουλία. διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται· αὕτη γὰρ οὕτω φάσις· καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος, ἐάν τε εὖ

2 φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχὺ κ.τ.λ.] Fritzsche quotes Isocr. *Demon.* p. 9, c. § 35: βουλευόμεν μὲν βραδέως ἐπιτέλει δὲ ταχέως τὰ δόξαντα. Herod. vii. 49: ἀνὴρ δὴ οὕτω ἂν εἴη ἄριστος, εἰ βουλευόμενος μὲν ἀρρωδέοι, πᾶν ἐπιλεγόμενος πείσεσθαι χρῆμα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ θρασὺς εἴη.

3 ἔστι δ' εὐστοχία τις ἡ ἀγχίνουα] This is announced by Aristotle, *Post. Anal.* i. xxxiv. 1, in the very next line to that passage on the distinction of the organs of truth, which apparently suggested so much of the subjects of the present book, ἡ δ' ἀγχίνουα ἐστὶν εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέπτῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ μέσου. In more general terms ἀγχίνουα is defined by Plato, *Charmides*, p. 160 A, as ὁζύτης τις τῆς ψυχῆς.

ἐπιστήμης μὲν—λογίζεται] 'Now in science there is no such thing as "rightness," for there is no such thing as wrongness. In opinion, on the other hand, rightness is truth. And besides, whatever we have an opinion about is already decided. But good counsel is not by any means beyond questioning (ἄνευ λόγου). Therefore it remains that good counsel is a rightness of the operation of thought (διανοίας), for this does not

amount to decision. Opinion is not an inquiry, but is already a kind of decision. On the other hand, he that deliberates, whether well or ill, is inquiring after something and calculating.'

ἐπιστήμης] This is said here just as it was before said, ch. v. § 7, that there were no degrees of excellence in wisdom.

δόξης δ'] Cf. *Eth.* iii. ii. 13, and above, ch. ii. § 2, note.

διανοίας ἄρα] Plato, *Repub.* p. 511 D, proposed to confine the term διάνοια to the discursive understanding as opposed to νοῦς, the intuitive and speculative reason, διάνοιαν δὲ καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἔξιν ἀλλ' οὐ νοῦν, ὥς μεταξύ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν οὔσαν. Aristotle probably had the same distinction in view, *Post. Anal.* i. xxxiii. 9 (*l.c.*), πῶς δεῖ διανεῖμαι ἐπὶ τε διανοίας καὶ νοῦ. But he did not maintain the distinction in his works, and certainly it is not observed by Eudemus in the present book, where both νοῦς πρακτικός and διάνοια θεωρητική are spoken of. In the place before us διάνοια apparently means the exercise of reason, a process of thought.;

ἐάν τε κακῶς βουλευῆται, ζητεῖ τι καὶ λογίζεται. ἀλλ' ὁρθότης τίς ἐστίν ἡ εὐβουλία βουλῆς· διὸ ἡ βουλὴ ζητητέα πρῶτον τί καὶ περὶ τί. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὁρθότης πλεοναχῶς, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα· ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατής καὶ ὁ φαῦλος ὁ προτίθεται ἰδεῖν ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύξεσθαι, ὥστε ὁρθῶς ἔσται βεβουλευμένος, κακὸν δὲ μέγα εἰληφώς. δοκεῖ δ' ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τὸ εὖ βεβουλευθῆναι· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ὁρθότης βουλῆς εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική. ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ τούτου ψευδεῖ συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν, καὶ ὁ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δι' οὗ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῇ τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι· ὥστ' οὐδ' αὕτη πω εὐβουλία, καὶ ἣν οὐ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μένοι

4 ἐπεὶ δ'—βεβουλευθῆναι] 'But since the term "rightness" is used in more senses than one, it is plain that "good counsel" does not answer to all the senses. For the incontinent or bad man will obtain, by his calculation, what he proposes to himself, so that he will have deliberated rightly, yet secured a great evil. Whereas, to have deliberated well is generally thought (δοκεῖ) to be a good.'

πλεοναχῶς] i. e. Rightness of means, either respective, or irrespective, of rightness in the end; or, again, rightness of end (§ 5), whatever may have been the means.

ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατής] It would seem rather the abandoned man (ἀκόλαστος) who by calculation attains bad ends. The incontinent man would not generally have deliberation attributed to him, cf. *Eth.* vii. ii. 2. But the characters cannot be kept very distinct.

ἰδεῖν] Perhaps ἰδεῖν may be taken here as equivalent to something like σκοπόν. The Scholiast offers the following loose explanation: ὁ γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατής καὶ ἀπλῶς ὁ φαῦλος προτίθεται, ὡς τέλος ἰδεῖν, ἥτοι σκέψασθαι δπως αὐτοῦ ἐπιτεύξεσθαι κ.τ.λ.

δοκεῖ δ' ἀγαθόν] Fritzsche quotes Herod. vii. 10: τὸ γὰρ εὖ βουλευέσθαι κέρδος μέγιστον εὐρίσκω ἐόν. Sopho-

cles, *Antig.* 1050: κράτιστον κτημάτων εὐβουλία. Isocr. *Demon.* p. 9. c. § 35: ἡγοῦ κράτιστον εἶναι παρὰ μὲν τῶν θεῶν εὐτυχίαν, παρὰ δὲ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν εὐβουλίαν.

5 ἀλλ' ἔστι—εἶναι] 'But, further, it is possible to obtain what is good by a false syllogism;—to obtain what one ought to do, not however by the right means, but with a false middle term.' Great indefiniteness is introduced here by the word ποιῆσαι. We could not surely be said 'to obtain what we ought to do' by the wrong means. Doing a thing is means not end (cf. *Eth.* iii. iii. 15), or if looked at as end, it is end inseparable from the means. Again, it is an inaccuracy to speak of a 'false middle term.' Falsehood or truth is the attribute of a proposition not a term, cf. *De Interpret.* i. 3: περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσιν ἔστι τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. If the conception of the end be right and yet the syllogism wrong, it follows that the minor premiss must be false, thus:

Preservation of health is good:

Abstinence from intellectual labour is preservation of health:

the result of which syllogism will be the preservation of health, but by the sacrifice of mental culture.

6 δι' οὗ ἔδει. ἔτι ἔστι πολὺν χρόνον βουλευόμενον τυχεῖν, τὸν δὲ ταχύ. οὐκοῦν οὐδ' ἐκείνη πω εὐβουλία, ἀλλ' ὀρθότης 7 ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ οὗ δεῖ καὶ ὡς καὶ ὅτε. ἔτι ἔστι καὶ ἀπλῶς εὖ βεβουλευῆσθαι καὶ πρὸς τι τέλος. ἡ μὲν δὴ ἀπλῶς ἡ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς κατορθοῦσα, ἡ δέ τις ἡ πρὸς τι τέλος. εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὖ βεβουλευῆσθαι, ἡ εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τι τέλος, οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψις ἐστίν.

10 Ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ ἀσυνεσία, καθ' ἧς λέγομεν συνετοὺς καὶ ἀσυνέτους, οὗθ' ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμη ἡ δόξη

6—7 The writer first raises good counsel to the rank of one of the virtues, by the mention of all the qualifications necessary; afterwards he seems to modify this by saying that, besides the absolute good counsel which aims at the absolute end, there is also such a thing as relative good counsel aiming at relative ends.

One might have thought that it was unnecessary to give so separate a psychological existence to excellence in deliberation. However, the quality here described answers more nearly than *φρόνησις* to what we call 'prudence.' *φρόνησις*, we are here told, is the conception of ends, and afterwards (ch. xii. § 9) it is shown to be the faculty of means. In truth, it is both, according to the Aristotelian views (as far as we can discern them); it implies both prudence (*εὐβουλία*), and also a certain moral condition (*ἀρετή*), and it is implied by both of them. As compared with the one it is of ends, and as compared with the other it is of means.

X. This chapter treats of another faculty which forms an element in wisdom, and yet may be distinguished from it, namely, apprehension (*σύνεσις*). Apprehension is not mere opinion (else all would possess it),

nor is it a science, for it deals with no separate class of objects whether necessary or contingent (*ὅτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων καὶ ἀκινήτων ἡ σύνεσις ἐστίν, ὅτε περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ὄντων*). It deals with all that can be matter of human deliberation, in short, with the same objects as wisdom. But wisdom *commands*, it is concerned with right action, in short, it belongs to the will as well as to reason. But apprehension only *judges*, it is merely intellectual. It is neither the having nor the getting wisdom, but rather it is the application of one's knowledge to give a meaning to the *dicta* of wisdom. It is 'understanding,' as its name implies, or 'taking in' (*συνιέναι*), when another speaks. The word appears to mean 'combination,' 'joining one thing to another.'

Aristotle had spoken of *σύνεσις* as one of the intellectual excellencies, *Eth.* i. xiii. 20: *σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικὰς*. Eudemus does not apply the term *ἀρετή* to this, or to any of the other intellectual qualities which he treats of, except wisdom and philosophy. He gives here a psychological account of *σύνεσις*, the operation of which he confines to intellectual insight with regard to moral subjects, apprehension of

(πάντες γὰρ ἂν ἦσαν συνετοί) οὔτε τις μία τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ περὶ ὑγεινῶν ἢ γεωμετρία περὶ μεγέθους· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ ὄντων καὶ ἀκινήτων ἢ σύνεσις ἐστὶν οὔτε περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ὁπουοῦν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις καὶ βουλεύσαιτο. διὸ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ταυτὸν σύνεσις καὶ φρόνησις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ ἐστὶν· τί² γὰρ δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μή, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον· ταυτὸν γὰρ σύνεσις καὶ εὐσυνεσία καὶ συνετοὶ καὶ εὐσύνετοι. ἔστι δ' οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν³ οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν ἢ σύνεσις· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ μαθάνειν λέγεται συνίεναι, ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὕτως ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησις ἐστίν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς· τὸ

the meaning of moral *dicta* and critical judgment thereon. That there is such a faculty of apprehension, and of sympathetic or critical understanding, quite distinct from moral goodness in people, the experience of life seems to show.

The author of the *Magna Moralia* gives a much inferior account of *σύνεσις* (I. xxxv. 17), making its characteristic to be that it deals with *small matters*, *περὶ μικρῶν τε καὶ ἐν μικροῖς ἢ κρίσις*.

1 διὸ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει] It is used nearly equivalently to φρόνησις by Thueyd. I. 140: Δικαιῶ τοῖς κοινῇ δόξασιν, ἣν ἄρα τι καὶ σφαλλώμεθα, βοηθεῖν, ἢ μηδὲ κατορθοῦντας τῆς ξυνέσεως μεταποιεῖσθαι.

2 ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ ἐστίν—ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον] The opposition of these terms is taken from Plato, *Politicus*, p. 259 E—260 C, where it is argued that the arithmetician (λογιστής) is content with a knowledge and judgment about numbers, whereas the architect (ἀρχιτέκτων) must go on to apply his know-

ledge by directing the workmen—thus that all science may be divided under the two heads of critical and mandatory. (260 A) Οὐκοῦν γνωστικὰ μὲν αἶτε τοιαῦτα ξύμπασαι καὶ ὁδοῖαι ξυνέπονται τῇ λογιστικῇ, κρίσει δὲ καὶ ἐπιτάξει διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοις τούτω τῷ γένει;—φαίνεσθον. Ἀρ' οὖν συμπάσης τῆς γνωστικῆς εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιτακτικὸν μέρος, τὸ δὲ κριτικὸν διαιρούμενοι προσείπομεν, ἐμμελῶς ἂν φαίμεν διηρῆσθαι;—κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν.

3 ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ μαθάνειν λέγεται συνίεναι ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ] The word *μαθάνειν* was ambiguous in Greek, it meant either to 'learn' or to 'understand.' The Sophists used to play on this ambiguity, arguing that one could 'learn what one knew already.' Cf. Ar. *Soph. Elench.* iv. 1, 2, which illustrates the present passage: Εἰσὶ δὲ παρὰ μὲν τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν οἱ τοιοῦτε τῶν λόγων, οἷον ὅτι μαθάνουσιν οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι· τὰ γὰρ ἀποστοματιζόμενα μαθάνουσιν οἱ γραμματικοί. Τὸ γὰρ μαθάνειν ὁμώνυμον, τό τε ξυνίεναι χρώμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν ἐπιστήμην.

4 γὰρ εὖ τῷ καλῶς ταῦτόν. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθε τοῦνομα ἡ σύνεσις, καθ' ἣν εὐσύνετοι, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν· λέγομεν γὰρ τὸ μανθάνειν συνιέναι πολλάκις.

11 Ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ' ἣν εὐγνώμονας καὶ ἔχειν φάμεν γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις ὀρθή. σημεῖον δέ· τὸν γὰρ ἐπεικῇ μάλιστά φαμεν εἶναι συγγνωμονικόν, καὶ ἐπεικῆς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἓνα συγγνώμην. ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπεικοῦς ὀρθή. ὀρθή δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

2 Εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἕξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταῦτὸ τείνουσαι· λέγομεν γὰρ γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἥδη καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετούς· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὗται τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ κριτικῶς

XI. This chapter (which is not conveniently divided as it stands) opens with a mention of the quality of considerateness (γνώμη), and proceeds to point out how various qualities unite in wisdom, and what are the natural and intuitive elements which it contains.

1 ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη] By the progress of psychology, this term came to bear the special meaning of 'considerateness.' At first it meant knowledge in general, cf. Theognis, vv. 295 sq.

Γνώμης δ' οὐδὲν ἕμεινον ἀνὴρ ἔχει αὐτὸς ἐν αὐτῷ,
Οὐδ' ἀγνωμοσύνης, Κύρν', ὀδυνηρότερον.

In Thucydides it bore a variety of significations, especially when used in the plural, standing for almost anything mental, 'minds' as opposed to bodies, 'thoughts' as opposed to deeds; 'feelings,' 'principles,' 'maxims,' &c. In Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, II. xxi. 2—15, γνώμη is used for a moral maxim (such as those of the so-called Gnomie Poets); so also, for all popular sayings, *Soph. El.* xvii. 17.

It was probably from the association of *συγγνώμη* that *γνώμη* came to have its distinctive meaning. The author of the *Magna Moralia* calls it *εὐγνωμοσύνη*, and makes it a sort of passive form of *ἐπιείκεια* (II. ii. 1): *ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἄνευ ἐπιεικείας ἡ εὐγνωμοσύνη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κρίναι τοῦ εὐγνώμονος, τὸ δὲ δὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ ἐπεικοῦς.*

In the text above, it is said that 'considerateness is a right judgment of the equitable man.' 'Pardon is a right critical considerateness of the equitable man.'

ὀρθή δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς] 'Now by a *right* judgment is meant a *true* one.' This must be the import of the sentence, but the writer says not *ἀληθής*, but *τοῦ ἀληθοῦς*—probably 'by attraction' to *τοῦ ἐπεικοῦς*. But it is an inaccuracy of language to speak of 'a true man' in the sense of 'a man whose judgment is true.' Eudemus, as we have seen (ch. ii. § 2, note), is inclined to confine the application of *ὀρθός* to acts of the desire and will.

2 εἰσὶ δὲ—ἄλλον] 'Now all the (above-mentioned) conditions of mind

εἶναι περὶ ὧν ὁ Φρόνιμος, συνετὸς καὶ εὐγνώμων ἢ συγγνώμων· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῇ κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχά-³ των πάντα τὰ πρακτά· καὶ γὰρ τὸν Φρόνιμον δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη περὶ τὰ πρακτά, ταῦτα δ' ἔσχατα. καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα· καὶ⁴ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὄρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων ὄρων

naturally tend to the same point; we apply (*ἐπιφέροντες*) the terms considerateness, apprehension, wisdom, and reason to the same persons, and say (*λέγομεν*) that they have considerateness, that they have attained to (*ἤδη*) reason—that they are wise—that they are apprehensive. For all these faculties deal with immediate truths (*τῶν ἐσχάτων*) and particulars; and it is by being able to judge of those matters with which the wise man is concerned, that a man is apprehensive, considerate, or forgiving. Equity extends itself over all the forms of good which consist in a relation to one's neighbour.'

νοῦν ἤδη] What this means is not quite clear. It may refer to what is said in § 6, *ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει*. Thus it might be nearly equivalent to our saying of a person that he had 'attained to years of discretion.' Or again, it may refer to the moment of action, and *ἤδη* would be thus equivalent to the French *voilà*. 'There is reason exhibited.' *ἤδη* is used similarly to denote the present moment, *Eth. Eud.* II. viii. 11: Καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐγκρατεύμενος λυπεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττων ἤδη, καὶ χαίρει τὴν ἀπ' ἐλπίδος ἡδονήν, ὅτι ὕστερον ὠφελήθησεται, ἢ καὶ ἤδη ὠφελεῖται ὀργαίνων.

τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῇ] This is said because *γνώμη* and *συγγνώμη* are acts of equity. Cf. *Eth.* V. x. 1, note.

4—5 καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων—*νοῦς*] 'And reason is of the ultimates at both ends of the series. Both the first and the last terms are apprehended, not by inference, but by reason. On the one hand, the scientific and demonstrative reason (*ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις*) apprehends those terms which are immutable and primary. And on the other hand, the practical reason (*ὁ ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς*) apprehends the particular (*ἐσχάτου*) and contingent truth, and the minor premiss. For these constitute the sources of our idea of the end, the universal being developed out of the particulars. Of these particulars, then, one must have perception, and this perception is reason.' The writer having before (in § 3) connected the faculties of 'apprehension,' &c., with wisdom, on the ground of their all being concerned with particulars (*ἐσχατα*), proceeds to include reason (*νοῦς*) under the same category, and says that this apprehends *ἐσχατα* at both ends of the series. But now comes in a piece of confusion which is thoroughly Eudemean, for he goes on to say that the scientific reason apprehends first truths or principles (cf. ch. vi.), while the practical reason apprehends *last* terms or particulars. To mix up considerations of the scientific reason with the present discussion is to introduce what is entirely irrelevant. We see

καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ' ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἐτέρας προτάσεως· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ
 5 ἔνεκα αὐται· ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ τὸ καθόλου. τούτων
 οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἰσθῆσιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς. διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ
 δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα, καὶ φύσει σοφὸς μὲν οὐδεὶς, γνώμην δ'
 6 ἔχειν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ νοῦν. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλι-
 κίαις οἴομεθα ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει καὶ
 γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας οὔσης. διὸ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ

here a bringing together of two things which were before placed in contrast with each other (ch. viii. § 9), namely, the reason which apprehends first principles, and wisdom apprehending particular facts (*ἐσχάτων*). In the present passage, what was before called wisdom (*φρόνησις*) is called reason (*νοῦς*), and it is said that reason is the faculty which perceives or apprehends the particular in moral subjects (*ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς*). This, then, is the main purport of the present remarks. Setting aside as irrelevant what is said of the scientific reason, we learn that the moral judgment is intuitive, that moral intuitions are to be attributed to the reason, and that out of these particular intuitions the moral universal grows up. When stripped of its ambiguities of statement, the sense of the passage becomes unexceptionable. We may compare it with the incidental observations of Aristotle, *Eth.* i. iv. 7: 'Ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνεται ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἢ ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς βεβίως. *Ib.* vii. 20: ἱκανὸν ἐν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. The expression of Eudemus is not so strong as that of Aristotle. Eudemus says ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ καθόλου, while Aristotle said ἀρχὴ τὸ ὅτι. The latter must be true if *reason* be the organ by which

the fact is apprehended, for reason is in itself universal, and whatever it apprehends must be of the nature of the universal.

ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἔνεκα αὐται.] This is similar in form of expression to ch. iii. § 3: ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ καθόλου. On οὗ ἔνεκα see below, ch. xii. § 10, note.

αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς.] To say that 'reason is a perception of particulars' is only the counterpart of Aristotle's saying that we can have 'a perception of universals.' *Eth.* i. vii. 20: τῶν ἀρχῶν αἱ μὲν αἰσθῆσαι θεωροῦνται. Aristotle expresses the intuitive character of reason by saying that it 'touches' its object. Cf. *Metaphys.* viii. x. 5: τὸ μὲν θιγεῖν καὶ φάναι ἀληθές . . . τὸ δ' ἀνηροεῖν μὴ θιγγάνειν. *Ib.* xi. vii. 8: αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταῦτον νοῦς καὶ νοητόν. That reason, while it is on the one hand intuitive, is on the other hand developed by experience, we learn from the discussions in *Post. Anal.* ii. ch. xix. The same is expressed above in the saying that 'reason is the beginning and the end.'

5—6 διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ—ὁρθῶς.] 'Hence it is that these faculties are thought to come naturally, and that although no one without conscious effort (*φύσει*) gets to be a philosopher, men do get naturally to have consideration, and apprehension, and

τέλος νοῦς· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις καὶ περὶ τούτων. ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ φρονίμων ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ δόξαις οὐχ ἥττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα ὀρθῶς. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ περὶ τίνα ἑκατέρα τυγχάνει οὔσα, καὶ ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρα, εἴρηται.

Διαπορήσεις δ' ἂν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τί χρήσιμοί εἰσιν.¹² ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία οὐδὲν θεωρεῖ ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαίμων ἄνθρω-

reason. A proof of this is, that we think they ought successively to appear as age advances, and (we say that) such and such an age possesses reason and considerateness, as if these things came from nature. Hence reason is the beginning and the end, the matter of premises and conclusions is the same. Thus we must pay regard to the unproved assertions and opinions of the elderly and experienced, or of the wise, no less than to demonstrations. For, from having obtained the eye of 'old experience,' they see aright.' In these excellent remarks the subject is brought round again to the contrast between philosophy and wisdom. The former never comes naturally, but the latter does. The nature of reason, and its growth in the mind, is illustrated by the common fact of the respect paid to age.

ἐκ τούτων—καὶ περὶ τούτων] Cf. *Eth.* I. iii. 4: περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας. The 'subject' of the demonstration is the conclusion, cf. *Eth.* I. viii. 1: Σκεπτόν . . . οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος. ὄμμα] Cf. *Eth.* I. vi. 12: ὥς γὰρ ἐν σώματι ὕψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς. Plato, *Repub.* p. 533 D: ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῶ τινὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατορυσμένον ἡρέμα ἔλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω.

XII. In this and the following chapter, by mooted the question, of what use are wisdom and philosophy? the writer shows the relation of the two qualities to each other, and the inseparable connexion existing between wisdom and virtue. The following difficulties are first stated. (1) Philosophy is not practical, it does not consider at all the means to happiness, how then can it be useful? (2) Wisdom, on the other hand, though it treats of happiness, might be said to be mere knowledge. It might be said that a man no more *acts* well from having this knowledge of the good, than he *is* well from having a knowledge of medicine. (3) Or again, if wisdom be useful for telling us *how* to be good, why not get this advice from others? Why should it be necessary to *have* wisdom, any more than it is to learn medicine, when one can go to a doctor? (4) If philosophy be better than wisdom, how is it that the latter controls the former? The answer to question (1) is, that both philosophy and wisdom are good in themselves, and desirable as being perfections of our nature, even though they were not useful as means to anything beyond. But they are not without results. Philosophy, if it does not serve as an instrument to happiness, is identical with happi-

πος (οὐδεμιᾶς γάρ ἐστι γενέσεως), ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τοῦτο μὲν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τίνος ἕνεκα δεῖ αὐτῆς, εἴπερ ἡ μὲν φρόνησις ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς πράττειν, οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ ἐσμεν, εἴπερ ἔξεις αἱ ἀρεταὶ εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ οὐδὲ τὰ εὐεκτικά, ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἔξεως εἶναι λέγεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἱατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικὴν ἐσμεν. εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων χάριν φρόνιμον θετέον ἀλλὰ τοῦ γίνεσθαι, τοῖς οὗσι σπουδαίοις οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη χρήσιμος, ἔτι δ' οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐθὲν γὰρ διοίσει αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἢ ἄλλοις ἔχουσι πείθεσθαι, ἱκανῶς τ' ἔχει ἂν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ καὶ

ness itself. Questions (2) and (3) are answered by showing the relation of wisdom to virtue. Virtue gives the right aim, and wisdom the right means. They are inseparable from one another. Wisdom without virtue would be mere cleverness apt to degenerate into cunning, and virtue without wisdom would be a mere gift of nature, a generous instinct capable of perversion. While thus inseparable from virtue, wisdom is not to be identified with it. In this respect an advance has been made beyond the crude formula of Socrates. Wisdom accompanies the virtues, and is a sort of centre-point to them all (ἅμα τῇ φρονήσει μᾶ οὕση πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν, xiii. 6). Question (4) is easily answered, since wisdom rather ministers to philosophy than thinks of controlling it.

1 οὐδεμιᾶς γάρ ἐστι γενέσεως] Suggested perhaps by *Eth.* x. vii. 5, where it is said of the θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια—οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι. *Ib.* § 7: δοκεῖ . . . παρ' αὐτὴν οὐδένας ἐφίεσθαι τέλους.

εἴπερ ἡ μὲν φρόνησις ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ] 'If wisdom be that which is concerned

with things just and noble and good for man.' 'H is indefinite, being probably feminine on account of the preceding φρόνησις. This passage is the first that asserts strongly the moral nature of wisdom. We are told here that wisdom takes cognizance of the just and the noble; before it was only said to be concerned with what was good (περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ, ch. v. § 6). These concluding discussions about φρόνησις show the inadequacy of the term 'prudence,' by which it has been so often translated, really to represent it.

οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ] The answer to this objection has virtually been already given, ch. v. § 8: where φρόνησις was said *not* to be a merely intellectual quality.

2 εἰ δὲ μὴ—πείθεσθαι] 'But suppose we assume that a man is wise not for this object (*i.e.* mere knowledge of virtue), but with a view to becoming (virtuous), we must then concede that to those who *are* virtuous wisdom will be of no use; but neither will it be so to those who have not got (virtue), for there will be no difference whether they have (wisdom) themselves, or follow the advice of

περὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν· βουλόμενοι γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν ὅμως οὐ μανθάνομεν ἰατρικὴν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν, ³ εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὕσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται· ἢ γὰρ ποιοῦσα ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ ἕκαστον. περὶ δὲ τούτων λεκτέον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἠπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγομεν ὅτι καὶ αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἰρετάς ⁴ αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀρετάς γ' οὕσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου, καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσι μὴδὲν μὴδετέρα αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα καὶ ⁵ ποιοῦσι μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν· μέρος γὰρ οὕσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα. ἔτι ⁶

others possessing it.' The compression used here is quite in the style of Eudemus, and so is the confusion caused by the careless writing in τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐθὲν γὰρ διοίσει αὐτοὺς ἔχειν, where ἔχουσιν and ἔχειν appear to refer to two different things.

3 εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὕσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται] This difficulty may have been partly suggested by the prominent position assigned to wisdom in the present book (cf. ch. vii. § 7: εἴη δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική), partly by the authoritative character attributed to politics by Aristotle, *Eth. I. ii. 4—6*: δόξειε δ' ἂν τῆς κυριαύτης καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς· τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται κ.τ.λ. Cf. Plato on the βασιλικὴ τέχνη, *Euthydem.* p. 291 B, quoted Vol. I. Essay III. p. 140.

4 Wisdom and philosophy cannot be otherwise than desirable, as they are the best state of the human mind. And the mind must necessarily (ἀναγκαῖον) desire its own best state.

5 ἔπειτα — εὐδαίμονα] 'Furthermore they do produce happiness—philosophy produces it, not in the way that medicine produces health, but rather it operates like health itself. Being a part of the entire well-being (τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς) of man,

it makes one happy by the consciousness of possessing it.'

τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς] This phrase, which never occurs in the writings of Aristotle, is frequent in those of Eudemus. Cf. *Eth. Eud.* II. i. 9: καὶ ἔστι ζωὴ καὶ τελεία καὶ ἀτελής, καὶ ἀρετὴ ὁσαύτως (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὅλη, ἡ δὲ μέρος). *Ib.* § 14: διὸ καὶ ἄλλο εἴ τι μέρος ἐστὶ ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ θρεπτικόν, ἡ τούτου ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἐστὶ μέρος τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς. *Eth. Eud.* IV. (Nic. V.) ii. 7: ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ δικαιοσύνη πλείους, καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τις καὶ ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν, δῆλον. *Ib.* § 10: ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη. This conception Eudemus came to identify with καλοκάγθεια, *Eth. Eud.* VIII. iii. 1: κατὰ μέρος μὲν οὖν περὶ ἐκάστης ἀρετῆς εἴρηται πρότερον· ἐπεὶ δὲ χωρὶς διείλομεν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς διαθροατέον τῆς ἐκ τούτων, ἣν ἐκαλοῦμεν ἥδη καλοκάγθειαν.

τῷ ἔχεσθαι καὶ ἐνεργεῖν] 'Ἐνεργεῖν added on to ἔχεσθαι expresses the fruition, as well as the possession, of philosophy. It implies that philosophy exists not only *in*, but *for*, the mind. See Vol. I. Essay IV. pp. 193–196.

6 ἔτι—τούτων] 'Again, man's proper function is discharged by an

τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον. τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ· οὐθέν γάρ 7 ἐπ' αὐτῷ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθέν εἶναι πρακτικωτέρους διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, μικρὸν ἀνωθεν ἀρκτέον, λαβόντας ἀρχὴν ταύτην. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας οὕτω δικαίους εἶναι, οἷον τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα ποιοῦντας ἢ ἄκοντας ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἢ δι' ἕτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτά (καίτοι πράττουσιν γε ἅ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα χρὴ τὸν σπουδαῖον), οὕτως, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἔστι τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν ἕκαστα ὥστ' εἶναι ἀγαθόν, λέγω δ' οἷον διὰ προαίρεσιν 8 καὶ αὐτῶν ἔνεκα τῶν πραττομένων. τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετὴ, τὸ δ' ὅσα ἐκείνης ἔνεκα πέφυκε πρᾶτ-

accordance with wisdom and moral virtue. For virtue makes the aim right, and wisdom the means to the attainment of this.' The conception of τὸ ἔργον is taken from *Ar. Eth.* i. vii. 10. The rest of the psychology here is different from that of Aristotle (see *Eth.* iii. v. 1, note), but is identical with that adopted by Eudemus in his earlier books. Cf. *Eth. Eud.* ii. xi. 1: τούτων δὲ διωρισμένων λέγωμεν πότερον ἢ ἀρετὴ ἀναμάρτητον ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ τέλος ὀρθόν, οὕτως ὥστε οὐ ἔνεκα δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι, ἢ ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τισί, τὸν λόγον. "Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ἐγκράτεια· αὕτη γὰρ οὐ διαφθείρει τὸν λόγον. "Ἔστι δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἕτερον. Λεκτέον δ' ὕστερον περὶ αὐτῶν (this refers to ch. v. § 6, where, however, σωφροσύνη is substituted for ἐγκράτεια). *Ib.* § 3: πότερον δ' ἢ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ τὸν σκοπὸν ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπόν; τιθέμεθα δὴ ὅτι τὸν σκοπόν, διότι τοῦτου οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς οὐδὲ λόγος. *Ib.* § 6, quoted below.

τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου κ.τ.λ.] Cf. *Eth. Eud.*

ii. i. 14 (*l.c.*). There is apparently an attempt here to bring under one view the functions of the different parts of human nature, in relation to morality.—On πράττει, see ch. ii. § 2, note.

7 The first step to prove the *use* and practical necessity of wisdom, is to show that moral action implies consciousness and a conscious purpose.

8 τὴν μὲν—δυνάμει] 'Now virtue makes the purpose right, but the means to this (ὅσα ἐκείνης ἔνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι) do not belong to virtue, but to another faculty.' There is some confusion here in speaking of the means to a purpose, προαίρεσις itself being in the Aristotelian psychology a faculty of means; but cf. *Eth. Eud.* ii. xi. 5—6, where προαίρεσις is said to imply both end and means, and whence the present passage is repeated almost *verbatim*. "Ἔστι γὰρ πᾶσα προαίρεσις τινος καὶ ἕνεκά τινος. Οὐ μὲν οὖν ἔνεκα τὸ μέσον ἐστίν, οὐ αἰτία ἢ ἀρετὴ τὸ (τῷ, Fritzsche, e conj.) προαιρεῖσθαι οὐ ἔνεκα. "Ἔστι

τεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ἐτέρας δυνάμεως. λεκτέον δ' ἐπιστήσασι σαφέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὴ τις δύναμις ἣν καλοῦσι δεινότητα· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ τοιαύτη ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπὸν συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν. ἂν μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ᾗ καλός, ἐπαινετὴ ἔστιν, ἂν δὲ φαῦλος, πανουργία· διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους φαιμέν εἶναι. ἔστι ¹⁰ δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ δεινότης, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. ἡ δ' ἕξις τῷ ὅμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, ὡς εἴρηται τε καὶ ἔστι δῆλον· οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε

μέντοι ἡ προαίρεσις οὐ τούτου, ἀλλὰ τῶν τούτου ἕνεκα. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνειν τούτων ἄλλης δυνάμεως, ὅσα ἕνεκα τοῦ τέλους δεῖ πράττειν· τοῦ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὀρθὸν εἶναι τῆς προαιρέσεως, οὗ ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία.

8—10 λεκτέον δ'—ἀγαθόν] 'But we must speak on the point with a more exact attention. There is a certain faculty which is called "cleverness," this is of a nature to perform and to hit upon the means that conduce to any given aim. Now if the aim be good, this faculty is praiseworthy, but if bad, it turns to cunning. Hence both wise men and cunning men get the name of "clever." Now wisdom is not cleverness, but it is not without a faculty of the kind. But this eye of the mind attains its full condition not without virtue, as we have already stated, and as is clear, for the syllogisms of action have as their major premiss—"Since such and such is the end and the best"—(being whatever it is,—something for the sake of argument, it matters not what). But this (major premiss) cannot be apprehended except by the good man; for vice distorts (the mind), and makes it false with regard to the principles of action. Hence it is

evident that one cannot possess wisdom unless he be good.'

καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους φαιμέν εἶναι] We should have expected τοὺς πανούργους. That want of clearness of mind which is characteristic of Eudemus shows itself in his use of the article, cf. ch. xi. § 6: τῶν ἐμπεύρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ φρονίμων, where one would have expected τῶν φρονίμων.

Fritzsche quotes Plato, *Theatet.* p. 177 A: ἂν μὴ ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῆς δεινότητος—ταῦτα δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοὶ καὶ πανούργοι ἀνοήτων τινῶν ἀκούσονται. Demosth. *Ol.* i. p. 9: πανούργος ὢν καὶ δεινὸς ἄνθρωπος πράγμασι χρῆσασθαι.

10 ὡς εἴρηται τε] Ch. ii. § 4: διδ' οὗτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας, οὗτ' ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξεως ἡ προαίρεσις. *Eth. Eud.* ii. xi. 5: διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἂν ὀρθὸν εἴη τὸ τέλος κ. τ. λ.

οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν] The form of the practical syllogism is similarly given, *Eth. Eud.* ii. xi. 4: ὥσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις· 'ἐπειδὴ δεῖ τόδε ἔγχειν, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ ὑπάρχει, εἰ ἔσται ἐκεῖνο,' ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, 'εἰ ἔστι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαί, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ εἶναι.'

τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὅτιδήποτε ὄν. ἔστω γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν. τοῦτο δ' εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ φαίνεται· διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχάς. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθόν.

- 13 Σκεπτέον δὲ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα· οὐ ταυτὸν μὲν, ὅμοιον δέ· οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν. πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἡθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει

On the doctrine of the practical syllogism, see Vol. I. Essay IV. pp. 212—219. It was there doubted whether Aristotle was himself the author of this formula which appears in the *Eudemian Ethics*, and in the probably spurious treatise *De Motu Animalium*. But, in fact, one passage, at all events, in the *De Animâ*, proves that Aristotle had himself applied the syllogistic form to the process which the mind goes through in forming a practical resolution, though Eudemus undoubtedly carried out the application farther and used it more constantly; cf. *De An.* III. xi. 4: 'Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν καθόλου ὑπόληψις καὶ λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστα (ἡ μὲν γὰρ λέγει ὅτι δεῖ τὸν τοιοῦτον τὸ τοιόνδε πράττειν, ἡ δὲ ὅτι τῷδε τὸ νῦν τοιόνδε, καὶ γὰρ δὲ τοιόσδε) ἤδη αὐτὴ κινεῖ ἡ δόξα, οὐχ ἡ καθόλου. Ἡ ἔμφω, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἡρεμοῦσα μᾶλλον, ἡ δ' οὐ.

XIII. Σκεπτέον δὲ—κυρίαν] 'We must consider then, over again, the nature of virtue. For there is a relation in virtue analogous to that borne by wisdom to cleverness. Cleverness, though not the same as wisdom, is similar to it, and this is the way in which natural virtue stands related to virtue proper.' The doctrine of the natural element in virtue was clearly given by Aristotle, cf. *Eth.* x.

ix. 6—8: Γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθὸς οἴονται, οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ' ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδασκῶν. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔφ' ἡμῶν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τινος θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει—Δεῖ δὲ τὸ ἥθος προϋπάρχειν πῶς οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχροῦν. In the present passage, the analogy between the development of the reason and of the moral will is well drawn out. At first, there is the intellectual faculty, cleverness, undetermined as yet for good or bad, but requiring a right direction to be given to its aims. This the moral feelings can alone supply. On the other side, there is the generous instinct, the impulse to bravery, justice, and the like, but this is deficient in consciousness and in the idea of a law, which reason can alone supply. The joint development of these two sides gives, on the one hand, wisdom, on the other hand, virtue, in its complete and proper form. What there is difficult or strange in the doctrine, is, that virtue has apparently assigned to it the intellectual function of apprehending the end of action. This appears an inversion. 'Ἀρετὴ seems now to have changed places with λόγος. But, at all events, the point is clearly established that an intellectual side and a moral side are entirely inseparable.

πως· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ τᾶλλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπάρχειν· καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρχουσιν ἔξεις, ἀλλ' ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὔσαι. πλὴν τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅτι ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῷ ἄνευ ὀψεως κινουμένῳ συμβαίνει σφάλλῃσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα· ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει. ἡ δ' ἔξις ὁμοία οὔσα τότ' ἔσται κυρίως ἀρετῇ. ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἐστὶν εἶδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡθικοῦ δύο ἐστί, τὸ μὲν ἀρετῇ φυσικῇ τὸ δ' ἡ κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως. διόπερ τινές φασι³

καὶ γὰρ παισὶ—ἀρετῇ] 'For the natural dispositions belong both to children and beasts, but without reason they appear harmful. At least this seems evident, that as a strong body, if moved without sight, comes into violent collisions because it has not sight to guide it, so is it in mental things (ἐνταῦθα). If the natural qualifications have reason added to them, they then excel in action, and the state, which (before) was a semblance of virtue, now becomes virtue in the true sense of the term.' Φυσικαὶ ἔξεις is used inaccurately for φυσικαὶ διαθέσεις, cf. *Eth.* II. vii. 6, note. On the moral qualities of brutes Aristotle often speaks; cf. *Hist. An.* I. i.; IX. i. &c. The 'courage' of brutes, being undirected, is no doubt harmful, so the generosity, &c., of boys. That fine natures are capable of the worst perversion, is an opinion to be found stated in Plato's *Republic*, p. 491 E: Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτω φῶμεν τὰς εὐφροσύνας κακῆς παιδαγωγίας τυχοῦσας διαφερόντως κακὰς γίγνεσθαι; ἢ οἶσι τὰ μεγάλα ἀδίκηματα καὶ τὴν ἄκρατον

πονηρίαν ἐκ φαύλης, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ νεανικῆς φύσεως τροφῇ διολομένης γίγνεσθαι, ἀσθενῇ δὲ φύσιν μεγάλων οὔτε ἀγαθῶν οὔτε κακῶν αἰτίαν ποτὲ ἔσεσθαι;

3—5 διόπερ—μετὰ λόγῳ] 'Hence it is that some say that all the virtues are wisdoms; and thus Socrates was partly right and partly wrong in his investigations. He was wrong in thinking the virtues wisdoms, but perfectly right in thinking that they were inseparable from wisdom. The same point is testified to by the fact that, at present, persons, when they wish to define virtue, add the terms "state (specifying the particular object), according to the right law." And *that* law is right which is in accordance with wisdom. All men therefore seem to have a presentiment that a particular state in accordance with wisdom is virtue. But a little alteration is necessary. Not merely the state according to the right law, but that which is conscious of (μετὰ) the right law constitutes virtue. Now in such matters wisdom is right law. Socrates then considered that the

πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐξίτηι τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ὤετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ 4 φρονήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, ὅταν ὀρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετὴν, προστιθέασι τὴν ἔξιν, εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς ἃ ἔστι, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. εἰκόασι δὲ μαντεύεσθαι πως ἅπαντες ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἔξις ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν ἢ κατὰ τὴν 5 φρόνησιν. δεῖ δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἔξις ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν. ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ὤετο εἶναι 6 (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτῃ λύοιτ' ἄν, ὥ διαλεχθεῖη τις ἂν

virtues were laws (for he defined them all as sciences), but we consider that they are conscious of a law.'

καὶ Σωκράτης] On the doctrine of Socrates that 'virtue is science,' see Vol. I. Essay II. pp. 122—124. In *Eth.* iii. viii. 6, the phrase is *οὕτως καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης*, on which Bishop Fitzgerald remarks that by prefixing the article Aristotle appears to have indicated the Socrates of Plato's dialogues, the dramatic, and not the historical, philosopher. Thus speaking similarly of *characters* in books, Aristotle says, *Eth.* iii. viii. 2, *τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἑκτορα. Ib.* ii. ix. 3, *ἡ Καλυψώ. Ib.* ii. ix. 6, *πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην*. And contrariwise of real persons he speaks without the article. *Eth.* i. iv. 5, *Εὐ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει. Ib.* i. v. 3, *ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλη. Ib.* i. vi. 8, *οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπένσιππος. Ib.* i. x. 1, *κατὰ Σόλωνα*. All through the first book of the *Metaphysics*, when writing the history of philosophy, Aristotle speaks of the different philosophers without

the article, and so too elsewhere in contrasting Socrates with Plato, &c. The only exceptions to this rule are the cases of *renewed mention*. Cf. *Met.* xii. iv. 5: *Δύο γὰρ ἐστὶν ἃ τις ἂν ἀποδοίη Σωκράτει δικαίως—Ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης κ.τ.λ.* But in discussing Plato's *Republic* and *Laws* (*Pol.* ii. i.—vi.), Aristotle invariably speaks of *ὁ Σωκράτης, οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι*, &c., as referring not to a real but to a represented personage. Assuming that Eudemus has followed the same rule, we may conclude that here and in *Eth.* vii. ii. 1, *Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ δλως ἐμαρχετο, Ib.* vii. iii. 14, *ὁ ἐξίτηι Σωκράτης*,—the actual and historical Socrates is designated.

καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες] i.e. since the establishment of the Peripatetic doctrine. Eudemus refines upon the usual Peripatetic formula, substituting *μετὰ λόγου* for *κατὰ λόγον*. On the meaning of this alteration see *Eth.* i. vii. 14, note.

6 ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος—ἐπάρξουσιν]

ὅτι χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταί· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς εὐφύε-
στατος πρὸς ἀπάσας, ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ' οὐπω
εἰληφὼς ἔσται· τοῦτο γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς
ἐνδέχεται, καθ' ἃς δὲ ἀπλῶς λέγεται ἀγαθός, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται·
ἅμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μιᾷ οὔση πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν. δῆλον γ
δέ, καὶ εἰ μὴ πρακτικὴ ἦν, ὅτι ἔδει αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ
μορίου ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ
ἄνευ φρονήσεως οὐδ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος ἡ δὲ
τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ποιεῖ πράττειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία 8
γ' ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
τῆς ὑγείας ἡ ἰατρική· οὐ γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὁρᾷ
ὅπως γένηται· ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνη.
*τι ὁμοιον καὶ εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν φαίη ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν,
ὅτι ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει.

'Thus the opinion is refuted of him who would argue that the virtues are separated from one another, that the same man is not equally gifted by nature for all the virtues, so that he will acquire one now and another later. This is possible with regard to natural good qualities, but not so with regard to those which constitute a good man absolutely; for together with wisdom, which is one, all the virtues will be in his possession.' The same perfect character is attributed to wisdom below, *Eth.* vii. ii. 5: *πρακτικός γε ὁ φρόνιμος· τῶν γὰρ ἐσχάτων τις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς.* The theory is, that he who has wisdom can do no wrong. It will be seen how nearly this ap-

proaches to the Stoical idea of the 'wise man.'

7 This section is a mere repetition, in Eudemian fashion, of what has gone before, ch. xii. §§ 4, 10; *Eth. Eud.* ii. xi. 6 (*l.c.*). Cf. also ch. ii. § 4: *διὸ οὐτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὐτ' ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξεως ἡ προαίρεσις.*

8 The relation of wisdom to philosophy is clearly stated by the author of the *Magna Moralia*, who paraphrases the present passage (*M. M.* i. xxxv. 32), *ἡ φρόνησις ὥσπερ ἐπίτροπός τις ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας, καὶ παρασκευάζει ταύτην σχολὴν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τὸ αὐτῆς ἔργον, κατέχουσα τὰ πάθη καὶ ταῦτα σωφρονίζουσα.*

PLAN OF BOOK VII.

THIS last of the Nicomacho-Eudemian Books consists of two parts, of which the one is a necessary complement to Aristotle's ethical system; the other superfluous, being little more than a modification of Aristotle's (far superior) treatise on Pleasure.

Part I. having enumerated the moral states which are above, below, and between virtue and vice, mentions six ordinary opinions on these states (Ch. I.), points out the difficult questions to which these opinions give rise (Ch. II.), and proceeds to elucidate them.

In Ch. III. the question is discussed, How is incontinence compatible with a knowledge of the right?

In Ch. IV. the question, Whether incontinence is confined to any definite object-matter?

Chs. V. and VI., pursuing the same inquiry, treat of certain morbid and unnatural kinds of incontinence, and of incontinence (analogously so called) in the matter of anger.

Ch. VII. compares generally incontinence with intemperance, treats of the subordinate forms of the intermediate moral states (endurance, softness, &c.), and traces incontinence to two separate sources in the character.

Ch. VIII. continues the comparison between intemperance and incontinence, reverts to two questions before mooted, namely:— (1) Is intemperance more curable than incontinence? (2) Is incontinence to be regarded as absolutely bad? and gives a negative answer to both.

Ch. IX. §§ 1-4 discusses the question mooted in Ch. II., Does continence consist in sticking to an opinion or purpose, right or wrong? In answering this question, a good distinction is drawn between obstinacy and continence.

Ch. IX. § 5—Ch. X. winds up the previous discussions and

formally settles the remaining questions of Ch. II. Is intemperance the same as incontinence? Can the wise man be incontinent?

These chapters form, as we have said, a necessary complement to the Aristotelian ethical system, taking a more practical point of view (*ἄλλην ἀρχήν*) than that which would divide mankind simply into the virtuous and the vicious. Moral systems in general have perhaps too much neglected this field of the intermediate states; and general language has not definitely adopted the distinction between the 'intemperate' and the 'incontinent,' as the use of these English words at once testifies, for we are evidently obliged to give a certain special and technical meaning to the word 'intemperate' in order to make it stand as the representative of *ἀκόλαστος*. A subtle, but not always clear, psychology is employed to explain the phenomena of moral weakness, and it is observable that physical and medical considerations are prominently appealed to throughout this book. The remarks on bestiality, cretinism, or morbid depravity (*θηριότης*) here made have attracted the notice of modern writers on the psychology of insanity (as for instance Dr. Thomas Mayo).^{*} And the interesting allusions here made to the melancholic, or bilious, temperament might be illustrated, not only from Aristotle's *Problems*, but also from Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*. The chief thing that we have to complain of in this book is the too vague way in which incontinence is treated. For the sake of forming a more definite notion of the standard of Greek morality, we could have wished a graphic portrait of the continent man, in the style of Aristotle's fourth Book. As it is, we must be content to know that the continent man yields to temptation less, and the incontinent man more, than people in general.

* 'Now according to this view of the subject, we have a class of persons, differing from the majority of mankind in their incapacity for moral distinction, differing from the insane, in not labouring under any suspension of the power of will. On the first of these grounds, they have a right to a place in our system of mental pathology. On the last, they must constitute a distinct head from insanity. I am not at present considering this class generally; I exclude indeed that section of persons, in whom the absence of principle is obviated by the harmlessness of their tendencies. I am speaking of persons destitute of the moral faculty, and *also* vicious in their propensities. For these I have borrowed the designation given to them by Aristotle: and I call them *brutal*.'—Mayo, *Elements of the Pathology of the Human Mind*, p. 127.

Part II. consists of that superfluous treatise on Pleasure, the authorship of which has been so much disputed. While professing to treat of pleasure as falling under the philosophy of human life, the writer seems to confine himself almost entirely to a refutation of three positions maintained by the Platonic school: 1st. That pleasure is in no sense a good. 2nd. That most pleasures (*i.e.* physical pleasures) are bad. 3rd. That no pleasure can be the chief good.

The first and third of these positions are refuted in Chs. XII. and XIII., and the second in Ch. XIV. The subject is treated in this book under a more physiological and practical aspect than in the tenth book of the Nicomachean work.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ [ΕΥΔΗΜΙΩΝ] VII.



ΜΕΤΑ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν, ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἥθη φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἶδη, κακία ἀκρασία θηριότης. τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ δῆλα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τὸ δ' ἐγκράτειαν καλοῦμεν· πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριότητα μάλιστ' ἂν ἀρμόττοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετὴν, ἡρωϊκὴν τινα καὶ θεϊαν, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος περὶ Ἑκτορος πεποιήκε λέγοντα τὸν Πρίαμον ὅτι σφόδρα ἦν ἀγαθός,

I. This chapter proposes a new field of inquiry (ἄλλην ἀρχήν) in Ethics, namely to consider those intermediate states, continence and incontinence, together with their subordinate forms (softness, luxury, and endurance), which are 'neither identical with virtue and vice, nor yet wholly distinct from them.' After an enumeration of the moral states above, below, and between, virtue and vice, the writer announces that his method of inquiry will be, as elsewhere, to collect current opinions on the subject, to raise doubts and objections to them, and by a process of sifting to reject such existing opinions as are untenable, and to leave a residue of 'sufficiently demonstrated' theory. He accordingly mentions six common notions about the states in question.

1 τὰ δ' ἐναντία κ.τ.λ.] A scale of the moral states is here drawn out, which stands as follows: 1. Divine

virtue, or pure reason. 2. Virtue (afterwards called temperance, σωφροσύνη), or the perfect harmony of passion subjugated to reason. 3. Continence, or the mastery of reason over passion after a struggle. 4. Incontinence, or the mastery of passion over reason, after a struggle. 5. Vice (afterwards called ἀκολασία, intemperance), or the perfect harmony of reason subjugated to passion. 6. Bestiality, or pure passion. It is remarkable that the terms σωφροσύνη and ἀκολασία, which in this book certainly supply the place of ἀρετή and κακία, are actually introduced extremely late. Cf. ch. v. § 9.

ἡρωϊκὴν τινα] Cf. Arist. Pol. vii. xiv. 2, where the gods and heroes are mentioned as excelling men. Dr. Hampden, in his *Bampton Lectures*, mentions that, in the canonisation of a Roman Catholic Saint, it was customary to declare that he had graduated 'in heroico gradu virtutis.'

οὐδὲ ἐφ'κει

ἀνδρός γε θνητοῦ πάϊς ἔμμεναι ἀλλὰ θεοῖο.

2 ὥστ' εἰ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ δι'
 ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, τοιαύτη τις ἂν εἴη δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῇ θη-
 ριώδει ἀντιτιθεμένη ἔξις · καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίου ἐστὶ
 κακία οὐδ' ἀρετή, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν τιμιώτερον
 3 ἀρετῆς, ἡ δ' ἕτερόν τι γένος κακίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον καὶ
 τὸ θεῖον ἄνδρα εἶναι, καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες εἰώθασι προσαγο-
 ρεύειν, ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα του (σεῖος ἀνὴρ φασιν),
 οὕτω καὶ ὁ θηριώδης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος. μάλιστα
 δ' ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐστίν, γίνεται δ' ἔνια καὶ διὰ νόσους
 καὶ πηρώσεις · καὶ τοὺς διὰ κακίαν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
 4 ὑπερβάλλοντας οὕτως ἐπιϋσφημοῦμεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν
 τῆς τοιαύτης διαθέσεως ὕστερον ποιητέον τινὰ μνείαν, περὶ
 δὲ κακίας εἴρηται πρότερον · περὶ δὲ ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας
 καὶ τρυφῆς λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ καρτερίας ·
 οὔτε γὰρ ὡς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔξεων τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθη-
 5 ρίᾳ ἐκατέραν αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέον, οὔθ' ὡς ἕτερον γένος. δεῖ

οὐδὲ ἐφ'κει] II. XXIV. 258.

3 οἱ Λάκωνες] Apparently taken from the *Meno* of Plato, p. 99 D.

4 ὕστερον] i. e. in chapter v.

πρότερον εἴρηται] Cf. *Elh. Eud.* II. x. 28, &c.

5 δεῖ δ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων—*ἰκανῶς*] 'Our course must be, as elsewhere, to state existing ideas (τὰ φαινόμενα), and, having gone through the doubts (which these ideas suggest), to establish thus if possible all, but if not all, anyhow the greater number and the most important of the ideas which are generally admitted (ἐνδόξα) about these conditions of mind. For if the difficulties be resolved and at the same time the generally admitted ideas be suffered to stand, the thing will be established sufficiently.' This passage is obscure, chiefly on account of the ambiguity in the words *ἐὰν γὰρ λύηται τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπεται τὰ ἐνδόξα*. Two meanings might be

attributed to *λύηται* τὰ δυσχερῆ, which might either refer (1) to the rejection of ideas that involved a difficulty; or (2) to the clearing up of difficulties attaching to any of the popular ideas. The former interpretation would seem best to suit the context, and to be justified by the actual procedure of subsequent chapters, and accordingly the following is the way in which the passage is rendered by the Paraphrast. *Λέγωμεν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸν τρόπον καθ' ὃν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἵπομεν· ἐκθροσόμεθα γὰρ τοὺς δοκοῦντας περὶ αὐτῶν λόγους, ὧν τοὺς μὴ συμβαίνοντας τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐλέγξαντες, τοὺς μάλιστα ἐνδόξους καταλείψαντες βεβαιώσομεν· καὶ οὕτως ἔσται φανερόν ὁ περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος.* But on looking below we find a sentence answering to, and in fact repeating, the present one in such a way that we cannot help taking it as a decisive guide as to what is here meant. After a statement of the

δ', ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυριώτατα· ἐὰν γὰρ λύηται τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς.

Δοκεῖ δὴ ἡ τε ἐγκράτεια καὶ καρτερία τῶν σπουδαίων⁶ καὶ τῶν ἐπαινετῶν εἶναι, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία τε καὶ μαλακία τῶν φαύλων τε καὶ ψεκτῶν, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ἐμμενετικὸς τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἐκστατικὸς τοῦ λογισμοῦ. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ πάθος, ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον. καὶ τὸν σώφρονα μὲν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ καρτερικόν, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον οἱ μὲν πάντα σώφρονα οἱ

various ideas, and of the difficulties which they suggest, the writer adds αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦταί τινες συμβαίνουσιν, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ, τὰ δὲ καταλείπειν· ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὐρεσίς ἐστιν (ii. 12). The words before us, λύηται τὰ δυσχερῆ, correspond with τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν (τῶν ἀποριῶν) and with ἡ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας. It is to be observed, however, that καταλείπειν is used in the one place to refer to the popular ideas, and in the other to the objections (ἀπορίαι) urged against those ideas. τὰ φαινόμενα, as shown by what follows, is here equivalent to τὰ λεγόμενα in § 7, the common sayings and ideas of men. It is used in the same sense, *Eth. Eud.* i. vi. 1: *πειρατέον δὲ περὶ τούτων πάντων ζητεῖν τὴν πίστιν διὰ τῶν λόγων, μαρτυρίαις καὶ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον τοῖς φαινομένοις.*

6—7 The common ideas are now enumerated. They are six in number:

(1) 'That continence and endurance are morally good, while incontinence and softness are morally bad.'

(2) 'That the continent man is he who sticks to his opinion, while the incontinent man is he who departs from his opinion.'

(3) 'That the incontinent man errs

through his peculiar state, knowing all the while that he is doing wrong; while owing to this knowledge the continent man abstains.'

(4) 'That temperance is the same as continence, and in like manner incontinence is sometimes confused with intemperance.'

(5) 'It is occasionally maintained that wise and clever men may be incontinent.'

(6) 'That there is such a thing as incontinence of other things beside pleasure, e.g. of anger, of honour, and of gain.'

6 δοκεῖ δὴ κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Xenophon, *Memorab.* i. v. 4-5, where it is said that Socrates considered ἐγκράτεια the foundation of the virtues. (Cf. *Id.* iv. v. 1, iv. v. 3-7, ii.)

καὶ τὸν σώφρονα μὲν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ καρτερικόν] The distinction between σωφροσύνη, ἐγκράτεια, and καρτερία, was not accurately maintained either by Xenophon or Plato; cf. *Memorab.* iv. v. 7, ii. i. 1, &c. Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 491 D: πῶς ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα λέγεις; οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σώφρονα ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. *Rep.* p. 430 E: κόσμος ποῦ

δ' οὐ, καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατῇ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῇ ἀκόλαστον συγκεχυμένως, οἱ δ' ἐτέρους εἶναί φασιν. τὸν δὲ φρόνιμον ὅτε μὲν οὐ φασιν ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι ἀκρατῇ, ὅτε δ' ἐνίοις φρονίμους ὄντας καὶ δεινοὺς ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι. ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ' ἐστίν.

2 Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς ἀκρατεῖται τις. ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὐ φασί τινες οἷόν τε εἶναι.

τις . . . ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ καὶ ἡδονῶν τινῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια.

τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατῇ] Fritzsche refers to Xen. *Mem.* iv. v. 6 sqq., and for the opposite comparison to Xen. *Mem.* ii. i. 1: ἐδόκει προτρέπειν τοὺς συνόντας ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν βρωτοῦ καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ λαχνείας καὶ ὕπνου καὶ ῥίγους καὶ θάλπους καὶ πόνου. γνοῦς γάρ τινα τῶν συνόντων ἀκολαστοτέρως ἔχοντα πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα, κ.τ.λ.

7 ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους] Cf. Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 869 A. Isocr. *Demon.* p. 6: ὅφ' ὧν κρατεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν αἰσχροῦ, τούτων ἐγκράτειαν ἀσκεῖ πάντων, κέρδους, ὀργῆς, ἡδονῆς, λύπης.

II. This chapter contains a statement of the objections and difficulties which may be raised against the above-mentioned ideas.

1—4 state the difficulties which attach to the third-mentioned idea—that the incontinent man sins against knowledge. How is this possible? how can one know the best and not do it? Socrates denied the possibility of incontinence altogether, making it convertible with ignorance; but with what kind of ignorance remains to be asked. Others confess that it is not knowledge which is perverted in the mind of the incontinent, but only opinion, *i.e.* a vague and weak conviction.

5 Continuing the same subject,

introduces also an objection to idea (5)—that the wise man may be incontinent. Some fancy that wisdom (though not knowledge in the scientific sense) may coexist with incontinence. But this shows a misconception of the nature of wisdom. The wise man can do no wrong.

6 Contains an objection to idea (4). How can continence be the same as temperance, since the former implies evil desires to be controlled, but the latter is a harmonious state of the moral nature?

7—10 Show the difficulties and absurdities which attach to idea (2), that continence consists in sticking to your opinion. If so it must be bad sometimes; Neoptolemus was incontinent; folly and incontinence combined will produce right actions; the abandoned man will be a more hopeful character than the incontinent, &c.

11 Urges against the sixth of the ideas, that the term 'incontinence' cannot be indiscriminately relative to wealth, honour, &c. There must be some absolute conception of incontinence, independent of these qualifications.

1 Ἀπορήσειε δ'—ἔγνωσαν] 'Now one might raise the question, how it is that a person with right conceptions comes to act incontinently. That a man who had absolute knowledge should do so, some say would be impossible, for it would be a strange

δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν. Οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἀμ-
 2 φισβητεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις ἐναργῶς, καὶ δεόν ζητεῖν περὶ τὸ πάθος, εἰ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας. ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἶεται γε ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος πρὶν ἐν τῷ πάθει γε-
 νέσθαι, φανερόν. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ τὰ μὲν συγχωροῦσι τὰ 3

thing, as Socrates thought, if knowledge were there, that anything else should master him and twist him about like a slave. Socrates in short was totally opposed to the idea, (arguing) as if incontinence did not exist at all, for he said no one with a conception of what was best could act differently from that best, but he could only so act through ignorance.' On this doctrine of Socrates, and on its connection with the rest of his ethical views, see Vol. I. Essay II. p. 125. The omission of the article before Σωκράτης seems to show that the real man, and not the personage of Plato's dialogues, is referred to, (see above, note on *Eth.* vi. xiii. 3), but yet the words of the passage before us have obvious reference to Plato's *Protagoras*, p. 352 B: δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι, οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ' ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδ' ἀρχικὸν εἶναι· οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιοῦτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος διανοοῦνται, ἀλλ' ἐνούσης πολλὰκίς ἀνθρώπων ἐπιστήμης, οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν θυμὸν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐρίτε δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλὰκίς δὲ φόβον, ἀτεχνῶς διανοοῦμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελακόμενης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων.

ὅλως ἐμάχετο] This is repeated in strong terms by the author of the *Magna Moralia*, II. vi. 2: Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτερος ἀνὴρ οἶετο ὅλως καὶ

οὐκ ἔφη ἀκρασίαν εἶναι, λέγων ὅτι οὐθεὶς εἰδὼς τὰ κακὰ θεῖ κακὰ εἰσιν ἔλοιτ' ἄν. Cf. Plato *Protag.* p. 357 B: ἡ δὲ ἐξαμαρτανόμενη πρᾶξις ἀνευ ἐπιστήμης ἵστε που καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι ἀμαθία πράττεται, &c.

2 οὗτος μὲν οὖν—φανερόν] 'Now this reasoning is manifestly at variance with experience, and we require to ask with regard to the state, supposing it to arise from ignorance, what manner of ignorance it is that takes place, for it is plain that the person who acts incontinently does not at all events think (that he must so act) before he gets into the particular state.' Φαινομένοις here refers no doubt to the actual facts of life, and accordingly the rendering of the Paraphrast is, οὗτος δὲ ὁ λόγος ἐναντίος ἐστὶ τοῖς φανεροῖς. And yet there is probably some allusion also to the φαινόμενα mentioned above (i. 5); we may represent the double allusion of the word by translating it 'experience,' comparing with it also the use of τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, *Eth.* I. viii. 1.

οὐκ οἶεται γε] There seems to be an ellipsis of δεῖν πράττειν ἢ πράττει. Cf. below, iii. 2: ὁ δ' οὐκ οἶεται μὲν, διώκει δέ. The writer argues that if incontinence be ignorance, it is a peculiar kind of ignorance, an ignorance that comes on (γίνεται), not a consistent ignorance; for the incontinent person does not think ignorantly, *i. e.* wrongly, before the time of temptation.

δ' οὐ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης μὴθὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον ὁμολο-
 γοῦσι, τὸ δὲ μὴθὲνα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον οὐχ
 ὁμολογοῦσι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν ἀκρατῆ φασὶν οὐκ ἐπιστήμην
 4 ἔχοντα κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀλλὰ δόξαν. ἀλλὰ
 μὴν εἶγε δόξα καὶ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, μὴδ' ἰσχυρὰ ὑπόληψις ἢ
 ἀντιτείνουσα ἀλλ' ἡρεμαία, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διστάζουσι,
 συγγνώμη τῷ μὴ μένειν ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἰσχυράς·
 τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ οὐ συγγνώμη, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὶ τῶν
 5 ψεκτῶν. φρονήσεως ἄρα ἀντιτεινούσης· αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυ-
 ρότατον. ἀλλ' ἄτοπον· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ἅμα φρόνιμος
 καὶ ἀκρατής, φήσκει δ' οὐδ' ἂν εἰς φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ πράτ-
 τειν ἐκόντα τὰ φαυλότατα. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις δέδεικται πρό-
 τερον ὅτι πρακτικὸς γε ὁ φρόνιμος· τῶν γὰρ ἐσχάτων τις
 6 καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς. ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμίας
 ἔχειν ἰσχυράς καὶ φαύλας ὁ ἐγκρατής, οὐκ ἔσται ὁ σώφρων
 ἐγκρατής οὐδ' ὁ ἐγκρατής σώφρων· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἄγαν σώ-
 φρονος οὔτε τὸ φαύλας ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε· εἰ μὲν
 γὰρ χρησταὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, φαύλη ἢ κωλύουσα ἔξισ μὴ ἀκο-
 λουθεῖν, ὥσθ' ἢ ἐγκράτεια οὐ πᾶσα σπουδαία· εἰ δ' ἀσθε-
 νεῖς καὶ μὴ φαῦλαι, οὐθὲν σεμνόν, οὐδ' εἰ φαῦλαι καὶ ἀσθε-
 7 νεῖς, οὐθὲν μέγα. ἔτι εἰ πάσῃ δόξῃ ἐμμενετικὸν ποιεῖ ἢ
 ἐγκράτεια, φαύλη, οἷον εἰ καὶ τῇ ψευδεῖ· καὶ εἰ πάσης δόξης

3 ἐπιστήμης μὴθὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον] Cf. *Eth. Eud.* viii. i. 10: καὶ ὁρθῶς τὸ Σωκρατικόν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐπιστήμην ἔφη, οὐκ ὁρθόν. Plato, *Protag.* p. 352 D: αἰσχρόν ἐστι—σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάναι εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων.

5 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις—ἀρετάς] 'And besides, it has been previously demonstrated that the wise man is emphatically (γε) one who acts, for his province is to deal with particulars, and he possesses also all the virtues.' πρότερον, cf. *Eth.* vi. vii. 7, vi. viii. 8; τῶν ἐσχάτων is here the genitive of the object, as, in the place last quoted, τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν (ἡ φρόνησις.)

καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς] Cf. *Eth.* vi. xiii. 6; καὶ τὰς ἄλλας is equivalent to καὶ αὐτὰς. See the note on *Eth.* ii. i. 4.

7 The rough and hasty conception of continence which would confound it with obstinacy is here refuted by showing that absurdities would follow from it. Continence would be sometimes an evil, and incontinence sometimes a good. From this point of view the conduct of Neoptolemus, (who first promised to deceive Philoctetes, and afterwards abandoned the design as unworthy), must be called incontinent and at the same time right. The full reference here given to the *Philoctetes* of Sophocles is more in the style of

ἢ ἀκρασία ἐκστατικόν, ἔσται τις σπουδαία ἀκρασία, οἷον ὁ Σοφοκλέους Νεοπτόλεμος ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ· ἐπαινέτος γὰρ οὐκ ἐμμένων οἷς ἐπείσθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως διὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος. ἔτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος ψευδόμενος ἀπορία· διὰ γὰρ τὸ παράδοξα βούλεσθαι ἐλέγχειν, ἵνα δεινοὶ ᾧσιν ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν, ὁ γενόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἀπορία

Endemus than of Aristotle. The allusion is repeated below, c. ix. § 4. For the sake of observing more accurately the 'noble incontinence' of Neoptolemus, it is worth while to quote at length the passage referred to (Soph. Phil. 895—916).

N. παπαῖ· τί δῆτ' ἂν δρῶμ' ἐγὼ τοῦν-
θένδε γε;

Φ. τί δ' ἔστιν, ὦ παῖ; ποῖ ποτ' ἐξέβης
λόγῳ;

N. οὐκ οἶδ' ὅποι χρὴ τάπορον τρέπειν
ἔπος.

Φ. ἀπορεῖς δὲ τοῦ σύ; μὴ λέγ', ὦ
τέκνον, τάδε.

N. ἀλλ' ἐνθάδ' ἤδη τοῦδε τοῦ πάθους
κυρῶ.

Φ. οὐ δὴ σε δυσχέρεια τοῦ νοσήματος
ἔπεισεν ὥστε μὴ μ' ἄγειν ναύτην ἔτι;

N. ἅπαντα δυσχέρεια, τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν
ὅταν λιπὼν τις δρᾷ τὰ μὴ προσει-
κότα.

Φ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἔξω τοῦ φευτέσαντος σύ γε
δρᾷς οὐδὲ φωνεῖς, ἐσθλὸν ἄνδρ'
ἐπωφελῶν.

N. αἰσχρὸς φανούμαι· τοῦτ' ἀνιῶμαι
πάλαι.

Φ. οὐκ οὖν ἐν οἷς γε δρᾷς· ἐν οἷς δ'
αὐδᾷς ὀκνῶ.

N. ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δρᾷσω; δεύτερον ληθῶ
κακός,
κρύπτων θ' ἂ μὴ δεῖ καὶ λέγων
αἰσχιστ' ἐπῶν;

Φ. ἀνὴρ δδ', εἰ μὴ γὰρ κακὸς γνώμην ἔφυν,
προδοὺς μ' ἔοικε κάκλιπὼν τὸν πλοῦν
στελεῖν.

N. λιπὼν μὲν οὐκ ἔγωγε· λυπηρῶς δὲ μὴ
πέμπω σε μᾶλλον, τοῦτ' ἀνιῶμαι
πάλαι.

Φ. τί ποτε λέγεις, ὦ τέκνον, ὡς οὐ
μανθάνω.

N. οὐδὲν σε κρύψω. δεῖ γὰρ ἐς Τροίαν
σε πλεῖν

πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ τὸν Ἀτρεί-
δων στόλον.

8—9 ἔτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς—κακὰ πρά-
ξει] 'Again (if we accept the above-
mentioned definition of continence)
the sophistical argument [though
lying] will cause us perplexity. For
from the sophists wishing to confute,
and at the same time astonish (παρά-
δοξα ἐλέγχειν), in order that on suc-
ceeding they may establish a reputation
for power,—they construct a piece of
reasoning which perplexes, since the
intellect is fettered, on the one hand
not wishing to abide by a conclusion
which does not please, and, on the
other hand, being unable to get loose,
from having no means of breaking
the chain of argument. Now from
one of their reasonings it ensues that
folly together with incontinence will
make up virtue; for (he who possesses
these qualities) does the reverse of
what he conceives (he ought) by
reason of his incontinence, but he
conceives good to be bad and that he
ought not to do it, and thus he will
do what is good and not what is bad.'
In the Oxford edition of Bekker
(1837) there is a misprint of μένειν
μὲν δὴ. The Berlin edition of Bekker,
like all other editions, reads μένειν μὲν
μὴ. The MSS. appear to vary with
regard to μὲν (which by some of them
is omitted), but not with regard to μὴ.

γίνεται· δέδεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια, ὅταν μένειν μὲν μὴ βούληται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκειν τὸ συμπερανθέν, προϊέναι δὲ μὴ δύνηται διὰ τὸ λῦσαι μὴ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον. συμβαίνει δ' ἔκ τινος λόγου ἡ ἀφροσύνη μετὰ ἀκρασίας ἀρετῇ· τάναντία γὰρ πράττει ὢν ὑπολαμβάνει διὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν, ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ τὰγαθὰ κακὰ εἶναι καὶ οὐ δεῖν πράττειν, ὥστε τὰγαθὰ καὶ

The great difficulty in the passage before us is caused by the word *ψευδόμενος*. This is explained either to be (1) an additional adjective to *ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος*, in which position it has an awkward appearance, or (2) to refer to the well-known puzzle of Eubulides the Megarian, which was called *ὁ ψευδόμενος*, and in logic books 'Mentiens' or 'the liar.' The puzzle was as follows: 'If a man says that he lies, does he lie or speak the truth?' to which of course no simple answer can be given. He may lie, and yet speak the truth in saying that he lies; for if he lies in saying that he lies, then he speaks the truth. This was a specimen of the 'eristic' of the Megarians, which consisted to a great extent in drawing out the difficulties that beset the common forms of language. Chrysippus wrote six books on the puzzle of 'the Liar;' and Philetas of Cos is said to have died of vexation from failing to solve it. Hegel (*Geschichte der Philos.* II. 117) compares it to the squaring of the circle. But clearly this puzzle has nothing to do with the subject under discussion in the text. Indeed one might almost fancy that the word *ψευδόμενος* was an interpolation which had crept in owing to the occurrence of the words *διὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος* in the line before. The acquaintance of the copyist with the fallacy 'Mentiens' might have tended to shroud the mistake. Evidently the words *συμβαίνει δ' ἔκ τινος λόγου* are an explanation of *ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος*, and the Paraphrast,

seeing this, ignores the word *ψευδόμενος* altogether. Supposing, however, that it be allowed to stand, we must interpret it in a logical sense, not as if it had anything to do with the fallacy of Eubulides. The explanation of it is to be found in the *Sophist. Elench.* of Aristotle, iii. 1-2, where it is said that the aims of the Sophists and Eristics are five in number, *ἐλεγχος καὶ ψῆδος καὶ παράδοξον καὶ σολοικισμὸς* (making one talk bad grammar) *καὶ πέμπτον τὸ ποιῆσαι ἀδολεσχῆσαι* (making one repeat the same thing over and over) . . . *μάλιστα μὲν γὰρ προαιροῦνται φαίνεσθαι ἐλέγχοντες, δεύτερον δὲ ψευδόμενόν τι δεικνύειν, τρίτον εἰς παράδοξον ἄγειν, κ.τ.λ.* In the above passage we see that the writer has brought together two of these separate terms, speaking of *παράδοξα ἐλέγχειν*. It is possible that he may also have qualified the 'sophistical reasoning' with another of these logical formulae, though, as before said, its addition presents an awkward appearance. On the eristic of the Sophists, see Vol. I. Essay II. pp. 99-100.

δέδεται ἡ διάνοια] Cf. *Ar. Metaph.* II. i. 2: *λύνει δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμὸν· ἀλλ' ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἀπορία δηλοῖ τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ πράγματος· ἥ γὰρ ἀπορεῖ ταύτῃ παραπλήσιον πέποιντε τοῖς δεδεμένοις· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀμφοτέρως προελθεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν.* If we grant the premiss that continence is sticking to an opinion of whatever kind, we cannot 'get loose' from the conclusion forced upon us by the Sophists.

you let you
harm?

οὐ τὰ κακὰ πράξει. ἔτι ὁ τῷ πεπεισθαι πράττων καὶ διώ-
κων τὰ ἡδέα καὶ προαιρούμενος βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν τοῦ μὴ
διὰ λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀκρασίαν· εὐϊατότερος γὰρ διὰ τὸ
μεταπεισθῆναι ἂν. ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ἔνοχος τῇ παροιμίᾳ ἐν ᾗ
Φαμὲν “ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγη, τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν;” εἰ μὲν
γὰρ μὴ ἐπέπειστο ἂ πράττει, μεταπεισθεὶς ἂν ἐπαύσατο·
νῦν δὲ πεπεισμένος οὐδὲν ἤττον ἀλλὰ πράττει. ἔτι εἰ
περὶ πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐγκράτεια, τίς ὁ ἀπλῶς
ἀκρατὴς; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἀπάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀκρασίας, Φαμὲν
δ' εἶναί τινας ἀπλῶς. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦταί τινες
συμβαίνουσιν, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ τὰ δὲ
καταλιπεῖν· ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὐρεσίς ἐστιν.

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὐ, καὶ πῶς
εἰδότες, εἴτα περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῇ καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῇ

10 ἔτι ὁ τῷ—ἀλλὰ πράττει] ‘Again he who on conviction and with full purpose acts and pursues pleasure would seem to be in a better state than he who does so not from reasoning, but from incontinence; for (the former) is more curable, since there is a possibility of changing his convictions, whereas the incontinent man is open to the saying “When water chokes, what must one take to wash it down?” Had he not been convinced before with regard to his actions, there might have been a hope of his mind being enlightened and his ceasing so to act; but as it is, with all the conviction in the world, he still acts contrary to it.’ This is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the saying that incontinence means never acting on your conviction, and that continence means sticking to your conviction. If it were so, intemperance (ἀκολασία) would seem to be a sort of continence, and, on the other hand, incontinence would seem incurable. The reverse, however, of all this is true. See below ch. viii.

εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἐπέπειστο] Some MSS.

omit μὴ, which is not to be wondered at, as there is a transition of meaning in the use of ἐπέπειστο: (1) the intemperate man is said to act τῷ πεπεισθαι, i.e. with a wrong conviction, thinking bad to be good; (2) the incontinent man acts οὐ τῷ πεπεισθαι, not by reason of a conviction that he ought to do as he does; (3) the incontinent man πέπεισται ἂ πράττει, has a full conviction with regard to what he does (i.e. that it is wrong), but does not abide by that conviction.

12 αἱ μὲν οὖν—ἐστίν] ‘This then is the kind of difficulties which arise; part of them we must explain away (ἀνελεῖν), while we leave part unanswered, for resolving a difficulty is finding something out.’ Cf. Ar. *Metaphys.* II. i. 2: ἔστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι βουλομένοις προὔργου τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς· ἡ γὰρ ὑστέρον εὐπορία λύσις τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστὶ, λύνει δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν. See above, ch. i. 5, note.

III. This chapter discusses that which is really the most important and interesting question with regard

θετέον, λέγω δὲ πότερον περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ἢ περὶ τινὰς ἀφωρισμένας, καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν καρτερικόν, πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερός ἐστιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συγγενῇ τῆς θεωρίας ἐστὶ ταύτης.
 2 ἐστὶ δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως, πότερον ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς εἰσι τῷ περὶ ἃ ἢ τῷ πῶς ἔχοντες τὴν διαφοράν, λέγω δὲ πότερον τῷ περὶ ταῦτ' εἶναι μόνον ἀκρατὴς ὁ ἀκρατὴς, ἢ οὐ ἀλλὰ τῷ ὥς, ἢ οὐ ἀλλ' ἐξ ἁμφοῖν· ἔπειτ' εἰ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκρασία καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἢ οὐ· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρατὴς, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἅπερ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, οὔτε τῷ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπλῶς ἔχειν (ταῦτόν γὰρ ἂν ᾗν τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ), ἀλλὰ τῷ αἰδὲ ἔχειν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄγεται προαιρούμενος, νομίζων αἰεὶ δεῖν τὸ παρὸν ἢ τοῦ διώκειν· ὁ δ'

to incontinence and the whole nature of the moral will, namely, how is it possible to know the right and yet do the wrong? It treats of the third of the popular opinions mentioned above (ch. i. § 6), and the difficulties arising out of the same (ch. ii. §§ 1-4). The commencement of the chapter is rather confused, as it touches on, without discussing, the nature of the object-matter of continence and incontinence, &c. With § 3 the main question is opened, namely the relation of knowledge to incontinence, and a preliminary step is taken by the assertion that it makes no difference whether it be right *opinion* or *knowledge* which the incontinent man possesses, since opinion may be held quite as *strongly* as knowledge.

In §§ 5-8 it is shown that the real point to be ascertained is, what is meant by *knowing* or *having knowledge*. A man may have knowledge which is in abeyance, either because he does not apply a minor premiss to his general principle, or because he is under the influence of sleep, wine, madness, or the like.

9-14 A more intimate examination tells us that there may be two syllogisms in the mind, the one leading to continence and the other to incontinence. The former is not drawn out, but remains in want of a minor premiss; the latter through the instincts of sense and desire becomes realised and is acted on. However, the former knowledge cannot be said to have been present in a complete form to the mind, and therefore Socrates was not wrong in denying that knowledge of the right could exist, and yet be overborne.

1-2 There is something awkward in the way in which the questions to be discussed in succeeding chapters are here propounded. The writer might have made it his ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως to consider what is the exact point of difference between continence and incontinence, but as a matter of fact he has not done so. There is a want of art in the sudden announcement (ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄγεται κ.τ.λ.) of the distinction between intemperance and incontinence. The same want of art, proceeding from whatever cause, marks

οὐκ οἶται μὲν, διώκει δέ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ 3
ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι παρ' ἣν ἀκρατεύονται, οὐθὲν δια-
φέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων οὐ διστά-
ζουσιν, ἀλλ' οἶονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι. εἰ οὖν διὰ τὸ ἡρέμα 4
πιστεύειν οἱ δοξαζόντες μᾶλλον τῶν ἐπισταμένων παρὰ τὴν
ὑπόληψιν πράξουσιν, οὐθὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης· ἔνιοι
γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν ἥττον οἷς δοξαζουσιν ἢ ἕτεροι οἷς ἐπί-
στανται· δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ διχῶς λέγομεν 5
τὸ ἐπίστασθαι (καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἔχων μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ
ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ὁ χρώμενος λέγεται ἐπίστασθαι), διοίσει
τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ ἂ μὴ θεῖ πράττειν τοῦ
ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα· τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰ

the whole of these two sections, and the main business of the chapter only commences with section 3.

3—4 περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ κ.τ.λ.] Cf. above ch. ii. §§ 3—4. We must dismiss any idea that the phenomena of incontinence can be explained by saying that the incontinent man has only moral *opinions*, and that opinions are weak. 'Heraclitus shows' that opinions may be as strongly held as scientific certainties. Of course neither Aristotle nor his school would wish to do away with the distinction which Plato had established between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη. It is only as connected with the will, and as forming a ground for action, that opinion can be considered as strong as science.

δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος] Heraclitus had a reputation with the ancients for pride and dogmatism; cf. Diog. Laert. ix. i. 5: ἤκουσέ τε οὐδενὸς ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ἔφη διζήσασθαι καὶ μαθεῖν πάντα παρ' ἑαυτοῦ. Ib. ix. i. 1: μεγαλόφρων δὲ γέγονε παρ' ὄντιναοῦν καὶ ὑπερόπτης, ὥς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συγγράμματος αὐτοῦ δῆλον ἐν ᾧ φησὶ· πολυμαθὴν νόον οὐ διδάσκει· 'Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν εἰδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην, ἀδελφὸς τε Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἐκαταῖον. εἶναι γὰρ ἐν τῷ σοφῷ ἐπίστασθαι γνῶ-

μην ἦτε οἱ ἐγκυβερνήσει πάντα διὰ πάντων.

5 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ διχῶς—θεωρῶν] 'But since we use the term 'knowing' in two senses, both to denote the man who possesses without applying, and the man who applies knowledge, there will be a difference between doing what is wrong, when you have the knowledge but do not attend to it, and doing the same when you have the knowledge and pay attention to it. The latter case seems strange, but not so if you act without attending.' This distinction between the possession and the application of knowledge, which is of the utmost importance for explaining moral weakness, was perhaps first started by Plato in the *Theaetetus*, pp. 197—198, where he introduces his famous image of the pigeon-house. Every knowledge once acquired by the mind is like a bird caught and placed in a pigeon-house; it is possessed, but not available, till it be chased within the enclosure and captured anew.

μὴ θεωροῦντα] θεωρεῖν is used to express 'direct observation,' just as in *Etih.* vi. iii. 2: δταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται.

6 μὴ θεωρῶν. ἔτι ἐπεὶ δύο τρόποι τῶν προτάσεων, ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρως οὐθὲν κωλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρωμένον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος· πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἐστίν, ὅον ὅτι παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά, καὶ ὅτι οὗτος ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὅτι ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε· ἀλλ' εἰ τὸδε τοιόνδε, ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ. κατὰ τε δὴ τούτους διοίσει τοὺς τρόπους ἀμήχανον ὅσον, ὥστε δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι 7 μὴθὲν ἄτοπον, ἄλλως δὲ θαυμαστόν. ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ρηθέντων ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι δὲ διαφέρουσιν ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἔξιν, ὥστε καὶ ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, ὅον τὸν καθεύδοντα καὶ μαινόμενον καὶ οἰνωμένον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες· θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων καὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδήλως καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστάσιν, ἐνίοις δὲ

6 ἔτι ἐπεὶ—θαυμαστόν] 'Again since the premisses (in a syllogism) are of two modes, nothing hinders a man acting against knowledge, although he possesses both these, if he apply only the universal premiss, but not the particular, for it is particulars which are the objects of action. Moreover there is a distinction which may be made in the universal itself; part of it applies to the subject (ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ), and part to the object (ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος), for instance (you may have the universal) "dry things are good for all men," and (the minor premiss) "this is a man," or "such and such is dry;" but (the farther knowledge) that "this object is such and such," the person either has not or it is not realised. According then to these different mode of the premisses there will be an immense difference (in the way one knows), so that there is nothing paradoxical in (the incontinent man) "knowing" in the way I have

specified, but that he should know otherwise would be marvellous.' This section well points out the number of particular applications which have to be made before a general moral principle can be realised and acted on. Else it remains in abeyance, and the man who possesses it may yet act against it.

7 ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν—οἰνωμένον] 'For in the case of having and not using we see that the having (τὴν ἔξιν) becomes quite a different thing, so that in such cases a man has (knowledge) after a manner, and has it not, as for instance in sleep, in madness, and in drunkenness.' ἔξις is used here simply as the verbal noun of ἔχω, as it is in a passage of Plato, already alluded to, which the writer possibly had before his mind, *Theætetus*, p. 197 A: ἀκήκοας οὐκ ἔστιν νῦν λέγουσι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι;—ἴσως· οὐ μέντοι ἐν γε τῷ παρόντι μνημονεύω.—Ἐπιστήμης που ἔξιν φασὶν αὐτὸ εἶναι.

καὶ μανίας ποιοῦσιν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχειν λεκτέον τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τούτοις. τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι τούτοις ὄντες ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἔπη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι δ' οὐπω· δεῖ γὰρ συμφῦναι, τούτῳ δὲ χρόνου δεῖ· ὥστε καθάπερ τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους, οὕτως ὑποληπτέον λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ἀκρατευομένους. ἔτι καὶ ὥδε φυσικῶς ἂν τις ἐπι-9

8 τὸ δὲ λέγειν—ἀκρατευομένους] 'Now repeating the words which belong to knowledge is no sign, for those also who are in the states I have mentioned repeat demonstrations and verses of Empedocles, and those who are beginning to learn string the words together without yet understanding them; for (to be understood) a thing must grow up in the mind, and for this time is required. So in short we must suppose that men in a state of incontinence speak just like actors.' This is an extremely subtle observation. The writer having said that passion is like sleep or madness, which make one know and yet not know at the same time, proceeds to remark that men acting incontinently will often speak as if they were fully aware of the nature of their acts. They will say at the very moment of yielding to temptation, 'I know I ought not to do this.' But such words are no sign that the knowledge is really felt and realised; they are only like the verses of Empedocles which a man might mutter in his sleep; they are like the repetition of a schoolboy's task; they are hollow like the ranting of an actor.

ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης] 'That are caused by, are the results of, science.' Cf. *Met.* I. iv. 4: ἀλλ' οὐτε ἐκείνοι ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης, 'they do it not because of science,' and see below, ix. ix. 6.

οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες] Cf. *Etih.* vi. viii. 6.

9—11 ἔτι καὶ ὥδε—μνήμην] 'Again in the following manner one might psychologically consider the cause. There is first a general belief, and secondly a particular belief, which is no longer under the domain of reason, but under that of sense. Now when out of these two a third is created, it is a necessity that the mind should on the one hand assert the conclusion; and in the sphere of practice should straightway carry it out. As for instance, if (there be the general proposition) "one ought to taste all that is sweet," and the particular one "this thing is sweet," it is a necessity that he who is able, and is not hindered, should at once proceed to act upon the knowledge. When therefore there is in the mind one universal which forbids tasting, but another which says, "all that is sweet is pleasant," (having a minor) "this thing is sweet," and thus the second universal is realised,—and supposing that desire happen to be there; (in this case) the first universal says, "avoid this," but desire leads us on (to take it), from the power which it has of setting in motion every one of our organs. Thus the result is that one is incontinent under the sanction as it were of reason and belief, and a belief too which is opposed not directly but only acciden-

βλέψειε τὴν αἰτίαν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα, ἡ δ' ἑτέρα περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ὧν αἰσθησις ἤδη κυρία· ὅταν δὲ μία γίνηται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπερανθὲν ἔνθα μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθὺς, οἷον, εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δεῖ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ὡς ἔν τι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ κωλυό-
 10 μενον ἅμα τοῦτο καὶ πράττειν. ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν καθόλου ἐνῇ κωλύουσα γεύεσθαι, ἡ δέ, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ γλυκὺ ἡδύ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ (αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ), τύχη δ' ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα, ἡ μὲν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἄγει· κινεῖν γὰρ ἕκαστον δύναται τῶν μορίων· ὥστε συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγου

tally (to the true knowledge). For it is desire, and not the intellectual belief, which is opposed to the right law. And this consideration leads us to see why it is that brutes are not incontinent, namely, because they have no conception of universals, but only an image and a memory of particulars.'

This passage gives an admirable explanation of the way in which a man under temptation may ignore his moral principles. Action (as the writer implies) always depends on a syllogism in the mind, and, if a minor premiss were applied to the right moral principle, wrong action could never take place. But it is equally true that the man who acts wrongly does so under some sort of shadow of reason. The story of the temptation of Eve is typical of all similar cases of yielding. There are always arguments and considerations on which the mind, self-deceived and blinded by desire, may form a syllogism. And, as the writer observes, the misleading principle thus applied is not directly false or contrary to what is right. The saying 'sweet things are pleasant' is not in itself contrary to the principle 'intemperance is to be avoided.' Accidentally and in their effects the two

propositions are brought into collision, though not originally opposed.

ψυσικῶς] Perhaps 'psychologically' is the most representative translation which we can give of this word in the present passage. Psychology was, as we know, considered as a branch of physics by Aristotle, see Vol. I. Essay V. p. 237, and cf. *Eth.* ix. ix. 7.

ἤδη] A circumlocution is necessary to express what was probably here meant by this word. Cf. *Eth.* vi. xi. 2.

ἔνθα μὲν] i.e. in the sphere of the reason, to which ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς is opposed. For the latter phrase we should have expected to find ταῖς πρακτικαῖς, a formula which occurs *Eth.* vi. xi. 4. But in the *Eudemian Ethics*, ii. xi. 4, exactly the same usage is found: ὥσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις. It is not easy to say what substantive is understood. Perhaps αἱ πρακτικαὶ (or ποιητικαὶ) ἐπιστήμαι was the original phrase.

ἀνάγκη—πράττειν εὐθὺς] On the doctrine of the practical syllogism, see Vol. I. Essay IV. pp. 212-219.

τῶν μορίων] i.e. 'the parts of the body.' This is mixing up a physical explanation with the account of mental phenomena. The same thing is done

πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ καθ' αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ δόξα, τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ· ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῇ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τῶν καθόλου ὑπόληψιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην. πῶς δὲ λύεται ἡ ἄγνοια καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστήμων ὁ ἀκρατής, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ οἰνωμένου καὶ καθεύδοντος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος τούτου τοῦ πάθους, ὃν δεῖ παρὰ τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀκούειν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία πρότασις δόξα τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ κυρία τῶν πράξεων, ταύτην ἡ οὐκ ἔχει ὁ ἐν τῷ πάθει ὢν,

in the Peripatetic treatise *De Motu Animalium*; cf. especially with the present passage *Ib.* viii. 5: διὰ τοῦτο δ' ἅμα ὡς εἰπεῖν νοεῖ ὅτι πορευτέον καὶ πορεύεται, ἂν μὴ τι ἐμποδίσῃ ἕτερον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀργανικὰ μέρη παρασκευάζει ἐπιτηδεῖως τὰ πάθη, ἡ δ' ὕρεξις τὰ πάθη, τὴν δ' ὕρεξιν ἡ φαντασία· αὕτη δὲ γίνεται ἡ διὰ νοήσεως ἡ δι' αἰσθήσεως.

11 The mere intellectual knowledge that a thing is pleasant is not opposed to the moral law. It is only when this knowledge has become desire, *i. e.* part of the will, which implies acting, that an opposition is felt. Brutes act on desire, but their intellectual apprehension being entirely of particulars, there is a harmony between desire and the *data* of perception which prevents our attributing incontinence to brutes.—It might be said that there are dawns of the moral faculty, traces of a sense of right and wrong, in some animals, for instance, dogs; but the writer here does not enter upon the subject. On the meaning given by Aristotle to *φαντασία*, see note on *Eth.* iii. v. 17.

12 'Now to explain how the oblivion (*ἄγνοια*) of the incontinent man is stopped, and how he comes again to the use of his knowledge, requires no special account peculiar to this condition, but the same account as is to

be given about (the recovery of) the intoxicated man or the sleeper, for which we must inquire of the physiologists.' The most interesting relic of the speculations of the old physiologists upon the above question which has come down to us, is the account given by Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. Math.* vii. 129) of the opinion of Heraclitus, who thought that our rationality depended upon our communion through the senses with the universal reason that surrounds us; in sleep we become foolish because cut off from all communication with this, except through the act of breathing alone, but on awaking we are again replenished.

Τοῦτον δὴ τὸν θεῖον λόγον καθ' Ἡράκλειτον δι' ἀναπνοῆς σπᾶσαντες νοεροὶ γινόμεθα, καὶ ἐν ὕπνοις ληθαῖοι, κατὰ δὲ ἔγερσιν πάλιν ἐμφρονες. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὕπνοις μυσάντων τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων, χωρίζεται τῆς πρὸς τὸ περιέχον συμφύτας ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς, μόνος τῆς κατὰ ἀναπνοὴν προσφύσεως σωζομένης, οἷον εἰ τις ἀποβῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἀναπνεύσῃ πάλιν διὰ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων, ὥσπερ διὰ τινων θυρίδων προκύψας καὶ τῷ περιέχοντι συμβάλλων λογικὴν ἐνδύεται δύναμιν.

13—14 ἐπεὶ δ'—αἰσθητικῆς] 'But the minor premiss being a belief with regard to perception of the senses

ἢ οὕτως ἔχει ὥς οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἔχειν ἐπίστασθαι ἀλλὰ λέγειν ὥσπερ ὁ οἰνωμένος τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου μὴδ' ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως εἶναι δοκεῖν τῷ καθόλου τὸν ἔσχατον ὄρον. καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ ἐζήτει Σωκράτης συμ-
 14 βαίνειν· οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρούσης γίνεται τὸ πάθος, οὐδ' αὕτη περιέλεται διὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ εἰδότα καὶ μὴ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότα ἐνδέχεται ἀκρατεῦσθαι, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω.

and being what determines action,—this is either not possessed by a man in the condition we have been describing, or he possesses it in a way in which, as we said (*ὥς οὐκ ἦν*), possession is not knowledge, but is only a form of words, like the drunken man spouting Empedocles. And since the minor term is not universal and has not the same scientific character as the universal, the question raised by Socrates seems really (*καὶ*) to be substantiated. For it is not knowledge properly so called that is present when the condition arises, nor is it this which is twisted about by the condition of mind that comes on,—but only perceptual knowledge.' This section winds up the discussion of the compatibility of knowledge with incontinence. The first sentence is clear enough, but there is some little obscurity in the saying that perceptual knowledge is present in incontinence, and is overborne by passion. What is meant apparently is, that passion prevents that perception which would cause the moral principle existent in the mind to be realised. Hence, in short, there is a moral oblivion, and it is quite true that Socrates was justified in saying that incontinence could not take place if knowledge of the right were really present to the consciousness of the actor.

καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου] Lambinus,

followed by Fritzsche, places a full stop before these words, and connects them with *καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ Σωκράτης*. This punctuation has been adopted in the above translation as making far better sense. It must be confessed, however, that the Paraphrast favours the punctuation of Bekker. The occurrence of *καὶ* before *ἔοικεν* would naturally lead to a full stop being placed after *ὄρον*, but it might still be justified, as merely giving emphasis to *ἔοικε συμβαίνειν*, cf. ch. x. 2: διὰ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἐνίοτε κ. τ. λ. *Eth.* III. viii. 6: ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης. *Ib.* § 10, ὅθεν καὶ Ὁμηρος.

ἢ τελευταία πρότασις] This phrase is equivalent to ἢ ἑτέρα πρότασις, *Eth.* VI. xi. 4. The minor premiss is so called as containing the ἔσχατος ὄρος, or minor term, which is mentioned shortly after.

ὥς οὐκ ἦν] With this use of the past tense cf. *Eth.* v. vi. 9: κατὰ νόμον γὰρ ἦν, 'for this is, as we have said, according to law.'

ὁ ἐζήτει] This is sometimes translated 'what Socrates meant,' for which the Greek would have been ὁ ἤθελε or ἐβούλετο λέγειν. ὁ ἐζήτει must mean 'the questionings' or 'doubts' of Socrates, *i.e.* as to the possibility of acting against knowledge. Cf. *Eth.* I. iv. 5: Εἰ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει.

τῆς αἰσθητικῆς] The phrase αἰσθητικὴ ἐπιστήμη would to some philosophers

Πότερον δ' ἐστὶ τις ἀπλῶς ἀκρατής ἢ πάντες κατὰ μέ- 4
 ρος, καὶ εἰ ἔστι, περὶ ποῖα ἔστι, λεκτέον ἐφεξῆς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν
 περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἰσὶν οἱ τ' ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ καρτερικοὶ
 καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ μαλακοί, φανερόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ 2
 μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιούντων ἡδονήν, τὰ δ' αἰρετὰ μὲν καθ'
 αὐτὰ ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν, ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τὰ σωματικά.
 λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὰ τε περὶ τὴν τροφήν καὶ τὴν τῶν
 ἀφροδισίων χρείαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωματικῶν περὶ
 ἃ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην. τὰ δ' ἀναγ-
 καῖα μὲν οὐ, αἰρετὰ δὲ καθ' αὐτά. λέγω δ' οἶον νίκην τι-
 μὴν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων. τοὺς
 μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας

be a contradiction in terms, as they would hold that sensible things cannot be known. A doctrine was attributed to Speusippus, of which we may be here reminded, viz. that besides science there is 'scientific perception.' Cf. Sextus Empiricus *adv. Math.* vii. 145: Σπεύσιππος δέ, ἐπεὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ τὰ δὲ νοητά, τῶν μὲν νοητῶν κριτήριον ἔλεξεν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον, τῶν δὲ αἰσθητῶν τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν αἴσθησιν, ἐπιστημονικὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν ὑπέλειπε καθεστάναι τὴν μεταλαμβάνουσαν τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀληθείας.

IV. This chapter discusses the question mooted above (ch. i. § 7, ch. ii. § 11), as to whether incontinence is an absolute term, having a definite object-matter, or is merely relative. The answer is very simple. Pleasure is divided into necessary and desirable (§ 2), or into good, bad, and indifferent (§ 5). Incontinence, in an absolute sense, applies only to the necessary or bodily pleasures. It has then the same range of objects as were before assigned to Temperance and Intemperance, and differs from Intemperance chiefly in that it goes against the

reason and the will, instead of carrying them on its side. Having thus laid down a definite notion of Incontinence as something absolute and positive, it is easy to see that the idea and the term may be applied in a sort of analogous sense to mean an ill-control of the desires for other kinds of pleasures also, beside the bodily pleasures, e.g. wealth or honour. In such applications we must recollect that the use of the word Incontinence is metaphorical.

2 περὶ ἃ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην] Cf. *Eth. Eud.* iii. ii. 5: 'Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ σώφρων ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονάς, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας τινὰς αὐτὸν εἶναι. Δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν περὶ τίνος. Οὐ γὰρ περὶ πάσας οὐδὲ περὶ ἅπαντα τὰ ἡδέα ὁ σώφρων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν δόξῃ περὶ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν, περὶ τε τὸ γενεστόν καὶ τὸ ἁπτόν, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ περὶ τὸ ἁπτόν, κ.τ.λ. This is of course taken from *Eth. Nic.* iii. x. 3-8.

τοὺς μὲν οὖν] Here commences the apodosis to ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ, which is a complicated sentence with two parentheses (λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα—σωφροσύνην) and (λέγω δ' οἶον—ἡδέων).

τοὺς μὲν—ἕτερος ἦν] 'Those then who with regard to these latter objects

τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς, προστιθέντες δὲ τὸ χρημάτων ἀκρατεῖς καὶ κέρδους καὶ τιμῆς καὶ θυμοῦ, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ ὡς ἑτέρους καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα λεγομένους, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νενικηκώς· ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὁ κοινὸς λόγος τοῦ ἰδίου μικρῷ διέφερεν ἀλλ' ὅμως ἕτερος ἦν. σημεῖον δέ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκράσια ψέγεται οὐχ ὡς ἀμαρτία μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κακία τις ἣ ἀπλῶς οὐσα ἢ κατὰ τι μέρος, τούτων δ' οὐθείς. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις, περὶ ἧς λέγομεν τὸν σώφρονα καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ὁ μὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι τῶν τε ἡδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων, πείνης καὶ δίψης καὶ ἀλέας καὶ ψύχους καὶ πάντων τῶν περὶ ἀφὴν καὶ γεῦσιν, ἀλλὰ

(i.e. good pleasures) transgress that right law which they have within themselves, we do not call simply "incontinent," but we add a qualifying term (*προστιθέντες*) and speak of them as incontinent of wealth, gain, honour, rage,—not as absolutely incontinent, because they are different from this and are only called incontinent by analogy, as in the phrase "Man that has been victor at Olympia;" there the general conception (of man) differed but little from the special conception of the individual in question, and yet still it was different.' The meaning of this passage is clear, not so however that of the illustration which closes it. It is plain that the word *ἀκρατής* when spoken of in relation to anger, money, &c., has a somewhat different sense from the unqualified term *ἀκρατής*, which implies a certain moral weakness with regard to bodily indulgence. But what is meant by saying that *ἄνθρωπος ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νενικηκώς* is different from the general conception Man? There appear to be only two explanations possible: (1) that supported by the Scholiast on this place and also the Scholiast on *Eth.* v. i.,—by Alexander Aphrod. *ad*

Topica i. xvi., by Suidas, and by Eustathius on *Iliad*, λ. p. 847; namely, that there was a certain Olympionices whose name was "*ἄνθρωπος*." It might be said that this name "*ἄνθρωπος*" was not more distinct from the general term 'Man,' than the term *ἀκρατής* in the phrase *ἀκρατής θυμοῦ* is from the general conception of incontinence. The historical tenses *διέφερεν* and *ἕτερος ἦν* are in favour of this interpretation. (2) It might be argued that these very tenses had given rise to a conjectural fiction about a person called "*ἄνθρωπος*." The Paraphrast takes no notice of the tradition, and treats the illustration as a logical one, which would come merely to this, 'the conception of an individual implies a certain diversity from the conception of the genus.' If this be accepted, the past tenses of the verbs must be understood to mean a reference to some previous logical discourse with which the school was familiar. In short the passage must be considered to bear traces of being a scrap from some oral lecture—a hypothesis not to be entirely set aside with regard to parts of the *Ethics* of Aristotle.

παρὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀκρατὴς λέγεται, οὐ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι περὶ τάδε, καθάπερ ὀργῆς, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς μόνον. σημειῶν δέ· καὶ γὰρ μαλακοὶ λέγονται περὶ 4 ταύτας, περὶ ἐκείνων δ' οὐδεμίαν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' εἰς ταῦτον τὸν ἀκρατῇ καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον τίθεμεν καὶ ἐγκρατῇ καὶ σώφρονα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων οὐδένα, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς αὐτάς πως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι· οἱ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν περὶ ταῦτά, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως εἰσίν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν προαιροῦνται οἱ δ' οὐ προαιροῦνται. διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστον ἂν εἴποιμεν, ὅστις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἡρέμα διώκει τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας, ἢ τοῦτον ὅστις διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμῶν σφόδρα· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιήσειεν, εἰ προσγένετο ἐπιθυμία νεανικὴ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας λύπη ἰσχυρά; ἐπεὶ δὲ 5 τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων· τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων ἔνια φύσει αἰρετά, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον, οἷον χρήματα καὶ κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμὴ· πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ μεταξύ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ φιλεῖν ψέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ πως ὑπερβάλλειν.

3 κατὰ πρόσθεσιν] See note on *Eth.* II. iii. 5.

καθάπερ ὀργῆς] Fritzsche quotes Thucyd. III. 84: ἡ ἀνθρωπεῖα φύσις—ἀκρατὴς μὲν ὀργῆς οὕσα κρείσσων δὲ τοῦ δικαίου.

4 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων οὐδένα] *i. e.* not one of those mentioned in § 2, who are immoderate in giving way to a fondness for riches, honour, &c.

διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστον κ. τ. λ.] It is more intemperate to pursue luxury, &c., in cold blood, than to do so under the influence of passion. It shows that luxury has become more a part of the mind itself.

5—6 The remainder of this chapter is little more than a repetition of what has gone before. Indulgence in the good pleasures is no harm, except it be to excess; even excess in them is rather folly than vice, and is not to

be called by the name of incontinence, except as a sort of metaphor.

ἐπεὶ δὲ—ὑπερβάλλειν] 'Now since some desires and pleasures are in their kind noble and good—according to our former division of pleasures into the naturally desirable, the naturally detestable, and the intermediate—as for instance, wealth, gain, victory, and honour (are noble and good); with regard then to all such, and the intermediate pleasures, men are not blamed for feeling, desiring, and loving them, but for some sort of excess in them.' The present division of pleasures can hardly be said to have been made 'before,' though it can be harmonized with that given above in § 2. The φύσει αἰρετά (of which wealth and honour are specimens) answer to the αἰρετὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν; while τὰ μεταξύ

διὸ ὅσοι μὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἢ κρατοῦνται ἢ διώκουσι τῶν φύσει τι καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν, οἷον οἱ περὶ τιμὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ σπουδάζοντες ἢ περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται οἱ περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζοντες· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔστι τις ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐν τούτοις, εἴ τις ὥσπερ ἡ Νιόβη μάχοιτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ἢ ὥσπερ Σάτυρος ὁ φιλοπάτωρ ἐπικαλούμενος περὶ τὸν πατέρα· λίαν γὰρ ἐδόκει μωραίνειν. μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἰρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι δι' αὐτό· φαῦλαι δὲ καὶ φευκταὶ αὐτῶν εἰσὶν αἱ ὑπερβολαί. 6 ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ ἀκρασία· ἡ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον φευκτὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστίν. δι' ὁμοιότητα δὲ τοῦ πάθους προσεπιτιθέντες τὴν ἀκρασίαν περὶ ἑκάστου λέγουσιν, οἷον κακὸν ἱατρὸν καὶ κακὸν ὑποκριτὴν, ὃν ἀπλῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν κακόν· ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν εἶναι ἑκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνάλογον ὁμοίαν, οὕτω δῆλον ὅτι κακῇ ὑποληπτέον μόνην ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ ταῦτα τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ, περὶ δὲ θυμὸν καθ' ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν· διὸ καὶ προστιθέντες ἀκρατῇ θυμοῦ ὥσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους Φαμέν.

5 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἕνια μὲν ἡδέα φύσει, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν

here correspond with the 'necessary or bodily pleasures' of the former passage. The writer has here introduced a mention of pleasures 'naturally detestable,' by which must be meant the bestial pleasures which are discussed in the following chapter. The formula τὰ δ' ἐναντία, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, is used by Eudemus in *Eth. Eud.* II. x. 24: ἀλλὰ μὴν ἑκάστου γε φθορὰ καὶ διαστροφή οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ ἐναντία καὶ τὰ μεταξύ. Later in the present book (ch. xiv. § 2) there is a mention made of pleasures which are not only good in themselves, but do not admit of excess.

Σάτυρος ὁ φιλοπάτωρ] Of this personage nothing is known. The story given by the Scholiast is, as Fritzsche observes, not worth repeating.

μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν] This is an anacoluthon. The sentence ought to form an apodosis and supply a verb to διὸ ὅσοι μὲν κ.τ.λ. We therefore require μοχθηροὶ μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶ, &c.

6 δι' ὁμοιότητα δὲ] The writer seems here to make a mistake about the history of the word ἀκρατής, just as before (*Eth.* v. x. 1) about the history of the word ἐπεικής. Ἀκρατής in a limited and special sense, to denote want of control over a particular set of desires, is certainly later than the general use of the word, as in the phrase ἀκρατής ὀργῆς, &c. Hence the latter is not to be regarded (historically) as a metaphorical extension of the former.

V. This chapter discusses those

ἀπλῶς τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένη καὶ ζώων καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεις τὰ δὲ δι' ἔθνη γίνεται, τὰ δὲ διὰ μοχθηρὰς φύσεις, ἔστι καὶ περὶ τούτων ἕκαστα παραπλησίας ἰδεῖν ἕξεις. λέγω δὲ τὰς θηριώδεις, οἷον τὴν ἀνθρωπον ἣν λέγουσι τὰς κυρσάσας ἀνασχίζουσιν τὰ παῖδια κατεσθίειν, ἣ οἷοις χαίρειν φασὶν ἐνίοις τῶν ἀπηγριωμένων περὶ τὸν Πόντον, τοὺς μὲν ὠμοῖς τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπων κρέασιν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παῖδια δανείζουσιν ἀλλήλοις εἰς εὐχίαν, ἣ τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν λεγόμενον. αὐταὶ μὲν θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ τε νόσους γίνονται καὶ μανίαν ἐνίοις,

kinds of incontinence which are something more than incontinence, being morbid or bestial. Certain pleasures are specified which imply a depravity either of nature or habits. A sort of classification of these is suggested, but the whole style of the chapter is careless and inaccurate.

1 ἐπεὶ δ'—ἕξεις] 'Now while some things are natural pleasures, either absolutely so, or relatively to the different races of animals and men, other pleasures are not natural, but depend on physical defects or habits or depravity of the nature; and we may see moral conditions corresponding to each of these latter kinds.' The apodosis to ἐπεὶ is ἔστι καὶ περὶ τούτων. The things which are 'pleasures absolutely' are for instance life and consciousness; while it depends on the constitution of the race whether it be pleasant to live on land or water, &c. In this passage φύσις is used in two senses, (1) φύσει=in accordance with the entire constitution of things, not only what is, but what ought to be. (This corresponds with head V. in the note on *Ελλ.* II. i. 3.) (2) φύσεις means individual natures, not as they ought to be, but as they are. (See the same note, head IV.)

2 τὰς θηριώδεις] i. e. ἕξεις.

τὴν ἀνθρωπον] 'The female.' The

word ἀνθρωπος (in the feminine) was applied contemptuously, as for instance to female slaves. Here it denotes the monstrous nature of the person in question, who was not to be called 'a woman.' Perhaps for the same reason it was applied by Herodotus to the gigantic Phye. Book I. ch. 60: καὶ ἐν τῇ ἁστέϊ πειθόμενοι τὴν γυναῖκα εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν θεὸν προσεύχοντό τε τὴν ἀνθρωπον καὶ ἐδέκοντο τὸν Πεισίστρατον. Who was the monster alluded to in the text is not known. It appears a mere fiction of the Scholiast to connect her with the Lamia mentioned by Horace, *A. P.* 340.

τοὺς δὲ τὰ παῖδια δανείζουσιν ἀλλήλοις εἰς εὐχίαν] 'And others (they say) lend their children to each other (in turn) to be served up as a banquet.' Cf. 2 Kings VI. 26–29, where the same horrible arrangement is said to have been made under the compulsion of famine. The shores of the Black Sea seem to have had a character for cannibalism. Cf. *Ar. Pol.* VIII. iv. 3: πολλὰ δ' ἔστι τῶν ἐθνῶν ἃ πρὸς τὸ κτείνειν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωποφαγίαν εὐχερῶς ἔχει, καθάπερ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πόντον Ἀχαιοί τε καὶ Ἠνίοχοι.

τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν λεγόμενον] Some story now lost, which is apparently referred to again in § 7.

3 αἱ δὲ διὰ τε νόσους—αἱ δὲ νοση-

ὥσπερ ὁ τὴν μητέρα καθιερεύσας καὶ φαγών, καὶ ὁ τοῦ
 συνδούλου τὸ ἔπαρ. αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἢ ἐξ ἔθους, ὅον
 τριχῶν τίλσεις καὶ ὀνύχων τρώξεις, ἔτι δ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ
 γῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἢ τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν· τοῖς
 μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἔθους συμβαίνουσιν, ὅον τοῖς ὑβρι-
 4 ζομένοις ἐκ παιδῶν. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσις αἰτία, τούτους
 μὲν οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴπειεν ἀκρατεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς γυναῖκας,
 ὅτι οὐκ ὀπύουσιν ἀλλ' ὀπύονται· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς
 5 νοσηματωδῶς ἔχουσι δι' ἔθος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα
 τούτων ἔξω τῶν ὄρων ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ θη-
 ριότης· τὸ δ' ἔχοντα κρατεῖν ἢ κρατεῖσθαι οὐχ ἡ ἀπλῆ
 ἀκрасία ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν περὶ τοὺς
 θυμοὺς ἔχοντα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πάθους, ἀκρατῇ δ' οὐ
 λεκτέον. πᾶσα γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἀφροσύνη καὶ δει-
 λία καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ χαλεπότης αἱ μὲν θηριώδεις αἱ δὲ
 6 νοσηματώδεις εἰσὶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος ὅος δε-
 διέναι πάντα, καὶ ψοφήσῃ μῦς, θηριώδη δειλίαν δειλός, ὁ

ματώδεις] These clauses are a repetition of each other, the style is unfinished.

ἡ τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν] It is important to observe here the strong terms in which the unnatural character of these practices is denounced. An equally strong and more explicit passage occurs in the *Laws* of Plato, p. 636 B, where the advantages and disadvantages of the gymnasia and syssitia are discussed: Καὶ δὴ καὶ παλαιὸν νόμιμον δοκεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα κατὰ φύσιν τὰς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἡδονὰς οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ θηρίων διεφθαρκέναι. Καὶ τούτων τὰς ὑμετέρας πόλεις (Sparta and Crete) πρώτας ἂν τις αἰτιῶτο καὶ ὅσαι τῶν ἄλλων μάλιστα ἄπτονται τῶν γυμνασίων· καὶ εἴτε παίζοντα εἴτε σπουδάζοντα ἐννοεῖν δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐννοητέον ὅτι τῇ θηλείᾳ καὶ τῇ τῶν ἀρρένων φύσει εἰς κοινωνίαν ἰούσῃ τῆς γεννήσεως ἢ περὶ ταῦτα ἡδονὴ κατὰ φύσιν ἀποδεδοσθαι δοκεῖ, ἀρρένων δὲ πρὸς ἄρρενας ἢ θηλειῶν

πρὸς θηλείας παρὰ φύσιν καὶ τῶν πρώτων τὸ τόλμημα εἶναι δι' ἀκράτειαν ἡδονῆς.

4—5 ὅσοις μὲν οὖν—λεκτέον] 'Where nature is the cause, one cannot call people incontinent, just as no one would find fault with women for being not male but female; and it is the same with those who by habit have superinduced a morbid condition. To possess, indeed, any of these tendencies is beyond the pale of vice, just as bestiality is; and if a person possesses them, his subduing them or being subdued by them is a matter not of simple incontinence (or continence), but is the analogous kind, exactly as a man who is in this condition with regard to his angry passions may be called (incontinent of anger), but not simply incontinent.' What the writer here implies is quite true, that morality requires for its sphere certain natural conditions of body and mind. In states that are entirely morbid, whether originally so or from the

δὲ τὴν γαλῆν ἐδεδίει διὰ νόσον· καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθήσει ζῶντες θηριώδεις, ὥσπερ ἓνια γένη τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων, οἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους, οἷον τὰς ἐπιληπτικάς, ἢ μανίας νοσηματώδεις. τούτων ἡ δ' ἔστι μὲν ἔχειν τινὰ ἐνίοτε μόνον, μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δέ, λέγω δὲ οἷον εἰ Φάλαρις κατεῖχεν ἐπιθυμῶν παιδίου φαγεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἀφροδισίων ἄτοπον ἡδονήν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ κρατεῖσθαι, μὴ μόνον ἔχειν. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ μοχθηρία ἢ μὲν κατ' ἄνθρωπον ἀπλῶς λέγεται μοχθηρία, ἢ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι θηριώδης ἢ νοσηματώδης, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀκρασία ἐστὶν ἢ μὲν θηριώδης ἢ δὲ νοσηματώδης, ἀπλῶς δὲ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀκολασίαν μόνη. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι μόνον περὶ ἅπερ ἀκολασία καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐστὶν ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας, λεγόμενον κατὰ μεταφοράν καὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς, δῆλον·

Ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἦττον αἰσχυρὰ ἀκρασία ἢ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἢ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, θεωρήσωμεν. ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκούειν μὲν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δέ, καθάπερ οἱ ταχεῖς τῶν διακόνων, οἱ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι πᾶν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκθέουσιν, εἶτα ἀμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως, καὶ οἱ κύνες, πρὶν σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος, ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ, ὑλακτοῦσιν· οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτῆτα τῆς φύσεως ἀκούσας μὲν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ' ἀκούσας, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν

effects of an ill-regulated life, the distinctions of right and wrong are no longer applicable. Cf. ch. vii. 7.

ἡ εἰ Φάλαρις κατεῖχεν] 'Had Phalaris refrained.' With this use of κατέχω, cf. Aristoph. *Peace*, 944, where it is applied to a wind lulling:

ἐπείγετε νῦν ἐν ὅσῳ
σοβαρὰ θεόθεν κατέχει
πολέμου μετὰτροπος αἶρα.

And Soph. *Œd. Rex*, 782:

κἀγὼ βαρυνθεὶς τὴν μὲν οὔσαν ἡμέραν
μόλις κατέσχον.

incontinence not simply to be called so without a qualification, there now follows a comparison of some of these kinds, from a moral point of view, with incontinence proper. Incontinence of anger is not so bad as incontinence of lust, (1) because there is more semblance of reason in anger; (2) because anger is more a matter of constitution; (3) it admits of less deliberate purpose; (4) because anger is exercised under a sort of pain, and not in wantonness. As to the rest, incontinence which exceeds the pale of human weakness is more horrible, but at the same time is rarer, and less mischievous, than vice.

VI. It having been repeatedly laid down that there are some kinds of

τιμωρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγωρία ἐδήλωσεν, ὁ δ' ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς· ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία, ἐὰν μόνον εἴπῃ ὅτι ἴδὺ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν. ὥσθ' ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. αἰσχίων οὖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατὴς τοῦ λόγου πως ἡττᾶται, ὁ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου. ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμῃ ἀκολουθεῖν

1 ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος—οἷ] 'For first (μὲν) reason or fancy tells that there is insult or slight, and then (anger) drawing a sort of conclusion, "I must fight with such and such," forthwith rages accordingly. But desire, if reason or sense merely assert that a thing is pleasant, rushes to the enjoyment of it; so that anger in a way follows reason, but desire does not.' *Φαντασία* here seems nearly to correspond to our word 'fancy,' which has of course grown out of the Greek term, though it has come to imply widely different associations. We are told in *Ar. De An.* iii. iii. 15 that *φαντασία* may be mistaken. See the note on *Eth.* iii. v. 17.

The present passage might seem discrepant from ch. iii. § 10, ὥστε συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεῖσθαι, where incontinence is said to have some sort of reasoning in what it does. And if the comparison were exactly carried out, it would probably appear that incontinent anger had no more reason in it than incontinent desire. But it is true that anger is fundamentally based on an idea of justice, however wild that idea may be. Hence there is a peculiar force in συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ. And hence too anger is a less immediately selfish passion than desire. It is less debasing in the long run to the character. On anger, cf. *Eth.* v. viii. 10: οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται,

ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου· ἐπὶ φαινομένη γὰρ ἀδικία ἢ ὀργή ἐστιν: and *Ar. Rhet.* ii. ii. 1: "Ἐστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὕβρις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινομένης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν. The illustrations in the text comparing anger to an overhasty servant who runs off before he has heard half the message, or to a dog who barks without waiting to see who it is, are most admirable.

2 The next plea urged in favour of anger is that it is more natural (or, we might say, constitutional) than desire: in support of which two humorous stories are told in the text (see Vol. I. Essay III. p. 165). The argument appears somewhat contradictory to *Eth.* ii. iii. 10: ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος. However, when we look closely at the text, we find that it is 'excessive and unnecessary desire' with which anger is here compared (τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων). This no doubt makes the above assertion true, but it gives a new conception of incontinence, as compared with the mention of ἀναγκαῖα ἡδέα, c. iv. § 2. It sets incontinence too much in the light of θηριότης. But indeed the vagueness of the term ἀκρασία, and the uncertainty as to what it exactly implies, must be felt throughout the present discussions.

With regard to anger, it is true that hot temper is frequently consti-

ὀρέξουσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις μᾶλλον ὅσαι κοιναὶ πᾶσι, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοιναί· ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικώτερον καὶ ἡ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀπολογούμενος ὅτι τὸν πατέρα τύπτοι. 'καὶ γὰρ οὗτος' ἔφη 'τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κάκεϊνος τὸν ἄνωθεν,' καὶ τὸ παιδίον δείξας 'καὶ οὗτος ἐμέ' ἔφη, 'ὅταν ἀνὴρ γένηται· συγγενὲς γὰρ ἡμῖν.' καὶ ὁ ἐλκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ παύεσθαι ἐκέλευε πρὸς ταῖς θύραις· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐλκύσαι τὸν πατέρα μέχρ' ἐνταῦθα. ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι οἱ 3 ἐπιβουλότεροι. ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμᾶδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδ' ὁ θυμὸς, ἀλλὰ φανερός· ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην φασί·

δολοπλόκον γὰρ κυπρογενεὺς·

καὶ τὸν κεστὸν ἱμάντα Ὅμηρος·

πάρφασις, ἥ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντος.

ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀδικωτέρα καὶ αἰσχύων ἡ ἀκρασία αὕτη τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἐστι, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ κακία πως. ἔτι οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζει λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὀργῇ ποιῶν πᾶς ποιεῖ 4

tutional. It appears more difficult to tame down and eradicate, even with the help of time, than other passions. The Stoics gave peculiar attention to its control.

3 ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι—κακία πως] 'Again there is more wrong where there is more craft. The angry man and anger are not crafty, but open; while lust is crafty, as they say Aphrodite is,

"The wily Cyprian goddess."

And Homer sings of her embroidered girdle (that on it is wrought)

"Allurement which can steal the wise man's sense."

So that if this kind of incontinence is more wrongful than incontinence of anger, it is also worse, and thus deserves to be called by the simple name "incontinence," and amounts to a sort of vice.'

δολοπλόκου] From some lyric poet. Muretus compares the fragment of Sappho:

Ποικιλόθρον' ἀθάνατ' Ἀφροδίτα,

Παῖ Διὸς δολοπλοκε, λίσσομαί σε.

τὸν κεστὸν ἱμάντα Ὅμηρος] *Iliad*, xiv. 214-217:—

Ἦ, καὶ ἀπὸ στήθεσφιν ἐλύσατο κεστὸν ἱμάντα,

Ποικίλον· ἔνθα δέ οἱ θελεκτήρια πάντα τέτυκτο·

Ἐνθ' ἐνὶ μὲν φιλότῃς, ἐν δ' ἱμερὸς, ἐν δ' ὀαρσιτὸς

Πάρφασις, ἥ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντων.

4 Incontinence of desire is full of wantonness and exultation, while anger implies pain and suffering. This argument is similar to that used, *Eth.* iii. xii. 2, to prove that intemperance is more voluntary than cowardice.

λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὑβρίζειν μεθ' ἡδονῆς. εἰ οὖν οἷς ὀργίζεσθαι
 μάλιστα δίκαιον, ταῦτα ἀδικώτερα, καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία ἢ
 5 δι' ἐπιθυμίαν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν θυμῷ ὕβρις. ὥς μὲν τοίνυν
 αἰσχίων ἢ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν, καὶ
 ὅτι ἐστιν ἡ ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία περὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ
 6 ἡδονὰς σωματικὰς, δῆλον, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς
 ληπτέον. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς, αἱ μὲν ἀνθρω-
 πικαὶ εἰσι καὶ φυσικαί, καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ μεγέθει, αἱ δὲ
 θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεις καὶ νοσήματα. τούτων δὲ
 περὶ τὰς πρώτας σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκολασία μόνον ἐστίν· διὸ
 καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σώφρονα οὔτ' ἀκόλαστα λέγομεν ἀλλ'
 ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ εἴ τιτι ὅλως ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο δια-
 φερει γένος τῶν ζώων ὕβρει καὶ σιναμωρία καὶ τῷ παμ-
 φάγον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει προαίρεσιν οὐδὲ λογισμόν, ἀλλ'
 7 ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
 ἔλαττον δὲ θηριότης κακίας, φοβεριώτερον δέ· οὐ γὰρ διέ-

ὁ δ' ὑβρίζειν μεθ' ἡδονῆς] 'While he who wantons acts with pleasure.' There seems to be a double meaning in this passage to the word ὑβρίζει, exactly as there might be to our word 'wantonness.' It first means 'to act insolently' or 'wantonly' in a general sense, and second, it means to 'act wantonly' in a particular sense, *i.e.* lasciviously.

6 αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς ληπτέον] *i.e.* the difference between continence and incontinence, which with other things is treated of in the next chapter. There is a want of method about the sequence of different parts in this book. The reference which follows, ὥσπερ εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς only goes back to ch. v. 1, and gives colour to a suspicion that the book may have been put together out of separate pieces, and perhaps lectures, one of which may have commenced with the fifth chapter.

διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία—ἀνθρώπων] 'Hence we do not call brutes either temperate

or intemperate, except by a metaphor, and where it happens that one whole race of animals in comparison with another is remarkable for wantonness it may be (τινι), or lechery, or voracity; for (animals) have no purpose or reasoning, but are beside themselves like madmen.' Different races of animals have good or bad moral characteristics ascribed to them. The goat, the ass, and the monkey have a bad reputation for wantonness, and the shark, &c., for voracity. It is not quite clear what is meant by ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως. Perhaps it may best be taken to imply not that animals transgress their own nature, but simply that they get into a state of ecstasy, like madmen, and have no senses nor any principle which would justify their being called either temperate or intemperate.

7 ἔλαττον δέ—θηρίου] 'Now bestiality is less evil than vice, but it is more fearful, for in it the good principle is not corrupted, as in a man, but does not exist. Therefore (comparing bes-

φθαρται τὸ βέλτιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει. ὅμοιον οὖν ὥσπερ ἄψυχον συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἔμψυχον, πότερον κάκιον· ἀσινεστέρα γὰρ ἢ φαυλότης αἰεὶ ἢ τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν, ὃ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή. παραπλήσιον οὖν τὸ συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἀδικον· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἐκάτερον κάκιον· μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν κακὰ ποιήσκειν ἄνθρωπος κακὸς θηρίου.

Περὶ δὲ τὰς δι' ἀφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ 7 ἐπιθυμίας καὶ φυγὰς, περὶ αἷς ἣ τε ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη διωρίσθη πρότερον, ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστε ἡττάσθαι καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ κρείττους, ἔστι δὲ κρατεῖν καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἥττους· τούτων δ' ὃ μὲν περὶ ἡδονὰς ἀκρατὴς ὃ δ' ἐγκρατὴς, ὃ δὲ περὶ λύπας μαλακὸς ὃ δὲ καρτερικὸς. μεταξὺ δ' ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἕξις, καὶ εἰ ῥέπουσι μᾶλλον

tiality with vice) is like comparing what is inanimate with a living thing, and asking which is worse. Evil is always less harmful when it has no guiding principle, and reason is the guiding principle. So it is just like comparing injustice with an unjust man; each is in a different sense worse. A bad man will do ten thousandfold more evil than a beast.'

ἔχει] sc. τὸ θηρίον. The whole passage is briefly expressed, but perhaps requires no further comment.

VII. This chapter, after a general comparison between intemperance and incontinence (§ 1-3), makes some remarks on endurance, softness, and childishness (§ 4-7); and ends by distinguishing two kinds of incontinence, of which the one proceeds from impetuosity, the other from weakness of character.

1 πρότερον] *Eth. Eud.* iii. ii. 6. Cf. above ch. iv. § 2.

ἔστι μὲν—χείρους] 'It is possible to be in such a state as to yield to things that most men are superior to, and again it is possible to overcome things

that most men yield to. Of those who possess these opposite dispositions, with regard to *pleasures*, the first is an incontinent man, and the second a continent man; with regard to *pains*, the first is soft and the second enduring. But the state of the majority of mankind lies between these opposites, albeit men verge rather to the side of the worse.' Moral designations may be fixed either in relation to the standard of what is, or of what ought to be. Cf. *Eth.* iii. xi. 4: τῶν γὰρ φιλοτιμούτων λεγομένων ἡ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί. *Lb.* iv. iv. 4: ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. The above passage fixes the terms 'continent' and 'incontinent' relatively to what *is*, as implying more or less continence than people in general have. And yet there is evidently some reference beside to the standard of what ought to be, else it could not be said that people in general verge rather to the worse side. To represent the majority of mankind as possessing a mediocre moral character, neither eminently

² πρὸς τὰς χεῖρους. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀναγκαῖαί εἰσιν αἱ δ' οὐ καὶ μέχρι τινός, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ οὐ, οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ λύπας, ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς† ἢ διὰ προαίρεσιν, δι' αὐτὰς καὶ μηδὲν δι' ἕτερον ἀποβαῖνον, ἀκόλαστος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν, ὥστ' ἀνιάτος· ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνιάτος. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ὁ ἀντικείμενος, ὁ δὲ μέσος σώφρων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας μὴ δι' ἥτταν ἀλλὰ διὰ προαίρεσιν. τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων ὁ μὲν ἄγεται διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυ-

good nor bad, but inclining to weakness, was in accordance with the Greek point of view. Widely different from this was what may be called the Semitic point of view, which, regarding man with greater religious earnestness, attributed to him 'desperate wickedness.' The latter feeling was not confined to the Jews and to the pages of the Bible, but in some degree made itself known to the world in the Stoical philosophy. See Essay VI. p. 261 &c.

² ἐπεὶ δ' ἔναι—ἀνιάτος] 'Now as some pleasures are necessary, but others are not to be called so, as being (καὶ) only necessary in certain degrees, while their excesses or deficiencies are not necessary, (and the same division holds with regard to desires and pains), he who pursues excessive pleasures, or who pursues pleasures not in themselves excessive in an excessive way, and does so from deliberate purpose, with no ulterior aim beyond the pleasures themselves, is abandoned (ἀκόλαστος), (and he may well be called so), for it stands to reason (ἀνάγκη) that he is not likely to repent, and so he is incurable; for without repentance there is no cure.'

οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις] This might seem superfluous. But what is meant is,

that in some pleasures the μέσος is good and necessary. Cf. below, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ὁ ἀντικείμενος.

ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς ἢ διὰ προαίρεσιν] The Paraphrast well expresses the meaning of this passage as follows: ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδονῶν, καὶ ἢ τὰς φύσει μεγάλας αἰεὶ ζητῶν ἡδονάς, ἢ τὰς φύσει μετρίας ὑπερβαλόντως ζητῶν, οὐχ ἐλκόμενος βιαίως πῶς ἐκ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ μετὰ προαιρέσεως ἐκ' αὐτὰς τρέχων, οὐ δι' ἄλλο τι, δόξαν, φέρε εἰπεῖν, ἢ κέρδος, ἀλλὰ αὐτὰς δι' ἑαυτάς, ἀκόλαστος. It is plain that ἢ before διὰ προαίρεσιν in the text must be a mistake. One of Bekker's MSS. reads καὶ—which would be very easily changed into ἢ, especially with the clause ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς preceding. It would answer also to the expansion of the Paraphrast, οὐχ ἐλκόμενος κ. τ. λ.

ἀνάγκη γάρ] If a man with deliberate purpose pursues pleasure for its own sake, he is not likely to repent of his course, therefore he is ἀκόλαστος. This is the first intimation we have had that an unrepenting character belongs to 'intemperance'; it is an irregular argument, unless we regard it as laying some stress on the etymology of the word ἀκόλαστος. Cf. *Elk.* iii. xii. 5-7, iv. i. 5.

μίας, ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε χείρων εἶναι, εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἡρέμα πράττοι τι αἰσχρόν, ἢ εἰ σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτοι ἢ εἰ ὀργιζόμενος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει ἐν πάθει ὢν; διὸ ὁ ἀκόλαστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος. ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ⁴ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν, ἢ δ' ἐγκράτεια ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦ νικᾶν· διὸ καὶ αἰρετώτερον ἐγκράτεια καρτερίας ἐστίν. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ⁵ ἀντιτείνουσι καὶ δύνανται, οὗτος μαλακὸς καὶ τρυφῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τρυφή μαλακία τίς ἐστίν· ὅς ἔλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, ἵνα μὴ πονήσῃ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵρειν λύπην, καὶ μιμούμενος τὸν κάμνοντα οὐκ οἶται ἄθλιος εἶναι, ἀθλίῳ ὅμοιος ὢν. ὁμοίως⁶

3 ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων] 'So that they are distinct from one another,' i.e. on the one hand the reprobate (ἀκόλαστος), in his two forms of systematically seeking pleasure, and of systematically avoiding pain; and on the other hand the morally weak, whether in the form of yielding to the allurements of pleasure (ἀκρατής), or flying from the pressure of pain (μαλακός). The comparison is not between the two forms of the μὴ προαιρούμενοι, but these are together contrasted with ἀκολασία.

παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε] A repetition of ch. iv. § 4, on which see note.

τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος] The temptation is great to refer τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων to τῶν μὴ προαιρουμένων, and to read ἀκρατής for ἀκόλαστος, taking the sentence in connection with what follows. Wilkinson does so without any variation of the MSS. to justify him, although the Paraphrast has ἀκρατής. But when we consider (1) the unanimity of MSS.; (2) that μαλακία has been already distinguished

from ἀκρασία, in § 1; (3) the import of μᾶλλον, we shall be led to see that the sentence comes in, though rather in a disjointed way, to wind up the comparison here made generally between incontinence and intemperance, (cf. ch. vi. § 5, and above, § 1). Incontinence may be said to be more like a kind of softness, while determinate vice is something different. Μαλακία, according to this interpretation, is used here in a general sense, in the next section with a special and limited import.

4 Continnence, it is argued, is finer than endurance, just as victory is finer than holding out. This argument is not sound, since continence is in reality nothing more than holding out against temptation. To noble natures continence would doubtless cause a greater struggle than mere endurance of pains, and in this sense it might be called finer.

5 ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων—ὅμοιος ὢν] 'Now he who faints before things against which most men hold out and are strong,—he is soft and luxurious, (for

ὃ ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκρασίαν· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶται ἢ λυπῶν, θαυμαστόν, ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικόν, εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ὥσπερ ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχεως πεπληγμένος ἢ ὁ Καρκίνου ἐν τῇ Ἀλόπῃ Κερκύων, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ κατέχειν πειρώμενοι τὸν γέλωτα ἀθρόον ἐκκαγχάζουσιν, οἷον συνέπεσε Ξενοφάντῳ, ἀλλ' εἴ τις πρὸς ἃς οἱ πολλοὶ δύνανται ἀντέχειν, τούτων ἡττᾶται καὶ μὴ δύναται ἀντιτείνειν, μὴ διὰ φύσιν τοῦ γένους ἢ διὰ νόσον, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεῦσιν ἡ μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος, καὶ ὡς τὸ θῆλυ πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν διέστηκεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδιώδης ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ μαλακός· ἡ γὰρ παιδιὰ ἀνέσις ἐστίν, εἴπερ ἀνάπαυσις· τῶν δὲ πρὸς ταύτην ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ παιδιώδης ἔστιν. ἀκρασίας δὲ τὸ μὲν προπέτεια τὸ δ' ἀσθένεια· οἱ μὲν γὰρ βουλευσάμενοι οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οἷς ἐβουλεύσαντο διὰ τὸ

luxury, it may be added, is a kind of softness), he for instance who trails his cloak, rather than have the trouble of lifting it, and who imitates the languor of an invalid, without seeing that it is miserable to be like one who is miserable.' This passage is somewhat in the style of the *Characters* of Theophrastus. To illustrate the affectation of weakness described above, Coray quotes from Athenæus a story of the Sybarites, one of whom said that he had been in the fields, and that 'to see the men digging had given him a rupture.' To which his friend replied, that 'the very mention of it gave him a pain in his side.'

6 ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης] A play by Theodectes the rhetorician, a friend of Aristotle's. Fritzsche quotes Cicero *Tusc.* II. vii. 19: Adspice Philoctetam, cui concedendum est gementi: ipsum enim Herculem viderat in (Eta magnitudine dolorum ejulantem, &c.

Καρκίνου] Of this tragic poet nothing appears to be known.

Ξενοφάντῳ] Giphanius finds in Seneca, *De Ira*, II. 2, a mention of

Xenophantus as a musician of Alexander the Great.

οἷον ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεῦσιν ἡ μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος] Aspasius for Σκυθῶν reads Περσῶν. But the commentators refer us to Herodotus I. 105: τοῖσι δὲ τῶν Σκυθέων συλήσασσι τδῖρην τὸ ἐν Ἀσκάλῳι καὶ τοῖσι τούτων ἀεὶ ἐκγόνοισι ἐνέσκηψε ἡ ἐδὲ θήλειαν νοῦσον· ὥστε ἅμα λέγουσι τε οἱ Σκύθαι διὰ τοῦτό σφας νοσείν. Hippocrates gives a description of this malady, which appears to have been a kind of impotence (*De Aer. Aq. et Loc.* VI. 108): εὐνουχίαι γίνονται καὶ γυναικεία ἐργάζονται καὶ ὡς αἰγυναῖκες διαλέγονται τε ὁμοίως, καλεῦνται τε οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἀνανδρίεις. 'This impotency Hippocrates ascribes to venesection, but he mentions that the natives believed it to be a judgment from the gods. It is said that traces of the disease are still found among the inhabitants of Southern Russia.'—Mr. Rawlinson's *Herodotus*, Vol. I. p. 248.

καὶ ὡς τὸ θῆλυ] Cf. c. v. § 4.

8 ἀκρασίας δὲ—φαντασίῳ] 'Now incontinence is sometimes impetuosity

πάθος, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλεύσασθαι ἄγονται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους· ἔνιοι γάρ, ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες οὐ γαργαλίζονται, οὕτω καὶ προαισθόμενοι καὶ προϊδόντες καὶ προεγείραντες ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν οὐχ ἡττῶνται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, οὗτ' ἂν ἡδὺ ᾗ οὗτ' ἂν λυπηρόν. μάλιστα δ' οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν προπετῇ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν ταχυτῆτα, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναμένουσι τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ.

and sometimes weakness. Some men, when they have deliberated, do not abide by their deliberations, owing to the state into which they are thrown, (and this is weakness): while others, from never having deliberated, are carried away by their feelings. Some on the contrary, like the beginners in a tickling match, who cannot be tickled,—having prescience, and foresight, and having roused up themselves and their reason beforehand, are not overcome by their feelings, whether pleasant or painful. It is especially persons of a quick or bilious temperament who are subject to the impetuous kind of incontinence, for the one through the rapidity, and the other through the intensity, of their nature, do not wait to see what is the law of right, because they are apt to follow impressions.

ὥσπερ οἱ προγαργαλίσαντες] The Paraphrast understands ἑαυτοὺς, rendering the passage ὥσπερ τὰ προτριβέντα καὶ προγαργαλισθέντα μέλη οὐ γαργαλίζονται. And two of Bekker's MSS. read οἱ προγαργαλισθέντες. It might be possible by previous tickling to exhaust the irritability of the cuticle, but this would not be a usual process, and in one of the *Problems* attributed to Aristotle (xxxv. vi.) it is discussed, 'Why cannot a man tickle himself?' To which the answer is, 'For the same reason that he

can hardly be tickled by anybody else if he knows that it is going to happen. For laughter implies a sudden revulsion and a surprise.' Surely this is exactly what is meant in the text.

οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ] An account which seems at first sight the opposite of this is given by the author of the *Magna Moralia* (ii. vi. 43): 'Ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν (the impetuous kind of incontinence) οὐδ' ἂν λίαν δόξειεν εἶναι ψεκτὴ· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σπουδαίοις ἡ τοιαύτη ἐγγίνεται, ἐν τοῖς θερμοῖς καὶ εὐφύεσιν· ἡ δὲ (the weak kind) ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοῖς, οἱ δὲ τοιοῦτοι ψεκτοί. If however we consult the curious disquisition on μελαγχολικοὶ and the μέλαινα χολή in *Ar. Problems*, xxx. i., we shall see that both passionate impetuosity and cold sluggishness were considered by the ancient physiologist to be different manifestations of the same strange temperament. *Ib.* xxx. i. 18: 'Ὅσοις δὲ ἐν τῇ φύσει συνέστη κρᾶσις τοιαύτη, εὐθὺς οὗτοι τὰ ἥθη γίνονται παντοδαποί, ἄλλος κατ' ἄλλην κρᾶσιν· οἷον ὅσοις μὲν πολλὴ καὶ ψυχρὰ ἐνυπάρχει, νωθροὶ καὶ μωροί, ὅσοις δὲ λίαν πολλὴ καὶ θερμὴ, μανικοὶ καὶ εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἐρωτικοὶ καὶ εὐκίνητοι πρὸς τοὺς θυμοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ λάλοι μᾶλλον. With the moderns the term 'melancholy' is restricted to the cold and dejected mood; while the ancients much more commonly applied the term μελαγχολικός to denote

- 8 Ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐ μεταμελη-
 τικός· ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς μεταμε-
 λητικός πᾶς. διὸ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἠπορήσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ἔχει,
 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀνιάτος, ὁ δ' ἱατός· ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ μὲν μοχθη-
 ρία τῶν νοσημάτων οἷον ὑδέρῳ καὶ φθίσει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία
 τοῖς ἐπιληπτικοῖς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ συνεχὴς, ἡ δ' οὐ συνεχὴς πο-
 νηρία. καὶ ὅλως δ' ἕτερον τὸ γένος ἀκρασίας καὶ κα-
 κίας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει.
 2 αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων βελτίους οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ ἢ οἱ τὸν λόγον
 ἔχοντες μὲν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ· ὑπ' ἐλάττωνος γὰρ πάθους

warmth, passion, and eccentricity of genius. Cf. Plato, *Repub.* 573 c: Τυραννικὸς δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ δαμόνιε, ἀνὴρ ἀκριβῶς γίγνεται, ὅταν ἡ φύσει ἡ ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἡ ἀμφοτέροις μεθυστικός τε καὶ ἐρωτικός καὶ μελαγχολικός γένηται. Cf. also Ar. *Probl.* xi. xxxviii: τὸ τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἀκολουθεῖν ταχέως τὸ μελαγχολικὸν εἶναι ἐστίν. In the language of our own day, 'The passionate heart of the poet is whirl'd into folly and vice.' For more remarks on μέλαινα χολή, see below.

VIII. This chapter is not separated by any marked logical boundary from the preceding one. Rather it is a continuation of the same subject, as it goes on comparing incontinence with intemperance. Two previously mooted questions are now discussed, namely, is intemperance more curable than incontinence? (which is answered in the negative), and, is incontinence to be regarded as absolutely bad? (See above ch. i. § 6). This is also answered in the negative.

1 Ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐ μεταμελητικός] Cf. c. vii. § 2. The continuity of the subject is preserved, if we consider that the writer, having mentioned the various ways in which incontinent people submit to temptation, next reflects that,

after yielding, these are all repentant (μεταμελητικός πᾶς), while the intemperate man forms a contrast to them, and is unrepentant.

διὸ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἠπορήσαμεν] Cf. ch. ii. § 10. Intemperance, which is a corruption of the will, is like a chronic disorder, while incontinence, which is a temporary derangement of the will, is like an epileptic seizure.

ἡ γὰρ κακία λανθάνει] As being a false sort of harmony in the mind, in which no struggle is felt.

2 αὐτῶν δέ—ἐμμένοντες δέ] 'Now, looking at incontinence itself and the two kinds of it which I have mentioned, those people who are carried away are better than the sort who are in possession of "the law" but do not abide by it.' As said before, the thread of reasoning goes on continuously from the end of the preceding chapter (according to Bekker's division), and so there is nothing remarkable in the writer's now reverting to the two kinds of incontinence, as if he had never digressed from discussing them. Οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ here answers to the ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ (οἱ) τὴν προπετῇ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς. The words ἐκστασις, ἐκστηναι, and ἐκστατικός, are frequently used in the *Problems*, (*l.c.*) in connection with the μελαγχολικοί. Cf. *Ib.* xxx. i. 3:

ἡττῶνται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπροβούλευτοι ὥσπερ ἄτεροι· ὅμοιος γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατής ἐστι τοῖς ταχὺ μεθύσκομένοις καὶ ὑπ' ὀλίγου οἴνου καὶ ἐλάττονος ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί. ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία ἢ ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι, φανερὸν. ἀλλὰ πῇ ἴσως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἐστίν. οὐ μὲν ἀλλ' ὅμοιον γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου εἰς Μιλησίους 'Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, ὀρώσι δ' οἵα- περ οἱ ἀξύνετοι.' καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἄδικοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, ἀδικοῦσι δέ. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ διὰ τὸ πε-⁴ πείσθαι διώκειν τὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον σωματικᾶς ἡδονάς, ὁ δὲ πέπεισταὶ διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος διώκειν αὐτάς, ἐκείνος μὲν οὖν εὐμετάπειστος, ὁ δ' οὐ· ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ μὲν φθεί-

where it is said of Ajax, ἐκστατικός ἐγένετο παντελῶς (i.e. mad). Cf. above ch. vi. § 6. 'Εκστατικός is used presently (§ 5) in a different sense to express 'departing from' a purpose, as also before, ch. i. § 6, and ii. § 7.

οὐ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες] On this phrase see *Eth.* vi. i. 1, and note.

ὅμοιος γὰρ—οἱ πολλοί] 'For the man who is weakly incontinent is like those who are soon intoxicated, and by a small quantity of wine, less than intoxicates people in general.' 'Ο ἀκρατής seems used in this sentence as if specially applicable to the weak kind of incontinence. It is in contrast to ἐκστατικός. Weakness is worse than being carried away by passion, for it is acting against warning, and with less temptation.

3 Incontinence is not vice, though it resembles vice in what it does (κατὰ τὰς πράξεις), but it goes against the will, while vice goes with the will. It is like the saying of Demodocus against the Milesians. 'The Milesians are not fools, but they act just as if they were fools.' The incontinent are not bad, but they do wrong.

Δημοδόκου] This was an epigram-

matist of the island of Leros, not far from Miletus. Some of his epigrams against different cities are preserved in the *Anthology*.

ἀδικοῦσι] In the general sense 'do wrong.' Cf. *Eth.* v. ii. 2.

4 ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ—ἐναντίος] 'For virtue on the one hand preserves, while vice destroys, the major premiss. Now the end is in action just what the hypotheses are in mathematics, namely, a major premiss on which everything depends; hence, neither in the one case nor in the other is it the chain of inference (ὁ λόγος) that demonstrates the major premiss, but in the case of action (ἐνταῦθα) it is virtue either natural or acquired to which a right opinion with regard to the major premiss is due. He who possesses this is temperate, while the contrary person is intemperate.' This passage comes in as a final argument against the notion that incontinence is more curable than intemperance. In the latter the fountain-head of action (the ἀρχή) is destroyed. While the temperate man has in himself the source of all good action, the intemperate man is the direct opposite, and the

ρει ἢ δὲ σώζει, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὗ ἔνεκα ἀρχή, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις· οὔτε δὴ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος διδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν οὔτε ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ' ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἐπιστὴ τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. Σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἀκόλαστος δ' ὁ ἐναντίος. ἔστι δέ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικὸς παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃν ὥστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος, ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν ἀνέδην δεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὐ κρατεῖ· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατής, βελτίων τοῦ

incontinent man is something intermediate.

ἢ δὲ σώζει] cf. *Eth.* vi. v. 6, where almost all the ideas which occur above are given, even the reference to mathematical axioms. *Ib.* ch. xii. § 10: where a still more explicit statement is made of the relation of virtue to the practical syllogism.

αἱ ὑποθέσεις] This term is used precisely in the same way in the *Eudemian Ethics*, II. x. 20: περὶ μὲν τοῦ τέλους οὐθελς βουλευέται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑποθέσεις· εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ βραχέως, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς δι' ἀκριβείας (i.e. the *Analytics* of Eudemus). Cf. *Ib.* ch. xi. § 4: ὥσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις. In *Eth. Eud.* vii. ii. 4, ὑπόθεσις is used as equivalent to ἀρχή.—(§ 3) περὶ τούτων . . . πειρατέον διορίσαι, λαβοῦσιν ἀρχὴν τήνδε . . . τούτου δὲ διωρισμένου ληπτέον ὑπόθεσιν ἑτέραν. Plato, *Repub.* p. 510—511, reproaches mathematics with always resting on hypotheses of which they can give no account. P. 510 c: οἶμαι γὰρ σε εἶδέναι ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὰς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέμενοι τό τε περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ γωνιών τριττὰ εἶδη καὶ ἄλλα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καθ' ἑκάστην μέθοδον, ταῦτα μὲν

ὡς εἰδότες, ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά, οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ἐτι ἀξιούσι περὶ αὐτῶν δίδοναι ὡς παντὶ φανερῶν, ἐκ τούτων δ' ἀρχόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη διεξιόντες τελευτῶσιν ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τούτο, οὐ ἂν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὁρμήσωσιν.

Aristotle, *Post. Analyt.* I. ii. 7, defines thesis or assumption as an immediate syllogistic principle, indemonstrable, but not (as the axioms are) a necessary antecedent to all reasoning. He divides theses into hypotheses and definitions, which differ in that the former assert existence or non-existence, while the latter do not. The hypothesis then is a peculiar principle (*οἰκεία ἀρχή*), and differs from an axiom, (1) in that it varies in the different sciences; (2) in that it is wanting in recognisable necessity. (Cf. *Post. Anal.* I. x. 6: οὐκ ἔστι δ' ὑπόθεσις . . . δ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι δι' αὐτὸ καὶ δοκεῖν ἀνάγκη). The Aristotelian hypothesis is however widely different from the hypothesis of the moderns, which means in short little more than a conjecture. For more particulars on this subject see Mr. Poste's *Logic of Science* (Oxford, 1850), p. 139—143.

τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν] By what the grammarians call *zeugma*, this genitive goes with τῶν ἀρχῶν, as governed by διδασκαλικός. One would have expected αἰτία.

ἀκολάστου, οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἀπλῶς· σώζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλ-
τιστον, ἢ ἀρχή. ἄλλος δ' ἐναντίος, ὁ ἐμμενετικὸς καὶ οὐκ
ἐκστατικὸς διὰ γε τὸ πάθος. Φανερόν δὴ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ
μὲν σπουδαία ἔξις, ἢ δὲ φάυλη.

Πότερον οὖν ἐγκρατής ἐστίν ὁ ὁποιοῦν λόγῳ καὶ ὁποι- 9
οῦν προαιρέσει ἐμμένων ἢ ὁ τῇ ὀρθῇ, καὶ ἀκρατής δὲ ὁ
ὁποιοῦν μὴ ἐμμένων προαιρέσει καὶ ὁποιοῦν λόγῳ ἢ ὁ
τῷ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ μὴ ὀρθῇ, ὥσπερ
ἤπορήθη πρότερον; ἢ κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ὁποιοῦν,

5 ἄλλος δ' ἐναντίος κ.τ.λ.] Incon-
tinence having been shown to be an
intermediate state not so bad as in-
temperance, it is here added, that
the true opposite to the incontinent
man is he

'Who, through the heat of conflict,
keeps the law
In calmness made, and sees what he
foresaw;'

i.e. not the temperate but the contin-
ent. And though incontinence is
not absolutely bad, yet relatively, if
you compare it with its opposite, you
must call one bad and the other good.

IX. The first part of this chapter
(§§ 1—4) takes up again the question
before started (ch. i. § 6, ch. ii. § 7—10),
Does continence consist in sticking to
any opinion and purpose, whether
wrong or right? After some refine-
ments, which are perhaps unnecessary,
as to the continent man 'accidentally'
or 'non-essentially' maintaining a
wrong opinion, a good distinction is
given between obstinacy and conti-
nence. Obstinate people (*ἰσχυρογνώ-
μονες*), if not mere dullards (*οἱ ἀμαθεῖς*
καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι), are self-opinionated,
which state of mind is rather inconti-
nence than continence, for it is a
yielding to the desire for victory and
self-assertion. The continent man on

the other hand is not at all deaf to
the voice of persuasion, it is only the
voice of passion when opposed to
reason which he resists. Nor is a
man to be called incontinent if he
deserts a resolution, even for the sake
of pleasure. Since Neoptolemus de-
serted his resolution to deceive, in
order to obtain the noble pleasure of
preserving his honour.

1. ἢ ὁ τῷ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαι-
ρέσει τῇ μὴ ὀρθῇ] Various solutions
have been proposed for the difficulty in-
volved in this sentence. (1) Aspasius,
followed by Argyropulus, Fritzsche,
&c., think that ἐμμένων is to be
understood as carried on from μὴ
ἐμμένων in the line before. But this
will not do. The ἀκρατής cannot be
said to 'abide by a false opinion.'
(2) Some understand the clause as
applying to cases like those of Neo-
ptolemus. 'Is a man incontinent who
does not stick to a false opinion?'
But all this is implied in ὁ ὁποιοῦν
κ.τ.λ. And moreover this interpre-
tation would give a new sense to ἢ,
making it a particle of opposition
instead of a particle of contrast, which
is required for the sake of correspon-
dence with the opening sentence. (3)
One of Bekker's MSS. reads τῷ μὴ
ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ
ὀρθῇ. This is a very natural correc-
tion to make, and it seems followed by

καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει
 ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐμμένει; εἰ γάρ τις τοδὶ διὰ τοδὶ
 αἰρεῖται ἢ διώκει, καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν τοῦτο διώκει καὶ αἰρεῖται,
 κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ πρότερον. ἀπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν τὸ
 καθ' αὐτό, ὥστε ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὁποιοῦν δόξῃ ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει
 2 ὁ δ' ἐξίσταται, ἀπλῶς δὲ ὁ τῇ ἀληθεῖ. εἰσὶ δέ τινες καὶ
 ἐμμενετικοὶ τῇ δόξῃ, οὓς καλοῦσιν ἰσχυρογνώμονας, οἷον
 ὀύσπειστοι καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι· οἱ ὅμοιον μὲν τι ἔχουσι
 τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ θρασὺς
 τῷ θαρραλέῳ, εἰσὶ δ' ἕτεροι κατὰ πολλά. ὁ μὲν γὰρ διὰ
 πάθος καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐ μεταβάλλει, ὁ ἐγκρατής, ἐπεὶ
 εὐπειστος, ὅταν τύχῃ, ἔσται ὁ ἐγκρατής· ὁ δὲ οὐχ ὑπὸ
 λόγου, ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ἄγονται πολλοὶ
 3 ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμονες οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες
 καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι, οἱ μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες δι' ἡδο-
 νήν καὶ λύπην· χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες, ἐὰν μὴ μεταπεί-
 θωνται, καὶ λυποῦνται, ἐὰν ἄκυρα τὰ αὐτῶν ἢ ὥσπερ
 ψηφίσματα· ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ εἰκόασιν ἢ τῷ
 4 ἐγκρατεῖ. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ τοῖς δόξασιν οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οὐ
 δι' ἀκρασίαν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτῆτῃ τῷ Σοφοκλέους ὁ

the Paraphrast, who has ὁ μὴ ἐμμένων
 τῇ ὀρθῇ. But since the correction is
 so natural, why should such a pre-
 ponderance of MSS. have failed to
 adopt it? Though the sense ab-
 solutely requires some such reading,
 it seems better to conclude that there
 is some original confusion in the
 text. The author may have carelessly
 written as above, from a mistaken
 antithesis to ἢ ὁ τῇ ὀρθῇ in the former
 sentence.

κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ πρότερον]
 One chooses the means 'accidentally.'
 This is a mere illustration of the
 import of καθ' αὐτό and συμβεβηκός.
 The whole paragraph seems perfectly
 irrelevant. It may be compared with
Eth. v. xi. 8: καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ
 ἀδικεῖσθαι ἥττον φάυλον, κατὰ συμβε-
 βηκὸς δ' οὐθὲν κωλύει μείζον εἶναι

κακόν, which is a weak qualification
 of the moral principle, that to injure
 is worse than to be injured.

2 ὥσπερ ὁ ἄσωτος κ.τ.λ.] The
 same illustrations are coupled together
 in the *Eudemian Ethics* iii. vii. 14:
 τὸ ὁμοιότερον ἥττον ἐναντίον φαίνεται,
 οἷον πέπονθε τὸ θράσος πρὸς τὸ θάρσος
 καὶ ἄσωτία πρὸς ἐλευθεριότητα.

ὁ δὲ οὐχ — ἡδονῶν] 'But the obsti-
 nate man (is immovable) not from the
 influence of reason, for such men
 assuredly admit desires, and many of
 them are carried away by the allure-
 ment of pleasures.' The curious
 phrase ἐπιθυμίας λαμβάνουσι occurs
 in the *Eudemian Ethics*, iii. ii. 13:
 πάντες γὰρ τούτοις φύσει τε χαίρουσι,
 καὶ ἐπιθυμίας λαμβάνουσι.

4 οἷον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτῆτῃ] See above
 ch. ii. § 7, note.

Νεοπτόλεμος. καίτοι δι' ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλὴν· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθεύειν αὐτῷ καλὸν ᾗ, ἐπείσθη δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσεύος ψεύδεσθαι. Οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ δι' ἡδονὴν τι πράττων οὔτ' ἀκόλαστος οὔτε φαῦλος οὔτ' ἀκρατής, ἀλλ' ὁ δι' αἰσχράν.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τις καὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος ἤττον ἢ δεῖ τοῖς σω-
ματικοῖς χαίρων, καὶ οὐκ ἐμμένων τῷ λόγῳ ἢ τοιοῦτος,
τούτου καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς μέσος ὁ ἐγκρατής· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
ἀκρατής οὐκ ἐμμένει τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον τι, οὗτος δὲ
διὰ τὸ ἥττον τι· ὁ δ' ἐγκρατής ἐμμένει καὶ οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον
μεταβάλλει. Δεῖ δέ, εἴπερ ἡ ἐγκράτεια σπουδαῖον, ἀμφο-
τέρας τὰς ἐναντίας ἔξεις φαύλας εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ φαί-
νονται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις
εἶναι φανεράν, ὥσπερ ἡ σωφροσύνη τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ δοκεῖ
ἐναντίον εἶναι μόνον, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ.
ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ' ὁμοιότητα πολλὰ λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἡ 6

5—ch. x. § 5. In his later edition Bekker makes this portion of the text into a separate chapter, which seems a better arrangement. We have now a winding up of the previous discussions. Continence is not only the contrary of incontinence, but is also a sort of mean. It bears an analogy to temperance, but must not be identified with it. Neither must incontinence and intemperance be confounded (see above ch. i. § 6). Nor must it be thought possible that the wise man can be incontinent, though the clever man may (see ch. i. § 7). Incontinence is like sleep or drunkenness, not a state of wakeful knowledge (see ch. iii. §§ 6–8). Its acts are voluntary, but yet it is not absolutely wicked, since it implies no deliberate purpose. The incontinent man is like a state which has good laws, but does not act upon them. The bad man like a state with a bad code, which she carries out. Both the terms incontinence and continence are used comparatively, as implying more

firmness than is common, or less. Of the two kinds of incontinence, that which is caused by passion is more curable than that caused by weakness, that which proceeds from habit is more curable than that which is natural.

5 καὶ οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον μεταβάλλει.] This is an Atticism for καὶ δι' οὐδέτερον. The attempt to make continence into 'a mean' can hardly be called successful. It can only be done by assuming the same ἔλλειψις for this quality as for temperance. You will have one set of terms, ἀκολασία, σωφροσύνη, ἀναισθησία, and another set ἀκρασία, ἐγκράτεια, ἀναισθησία. It is plain that ἐγκράτεια is not a mean, in the sense of being a balance, or harmony of the mind. It is only imperfect temperance, it is temperance in the act of forming.

6 ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἡ τοῦ σώφρονος καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἠκολούθηκεν.] 'The "continence" of the temperate man has come to be called so derivatively (ἠκολούθηκεν) and by analogy.'

- τοῦ σώφρονος καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἠκολούθηκεν· ὃ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς οἷος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σώφρων, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἔχων ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔχων φάυλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἡδῆσθαι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ὁ δ' οἷος ἡδῆσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι.
- 7 ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἕτερον μὲν ὄντες, ἀμφοτέροι δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν καὶ οἰόμενος δεῖν, ὁ δ' οὐκ οἰόμενος.
- 10 Οὐδ' ἅμα φρόνιμον καὶ ἀκρατῇ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ἅμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος τὸ ἦθος
- 2 δέδεικται ὧν. ἔτι οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον φρόνιμος ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικός· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικός. τὸν δὲ δεινὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀκρατῇ εἶναι· διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἐνίοτε φρόνιμοι μὲν εἶναι τινες ἀκρατεῖς δέ, διὰ τὸ τὴν δεινότητα διαφέρειν τῆς φρονήσεως τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἐγγύς
- 3 εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν. οὐδὲ δὴ ὡς ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ θεωρῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ καθεύδων ἢ οἰνωμένος. καὶ ἐκὼν μὲν (τρόπον γὰρ τινὰ εἰδὼς καὶ ὁ ποιεῖ καὶ οὗ ἔνεκα), πονηρὸς δ' οὐ· ἢ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής· ὥσθ' ἡμιπόνηρος. καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος· ὁ

X. 1 ἅμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος τὸ ἦθος δέδεικται ὧν] Cf. ch. ii. § 5. *Eth.* vi. xiii. 6.

2 τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις] Cf. *Eth.* vi. xii. 8—9. The phrase ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις is used by Aristotle, *Eth.* iv. iv. 1, 4, in reference to the Second Book of *Ethics*. It must mean something more than πρότερον, one would think. It seems to point to a sort of interval between the later passage and that referred to. Cf. ch. i. § 1: ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχὴν.

3 καὶ ἐκὼν μὲν] Cf. *Eth.* v. ix. 4—6, where the question is discussed, Does the incontinent man voluntarily do wrong and injury to himself as well as harm?

ἢ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής] Προαίρεσις

here must mean the general state of the will. It is only one form of incontinence, which errs against a definitely formed purpose. Incontinence is always παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν (cf. *Eth.* v. ix. 6); in passionate natures it is ἀνευ προαίρεσεως. The Aristotelian psychology seems however to have admitted the formation of προαίρεσις which are not carried out into action, and the question thus arose, Are purposes or actions most decisive as constituting virtue? See *Eth.* iii. ii. 1, note, and *Eth.* x. viii. 5.

ὥσθ' ἡμιπόνηρος] 'So that he is only half depraved.' This epithet occurs in *Ar. Pol.* v. xi. 34: ἔτι δ' αὐτὸν (the monarch) διακείσθαι (ἀναγκαῖον) κατὰ τὸ ἦθος ἥτοι καλῶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ ἡμίχρηστον ὄντα, καὶ μὴ πονηρὸν ἄλλ'

μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐμμενετικὸς οἷς ἂν βουλευέσθαι, ὁ δὲ μελαγχολικὸς οὐδὲ βουλευτικὸς ὅλως. καὶ ἔοικε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατὴς πόλει ἣ ψηφίζεται μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ θέοντα καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους, χρῆται δὲ οὐδέν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξανδρίδης ἔσκωψεν

ἡ πόλις ἐβούλεθ', ἣ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει·

ὁ δὲ πονηρὸς χρωμένη, μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, πονηροῖς δὲ χρωμένη. 4 ἔστι δ' ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια περὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ἕξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐμμένει μᾶλλον ὁ δ' ἥττον τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως. εὐΐατοτέρῃ δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν, ἣν οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ ἀκρατεύονται, τῶν βουλευομένων μὲν μὴ ἐμμενόντων δέ, καὶ οἱ δι' ἐθισμού ἀκρατεῖς τῶν φυσικῶν· ῥᾶον γὰρ ἔθος μετακινήσαι φύσεως· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος χαλεπὸν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐήνος λέγει

φημὶ πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἔμεναι, φίλε, καὶ δὴ ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι.

τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐγκράτεια καὶ τί ἀκρασία καὶ τί καρτερία 5 καὶ τί μαλακία, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἕξεις αὗται πρὸς ἀλλήλας, εἴρηται.

ἡμιπόνηρον. In Plato, *Repub.* p. 352 c, the term ἡμιμόθηροι is used, in proving that there must be honour even among thieves.

οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος] Though lust as compared with anger is called ἐπίβουλος (cf. ch. vi. § 3), yet it is true on the other hand that the incontinent man is not a designing character.

ὁ δὲ μελαγχολικός] Cf. above ch. vii. § 8, ch. viii. § 2.

ὥσπερ Ἀναξανδρίδης] A Rhodian comic poet, who is said to have satirized the Athenians. Aristotle mentions one of his plays, the *Γεροντομανία* (*Rhet.* iii. xii. 3). Also a famous saying of his (*Ib.* iii. xi. 8), Ἀναξανδρίδου τὸ ἐπαινούμενον—

καλὸν γ' ἀποθανεῖν πρὶν θανάτου δρᾶν ἄξιον.

And another witticism (*Ib.* iii. x. 7). Cf. Athenæus, *Deipnos.*, ix. 16.

4 τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως] Cf. ch. vii. 1, note.

ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐήνος] An elegiac and gnomic poet of Paros, who appears to have been a contemporary and friend of Socrates.

φημὶ πολυχρόνιον κ. τ. λ.]

'Habit sticketh long and fast,
Second nature 'tis at last.'

μελέτην] 'That which is acquired by culture and habit.' That habit is 'second nature,' we are told by Aristotle, *De Mem.* ii. 16: ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσις ἤδη τὸ ἔθος, διὸ ἀ πολλάκις ἐννοοῦμεν ταχὺ ἀναμνησκόμεθα· ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσει τότε μετὰ τότε ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ· τὸ δὲ πολλάκις φύσιν ποιεῖ.

11 Περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης θεωρῆσαι τοῦ τὴν πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφοῦντος· οὗτος γὰρ τοῦ τέλους ἀρχιτέκτων, πρὸς ὃ βλέποντες ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν κακὸν τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς
2 λέγομεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ

XI. We now come to a treatise upon the nature of Pleasure. With regard to the authorship and character of this treatise see the remarks in Vol. I. Essay I. pp. 34 and 38, and Essay III. p. 145. A notable scholium, discovered by Professor Brandis in the Vatican, and quoted by Spengel and Fritzsche, attributes it to Eudemus, though in a merely conjectural way; see below ch. xiii. § 2, note. In the outset of the *Eudemean Ethics*, a discussion on Pleasure is promised in terms which correspond both to the contents and the position of the present chapters. (*Eth. Eud.* I. v. 11.) τούτων δ' (i.e. with regard to the three kinds of life) ἡ μὲν περὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἡδονή, καὶ τίς καὶ ποία τις γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνων, οὐκ ἄδηλον, ὥστ' οὐ τίνες εἰσὶ δεῖ ζητεῖν αὐτάς, ἀλλ' εἰ συντείνουσι τι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μή, καὶ πῶς συντείνουσι, καὶ πότερον εἰ δεῖ προσάπτειν τῇ ζῇ καλὰς ἡδονάς τινας, ταύτας δεῖ προσάπτειν, ἢ τούτων μὲν ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν, ἕτεραι δ' εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ δι' ἃς εὐλόγως οἰονται τὸν εὐδαιμονα ζῆν ἡδέως καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀλύπως. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον, περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως πρῶτον θεωρήσωμεν. It is quite in agreement with the terms of this programme that the present treatise is prominently concerned with the discussion of *bodily* pleasure (ἡ περὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἡδονή). At the close of the *Eudemean Ethics* there is also a reference backward to these chapters (*Eth. Eud.* viii. iii. 11): καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς δ' εἴρηται ποῖόν τι καὶ πῶς ἀγαθόν, καὶ ὅτι τὰ τε ἀπλῶς ἡδέα καὶ

καλά, καὶ τὰ (γε) ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἡδέα. οὐ γίνεται δὲ ἡδονὴ μὴ ἐν πράξει· διὰ τοῦτο δ' ἀληθῶς εὐδαιμόνων καὶ ἡδιστα ζήσκει, καὶ τοῦτο οὐ μάτην οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀξιούσιν. (Cf. this Book, ch. xii. § 3, and § 7; ch. xiii. § 2.)

I — 2 περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς — χαίρειν] 'Pleasure and pain are subjects which come within the scope of him who makes politics a philosophy, for he has to frame the idea of that supreme end, in reference to which we call things absolutely good and bad. Also these are quite necessary for us to consider, since we have laid down the principle that moral virtue and vice are concerned with pains and pleasures, and since people in general hold that pleasure is involved in happiness, whence they have given the happy man his name (μακάριος from χαίρειν).'

There are three reasons given here for discussing pleasure; (1) Because it has claims to be 'the end.' (Cf. *Eth. Eud.* II. i. 1, where as a reason for discussing psychology it is said, φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὧν ἓνια ἢ πάντα τέλος εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν). (2) From the connection before shown to exist between pleasure and morality, cf. *Eth. Eud.* II. iv. 2-4. (3) Because the idea of pleasure is involved in the common idea of happiness, as shown by the etymology (a false one) of μακάριος.

ἀρχιτέκτων τοῦ τέλους] i.e. to conceive in a grand and liberal way, independently of details, that supreme human good at which a state should aim. Cf. *Eth.* I. xiii. 1-3, and I. i. 4, note.

ἀπλῶς λέγομεν] There is some con-

αὐτῶν· τήν τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἡθικὴν περὶ
λύπας καὶ ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν, καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἱ πλεῖστοι
μεθ' ἡδονῆς εἶναι φασιν, διὸ καὶ τὸν μακάριον ὠνομάκασιν
ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι³
ἀγαθόν, οὔτε καθ' αὐτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ
εἶναι ταῦτὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν· τοῖς δ' ἔνιαι μὲν εἶναι αἱ
δὲ πολλαὶ φαῦλαι. ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι
ἀγαθόν, ὅμως μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν.
ὅλως μὲν οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσις ἐστίν· εἰς⁴
φύσιν αἰσθητή, οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενῆς τοῖς τέλεσιν,
οἷον οὐδεμία οἰκοδόμησις οἰκία. ἔτι ὁ σώφρων Φεύγει
τὰς ἡδονὰς. ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος τὸ ἄλυπον διώκει, οὐ τὸ ἡδύ.
ἔτι ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ ὅσω μᾶλλον χαίρει,
μᾶλλον, οἷον τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων· οὐδένα γὰρ αὖ δύνασθαι
νοῆσαι τι ἐν αὐτῇ. ἔτι τέχνη οὐδεμία ἡδονῆς· καίτοι πᾶν
ἀγαθὸν τέχνης ἔργον. ἔτι παιδία καὶ θηρία διώκει τὰς
ἡδονὰς. τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας σπουδαίας, ὅτι εἰσὶ καὶ⁵

fusion in this expression, for though things are called good in reference to the supreme end, yet they are not called so *absolutely*. All such goods are merely means, and therefore goods relatively. What is here meant is more definitely expressed in *Eth. Eud.* I. viii. 18, ὅτι δ' αἴτιον τὸ τέλος τῶν ὑφ' αὐτό, δηλοῖ ἡ διδασκαλία. ὁρισμένοι γὰρ τὸ τέλος τᾶλλα δεικνύουσιν, ὅτι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀγαθόν· αἴτιον γὰρ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα.

μεθ' ἡδονῆς) The first sentence of the *Eudemian Ethics* asserts that happiness is not only most good and beautiful, but also most pleasurable; this is taken, of course, from *Eth. Nic.* I. viii. 4.

3—5 The writer now mentions three existing opinions with regard to pleasure, and the arguments by which they are supported.

1 That pleasure is in no sense a good.

(α) because it is a state of becoming (γένεσις):

(β) because the temperate man avoids pleasures;

(γ) because the wise man aims not at pleasure, but at a painless condition;

(δ) because pleasure hinders thought;

(ε) because there is no art of pleasure;

(ς) because children and brutes follow pleasure.

2 That some pleasures may be good but that most are bad; supported by instances of morbid and hurtful pleasures.

3 That pleasure is at all events not the chief good; because it is not an end-in-itself, but a state of becoming.

τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ] The opinions stated here are negative. The writer in all probability had before him Aristotle's treatise on Pleasure (*Eth.*

αἰσχροὶ καὶ ὀνειδιζόμεναι, καὶ ἔτι βλαβεραί· νοσῶδη γὰρ ἔνια τῶν ἡδέων. ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄριστον ἡ ἡδονή, ὅτι οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ γένεσις. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐστίν.
 12 Ὅτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε ὁῦλον. πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν

x. i.-v.). He deviates from it slightly, and exhibits that kind of differences which might be expected under the circumstances. He does not, like Aristotle, state the positive view (held by Eudoxus) that pleasure is the chief good, but commences with the opinions of the objectors to this view (*i.e.* Speusippus and the Platonists of his school). The principal argument which he attributes to them (that pleasure is a *γένεσις*) is given, though not in such a definite form, *Eth.* x. iii. 4. Argument (ζ') appears to be implied in the objection against Eudoxus which is mentioned *Eth.* x. ii. 4. Argument (ε) may be the same perhaps as that given *Eth.* x. iii. 2 (that pleasure is *ἀόριστον*). The other arguments are not taken from Aristotle; they may perhaps have been derived from the books of Speusippus on this subject (*περὶ ἡδονῆς α'*, *Ἀριστιππος α'*. See Vol. I. Essay III. p. 168).

The second view belongs probably to a more moderate section of the Older Academy. It still however requires qualification, and to this effect the writer argues below, in ch. xii.

The third view,—that pleasure, however good, cannot be the chief good,—was held by both Plato and Aristotle (though the argument by which it is supported, *ὅτι οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ γένεσις*, was Plato's alone, cf. *Philebus* p. 53 c, 54 A, &c. *Eth.* x. ii. 3, x. iii. 8-13). Eudemus, identifying pleasure with happiness, denies this, ch. xii. § 1, ch. xiii. § 2.

XII. The arguments used in this chapter are as follows: (1) Before deciding on the goodness or badness of pleasure, a distinction has to be made between absolute and relative goodness or badness, and then various degrees have to be admitted among the relative kinds of goodness, § 1. (2) We must allow that real pleasure consists in life itself (*ἐνέργεια*), not what merely produces life (*γένεσις*). Hence all the arguments founded on defining pleasure to be a *γένεσις* fall to the ground. Those processes which restore nature are only pleasures in a subsidiary and accidental way. And even in them what is pleasant is the life (*ἐνέργεια*) which accompanies them, §§ 2-3. (3) Some pleasures may be morbid or they may hinder thought; but this only proves that *from one point of view* they are not good: but again the pleasures of thought are an assistance to thought, § 4-5. (4) There is no art of pleasure, because art is of conditions, not of functions, not of life itself, § 6. (5) The arguments about the wise man, the temperate man, and the child (ch. xi. § 4), all apply merely to the inferior and subsidiary, that is the bodily pleasures, § 7.

The course of procedure here is like that in *Eth.* x. ii.-iii., where the objections of the school of Speusippus are answered before Aristotle gives his own theory of the nature of pleasure. The arguments above are rather confused in statement. Those in § 1 are apparently meant to answer the assertion that no pleasure is good,

διχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινί), καὶ αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἔξεις ἀκολουθήσουσιν, ὥστε καὶ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις, καὶ αἱ φαῦλαι δοκοῦσαι εἶναι αἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς φαῦλαι τινὶ δ' οὐ ἀλλ' αἰρεταὶ τῷδε, εἶναι δ' οὐδὲ τῷδε ἀλλὰ ποτὲ καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον, αἰρεταὶ δ' οὐ· αἱ δ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί, ἀλλὰ φαίνονται, ὅσαι μετὰ λύπης καὶ ἰατρείας ἐνεκεν, οἷον αἱ τῶν καμνόντων. ἔτι ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ

οὔτε καθ' αὐτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός. The writer wishes first to urge that pleasure may be relatively good, if not absolutely so; he afterwards goes on to maintain that it is absolutely good.

Other passages of Eudemus bear a similarity to this, cf. *Eth. Eud.* III. i. 7: ἀλλ' ἴσως τὸ φοβερόν λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὰ γαθόν, διχῶς. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, τὰ δὲ τινὶ μὲν καὶ ἡδέα καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἔστιν, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ τούναρ-τίον φαῦλα καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ὅσα τοῖς πονηροῖς ὠφέλιμα, καὶ ὅσα ἡδέα τοῖς παιδίοις ἢ παιδία. VII. ii. 4-7, &c.

1 ἔτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει — καμνόντων] 'But that it does not follow from these arguments that (pleasure) is not a good, nor even that it is not the chief good, will be seen from the following considerations. First, the term 'good' has a double import, it means either the absolute or the relative good; in accordance with this distinction, different constitutions and states will be either absolutely or relatively good, and so too the processes of charge and transition (which produce them). Thus some of these processes which appear bad may be so in the abstract (ἀπλῶς), while they are not so relatively (τινί), but are desirable for the particular individual. Others again cannot be called desirable even for the particular individual, except on occasion and for a short time; others are not pleasures at all, but only seem so, being accompanied by pain and being (merely) for

the sake of relief, as for instance the pleasures of the sick.'

2 ἔτι ἐπεὶ—ἀπὸ τούτων] 'Secondly, "good" may be either a state or the operation of a state, and so the processes which restore any one to his normal state (φυσικὴν ἔξιν) are pleasurable (not in themselves, but) accidentally (and by association). In fact there is an operation or vital action in desire, namely that of the powers in us which remain unimpaired (τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἔξεως καὶ φύσεως). (And it may be proved that pleasure depends not on want and desire, but on vital action), because there are pleasures which do not imply want and desire, as for instance the pleasures of thought, which take place when the nature is in no respect deficient. A proof (that the processes before-mentioned are only accidentally pleasurable) is to be found in the fact that men do not find delight in the same pleasure while their nature is being recruited (ἀναπληρουμένης) and when it is in a settled condition, but when it is settled they delight in things which are absolutely pleasant, and during the other process in things that are even quite the reverse; as in sharp and bitter things, which are not naturally nor abstractedly pleasant. Nor is the enjoyment of them natural, for as pleasant things, regarded objectively (τὰ ἡδέα), are to one another, so are the subjective feelings which these excite (ἡδοναί).'

μὲν ἐνέργεια τὸ δ' ἕξις, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ καθιστᾶσαι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἕξιν ἡδεῖαί εἰσιν. ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἕξεως καὶ φύσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσιν ἡδοναί, οἷον αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαι, τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεοῦς οὔσης. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ χαίρουσιν ἡδεῖ ἀναπληρουμένης τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, ἀλλὰ καθεστηκυίας μὲν τοῖς ἀπλῶς ἡδέσιν, ἀναπληρουμένης δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις· καὶ γὰρ ὀξέσι καὶ πικροῖς χαίρουσιν, ὧν οὐδὲν οὔτε φύσει ἡδὺ οὐδ' ἀπλῶς ἡδύ. ὥστ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί· ὥς γὰρ τὰ ἡδέα πρὸς ἀλλήλα συνέστηκεν, οὕτω καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων.

3 ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ

This passage is expressed so elliptically as to require several links of thought to be supplied. In the above translation this has been attempted. A bare rendering of the sentences into English would leave them utterly unintelligible.

αἱ καθιστᾶσαι] *i. e.* αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις, carried on from the previous section. The argument is that it is only life and the vital action (φυσικὴ ἕξις καὶ ταύτης ἐνέργεια) which is good and pleasant; the restorative processes are only secondarily, non-essentially, and by a sort of inference, pleasant. The words καθιστᾶσαι and καθεστηκυίας correspond with the term κατὰστασις, which is used of pleasure in *Ar. Rhetoric*, I. xi. 1: κατὰστασις ἀθρόα καὶ αἰσθητὴ εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν.

τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἕξεως] The argument goes on to add that even in these restorative processes there is vital action (ἐνέργεια), namely of those organs that remain unimpaired. The Paraphrast and others understand ὑπολοίπου to mean 'deficient,' and as being equivalent to ἐνδεοῦς in the next line. But the above translation is not only more suitable to the doctrine of the *Peripatetics*, (see Vol. I. Essay IV.

p. 199), but it is borne out by c. xiv. § 7: Λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδέα τὰ ἱατρεύοντα· ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἱατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένουτος ἡγιούς πρᾶττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι. Cf. *Eth.* x. iii. 6.

ὀξέσι καὶ πικροῖς] Mentioned as an instance of things only pleasant during a morbid condition of the body. Cf. *Eth.* x. iii. 8.

3 ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη—ἔστι δ' ἕτερον] 'Moreover it does not follow that these must be something better than pleasure, as some argue, in the same way that the end is better than the process which leads to it. For all pleasures are not transition-states nor the accompaniments of such, but they are rather life itself and the end itself. They do not result from our coming to our powers (γινόμενων), but from our using those powers (χρωμένων); and it is not true that all pleasures have an end separate from them; this is only true of such as are felt by persons in the process of being restored to their normal condition. Hence it is not right to define pleasure as a "sensible transition," but rather we should call it "a vital action of one's natural state," and

τινές φασι τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως· οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον. δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις τις εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν· τὴν

instead of "sensible," "unimpeded." Now pleasure appears to people to be a transition-process from its being good in the full sense of the term, for people confound the ideas of process and action, whereas they are distinct.'

ὥσπερ τινές φασι] In all probability the school, and perhaps the actual writings, of Speusippus, are here alluded to. Nowhere in Plato do the exact words of this definition of pleasure occur (γένεσις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή), but they represent his views, though perhaps carried rather farther. The present section places in opposition to each other the theories of the Platonic and the Aristotelian school, of whom the one considered pleasure to be a relief from pain, a return from depression, an addition to the vital powers; the other considered it to be the play of life itself, the flow of life outward rather than anything received. On these two divergent theories see Vol. I. Essay IV. pp. 197-201. The same subject may be found worked out at greater length, and with interesting notices of the opinions held by later philosophers, in Sir W. Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. II. lect. xliii. pp. 444-475.

ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν] Aristotle when writing accurately distinguishes pleasure from the moments of life and consciousness (ἐνέργειαι), from which it is inseparable. Cf. *Eth.*

x. v. 6: αἱ δὲ (ἡδοναὶ) σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὔτως ὥστε ἔχειν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταυτὸν ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ. οὐ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοιαν εἶναι οὐδ' αἴσθησις· ἄτοπον γάρ· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεται τισι ταυτὸν. He however does not more specifically define it than as ἐπιγιγνώμενον τι τέλος (τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ), *Eth.* x. iv. 8, &c. Eudemus does not preserve the distinction, but simply says that pleasure should be defined as 'the unimpeded play of life.' Aristotle himself occasionally writes in this way; cf. *Metaphys.* xi. vii. 7: ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἐνέργεια τούτου. The term ἐνέργεια, besides other associations, implies consciousness, as has been shown in Vol. I. Essay III. pp. 193-196.

δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις τις εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν] At first sight there appears to be a contradiction in saying that pleasure is thought not to be a good, because it is a γένεσις (ch. xi. § 4); and that it is thought to be a γένεσις because it is a good. The explanation is that the latter clause refers not to the Platonists, but to the Cyrenaics. The Cyrenaics, who considered pleasure the chief good, defined it as an equable process in the soul.' Plato accepted this definition, and turned it against them, arguing that by the very terms used the Cyrenaics had proved pleasure not to be the chief good. The Platonists then were originally

4 γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἴονται εἶναι, ἔστι δ' ἕτερον. τὸ δ' εἶναι φαύλας ὅτι νοσώδη ἔνια ἡδέα, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι ὑγιεινὰ ἔνια φαῦλα πρὸς χρηματισμόν. ταύτη οὖν φαῦλα ἄμφω, ἀλλ' οὐ φαῦλα κατὰ γε τοῦτο, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν
5 ποτὲ βλάπτει πρὸς ὑγίειαν, ἐμποδίζει δὲ οὔτε φρονήσει οὐθ' ἔξει οὐδεμὶα ἢ ἀφ' ἐκάστης ἡδονῇ, ἀλλ' αἱ ἀλλότριαι, ἐπεὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ μαυθάνειν μᾶλλον ποιήσουσι
6 θεωρεῖν καὶ μαυθάνειν. τὸ δὲ τέχνης μὴ εἶναι ἔργον ἡδονὴν μηδεμίαν εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλης ἐνεργείας οὐδεμιάς τέχνη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως· καίτοι καὶ ἡ μυρεψικὴ τέχνη καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιητικὴ δοκεῖ
7 ἡδονῆς εἶναι. τὸ δὲ τὸν σῶφρονα φεύγειν καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον διώκειν τὸν ἄλυπον βίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ παῖδιά καὶ τὰ

indebted for their definition of pleasure (αἰσθητὴ γένεσις) to the Cyrenaics. See Vol. I. Essay II. pp. 132-133.

4—5 τὸ δ' εἶναι φαύλας—μαυθάνειν] 'To say that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are unhealthy is like saying (health is bad) because some healthy things are bad for money making. From that point of view it is true they are both bad, but they are not on account of this incidental badness bad *simpliciter*; since even thought is sometimes injurious to health, and neither wisdom nor any other state of mind is impeded by its own pleasure, but only by foreign pleasures; for the pleasures of learning and thought will make one learn and think more.' The argument here is that a thing good in itself may be relatively bad, *e.g.* health, and thought itself. One good may clash with another, and be from that point of view (ταύτη) bad. The writing is elliptical; we might have expected ἀπλῶς to be added to φαῦλα. The last clause in section 5, which asserts that a mental function is rather assisted than impaired by its own proper pleasure, is taken from Ar.

Eth. x. v. 2-3. Νοσώδη seems to mean 'producing disease,' cf. ch. xi. § 5: as νοσηματώδης before (ch. v. § 3, &c.) means 'produced by disease.' Φρονήσει is evidently used above as the verbal noun of φρονεῖν, in the general sense of 'thought,' and not in the restricted sense which is given to it in Book vi. Cf. *Eth.* i. vi. 11: *Eth. Eud.* ii. i. 1 (quoted above).

6 τὸ δὲ τέχνης κ.τ.λ.] Cf. ch. xi. § 4. An answer is now given to an argument probably occurring in the works of Speusippus. This argument, if fairly represented here, must have had a false major premiss, namely, 'All that is good is the subject of art.' The answer consists of two different pleas; (1) pleasure, like life, is above art, which can only deal with the conditions tending to these things. (2) In another sense there are arts of pleasure, *e.g.* the cook's or the perfumer's art.

7 Most of the arguments against pleasure ignore the distinction between different kinds of pleasures, the one kind being of the nature of life, and the end, and therefore good in themselves (§ 3); the other kind being

θηρία διώκειν, τῷ αὐτῷ λύεται πάντα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς ἀγαθαὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἀγαθαὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰς τοιαύτας τὰ θηρία καὶ τὰ παιδία διώκει, καὶ τὴν τούτων ἀλυπίαν ὁ φρόνιμος, τὰς μετ' ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπης καὶ τὰς σωματικὰς (τοιαῦται γὰρ αὗται) καὶ τὰς τούτων ὑπερβολάς, καθ' ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἀκόλαστος. διὸ ὁ σώφρων φεύγει ταύτας, ἐπεὶ εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ καὶ σώφρονος.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακὸν ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ¹ 3
φευκτόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς κακόν, ἡ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδι-

connected with inferior conditions of our nature, with pain, want, &c., and being therefore only secondarily and accidentally good (§ 2). This latter kind, and excess in them, are made the ground of reproaches against pleasure in general:

XIII. In this chapter, after refuting (§ 1) the objection of Speusippus (that pleasure may be the opposite of pain without being a good), Eudemus urges the claims of pleasure, of the highest kind, to be considered the chief good, because from the terms of its definition it is inseparable from and indeed identical with happiness (§ 2). It is a mere paradox to talk of a man being happy in torture, &c. Happiness requires prosperity, that an 'unimpeded function' may be obtained, *i.e.* pleasure, though there must not be too much prosperity, else happiness is 'impeded' in another way (§§ 3-4). The instinct of all creatures testifies to pleasure being the chief good (§ 5); and it is a mistake to think that bodily pleasure is the only kind that exists (§ 6). In short that pleasure is necessary for happiness proves that it is a good (§ 7).

1 ἀλλὰ μὴν—ἡδονήν] 'But we may go further—it is universally agreed that pain is an evil, and detestable—for it is either absolutely an evil, or

is so relatively as impeding the individual in some way or other.—But that which is contrary to the detestable in that very point which makes it detestable and evil, is good. Therefore it follows that pleasure must be a good. For the answer of Speusippus to this argument does not hold, that "(pleasure is contrary to pain and to the absence of pain) in the same way that the greater is contrary to the less, and also to the equal." For no one could ever say that pleasure is identical with any form of evil.' That pleasure is a good because it is the contrary of pain, is an argument attributed to Endoxus, *Eth.* x. ii. 2. Aristotle there (*Ib.* § 5) mentions the answer to it, and refutes that answer as above. Eudemus, in accordance with his usual style, adds the name of Speusippus. Aulus Gellius, ix. 5, mentions this doctrine: 'Speusippus vetusque omnis Academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse dicunt opposita inter sese: bonum autem esse quod utriusque medium foret.' Accordingly, the neutral state between pain and pleasure would have to be regarded as good. Aristotle and Eudemus reply that the point of contrariety between pain and pleasure is that the one is *φευκτόν*, and the other *αἰρετόν*, therefore the one must be considered an evil, the other a good.

στική. τῷ δὲ Φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ Φευκτόν τε καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὥς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλυσεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον τῷ ἐλάττωι καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη
 2 ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. ἄριστόν τ' οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡδονήν τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἔνιαι φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινα ἐνίων φαύλων οὐσῶν. ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ ἐκάστης ἑξέως εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθ' ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν,

ὅπερ κακόντι] Cf. *Eth.* vi. iv. 3, note. We are probably to understand *τις*, with the Paraphrast and Scholiast. Speusippus would have said that pleasure is an evil. Cf. *Eth.* x. ii. 5.

2 ἄριστον τ' οὐδὲν κωλύει.] This admission is directly contrary to the conclusions of Aristotle (cf. *Eth.* x. iii. 13). It is to be explained as an after development of the system of Aristotle, and an attempt to bring different parts of that system into harmony with each other. Aristotle having used the same formula (*ἐνέργεια*) to express both pleasure and happiness, Eudemus from the force of the terms identifies them. In this he is quite justified, for it is impossible to distinguish the highest kind of pleasure or joy from happiness, especially if we consider peace (*ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀκινήσιας*) to be a mode of joy. It is in accordance with the rest of the *Eudemian Ethics* to speak in this way of pleasure as being an essential element in, and as inseparable from, happiness. Cf. *Eth. Eud.* i. i. 6-7, i. v. 11-12 (quoted above), viii. iii. 11, &c. See Vol. I. Essay IV. 200.

The Vatican scholium on this passage speaks of it as being merely dialectical (but this is from an unwillingness to recognise the discrepancy between Books vii. and x). It proceeds to attribute the present treatise

conjecturally to Eudemus. Διὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων δοκεῖ ταῦτ' ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὰγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ μὴν οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας γένεσιν εἶναι ἢ φαύλας τινὰς τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὥς καὶ δι' αὐτὸ τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὴν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐπιγίνεται καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖ ἐνδόξως ὥς ἐνὸν αὐτὴν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν, ἐπεὶ ἔν γε τοῖς Νικομαχείοις ἐνθεν διείλεκται καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς Ἀριστοτέλης σαφῶς εἴρηκεν αὐτὴν μὴ ταῦτ' εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἀλλὰ παρακολουθεῖν ὥσπερ τοῖς ἄκμαίσι τὴν ὥραν. σημεῖον δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τοῦτ' Ἀριστοτέλους ἀλλ' Εὐδήμου τὸ ἐν τῷ κ' (Book X.) λέγειν περὶ ἡδονῆς ὥς οὐδέπω περὶ αὐτῆς διελεγμένου. πλήν εἴτε Εὐδήμου ταῦτά ἐστιν εἴτ' Ἀριστοτέλους, ἐνδόξως εἴρηται. διὰ τοῦτο λέγεται τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονὴ ὅτι σὺν τῷ ἁρίστῳ καὶ ἀχώριστον αὐτοῦ. τούτῳ δ' ὁμολογεῖ καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς. This, which is a remarkably favourable specimen of the Scholia, may serve to show the wavering and unprofitable character of these commentaries.

ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην.] This must not be taken very strictly, since pleasure and knowledge cannot *both* be the chief good. Both however may be considered as forms of the absolute good. Cf. *Eth.* i. vii. 5. The article is omitted at first with ἄριστον, but is added below. Knowledge is good, though some things it is better not to know.

ἀν ἢ ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἰρετωτάτην εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡδονή. ὥστε εἴη ἂν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ ἄριστον, τῶν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν φαύλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἀπλῶς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἡδὺν οἶονται βίον εἶναι, καὶ ἐμπλέκουσι τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εὐλόγως· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη, ἢ δ' εὐδαιμονία τῶν τελείων· διὸ προσδεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων τῶν ἐν σώματι ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδίζεται ταῦτα. οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις με-³ γάλαις περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ἢ ἀγαθός, ἢ ἐκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. διὰ δὲ τὸ⁴ προσδεῖσθαι τῆς τύχης δοκεῖ τισὶ ταῦτόν εἶναι ἢ εὐτυχία τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, οὐκ οὔσα, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλουσα ἐμπόδιός ἐστιν, καὶ ἴσως οὐκέτι εὐτυχίαν καλεῖν δίκαιον·

καὶ ἐμπλέκουσι τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εὐλόγως] Cf. *Eth. Eud.* i. v. 11 (which passage is here referred to): ἑτεραι δ' εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ δι' ἃς εὐλόγως οἶονται τὸν εὐδαίμονα ζῆν ἡδέως καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀλύπως.

τῶν ἐν σώματι ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς τύχης] This is the principle with regard to happiness which is laid down in *Eth. Nic.* i. viii. 15-17. It was afterwards considered characteristic of the Peripatetic School. Cf. Cicero, *De Fin.* ii. vi. 19: 'Aristoteles virtutis usum cum vitae perfectae prosperitate conjunxit.'

3 οἱ δὲ—λέγουσιν] 'But they who allege that he who is being racked on the wheel, or he that is plunged in great calamities, is happy, provided he be virtuous, talk nonsense, whether intentionally or not.' Cf. *Eth. Nic.* i. v. 6. The words ἐκόντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν answer to εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάτταν in that place. The paradox alluded to was maintained by the Cynics, and afterwards by the Stoics (who denied that pain was an evil). Cf. Cicero, *Tusc.* v. ix. 24: Theophrastus quum statuisset verbera, tormenta,

cruciatu, patriae eversiones, exsilia, orbitates, magnam vim habere ad male misereque vivendum, non est ausus elate et ample loqui, quum humiliter demisseque sentiret.—Vexatur autem ab omnibus primum in eo libro quem scripsit de vita beata, in quo multa disputat, quamobrem is, qui torqueatur, qui crucietur, beatus esse non possit: in eo etiam putatur dicere in rotam beatam vitam non escendere' (quoted by Fritzsche). Cf. also Cicero, *Paradoxa*, ii.

4 ταῦτόν εἶναι ἢ εὐτυχία] Cf. *Eth. Eud.* i. i. 4: ἢ διὰ τύχην· πολλοὶ γὰρ ταῦτόν φασιν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν. This, together with the present passage, is taken from *Eth. Nic.* i. viii. 17.

αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλουσα ἐμπόδιός ἐστιν] A more forcible expression of what is said *Eth.* x. viii. 9: οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὐταρκές κ.τ.λ.

καὶ ἴσως—αὐτῆς] 'And perhaps (when it is overweening), we should no longer call it prosperity; for the standard of prosperity consists in its being conducive to happiness.' The use of the term ὕψος here is by itself

5 πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ὅρος αὐτῆς. καὶ τὸ διώκειν
ὃ ἅπαντα καὶ θηρία καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν ἡδονὴν σημεῖόν τι
τοῦ εἶναί πως τὸ ἄριστον αὐτήν.

Φήμη δ' οὐ τί γε πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἦν τινα λαοὶ
πολλοὶ . . .

6 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσις οὔθ' ἕξις ἡ ἀρίστη οὔτ'
ἔστιν οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὔδ' ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες,
ἡδονὴν μέντοι πάντες. ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἦν
οἶονται οὔδ' ἦν ἂν φαῖεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν· πάντα γὰρ
φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον. ἀλλ' εἰλήφασιν τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος
κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ πλειστάκις τε

almost a conclusive sign that this is the writing of Eudemus. Cf. *Eth.* vi. i. 1, note; and Vol. I. Essay I. p. 22.

5 καὶ τὸ διώκειν δ'—θεῖον] 'In short that all things pursue pleasure, both beasts and men, is a proof that it is in some sort the chief good,—

"For mankind's universal voice can not

Be wholly vain and false."

Since however there is no one nature or state which is, or is thought to be, the best for all, so neither do they all pursue the same pleasure, but still they all pursue pleasure. Nay, perhaps unconsciously they are pursuing, not what they think, or would declare, but (in reality) the same; for all things have within them by nature a divine instinct.' This is said, *Eth.* x. ii. 1, to have been the argument of Eudoxus: *Εὐδοξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰγαθὸν ᾗτο εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάνθ' ὕρᾶν ἐφίεμενα αὐτῆς καὶ ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλογα. Ib.* § 4, Aristotle justifies the argument against objectors in much the same terms as those adopted in the text.

ἦν τινα λαοὶ πολλοὶ] sc. *φημίζουσι*. Hesiod, *Works and Days*, v. 761. Cf. *Eth.* x. ii. 4: ὁ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτ' εἶναι φαμεν.

ἴσως δὲ καὶ] Perhaps by a mys-

terious instinct all creatures, in seeking life and joy, seek under different manifestations one and the same principle of good. Cf. the dream-images in Goethe's *Faust*:

'Einige glimmen
Ueber die Höhen,
Andere schwimmen
Ueber die Seen,
Andere schweben
Alle zum Leben;
Alle zur Ferne
Liebender Sterne,
Seliger Huld.'

Aristotle, *Eth.* x. ii. 4 (which is the source of the above passage), does not go so far as to make all creatures aim at the same good, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φάυλοις ἐστὶ τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὐτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ.

ἀλλ' εἰλήφασιν—οἶονται εἶναι] 'But bodily pleasures have usurped the possession of the name of pleasure, from men's most often resorting to them, and from all men partaking of them; hence because these are the only pleasures they know of, they think they are the only ones which exist.' *παραβάλλειν* appears to mean 'lay themselves alongside,' 'apply themselves to.'

παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτάς καὶ πάντα μετέχειν αὐτῶν· διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους εἶναι ταύτας μόνας οἶονται εἶναι. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, 7 οὐκ ἔσται ζῆν ἡδέως τὸν εὐδαίμονα· τίνος γὰρ ἔνεκα δέοι ἂν αὐτῆς, εἴπερ μὴ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ λυπηρῶς ἐνδέχεται ζῆν; οὔτε κακὸν γὰρ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν ἡ λύπη, εἴπερ μηδ' ἡδονή· ὥστε διὰ τί ἂν φεύγοι; οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδίων ὁ βίος ὁ τοῦ σπουδαίου, εἰ μὴ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ.

Περὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπισκεπτέον τοῖς 14 λέγουσιν ὅτι ἔνιαι γε ἡδοναὶ αἰρεταὶ σφόδρα, οἷον αἱ

7 φανερὸν δὲ—αὐτοῦ] 'Finally it is plain that unless pleasure and the action of life are a good, the happy man cannot live pleasantly. For why should he need pleasure, if it be not a good, and if it be possible for him to live painfully? (and it will be possible), for pain will be neither evil nor good, unless pleasure is; so why should he avoid it? and hence it will follow that the life of the good man will not be more pleasurable than that of the bad man, if his moments of action are not more pleasurable.' This is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the position that pleasure is not a good. We shall be reduced to think (1) that the happy man may live devoid of pleasure; for nothing that is not good can form part of happiness—or even he may live a life of pain, which is the contrary of pleasure; (2) that the good man will have no more pleasure than the bad man, unless pleasure attaches to good acts, in which case it will be part of the good.

XIV. Hitherto Eudemus has followed the lead of Aristotle, only in one respect making a slight development of his conclusions. He now discusses a subject untouched by Aristotle, but which he had proposed to himself in his first book; cf. *Eth. Eud.*

I. V. 11: πότερον, εἰ δεῖ προσάπτειν τῇ ζῆν καλὰς ἡδονὰς τινάς, ταύτας (i.e. τὰς σωματικὰς) δεῖ προσάπτειν, ἢ τούτων μὲν ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν—ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον. Assuming that there are higher pleasures, and that pleasure in the highest form is identical with happiness and the chief good, what is to be said of bodily pleasure? is it an evil or a good? and why is it that men indulge in it so much? To this twofold problem the answers are, Bodily pleasure is in itself a good, as being the contrary of pain; but it is only good under certain limits, as it admits of excess, and the excess is bad (§ 2). There are various reasons why bodily pleasure recommends itself to human nature. (1) It expels the sense of pain, and hence as an anodyne is universally desired from a physical law, for life is full of labour, and the ordinary functions of the senses are laborious acts, only mitigated by custom, §§ 4, 5. (2) The period of youth especially craves after physical pleasure. (3) There are special cases where it is in a way necessary, namely, where peculiarities of temperament render men constitutionally depressed and in want of a sort of relief, §§ 4, 6. (4) From the mixture of the material with the

καλαί, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ περὶ αἷς ὁ ἀκόλαστος.
 2 διὰ τί οὖν αἱ ἐναντίαι λῦπαι μοχθηραί; κακῷ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν
 ἐναντίον. ἢ οὕτως ἀγαθαὶ αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ
 κακὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν; ἢ μέχρι του ἀγαθαί; τῶν μὲν γὰρ
 ἕξιων καὶ κινήσεων ὅσων μὴ ἐστὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ὑπερβολή,
 οὐδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς· ἔσων δ' ἐστί, καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐστίν.
 τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶν ὑπερβολή, καὶ ὁ φαῦλος
 τῷ διώκειν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαίας·
 πάντες γὰρ χαίρουσί πως καὶ ὅψοις καὶ οἴνοις καὶ ἀφρο-
 δισίοις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ. ἐναντίως δ' ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης· οὐ
 γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν φεύγει, ἀλλ' ὅλως· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τῇ
 ὑπερβολῇ λύπη ἐναντία ἀλλ' ἡ τῷ διώκοντι τὴν ὑπερ-
 βολήν.

3 Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον
 τοῦ ψεύδους· τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν·
 ὅταν γὰρ εὐλογον φανῇ τὸ διὰ τί φαίνεται ἀληθὲς οὐκ ὅν

spiritual in us, we are unable to continue perpetually delighting in one pure pleasure, that is, the pleasure of thought. God alone is capable of this; to us, through a fault in our nature (οὐ γὰρ ἀπλὴ οὐδ' ἐπιεικής), change appears sweet, because lower and contradictory elements in us require to be allowed their due action, § 8.

1 τοῖς λέγουσιν] *i. e.* that section of the Platonists referred to above, ch. xi. § 3: τοῖς δ' ἔναι μὲν εἶναι, αἱ δὲ πολλὰ φαῦλαι.

2 τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν—ὑπερβολήν] 'But right bodily pleasures admit of excess, and the bad man (is bad) in that he seeks that excess, instead of seeking such pleasures as are necessary. All men find delight in meat, and wine, and love, though not all according to the proper law. And reversely all men avoid pain (ἐναντίως δ' ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης). A man does not avoid the excess of pain, but pain in general. Pain is not contrary to the excess of pleasure, except to him who pursues

the excess of pleasure.' This argument goes to prove that bodily pleasure is in itself good; only when in excess is it evil. On the other hand all pain is evil. Pleasure and pain then are opposite terms, the one being good and the other evil. To make the doctrine of Speusippus (ch. xiii. 1) hold good, it would be necessary to make pain and the excess of pleasure opposite terms. But they are not so, except perhaps in the mind of the intemperate man, who thinks that the only alternative is between excessive pleasure and a painful sensation.

3 This section is not logically continuous with what immediately precedes. It no longer deals with the opinion of the Platonists that bodily pleasure is an evil, but takes up another question already partly anticipated, ch. xiii. § 6: namely, How is the vulgar error to be accounted for, which gives so much prominence to physical pleasure in the scale of pleasures?

ἀληθές, πιστεύειν ποιεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ μᾶλλον· ὥστε λεκτέον διὰ τί φαίνονται αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ αἰρετώτεραι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δὴ ὅτι ἐκκρούει τὴν λύπην· καὶ διὰ τὰς 4 ὑπερβολὰς τῆς λύπης, ὡς οὔσης ἰατρείας, τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν καὶ ὅλως τὴν σωματικὴν. σφοδραὶ δὲ γίνονται αἱ ἰατρεῖαι, διὸ καὶ διώκονται, διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι. καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ δοκεῖ ἢ ἡδονὴ διὰ δύο ταῦτα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι αἱ μὲν φαύλης φύσεώς εἰσι πράξεις, ἢ ἐκ γενετῆς, ὥσπερ θηρίου, ἢ δι' ἔθος, οἷον αἱ τῶν φαύλων ἀνθρώπων. αἱ δ' ἰατρεῖαι, ὅτι ἐνδοεὺς, καὶ ἔχειν βέλτιον ἢ γίνεσθαι. αἱ δὲ συμβαίνουσι τελευμένων· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν σπουδαῖαι. ἔτι διώ- 5 κονται διὰ τὸ σφοδραὶ εἶναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλαις μὴ δυναμέ-

4 πρῶτον—φαίνεσθαι] 'The first reason is that it drives out pain. When overwhelmed with pain, as a remedy men seek excessive pleasure, and in short bodily pleasure. Now remedies are naturally violent, and they are adopted because they seem to match (παρὰ) their opposites.' On the opinion that remedies are the opposites of the diseases to be cured, cf. *Eth.* II. iii. 4.

καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ—σπουδαῖαι] 'It is on account of these two causes, then, that pleasure is thought not to be a good; first, that some pleasures, as we have said before (ch. v. 1.), are the actions of a depraved nature, whether congenital, like that of a beast, or acquired, like that of depraved men; secondly, that other pleasures are remedies, implying imperfection, since a normal condition (ἔχειν) is better than the process of arriving at that condition, and some pleasures take place while we are arriving at a complete state of being, hence they are only inferentially and not directly (κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς) good.' This paragraph reverts parenthetically to the opinion of the Platonists.

5—6 ἔτι διώκονται—γίνονται] The argument is now resumed from the sentence ending φαίνεσθαι. 'Another reason why physical pleasure is sought, is its comparatively coarse and violent character, which suits those who require strong excitement. And indeed such men even create in themselves certain artificial thirsts for pleasure. If this does not hurt their health, it is no harm. Such men are incapable of enjoying the purer and simpler pleasures, and a neutral state of the sensations is to many painful by a law of nature. For the living creature ever travails, as the physiological books testify, telling us that the acts of seeing and hearing are laborious, only that we are accustomed to them (so they say). So also the young, in the first place, owing to the principle of growth in them, are like those who are intoxicated, and youth is pleasant in itself. And again those of bilious nature are ever in need of an anodyne. Their body is continually fretted by reason of their temperament, and they are ever in vehement desire. Now pleasure, be it the opposite of a given pain, or be it what it may, provided it be strong

νουν χαίρειν· αὐτοὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς δίψας τινὰς παρασκευάζουσιν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀνεπιτίμητον, ὅταν δὲ βλαβεράς, φαῦλον· οὔτε γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἕτερα ἐφ' οἷς χαίρουσιν, τό τε μηδέτερον πολλοῖς λυπηρὸν διὰ τὴν φύσιν· ἀεὶ γὰρ πονεῖ τὸ ζῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ φυσικοὶ λόγοι μαρτυροῦσι, τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες εἶναι λυπηρόν· ἀλλ' ἤδη συνήθεις ἐσμέν, ὡς φασίν.

6 ὁμοίως δ' ἐν μὲν τῇ νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὔξησιν ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι διαάκινται, καὶ ἡδὺ ἢ νεότης. οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν ἀεὶ δέονται ἰατρείας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δακνόμενον διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν κρᾶσιν, καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν ὀρέξει σφοδρᾷ εἰσίν. ἐξελαύνει δὲ ἡδονὴ λύπην ἢ τ' ἐναντία καὶ ἢ τυχοῦσα, ἐὰν ᾗ ἰσχυρά· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι καὶ

7 φαῦλοι γίνονται. αἱ δ' ἄνευ λυπῶν οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερ-

enough, drives out that pain. And hence persons of the bilious temperament become intemperate and vicious.' This passage gives two reasons to explain why a neutral state of the sensations is distasteful, first a general reason: that the laborious action of the human faculties calls for alleviation; second, a special reason: that certain periods of life and certain temperaments produce a craving after physical indulgence.

δίψας τινάς] Fritzsche, after the Scholiast, understands this literally, that some men make themselves thirsty to enjoy the pleasure of drinking. But the use of the plural seems to indicate that we should rather follow the Paraphrast, and the majority of the commentators, in understanding it generally of artificial desires for pleasure, ἐπισκευασταὶ ἐπιθυμίαι, as the Paraphrast calls them.

ὁμοίως δ' ἐν μὲν κ.τ.λ.] The best commentary on this passage will be found in Aristotle's *Problems*, bk. xxx. ch. i., where a frequent comparison is made between the effects of wine,

youth, and the melancholy (or bilious) temperament, in producing desire. Cf. § 5: ὁ γὰρ οἶνος ὁ πολὺς μάλιστα φαίνεται παρασκευάζειν τοιοῦτους οἶνους λέγομεν τοὺς μελαγχολικοὺς εἶναι. § 10: καὶ ὁ οἶνος δὲ πνευματώδης τὴν δύναμιν. διδὲ δὲ ἐστὶ τὴν φύσιν ὅμοια ὅ τε οἶνος καὶ ἡ κρᾶσις, κ.τ.λ. Cf. *Prob.* iv. xxx.: διὰ τί ἀφροδισιαστικοὶ οἱ μελαγχολικοί; ἢ ὅτι πνευματώδεις, κ.τ.λ. The Scholiast gives a rapid explanation of the words ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι in the passage before us. Evidently, all that is meant is to compare the *desires* of youth with those of drunkenness, and of the melancholy temperament. We may compare the lines of Goethe:

'Trunken müssen wir alle sein;
Jugend ist Trunkenheit ohne Wein.'

The principle of *αἵσις* in youth is represented as producing the same results as the humours (χυμὸς ὁ μελαγχολικός—ἡ τῆς μελαίνης χολῆς κρᾶσις) in the bilious temperament.

7—8 αἱ δ' ἄνευ λυπῶν—ἐπιεικής] 'The pleasures unpreceded by pain do not admit of excess, they are essentially and not accidentally pleasures.'

βολήν. αὗται δὲ αἱ τῶν φύσει ἡδέων καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἡδέα τὰ ἰατρεύοντα· ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἰατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένουτος ὑγιῶς πράττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι· φύσει δ' ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως. οὐκ αἰὲ δ' οὕθην ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπλῆν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνεῖναι τι καὶ ἕτερον, καθὼς φθαρτά, ὥστε ἂν τι θάτερον πράττῃ, τοῦτο τῇ ἑτέρᾳ φύσει παρὰ φύσιν, ὅταν δ' ἰσάζῃ, οὔτε λυπηρὸν δοκεῖ οὐθ' ἡδὺ τὸ πραττόμενον· ἐπεὶ εἴ του ἡ φύσις ἀπλῆ εἴη, αἰὲ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται. διὸ ὁ θεὸς αἰὲ μίαν καὶ ἀπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστίν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήσιας, καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ ἐστίν ἢ ἐν κινήσει. μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύτατον, κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῇ οὐδ' ἐπιεικῆς.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς 9

By the accidental pleasures, I mean such as are of the nature of a remedy. Because, when it happens that we are relieved, owing to some operation of that part in us which continues sound, the result is a sensation of pleasure. By the natural pleasures, I mean those which produce the action of any given nature. The same thing is never continuously pleasant to us, because our nature is not simple, but there is in us a second element, by reason of which we are destructible. Thus, when the one element is in action, it thwarts the tendencies of the second element. And when the two elements are balanced, the result appears neither painful, nor pleasant. If there is any being whose nature is simple, the same mode of action will be continuously and in the highest degree pleasurable to him. Hence God enjoys everlastingly one pure pleasure. For there is a function not only of motion, but of rest; and

pleasure consists rather in tranquillity than in motion. "Change," as the poet says, "is the sweetest of all things," on account of a certain fault in our nature. The bad man is fond of change, and of the same character is the nature which requires change; it is not simple or good.' In the above passage we see a reproduction, and to some extent a carrying out, of Aristotle's doctrines in the tenth Book of the *Ethics*, cf. especially ch. iv. 9: Πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἡδεταί; ἢ κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. On the comparison between the compound nature of man and the purely divine nature of God, cf. ch. vii. 8: ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ἡ θεῖον τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσῳ δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν.

καὶ λύπης εἴρηται, καὶ τί ἕκαστον καὶ πῶς τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ κακά· †λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ Φιλίας ἐροῦμεν.

It is to be remarked that the present Book, which commences with a mention of *θεία ἀρετή*, or the operation of reason unalloyed by passion, ends with a mention of *θεία ἡδονή*,

which is the consciousness of the same.

†λοιπὸν—ἐροῦμεν] See Vol. I. Essay I. p. 32.

PLAN OF BOOKS VIII.—IX.

A RISTOTLE'S treatise on Friendship, here contained, is quite continuous. The division of it into two books is merely artificial. There is really no break between the end of Book VIII. and the beginning of Book IX. The words *περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσούτον εἰρήσθω* (VIII. xiv. 4), introduced to create a division, are evidently from an Editor's and not from the Author's hand.

The use of the phrase *ἐν ἀρχῇ* (VIII. ix. 1, VIII. xiii. 1, IX. iii. 1), in reference to the earlier chapters of Book VIII., has led some persons to suppose that this was originally an independent treatise. But nothing is more clear than that it was written to form a part of Aristotle's work on ethics. Besides general expressions of the author's purpose to confine himself to an ethical point of view (see VIII. i. 7, IX. ii. 2), we find direct quotations of, or references to, the first books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. (Compare IX. ix. 5 with *Eth. Nic.* I. vii. 14; and I. viii. 13, and IX. iv. 2, with *Eth. Nic.* III. iv. 5.)

The present treatise has a close connection with the first three books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. But it is remarkable that it has no connection with Books V., VI., VII. Friendship is here treated in relation to Happiness and in relation to Justice. What is said of Happiness forms the complement to *Eth. Nic.* Book I., but what is said of Justice has no reference to *Eth. Nic.* Book V.; rather it appears written tentatively, perhaps before the *Politics* of Aristotle, from which the theories of *Eth. Nic.* Book V. seem to have been derived. (See VIII. vi. 6, VIII. vii. 2-3, VIII. ix., x., IX. i. 1-2.)

Again, it is equally striking that there is no reference to Book VII. in the parts of this treatise where the phenomena of vice are discussed (see IX. iv. 8-9, IX. viii. 6). Indeed the views taken

here are inconsistent with those of Book VII., which contain a more rigid analysis. (Compare IX. iv. 8 with VII. viii. 1.)

The style of these two Books is certainly unlike that of Books V., VI., VII., while it bears a close similarity with that of *Eth. Nic.* I. and X. Not one of the 'Eudemian' forms of expression is to be found here.

The treatise on Friendship may be roughly divided into three parts:—

I. On the different kinds of Friendship, and on the nature of the highest and truest type, VIII. i.—viii.

II. On the connection of Friendship with Justice, (1) as arising (with certain exceptions, see c. xii.) out of political relationships, or coinciding with them; (2) as implying obligations to be repaid, VIII. ix.—IX. iii.

III. On other questions connected with the nature of Friendship, and especially on its relation to Happiness, IX. iv.—xii.

Though the treatise is continuous, yet it is easy to see that the writer's views became deeper and more definite as he advanced. (Thus compare IX. vi. with VIII. i. 4; IX. x. with VIII. i. 5; and VIII. vi. 2–3, VIII. viii. 7 with VIII. i. 6.)

At the same time we see what a powerful instrument was the Aristotelian analysis for producing clearness of view. By an analysis of the objects of liking (*τὸ φιλητόν*, VIII. ii. 1), Aristotle clears away all the vagueness which the *Lysis* of Plato had left around the nature of Friendship. By an application of his own philosophical form *ἐνέργεια* (IX. vii. 4–6, IX. ix. 5–6, IX. xii. 1), he obtains a profound theory of the operation of the highest kind of Friendship in relation to human happiness.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ VIII.



ΜΕΤΑ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ φιλίας ἔποιτ' ἂν διελθεῖν· ἔστι γὰρ ἀρετὴ τις ἣ μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἔτι δ' ἀναγκαιότατον εἰς τὸν βίον· ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἔλοιτ' ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντα· καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δυναστείας κεκτημένοις δοκεῖ φίλων μάλιστ' εἶναι χρεῖα· τί γὰρ ὄφελος τῆς τοιαύτης εὐετηρίας ἀφαιρεθείσης εὐεργεσίας, ἣ γίγνεται μάλιστα καὶ ἐπαινετωτάτη πρὸς φίλους; ἢ πῶς ἂν τηρηθεῖ καὶ σώζοιτ' ἄνευ φίλων; ὅσα γὰρ πλείων, τοσούτω ἐπισφαλεστέρα. ἐν πενία τε καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς δυστυχίαις μόνην οἴονται καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοὺς φίλους. καὶ νέοις δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ πρεσβυτέροις πρὸς θεραπείαν καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῆς πράξεως δι' ἀσθένειαν βοηθεῖ, τοῖς τ' ἐν ἀκμῇ πρὸς τὰς καλὰς πράξεις·

σύν τε δὴ ἔρχομένῳ·

I. The discussion of Friendship is justified here (analogously to the way in which the discussion of the voluntary is justified, *Eth.* III. i. 1-2) *first*, on the ground of its connection with virtue, *secondly*, on the ground that it is a means to happiness (ἀναγκαιότατον) in all conditions of life. As a commencement of the discussion, Aristotle mentions the difficulties raised on the subject in the *Lysis* of Plato: Does friendship depend on similarity or on contrast? Can bad men be friends to each other? and he adds another: Is there only one species of friendship, or are there more? Aristotle by his own analysis of the likeable (τὸ φιλητόν) immediately cuts straight through these difficulties.

I ἀρετὴ τις ἣ μετ' ἀρετῆς] We have of course nothing here to do with that nameless excellence, mentioned *Eth.* IV. vi. 4, which is said to resemble *φιλία*, and which in the *Eudemean Ethics*, and the *Magna Moralia*, is brought into the list of virtues, under the name of *φιλία*, as a mean between *ἐχθρα* and *κολακεία*.

τί γὰρ ὄφελος—φίλους] 'For what is the use of that sort of abundance, if one is deprived of the power of doing good, which is exercised most especially, and in its most praiseworthy form, towards friends?'

2 σύν τε δὴ ἔρχομένῳ] The saying of Diomedes when about to penetrate the Trojan camp, *Il.* x. 224:

- 3 καὶ γὰρ νοῆσαι καὶ πρᾶξαι δυνατώτεροι. φύσει τ' ἐνυ-
 πάρχειν ἔοικε πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ γεννήσαντι καὶ
 πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι, οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὄρνισι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζώων, καὶ
 τοῖς ὁμοθεύεσι πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
 ὅθεν τοὺς φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν. ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐν
 ταῖς πλάναις ὡς οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ
 4 φίλῳ. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις συνέχειν ἡ φιλία, καὶ οἱ
 νομοθέται μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτὴν σπουδάζειν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην·
 ἡ γὰρ ὁμόνοια ὁμοίον τι τῇ φιλίᾳ ἔοικεν εἶναι, ταύτης δὲ
 μάλιστ' ἐφίενται καὶ τὴν στάσιν ἔχθραν οὖσαν μάλιστα
 ἐξελαύνουσιν. καὶ φίλων μὲν ὄντων οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης,
 δίκαιοι δ' ὄντες προσδέονται φιλίας, καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ
 5 μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ. οὐ μόνον δ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶν
 ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους ἐπαινοῦμεν, ἢ τῇ
 πολυφιλίᾳ δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν ἐν τι εἶναι, καὶ ἔνιοι τοὺς
 αὐτοὺς οἶονται ἀνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ φίλους.
 6 Διαμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ὀλίγα. οἱ μὲν

σύν τε δὴ ἐρχομένῳ, καὶ τε πρὸς τὸ τοῦ
 ἐνόησεν,

ἔκπας κέρδος ἔρ· μοῖνος δ' εἶπερ τε
 νοήσῃ.

ἀλλὰ τε οἱ βράσσων τε νόος, λεπτή δὲ
 τε μῆτις.

The words here quoted had become
 proverbial. Cf. Plato *Alcib.* II. 140 A;
Protag. 348 C.

3 τοῖς ὁμοθεύεσι] This word is ap-
 plied here to brutes as well as men.
 In the same sense ὁμογενέσιν is used,
Eth. Eud. VII. V. 3, and συγγενῇ, *Ar.*
Rhet. I. XI. 25.

ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις—φίλῳ] 'And in tra-
 velling too one may see how near and
 dear every man is to man,' i.e. one
 may see this both as a matter of gene-
 ral observation, and as oneself meet-
 ing with kindness and hospitality.

4 καὶ οἱ νομοθέται] Cf. the speech
 of Lysias in Plato's *Phædrus*,

καὶ τῶν δικαίων—δοκεῖ] 'And the

height of justice appears to be of the
 nature of friendship.' Under the
 words τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα equity
 (τὸ ἐπιεικές) appears to be meant. Cf.
Eth. V. X. 6-8.

5 ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν] This is repeating
 in other words that friendship is ἀρετή
 τις. The distinction between ἀναγκαῖον
 and καλόν is common in Aristotle, and
 the one term suggests the other. Cf.
Eth. IX. XI. 1.

ἢ τε πολυφιλία δοκεῖ] 'To have
 many friends is commonly thought to
 be something noble.' This popular
 opinion is considerably qualified on
 further examination, cf. *Eth.* IX. X. 6.

καὶ ἔνιοι—φίλους] 'And some think
 that the term "good friend" is con-
 vertible with that of "good man."' Cf.
 a similar form of expression, *Eth.*
 V. II. 11: οὐ γὰρ ἴσως ταῦτ' ἀνδρὶ τ'
 ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολὺν παντί.

6 διαμφισβητεῖται] The questions
 mentioned here are raised in the *Lysis*

γὰρ ὁμοιότητά τινα τιθέασιν αὐτὴν καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους φίλους, ὅθεν τὸν ὁμοίον φασιν ὡς τὸν ὁμοιον, καὶ κολοῖόν ποτὶ κολοῖόν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κεραμεῖς πάντας τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἀλλήλοις φασὶν εἶναι. καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἀνώτερον ἐπιζητοῦσι καὶ φυσικώτερον, Εὐριπίδης μὲν φάσκων ἑρᾶν μὲν ὕμβρου γαῖαν ξηρανθεῖσαν, ἑρᾶν δὲ σεμνὸν οὐρανὸν πληρούμενον ὕμβρου πεσεῖν ἐς γαῖαν, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν καὶ πάντα κατ' ἔριν γίνεσθαι· ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ τούτοις ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἑμπεδοκλῆς· τὸ γὰρ ὁμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου ἐφείσθαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν 7 φυσικὰ τῶν ἀπορημάτων ἀφείσθω (οὐ γὰρ οἰκεία τῆς παρούσης σκέψεως)· ὅσα δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπικὰ καὶ ἀνήκει εἰς τὰ ἦθη καὶ τὰ πάθη, ταῦτ' ἐπισκεψώμεθα, οἷον πότερον ἐν πᾶσι γίνεται φιλία ἢ οὐχ οἷον τε μοχθηροὺς

of Plato, pp. 214-215. (214 A) Λέγουσι δὲ (οἱ ποιηταί) πως ταῦτα, ὡς ἐγῴμαι, αὐδί·

αἰεὶ τοι τὸν ὁμοῖον ἀγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον

καὶ ποιεῖ γινώριμον . . . οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς τῶν σοφωτάτων συγγράμμασιν ἐντετύχηκας ταῦτ' αὐτὰ λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὸ ὁμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἀνάγκη αἰεὶ φίλον εἶναι; εἰσι δέ που οὗτοι οἱ περὶ φύσεως τε καὶ τοῦ ἔλου διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες. ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις . . . (215 C) Ἦδη ποτὲ τοῦ ἤκουσα λέγοντος, καὶ ἄρτι ἀναμνήσκομαι, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὁμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς πολεμιάτατοι εἶεν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἡσίοδον ἐπῆγετο μάρτυρα, λέγων ὡς ἄρα καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ αἰοῖδός αἰοῖδῷ
καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ.

καὶ τᾶλλα δὴ πάντα οὕτως ἔφη ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι μάλιστα τὰ ὁμοιώτα πρὸς ἄλληλα φθόνου τε καὶ φιλονεικίας καὶ ἔχθρας ἐμπέλασθαι, τὰ δ' ἀνομοιώτα φιλίας . . . τὸ γὰρ ἐναντιώτατον τῷ ἐναντιωτάτῳ εἶναι μάλιστα φίλον. ἐπιθυμεῖν γὰρ τοῦ τοιοῦτου ἕκαστον, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ὁμοίου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ξηρὸν ὑγροῦ, τὸ

δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμοῦ, τὸ δὲ πικρὸν γλυκεῖος, τὸ δὲ ὀξὺ ἀμβλέος, τὸ δὲ κενὸν πληρώσεως, καὶ τὸ πλήρες δὲ κενώσεως. Which of the two views is true, is not decided in the *Lysis*, where however it is laid down that friendship cannot consist in pure contrariety.

καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν—φυσικώτερον] 'And about these very questions some inquire in a more deep and philosophical way,' i.e. not limiting their view to the phenomena of friendship itself, but bringing in the analogies of the physical world. Aristotle sets aside such speculations as not belonging to ethics; he remarks parenthetically below (*Eth.* viii. viii. 7), that the contrary in nature does not desire its extreme contrary, but the mean.

Εὐριπίδης] The verses occur in a fragment of an uncertain play, which is preserved by Athenæus, xiii. p. 599.

τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον] 'The opposing conduces,' a play on words characteristic of the oracular style of Heraclitus.

7 ἢ οὐχ οἷον τε μοχθηροὺς ὄντας] This question is started in the *Lysis*,

όντας φίλους εἶναι, καὶ πότερον ἐν εἶδος τῆς φιλίας ἐστὶν ἢ πλείω. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν οἴόμενοι, ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπιστεύκασι σημείω· δέχεται γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον καὶ τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει. φέρεται δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔμπροσθεν.

- 2 Τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερόν γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον. δόξειε δ' ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι δι' οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἡδονή, ὥστε
 2 φιλητὰ ἂν εἴη τὰ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς τέλη. πότερον οὖν τὰ ἀγαθόν φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν; διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοτε ταῦτα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν φιλεῖν ἕκαστος, καὶ εἶναι ἀπλῶς μὲν τὰ ἀγαθόν φιλητόν, ἕκαστῳ δὲ τὸ ἕκαστῳ. φιλεῖ δ' ἕκαστος οὐ τὸ ὃν αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον. διοίσει δ' οὐδέν·
 3 ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητόν φαινόμενον. τριῶν δ' ὄντων δι' α'

p. 214 D: τοῦτο τοίνυν αἰνίττονται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ὃ ἐταῖρε, οἱ τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον λέγοντες, ὡς ὁ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνος μόνος φίλος, ὁ δὲ κακὸς οὐτ' ἀγαθῷ οὐτε κακῷ οὐδέποτε εἰς ἀληθῆ φιλίαν ἔρχεται.

οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν οἴόμενοι κ.τ.λ.] 'For they who think that there is only one species of friendship, because it admits of degrees, trust to an insufficient proof. For things also that differ in species admit of degrees. But we have spoken about them before.' Aristotle immediately proceeds to show that there are three distinct species of friendship, in accordance with the three objects of liking. He also says that the friendships for pleasure or profit are *less* friendships than that for the good (*ἡττόν εἰσιν*, viii. vi. 7). All three kinds admit of the idea (*λόγος*) of friendship, thus they are comparable in point of degree. Cf. *Ar. Categ.* viii. 36: ἀπλῶς δέ, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιδέχηται ἀμφοτέρω τῶν τοῦ προκειμένου

λόγον, οὐ βῆθησεται τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου μᾶλλον. As there is no place in the *Ethics* where Aristotle has discussed this logical question before, a Scholiast says with regard to the last words of the paragraph; ἔοικε δὲ εἰρησθαι ἐν τοῖς ἐκπεπτωκόσι τῶν Νικομαχείων. But most probably the words *ἐφρηται* δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν are the interpolation of a copyist, who was perhaps thinking vaguely of *Eth.* ii. viii. 5, to which the commentators generally refer. These words spoil the grammar of the sentence, as *περὶ αὐτῶν* is used in the next line with a different reference.

II. 2 πότερον οὖν—αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν] Aristotle here guards himself against the appearance of having admitted the Platonic theory, that the absolute good is always the object of human desire. Cf. *Eth.* iii. iv. 1, and note.

ἔσται γὰρ—φαινόμενον] 'For in that case the object of liking will be an apparent and not an absolute object.'

φιλοῦσιν, ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀψύχων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται
 φιλία· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκείνων
 ἀγαθοῦ· γελοῖον γὰρ ἴσως τῷ οἴνω βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ·
 ἀλλ' εἴπερ, σώζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα αὐτὸς ἔχῃ.
 τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα.
 τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τὰγαθὰ εὖνους λέγουσιν, ἐὰν μὴ
 ταῦτ' οὐ καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου γίγνηται· εὖνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντι-
 πεπονθήσει φιλίαν εἶναι. ἢ προσθετέον μὴ λανθάνουσιν·⁴
 πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσιν εὖνοι οἷς οὐχ ἐωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι
 δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους· τοῦτο δὲ ταῦτ' οὐ καὶ ἐκείνων
 τις πάθοι πρὸς τοῦτον. εὖνοι μὲν οὖν οὗτοι φαίνονται
 ἀλλήλοις· φίλους δὲ πῶς ἂν τις εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὥς
 ἔχουσιν ἑαυτοῖς; δεῖ ἄρα εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι
 τὰγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας δι' ἓν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.

Διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων εἶδει· καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις ἄρα³
 καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. τρία γὰρ τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἶδη, ἰσάριθμα τοῖς
 φιλητοῖς· καθ' ἕκαστον γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις οὐ λανθά-
 νουσα. οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τὰγαθὰ ἀλλή-
 λοις ταύτῃ ἢ φιλοῦσιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φι-
 λοῦντες ἀλλήλους οὐ καθ' αὐτοὺς φιλοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ γίγνεται
 τι αὐτοῖς παρ' ἀλλήλων ἀγαθόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδον-
 ῆν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιούς τινος εἶναι ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέ-
 λους, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡδεῖς αὐτοῖς. οἱ τε δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον²
 φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονήν

3 τῇ τῶν ἀψύχων] Suggested by the *Iysis* of Plato, p. 212 D, where οἶνος is mentioned as an object of liking: οὐδ' ἄρα φίλιποι εἰσιν, οὓς ἂν οἱ ἴπποι μὴ ἀντιφιλῶσιν, οὐδὲ φιλόρτυγες, οὐδ' αὖ φιλόκυνες γε καὶ φίλοινοι κ.τ.λ.

4 ἢ—τοῦτον] 'Or must we add the proviso that it be not unknown? For many are kindly disposed to men whom they have never seen, but whom they suppose to be good or useful, and one of these latter might reciprocate the same feeling.' τοῦτον, being substituted for the plural πολλοί, gives definiteness. Cf. ix. i. 4: τοῦτοις

καὶ προτέχει, καὶ ἐκείνου γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει.

III. 1 ταύτῃ ἢ φιλοῦσιν] 'According to the particular mode of their friendship.' The differences of mode are specified afterwards.

οὐ καθ' αὐτοὺς φιλοῦσιν] 'Do not love each other for their very selves.' This phrase καθ' αὐτοὺς is rather a logical formula than an ordinary grammatical combination. It seems to have arisen from καθ' αὐτό, 'the absolute.' Cf. viii. iii. 7, and the use of δι' αὐτοὺς, viii. iv. 6, ix. i. 7.

- διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἡδύ, καὶ οὐχ ᾗ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ᾗ
 χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς. κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι αὐταὶ
 εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἐστὶν ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φιλούμενος, ταύτη
 φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ᾗ πορίζουσιν οἱ μὲν ἀγαθόν τι οἱ δ' ἡδονήν.
 3 εὐδιάλυτοι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦταί εἰσι, μὴ διαμενόντων αὐτῶν ὁ-
 μοίων· ἐὰν γὰρ μηκέτι ἡδεῖς ἢ χρήσιμοι ᾤσι, παύονται φι-
 λούντες. τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ διαμένει, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλο
 γίγνεται. ἀπολυθέντος οὖν δι' ὁ φίλοι ἦσαν, διαλύεται
 4 καὶ ἡ φιλία, ὡς οὔσης τῆς φιλίας πρὸς ἐκεῖνα. μάλιστα
 δ' ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύταις ἡ τοιαύτη δοκεῖ φιλία γίνεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ
 τὸ ἡδὺ οἱ τηλικούτοι διώκουσιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον), καὶ τῶν
 ἐν ἀκμῇ καὶ νέων ὅσοι τὸ συμφέρον διώκουσιν. οὐ πάνυ
 δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐδὲ συζῶσι μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ'
 εἰσὶν ἡδεῖς· οὐδὲ δὴ προσδέονται τῆς τοιαύτης ὁμιλίας, ἐὰν
 μὴ ὠφέλιμοι ᾤσιν· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γὰρ εἰσιν ἡδεῖς ἐφ' ὅσον
 ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν ἀγαθοῦ. εἰς ταύτας δὲ καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν
 5 τιθέασιν. ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δι' ἡδονὴν εἶναι δοκεῖ· κατὰ
 πάθος γὰρ οὗτοι ζῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα διώκουσι τὸ ἡδὺ αὐτοῖς
 καὶ τὸ παρόν· τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μεταπιπτούσης καὶ τὰ ἡδέα
 γίνεται ἕτερα. διὸ ταχέως γίνονται φίλοι καὶ παύονται·
 ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἡδεῖ ἡ φιλία μεταπίπτει, τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης
 ἡδονῆς ταχεῖα ἡ μεταβολή. καὶ ἐρωτικοὶ δ' οἱ νέοι· κατὰ
 πάθος γὰρ καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἐρωτικῆς· διόπερ
 φιλοῦσι καὶ ταχέως παύονται, πολλάκις τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας
 μεταπίπτοντες. συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ συζῆν οὗτοι βούλου-
 νται· γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ φιλίαν οὕτως.
 6 Τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν
 ὁμοίων· οὗτοι γὰρ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις,
 ᾗ ἀγαθοί· ἀγαθοὶ δ' εἰσὶ καθ' αὐτούς. οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι
 τὰ ἀγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι· δι'
 αὐτοὺς γὰρ οὕτως ἔχουσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός·

2 καὶ οὐχ ᾗ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ᾗ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς] The reading surely should be ἔστιν, 'not by reason of the existence of the person who is loved, but by reason of his being useful or pleasant.' The personal existence of the friend is, according to Aristotle,

the chief blessing of friendship. Cf. IX. IX. 10: εἰ δὴ τῷ μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἰρετόν ἐστι καθ' αὐτό, ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει ἢ καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν αἰρετῶν ἂν εἴη.

διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων φιλία ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ ᾧσιν, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον. καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάτερος ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τῷ φίλῳ· οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἀπλῶς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις· ἐκάστω γὰρ καθ' ἡδονὴν εἰσιν αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται, τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ φιλία μόνιμος εὐλόγως ἔστιν· συνάπτει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πάνθ' ὅσα τοῖς φίλοις δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. πᾶσα γὰρ φιλία δι' ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ἢ δι' ἡδονήν, ἡ ἀπλῶς ἢ τῷ φιλοῦντι, καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα· ταύτῃ δὲ πάνθ' ὑπάρχει τὰ εἰρημένα καθ' αὐτούς· ταύτῃ γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ λοιπά, τό τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἀπλῶς ἐστίν. μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα φιλητά, καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν δὲ καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν τούτοις μάλιστα καὶ ἀρίστη. σπανίας δ' εἰκὸς τὰς 8 τοιαύτας εἶναι· ὀλίγοι γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. ἔτι δὲ προσδίδεται χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας· κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν

6 ἐκάστω γὰρ—ὅμοιαι] 'For to every man his own actions and those similar to them are pleasurable, and the actions of the good are (to the good) identical (with their own actions) or similar.' The friend being *alter ego*, the delight of friendship is that it gives an increased sense of existence.

7 συνάπτει] Neuter, as in VIII. iv. 5: οὐ πάντ' ὅ αὐταὶ συνάπτουσιν.

πᾶσα γὰρ—τινα] 'For every friendship is for good or for pleasure; either absolute, or else relative to him who feels the friendship, and only bearing a certain resemblance to the absolutely good or pleasurable.' The comma should surely be omitted after τῷ φιλοῦντι. Aristotle is not here saying (as the commentators fancy) that every friendship implies similarity. But that every friendship, whether the genuine type or one of the secondary and reflected species, aims at either good or pleasure. This is made clear by the next chapter, § 4: πρώτως μὲν

καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἀγαθοί, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ' ὁμοιότητα.

ταύτῃ γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ λοιπά, τό τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἀπλῶς ἐστίν] 'For the other kinds of friendship moreover are resemblances of this (the perfect kind), and the absolutely good is also absolutely pleasurable.' This passage has vexed the commentators. Zell thinks that ὅμοια may be referred to καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα in the previous sentence (which he mistakes), and explains, 'In this kind of friendship there is similarity and all the other requisite qualities.' But we surely then should have expected τὰ ὅμοια. Cardwell, following Giphanius, Zwinger, and the Scholiast, reads ταύτῃ γὰρ ὅμοιοι καὶ τὰ λοιπά. 'In this kind of friendship, men are similar, *et cætera*.' The common reading, as above explained, seems borne out by the opening of the next chapter, ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμοίωμα ταύτης ἔχει. Cf. VIII. vi. 7. Ὅμοια here is in opposition to ταύτῃ—καθ' αὐτούς.

εἰδῆσαι ἀλλήλους πρὶν τοὺς λεγομένους ἄλλας συναναλῶσαι· οὐδ' ἀποδέξασθαι δὴ πρότερον οὐδ' εἶναι φίλους, πρὶν ἂν
 9 ἐκάτερος ἐκατέρῳ φανῇ φιλητὸς καὶ πιστευθῇ. οἱ δὲ
 ταχέως τὰ φιλικὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιοῦντες βούλονται
 μὲν φίλοι εἶναι, οὐκ εἰσὶ δέ, εἰ μὴ καὶ φιλητοί, καὶ τοῦτ'
 ἴσασιν· βούλησις μὲν γὰρ ταχεῖα φιλίας γίνεται, φιλία
 ὃ οὐ. αὕτη μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον καὶ κατὰ τὰ
 λοιπὰ τελεία ἐστί, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτά γίνεται καὶ
 ὅμοια ἐκατέρῳ παρ' ἐκατέρου, ὅπερ δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπάρ-
 χειν·

- 4 Ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμῶμα ταύτης ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ
 ἡδέϊς ἀλλήλοις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον· καὶ
 γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἀγαθοί. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐν τού-
 τοις αἱ φιλίαι διαμένουσιν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίγνηται παρ'
 ἀλλήλων, ὅσον ἡδονή, καὶ μὴ μόνον οὕτως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ
 τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ὅσον τοῖς εὐτραπέλοις, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐραστῇ καὶ
 ἐρωμένῳ· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἡδονταὶ οὗτοι, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν
 ὁρῶν ἐκείνον, ὁ δὲ θεραπευόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐραστοῦ· λη-
 γούσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας ἐνίοτε καὶ ἡ φιλία λήγει· τῷ μὲν γὰρ
 οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέϊα ἡ ὄψις, τῷ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἡ θεραπεία. πολ-
 λοι δ' αὖ διαμένουσιν, ἐὰν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἥθη στέρ-
 2 ξωσιν, ὁμοῦθεις ὄντες. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀντικαταλλατ-
 τόμενοι ἀλλὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς καὶ εἰσὶν ἥττον
 φίλοι καὶ διαμένουσιν. οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ὄντες φίλοι
 ἅμα τῷ συμφέροντι διαλύονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἦσαν
 φίλοι ἀλλὰ τοῦ λυσιτελοῦς. δι' ἡδονὴν μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ
 τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ φαύλους ἐνδέχεται φίλους εἶναι ἀλλήλοις,
 καὶ ἐπεικεῖς φαύλοις καὶ μηδέτερον ὑποιοῦν, δι' αὐτοὺς

8 τοὺς λεγομένους ἄλλας] 'The salt of the proverb,' cf. *Eth. Eud.* vii. ii. 35: διὸ εἰς παροιμίαν ἐλήλυθεν ὁ μέδιμνος τῶν ἁλῶν. Cicero, *Laelius*, ch. xix.: Verumque illud est quod dicitur, multos modios salis simul edendos esse, ut amicitiae munus expletum sit.

οὐδ' ἀποδέξασθαι δὴ—φίλους] 'Nor indeed can they be satisfied that they are friends at all.' Cf. viii. v. 3: οἱ δ' ἀποδέχμενοι ἀλλήλους. ix. iii. 3:

ἐὰν δ' ἀποδέχεται ὡς ἀγαθόν. Xen. *Mem.* iv. i. 1: ἀποδέχεσθαι Σωκράτην.

9 εἰ μὴ—ἴσασιν] 'Unless they are likeable (by one another), and are assured of this.'

IV. 2 καὶ εἰσὶν ἥττον—διαμένουσιν] 'Are both friends in a less degree and are (less) abiding.'

καὶ μηδέτερον ὑποιοῦν] 'And he who is neither good nor bad may be a friend

δὲ δῆλον ὅτι μόνους τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς· οἱ γὰρ κακοὶ οὐ χαίρουσιν ἑαυτοῖς, εἰ μὴ τις ὠφέλεια γίγνοιτο. καὶ μόνῃ δὲ ἡ τῶν 3 ἀγαθῶν φιλία ἀδιάβλητός ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον οὐδενὶ πιστεῦσαι περὶ τοῦ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὑπ' αὐτῶν δεδοκιμασμένου. καὶ τὸ πιστεύειν ἐν τούτοις, καὶ τὸ μηδέποτ' ἂν ἀδικῆσαι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλίᾳ ἀξιούται. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἑτέραις οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰ τοιαῦτα γίνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι λέγουσι φίλους καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρή- 4 σιμον, ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις (δοκοῦσι γὰρ αἱ συμμαχίαι ταῖς πόλεσι γίνεσθαι ἕνεκα τοῦ συμφέροντος), καὶ τοὺς δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντας, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, ἴσως λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους τοὺς τοιούτους, εἶδῃ δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλείω, καὶ πρώτως μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἀγαθοί, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν τι καὶ ὅμοιον, ταύτῃ φίλοι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν τοῖς φιληδέσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' αὐταὶ συνάπτουσιν, οὐδὲ γίνονται 5 οἱ αὐτοὶ φίλοι διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συνδυάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. εἰς ταῦτα δὲ τὰ εἶδῃ τῆς φιλίας νενεμημένης οἱ μὲν Φαῦλοι ἔσονται 6

either to the good or to the bad, or to him who is neither one nor the other.' For the word *μηδέτερος* to express a neutral or intermediate state, cf. *Eth.* vii. xiv. 5: τὸ *μηδέτερον*, 'that which is neither pleasure, nor pain.'

3 καὶ μόνῃ δὲ—γίνεσθαι] 'And in short the friendship of the good is alone incapable of being disturbed by accusations. For it is not easy (for the good) to believe any person about a man whom they have long proved. And the sayings about "having faith," and that (the friend) "never could wrong one," and all the other points which are demanded in ideal friendship, are realised in the friendship of the good. But in the other kinds nothing prevents disturbances from accusations (τὰ τοιαῦτα) arising.' Διαβάλλειν is 'to set two people by the ears.' Cf. Plato, *Repub.* p. 498 c:

μη διάβαλλε ἐμὲ καὶ Θρασύμαχον ἔρτι φίλους γεγονότας.

4 ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι καὶ ὅμοιον, ταύτῃ φίλοι] 'For so far as (these kinds of friendship exhibit) something good and resembling the good, so far (those who exercise them) are friends.' The commentators are again deceived by the word *ὅμοιον*, taking it to mean 'similarity of character.' See above ch. iii. § 7, note.

5 οὐ πάνυ—συμβεβηκός] 'But the above-mentioned kinds of friendship do not always coincide. Nor do the same men become friends for the sake of the useful, as for the sake of the pleasant. For things only accidentally connected are not always found together.' On *συμβεβηκός*, cf. *Ar. Met.* iv. xxx. 1: *συμβεβηκὸς λέγεται δ' ὑπάρχει μὲν τινὶ καὶ ἀληθὲς εἶπεῖν, οὐ μέντοι οὐ* 'ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.' See also below, § 6.

φίλοι δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταύτη ὅμοιοι ὄντες, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ δι' αὐτοὺς φίλοι· ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθοί. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς φίλοι, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τῷ ὁμοιωσθαι τούτοις.

- 5 Ὡςπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν οἱ μὲν καθ' ἕξιν οἱ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συζῶντες χαίρουσιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ πορίζουσι τὰγαθά, οἱ δὲ καθεύδοντες ἢ κεχωρισμένοι τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι μὲν, οὕτω δ' ἔχουσιν ὥστ' ἐνεργεῖν φιλικῶς· οἱ γὰρ τόποι οὐ διαλύουσι τὴν φιλίαν ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. ἐὰν δὲ χρόνιος ἡ ἀπουσία γίνηται, καὶ τῆς φιλίας δοκεῖ λήθην ποιεῖν· ὅθεν εἴρηται

πολλὰς δὲ φιλίας ἀπροσηγορία διέλυσεν.

- 2 οὐ φαίνονται δ' οὐθ' οἱ πρεσβῦται οὐθ' οἱ στρυφνοὶ φιλικοὶ εἶναι· βραχὺ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, οὐδεὶς δὲ δύναται συνημερεῖν τῷ λυπηρῷ οὐδὲ τῷ μὴ ἡδέϊ· μάλιστα γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαίνεται τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν φεύγειν, ἐφίεσθαι δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος. οἱ δ' ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους, μὴ συζῶντες δέ, εὖνοις εἰκόασι μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοις. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλων ὥς τὸ συζῆν· ὠφελείας μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἐνδεεῖς ὀρέγονται, συνημερεῖν δὲ καὶ οἱ μακάριοι· μονώταις μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τούτοις ἥκιστα προσήκει. συνδιάγειν δὲ μετ' ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστι μὴ ἡδέϊς ὄντας μὴδὲ χαίροντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ ἡ ἐταιρική δοκεῖ ἔχειν.

- 4 Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φιλία ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καθάπερ πολλάκις εἴρηται· δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλητὸν μὲν καὶ αἰρετὸν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ, ἐκάστω δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ τοιούτον· ὁ δ'

6 ταύτη ὅμοιοι ὄντες] 'In this respect (*i.e.* as affording and seeking pleasure or utility) being like (the good).'

V. 1 οἱ δὲ καθεύδοντες—ἐνέργειαν] 'But those who are asleep, or who are separated by the intervals of space, do not exercise friendship, though they have all the disposition to exercise it. For the intervals of space do not destroy friendship, but only its exercise.' This is of course a most inadequate

translation of ἐνεργεῖν and ἔχουσιν. These words must be understood by a study of Aristotle's forms of thought. See Vol. I. Essay IV. On the ἐνέργεια of friendship, cf. *Eth.* ix. ix.

3 οἱ ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους] 'They who are satisfied with one another.' Cf. above, VIII. iii. 3.

ὅπερ ἡ ἐταιρική δοκεῖ ἔχειν] 'And this (*i.e.* pleasure and sympathy) seems the property of companionship.'

4. ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ δι' ἑμφω ταῦτα] 'Now the good man (is a

ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ δι' ἄμφω ταῦτα. ἔοικε δ' ἡ μὲν φί-
 λησις πάθει, ἡ δὲ φιλία ἔξει· ἡ γὰρ φίλησις οὐχ ἥττον
 πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχά ἐστιν, ἀντιφιλοῦσι δὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως,
 ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀφ' ἑξέως. καὶ τὰγαθὰ βούλονται τοῖς
 φιλούμενοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα, οὐ κατὰ πάθος ἀλλὰ καθ' ἔξιν.
 καὶ φιλοῦντες τὸν φίλον τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ
 ἀγαθὸς φίλος γινόμενος ἀγαθὸν γίνεται ὡς φίλος. ἐκάτε-
 ρος οὖν φιλεῖ τε τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι
 τῇ βουλήσει καὶ τῷ ἡδέϊ· λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης ἡ ἰσότης.

Μάλιστα δὴ τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταυτ' ὑπάρχει. ἐν δὲ 6
 τοῖς στρυφνοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτικοῖς ἥττον γίνεται ἡ φιλία,
 ὅσῳ δυσκολώτεροί εἰσι καὶ ἥττον ταῖς ὁμιλίαις χαίρουσιν.
 ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστ' εἶναι φιλικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ φιλίας.
 διὸ νέοι μὲν γίνονται φίλοι ταχύ, πρεσβῦται δ' οὐ· οὐ γὰρ
 γίνονται φίλοι οἷς ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ στρυ-

friend) to the good man for the sake of both these things,' (i.e. the absolutely good and the absolutely pleasant).

5 *ἔοικε δ'—ἔξως*] 'Loving is like an emotion, but friendship like a settled disposition of the mind. For loving exists just as well towards inanimate objects; but when men reciprocate friendship it implies purpose, and purpose proceeds from a settled disposition of the mind.' In *Eth.* iv. vi. 5 (cf. ii. v. 2), Aristotle makes friendship to be an emotion, or characterized by emotion. The present passage does not in the least contradict this, as *ἔξις*, or a settled disposition of mind, is merely the result of regulated emotions, and the tendency to reproduce them.

ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις, κ. τ. λ.] In *Eth.* iii. ii. 1, Aristotle speaks of 'purpose' as the test of character; *ib.* § 11, as constituting character; *ib.* § 2, as not acting suddenly; *ib.* § 17, as implying reason and forethought.

ἐκάτερος—ἡδέϊ] 'Each of the two then loves that which is a personal

good to himself, and he makes an equal return both in wishing good and in (actual) pleasure.' Zell, following two MSS., reads *εἶδει*. But Bekker's reading (*ἡδέϊ*) appears preferable: (1) because *ἴσον εἶδει* would not be a natural expression; it confounds *degree* with *kind*; we should expect *ταῦτόν εἶδει*: (2) because *ἡδέϊ* gives very good sense, since it is one thing to reciprocate the motives or feelings of friendship, and another to give your friend the same amount of pleasure as he gives you.

λέγεται—ἰσότης] 'For equality is said to constitute friendship.' A Pythagorean saying, connecting moral ideas with the ideas of number. Cf. Diog. Laert. viii. i. 8: *εἰπέ τε πρῶτος (ὡς φησι Τίμαιος) κοινὰ τὰ φίλων εἶναι· καὶ φιλίαν ἰσότητα*.

VI. 1 This section is an awkward repetition of what has been said before, ch. v. § 2. This, however, merely shows that we have probably the uncorrected draft of Aristotle's treatise on Friendship.

φνοί. ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἶνοι μὲν εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις· βούλονται γὰρ τὰγαθὰ καὶ ἀπαντῶσιν εἰς τὰς χρείας· φίλοι δ' οὐ πάνυ εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνημερεύειν μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλήλοις, ἀ² δὲ μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικά. πολλοῖς δ' εἶναι φίλον κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἔρᾶν πολλῶν ἄμα· ἔοικε γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ, τὸ τοιοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἓνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, πολλοὺς δ' ἄμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν σφόδρα οὐ³ ῥάδιον, ἴσως δ' οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι, ὃ παγχάλεπον. διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται· πολλοὶ⁴ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι. τούτων δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικε φιλία ἢ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ὅταν ταῦτα ὑπ' ἀμφοῖν γίγνηται καὶ χαίρωσιν ἀλλήλοις ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, οἷαι τῶν νέων εἰσὶν αἱ φιλίαι· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ ἐλευθέριον. ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἀγοραίων. καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δὲ χρησίων μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται, ἡδέων δέ· συζῆν μὲν γὰρ βούλονται τισι, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον φέρουσιν, συνεχῶς δ' οὐθεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι, οὐδ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγα-

2 πολλοῖς—εἶναι] 'It is not possible to be a friend to many men on the footing of the perfect kind of friendship, just as one cannot be in love with many at the same time. For (the perfect friendship) is a sort of excess of feeling, which naturally arises towards one person alone; again, it is not easy for many persons to be intensely pleasing to the same individual, and perhaps not easy that many should be good.' ὑπερβολή here would be nearly represented by the French word *abandon*; it implies the throwing away of limits and restraints, a giving up of one's whole self. Cf. IX. iv. 6: ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμοιοῦται. Of course there is an association of Aristotelian ideas (μεσότης, ἔλλειψις, &c.) in the term. It is repeated *Eth.* ix. x. 5, where the question of the plurality of friendships is carefully gone into.

3 πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται] We should have expected πολλοὺς ἡμῖν ἀρέσκειν, on the analogy of the last sentence, πολλοὺς τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν, but the writing seems careless and the expression is inverted.

οἱ τοιοῦτοι] i.e. the useful and the pleasant. Cf. § 6, where τοιοῦτοι again takes its sense from the context.

4 ἀγοραίων] 'Of mercenary persons.' Cf. *Ar. Pol.* iv. iv. 10: λέγω δ' ἀγοραῖον (πλήθος) τὸ περὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς ὠνὰς καὶ τὰς ἐμπορίας καὶ καπηλείας διατρίβον. *Ib.* vi. iv. 12: ὁ γὰρ βίος φαῦλος, καὶ οὐθὲν ἔργον μετ' ἀρετῆς ὧν μεταχειρίζεται τὸ πλήθος τὸ τε τῶν βαναύσων καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὸ θητικόν.

χρησίων μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται] i.e. Happiness by its definition implies a sufficiency of external means, *Eth.* i. viii. 15.

οὐδ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ λυπηρὸν] This sentence is παρ' ὑπόνοιαν, in other

θόν, εἰ λυπηρὸν αὐτῷ εἶη· διὰ τοὺς φίλους ἡδεῖς ζητοῦσιν. δεῖ δ' ἴσως καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοιούτους ὄντας, καὶ ἔτι αὐτοῖς· οὕτω γὰρ ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς ὅσα δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις. οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις διηρημένοις φαίνονται χρῆσθαι τοῖς φίλοις· ἄλλοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶ χρήσιμοι καὶ ἕτεροι ἡδεῖς, ἅμφω δ' οἱ αὐτοὶ οὐ πάνυ· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεῖς μετ' ἀρετῆς ζητοῦσιν οὔτε χρησίμους εἰς τὰ καλὰ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν εὐτραπέλους τοῦ ἡδέος ἐφίεμενοι, τοὺς δὲ δεινούς πρᾶξαι τὸ ἐπιταχθέν· ταῦτα δ' οὐ πάνυ γίνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ· ἡδὺς δὲ καὶ χρήσιμος ὅμα εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ σπουδαῖος· ἀλλ' ὑπερέχοντι οὐ γίνεται ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος, ἂν μὴ καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχεται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἰσάζει ἀνάλογον ὑπερεχόμενος. οὐ πάνυ δ' εἰώθασι τοιοῦτοι γίνεσθαι.

Εἰσὶ δ' οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι φιλίαι ἐν ἰσότητι· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ γίγνεται ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν καὶ βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἕτερον

words, a joke. It is a contradiction in terms to speak of the Absolute Good as painful. Cf. *Ar. Rhét.* i. vi. 2: 'Ἐστὼ δὴ ἀγαθὸν ὃ ἂν αὐτὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἕνεκα ᾗ αἰρετόν, καὶ οὐ ἕνεκα ἄλλο αἰρούμεθα, καὶ οὐ ἐφίεται πάντα ἢ πάντα τὰ αἰσθησιν ἔχοντα ἢ νοῦν, ἢ εἰ λάβοι νοῦν—καὶ οὐ παρόντος εὖ διακρίνεται καὶ αὐτάρκως ἔχει, κ. τ. λ.

δεῖ δ' ἴσως—αὐτοῖς] 'And perhaps (in seeking friends) one ought (to require) that even good men should have this qualification (*i.e.* pleasantness), and moreover not in a merely universal way, but relatively to one-self.'

5 οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς—φίλοις] 'Great potentates' (cf. *Eth.* i. v. 3) 'however seem to make use of their friends separately;' *i.e.* they keep two sets of friends, one for profit or business, and another for pleasure.

6 ἡδὺς δὲ—γίνεσθαι] 'Now we have already said that the good man is both pleasant and useful at once. But such a man does not become a friend to his superior (in rank), unless he be surpassed (by that superior) in

virtue also. Else, he does not find himself in that position of equality which is produced by superiority in proportion to merit. Such persons, however (as potentates who surpass the good in virtue), are not produced every day.' The commentators have strangely interpreted this passage, making *ὑπερέχεται* take for its nominative ὁ *ὑπερέχων*, as though Aristotle had said that a good man would not be a friend to a potentate, if that potentate had superior moral qualities; and as though 'equality' were produced by one man having all the merit and another all the power. On the contrary, Aristotle would have said that 'proportionate equality' is produced, according to the principles of distributive justice, by each man having in proportion to his merits, cf. *Eth.* v. iii. 6, *Pol.* iii. ix. 15. There is no sense of inequality produced by the position of a man socially exalted in intellect and character; inequality is felt when a fool or a villain occupies a high social position. Ἰσάζει is doubtless intransitive, and ἀνάλογον

ἀνθ' ἐτέρου ἀντικαταλλάττονται, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἀντ' ὠφελείας. ὅτι δ' ἦττον εἰσὶν αὗται αἱ φιλίαι καὶ μένουσιν, εἴρηται. δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ δι' ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ταύτου εἶναι τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι φιλίαι· καθ' ὁμοιότητα γὰρ τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν φαίνονται φιλίαι (ἡ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἔχει ἡ δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει κακείνῃ), τῷ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀδιάβλητον καὶ μόνιμον εἶναι, ταύτας δὲ ταχέως μεταπίπτειν ἄλλοις τε διαφέρειν πολλοῖς, οὐ φαίνονται φιλίαι δι' ἀνομοιότητα ἐκείνης.

- 7 Ἐτερον δ' ἐστὶ φιλίας εἶδος τὸ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν, οἷον πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὅλως πρεσβυτέρῳ πρὸς νεώτερον, ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ παντὶ ἄρχοντι πρὸς ἀρχόμενον. διαφέρουσι δ' αὗται καὶ ἀλλήλων· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἄρχουσι πρὸς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα, οὐδ' ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα. ἑτέρα γὰρ ἐκάστω τούτων ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἑτερα δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτὰ φιλοῦσιν.
- 2 ἑτεραι οὖν καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. ταῦτά μὲν δὴ οὔτε γίνεσθαι ἐκατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου οὔτε δεῖ ζητεῖν· ὅταν δὲ γονεῦσι μὲν τέκνα ἀπονέμῃ αὐτοῖς τοῖς γεννήσασιν, γονεῖς δὲ υἱέσιν αὐτοῖς τοῖς τέκνοις, μόνιμος ἡ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἐπιεικὴς ἔσται φιλία. ἀνάλογον δ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν οὖσαις φιλίαις καὶ τὴν φίλησιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι, οἷον τὸν ἀμείνω μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ἢ φιλεῖν, καὶ τὸν ὠφελιμώτερον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὁμοίως· ὅταν γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν ἡ φίλησις γίγνηται, τότε γίγνεται πως ἰσότης ὁ δὴ τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ.
- 3 Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἔν τε τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ φαίνεται ἔχειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον πρῶτως τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως, ἐν δὲ τῇ φιλίᾳ τὸ μὲν κατὰ ποσὸν πρῶτως, τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν δευ-

adverbial. For this intransitive use of ἰσάζω, cf. xiii. 1: ἰσάζοντες ταῖς ὠφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες.

7 εἴρηται] Cf. viii. iii. 2-3.

VII. 2 ἀνάλογον δ'] The same principle of distributive justice, main-

tained above in § 6 of the last chapter, is again appealed to. Where friends are not equal, their friendship must be regulated by proportion.

3 οὐχ ὁμοίως—δευτέρως] 'But equality seems to stand differently in justice and in friendship. In justice,

τέρως. ὁῦλον δ', ἐὰν πολὺ διάστημα γίγνηται ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας ἢ εὐπορίας ἢ τινος ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι εἰσίν, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀξιοῦσιν. ἐμφανέστατον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν· πλεῖστον γὰρ οὗτοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν. ὁῦλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτοις ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι οἱ πολὺ καταδεέστεροι, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ σοφωτάτοις οἱ μηδεὶς ἄξιοι. ἀκριβὴς μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις 5 οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρισμός, ἕως τίνος οἱ φίλοι· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀφαιρουμένων ἔτι μένει, πολὺ δὲ χωρισθέντος, οἶον τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐκέτι. ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται, μή ποτ' οὐ βοῦλονται οἱ φίλοι 6 τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οἶον θεοὺς εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι ἔσονται αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ δὴ ἀγαθὰ· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι ἀγαθὰ. εἰ δὴ καλῶς εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ βούλεται τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, μένειν ἂν ᾗ ὅς ποτ' ἔστιν ἐκεῖνος· ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ ὄντι βουλήσεται τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ. ἴσως δ' οὐ πάντα· αὐτῷ γὰρ μάλισθ' ἕκαστος βούλεται τὰ ἀγαθὰ.

proportionate equality is primary, and quantitative equality secondary; in friendship, quantitative equality is the first, and proportionate equality the second consideration.' Distributive justice begins by presupposing inequalities between man and man, and by proportionate assignments it equalizes these. Justice, however, cares little about bringing men to quantitative or exact equality. The latter kind of equality at all events is aimed at only in democracies, while the proportionate equality belongs to aristocracies and constitutional governments, cf. *Ar. Pol.* vi. ii. 2. Friendship on the other hand begins by presupposing equality between the parties, and though a certain amount of inequality may be made up by proportionate assignment of affection, &c., yet a wide interval of inequality will render friendship altogether impossible.

4 πλεῖστον γὰρ οὗτοι] The reading *πλείστων* in the Oxford reprint of Bekker's edition (1837) is a misprint.

The original Berlin edition has *πλεῖστον*.

5 ἀκριβὴς—οὐκέτι] 'In such cases there is no exact definition up to what point friendship is possible; for though many (advantages) be taken away (from the one side), friendship still abides; but when (the one friend) is far removed from the other, as, for instance, God is from man, there is no friendship any longer.'

6 ὅθεν καὶ—τὰ ἀγαθὰ] 'From this the question has arisen whether friends wish for their friends the greatest of all goods, as for instance to be gods. For having attained this, they would no longer at all be friends to those who formed the wish, and therefore no advantage to them, for friends are an advantage. If then it has been rightly stated that the friend wishes all that is good to his friend for that friend's sake, it will be necessary for that friend to remain as he is, and then he will wish for him, being a man, the greatest goods.'

- 8 Οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι διὰ φιλοτιμίαν βούλεσθαι φιλεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ φιλεῖν, διὸ φιλοκόλακες οἱ πολλοί· ὑπερεχόμενος γὰρ φίλος ὁ κόλαξ, ἢ προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος εἶναι καὶ μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι. τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἐγγὺς εἶναι
 2 δοκεῖ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οὗ δὴ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐφίενται. οὐ δὲ αὐτὸ δ' εἰκόσιν αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν τιμὴν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· χαίρουσι γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τιμώμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα· οἶονται γὰρ τεύξεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἃν του θέωνται· ὥς δὴ σημείω τῆς εὐπαθείας χαίρουσι τῇ τιμῇ. οἱ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπεικῶν καὶ εἰδότην ὀρεγόμενοι τιμῆς βεβαιῶσαι τὴν οἰκίαν δόξαν ἐφίενται περὶ αὐτῶν· χαίρουσι δὲ ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀγαθοί, πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν λεγόντων κρίσει. τῷ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ κατ' αὐτὸ χαίρουσιν· διὸ δόξειεν ἂν κρεῖττον εἶναι τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ ἡ φιλία
 3 κατ' αὐτὴν αἰρετὴ εἶναι. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι εἶναι. σημεῖον δ' αἱ μητέρες τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρουσαι· ἔναι γὰρ διδῶσι τὰ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι, καὶ φιλοῦσι μὲν εἰδοῦναι, ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δ' οὐ ζητοῦσιν, ἐὰν ἀμφοτέρω μὴ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν αὐταῖς ἔοικεν εἶναι, ἐὰν ὁρῶσιν εὖ πράττοντας, καὶ αὐταὶ φιλοῦσιν αὐτούς, καὶ

After all, perhaps he will not wish him to have everything. For every one especially wishes for himself what is good.' Under the words *ἀπορεῖται μή ποτ' οὐ* is included a question both as to fact and cause. *Οὐδὲ γὰρ* denies the fact and states the cause, which is that if we wished our friend to become a god, we should wish him to be in a position where he can no longer be our friend. The last sentence (*ἴσως δ' οὐ πάντα*) qualifies the previous statement, and guards against the notion that any human friendship can be utterly disinterested and selfless. The same topic is fully discussed in the eighth chapter of Book IX.

VIII. 1—2 Though the essence of friendship consists rather in loving than in being loved, the mass of men

prefer the latter, as ministering to their vanity. Being loved is akin to being honoured. Parenthetically it may be observed, that honour is sought not for itself but on account of things variously associated with it (*κατὰ συμβεβηκός*). (1) To be honoured by the great affords a hope of promotion. (2) To be honoured by the wise and good is an evidence to men of their own merits. Thus honour is desired as a means to the consciousness of virtue. Cf. *Eth.* i. v. 5: *εἰκόσιν τὴν τιμὴν δίδωκεν ἵνα πιστεύωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ' οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ ἐν' ἀρετῇ.*

3 The active spirit of love, as opposed to the passive gratification of being loved, is exemplified by the case of mothers, who give their children

ἐκεῖνοι μὴδὲν ὧν μητρὶ προσήκει ἀπονέμωσι διὰ τὴν ἄγνοι- 4
αν. μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς φιλίας οὐσης ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν φιλο-
φίλων ἐπαινουμένων, φίλων ἀρετῇ τὸ φιλεῖν ἔοικεν, ὥστ'
ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, οὗτοι μόνιμοι φίλοι καὶ ἡ
τούτων φιλία. οὕτω δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἀνισοὶ μάλιστα εἴεν φίλοι· 5
ισάζονται γὰρ ἂν. ἡ δ' ἰσότης καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης, καὶ
μάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοιότης· μόνιμοι γὰρ ὄντες
καθ' αὐτοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους μένουσι, καὶ οὔτε δέονται
φαύλων οὐθ' ὑπηρετοῦσι τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ δια-
κωλύουσι· τῶν ἀγαθῶν γὰρ μὴτ' αὐτοὺς ἀμαρτάνειν μήτε
τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτρέπειν. οἱ δὲ μοχθηροὶ τὸ μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ
ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς διαμένουσιν ὅμοιοι ὄντες· ἐπ'
ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον γίγνονται φίλοι, χαίροντες τῇ ἀλλήλων
μοχθηρίᾳ. οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένου- 6
σιν· ἕως γὰρ ἂν πορίζωσιν ἡδονὰς ἢ ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις.
ἐξ ἐναντίων δὲ μάλιστα μὲν δοκεῖ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον γίγ-
νεσθαι φιλία, οἷον πένης πλουσίῳ, ἀμαθὲς εἰδότη· οὗ γὰρ
τυγχάνει τις ἐνδεὴς ὧν, τούτου ἐφείμενος ἀντιδωρεῖται ἄλλο.
ἐνταῦθα δ' ἂν τις ἔλκοι καὶ ἐραστὴν καὶ ἐρώμενον, καὶ
καλὸν καὶ αἰσχροῦ. διὸ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ γελοῖοι
ἐνίοτε, ἀξιοῦντες φιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλοῦσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ φιλη-
τοὺς ὄντας ἴσως ἀξιοτέον, μὴδὲν δὲ τοιοῦτον ἔχοντας
γελοῖον. ἴσως δὲ οὐδ' ἐφίεται τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου καθ' 7
αὐτό, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἡ δ' ὁρεξις τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν·

to be brought up by other persons, and go on loving them, though not even recognised by them.

4—5 It is this active spirit of love which constitutes the virtue of friendship, and which causes us to praise those who are of a friendly disposition. This then explains what was above stated merely as a fact, *Eth.* VIII. i. 5. The same spirit serves as the equalising principle in unequal friendships, greater merit being met by greater love.

5—7 Friendship is based on equality and similarity, especially the friendship of the good. Friendships for the sake of pleasure or profit seem rather

based on contrariety, as for instance on the contrariety of riches and poverty. But, after all, one would say not that the contrary seeks its contrary, but that the contrary seeks the mean.

5 μάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοιότης] Cf. the *Lysis* of Plato, p. 214, quoted above upon ch. i. 6.

τῶν ἀγαθῶν—ἐπιτρέπειν] 'For the good will neither do wrong themselves, nor permit their friends to do it.'

7 ὁρεξις τοῦ μέσου] This phrase is in accordance with the pantheistic side of Aristotle's philosophy, attri-

τούτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν, οἷον τῷ ξηρῷ οὐχ ὑγρῷ γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐλθεῖν, καὶ τῷ θερμῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀλλοτριώτερα.

- 9 Ἴσους δέ, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἢ τε φιλία καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἐν ἀπάσῃ γὰρ κοινωνίᾳ δοκεῖ τι δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ φιλία δέ· προσαγορεύουσι γοῦν ὡς φίλους τοὺς σύμπλους καὶ τοὺς συστρατιώτας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις κοινωνίαις· καθ' ὅσον δὲ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτόν ἐστι φιλία· καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον. καὶ ἡ παροιμία 'κοινὰ τὰ φίλων,'
 2 ὁρθῶς· ἐν κοινωνίᾳ γὰρ ἢ φιλία. ἔστι δ' ἀδελφοῖς μὲν καὶ ἐταίροις πάντα κοινά, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἀφωρισμένα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πλείω τοῖς δ' ἐλάττω· καὶ γὰρ τῶν φιλιῶν αἱ μὲν μᾶλλον αἱ δ' ἥττον. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὰ δίκαια· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἀδελφοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐδ' ἐταίροις καὶ πολίταις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 3 φιλιῶν. ἕτερα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀδίκᾳ πρὸς ἐκάστους τούτων, καὶ αὐξήσιν λαμβάνει τῷ μᾶλλον πρὸς φίλους εἶναι, οἷον χρήματα ἀποστερῆσαι ἐταῖρον δεινότερον ἢ πολίτην, καὶ μὴ βοηθῆσαι ἀδελφῷ ἢ ὀνείῳ, καὶ πατάξαι πατέρα ἢ ὀντινοῦν ἄλλον. αὐξέσθαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἅμα τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὄντα καὶ ἐπ' ἴσον
 4 διήκοντα. αἱ δὲ κοινωνίαι πᾶσαι μορίοις εἰκόασι τῆς πολιτικῆς· συμπορεύονται γὰρ ἐπὶ τινι συμφέροντι, καὶ ποριζόμενοί τι τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ

buting to nature a desire for the good. Cf. *De Animâ*, II. IV. 3: πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου (τοῦ θεοῦ) ὀρέγεται, κακείνου ἕνεκα πράττει ὅσα πράττει κατὰ φύσιν. *Eth.* X. II. 4: ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φάυλοις ἐστὶ τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὐτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ.

IX. 1 ἐν ἀρχῇ] *Eth.* VIII. I. 4.

περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς] 'About the same things, and in the same persons.' Cf. *Eth.* V. III. 5: οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὅν, δύο ἐστί, καὶ

ἐν οἷς τὰ πράγματα, δύο. *Pol.* III. IX. 3: τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ἰσότητα ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι.

3 Αὐξέσθαι δὲ—διήκοντα] 'Justice of necessity becomes more binding as friendship becomes closer, for they exist in the same subjects, and are coextensive in their application.'

4 αἱ δὲ κοινωνίαι—βίον] 'All communities are like parts of the political community; for (the members of them) unite with a view to some advantage, and to providing some of the conveniences of life.'

κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμένειν· τούτου γὰρ καὶ οἱ νομοθέται στοχάζονται, καὶ δίκαιόν φασιν εἶναι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι κοινωναὶ κατὰ μέρη τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐφίενται, οἷον πλωτῆρες μὲν τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦν πρὸς ἐργασίαν χρημάτων ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, συστρατιῶται δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, εἴτε χρημάτων εἴτε νίκης ἢ πόλεως ὀρεγόμενοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ φυλέται καὶ δημόται. ἔναιαι δὲ τῶν κοινωνιῶν δι' ἡδονὴν δοκοῦσι γίνεσθαι, θιασωτῶν καὶ ἑρανιστῶν· αὗται γὰρ θυσίας ἔνεκα καὶ συνουσίας. πᾶσαι δ' αὗται ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν εἰκόασιν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος συμφέροντος ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐφίεται, ἀλλ' εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν βίον, θυσίας τε ποιοῦντες καὶ περὶ ταύτας συνόδους, τιμὰς ἀπονέμοντες τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀναπαύσεις πορίζοντες μεθ' ἡδονῆς. αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖαι θυσίαι καὶ σύνοδοι φαίνονται γίνεσθαι μετὰ τὰς τῶν καρπῶν συγκομιδὰς οἷον ἀπαρχαί· μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐσχόλαζον τοῖς καιροῖς. πᾶσαι δὲ φαίνονται αἱ κοινωναὶ μόρια τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι· ἀκολουθήσουσι δὲ αἱ τοιαῦται φιλίας ταῖς τοιαύταις κοινωνίαις.

Πολιτείας δ' ἐστὶν εἴδη τρία, ἴσαι δὲ καὶ παρεκβάσεις, οἷον φθοραὶ τούτων. εἰσὶ δ' αἱ μὲν πολιτεῖαι βασιλεία

5 θιασωτῶν καὶ ἑρανιστῶν] Cardwell refers for illustration of these terms to Demosthenes, pp. 313, 23; 403, 19; 1355, 3; 1217, 14.

By omitting, with Fritzsche, Bekker's full stop after *συνουσίας*, and by placing the words *οὐ γὰρ*—*τὸν βίον* in a parenthesis, we see that the participles *ποιοῦντες*, *ἀπονέμοντες*, *πορίζοντες* are to be referred to *κοινωνοί*, as implied in *κοινωνιῶν* above. The passage which speaks of men 'awarding honour to the gods, while providing recreation and pleasure for themselves,' is highly characteristic of the Greek religion. This sort of thing can perhaps be best understood in the present day by those who have seen

the religious festivals of the Hindoos. Cf. Plato's *Republic*, p. 364 B: *θυσίας τε καὶ ἐπαυδαῖς*—*μεθ' ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐορτῶν*.

X. This chapter, containing a classification of forms of government and of the perversions to which they are exposed, can hardly have been written after the *Politics* of Aristotle. It has rather the appearance of a first essay, the conclusions of which were afterwards worked out into detail, and partly modified. Thus Aristotle in the *Politics* by no means concedes the position that monarchy is the best form of government. He argues, *Pol.* III. xv. 4–16, that it is better for a

τε καὶ ἀριστοκρατία, τρίτη δ' ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἣν τιμοκρατικὴν λέγειν οἰκῆον φαίνεται, πολιτείαν δ' αὐτὴν εἰώθασιν οἱ πλείστοι καλεῖν. τούτων δὲ βελτίστη μὲν ἡ βασιλεία, χειρίστη δ' ἡ τιμοκρατία. παρέμβασις δὲ βασιλείας μὲν τυραννίς· ἄμφω γὰρ μοναρχίαι, διαφέρουσι δὲ πλείστον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ ἑαυτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος οὐδενὸς προσδεῖται· τὰ ὠφέλιμα οὖν αὐτῷ μὲν οὐκ ἂν σκοποίη, τοῖς δ' ἀρχομένοις· ὁ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος

state to be governed by good laws than by the best individual will; further on, *Pol.* iii. xvii., he qualifies this by admitting that for some peoples monarchy is better suited.

1 παρεκβάσεις] 'Perversions' or 'abnormal growths'; cf. *Pol.* iii. vi. 11, where a form of government is pronounced to be normal as long as it aims at the public good, abnormal when its end is private interest: φανερόν τοίνυν ὡς ὕσαι μὲν πολιτεῖαι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον σκοποῦσιν, αὗται μὲν ὀρθὰ τυγχάνουσιν ὁδοὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, ὅσαι δὲ τὸ σφέτερον μόνον τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἡμαρτημέναι πᾶσαι καὶ παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν· δεσποτικαὶ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐστίν.

πολιτείαν δ' αὐτὴν εἰώθασιν οἱ πλείστοι καλεῖν] 'But most people are accustomed to term it "a constitution."' The word *πολιτεία* was used by the Greeks in a restricted sense, just as the word 'constitution' is in English, to denote a balanced form of government. Cf. *Ar. Pol.* iii. vii. 3: ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμῆρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, *πολιτεία*. Aristotle does not use the word in the *Politics* to denote a timocracy. In the ninth chapter of Book IV. he uses it to denote a mixed form between

oligarchy and democracy. He also uses it to express his own ideal of a state, which was far from being a timocracy.

2 ὁ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος κληρωτὸς ἂν τις εἴη βασιλεὺς] 'For he who had not these qualifications would be a sort of ballot-box king.' It is difficult to express the word *κληρωτός*, which as coupled with *βασιλεὺς* is certainly meant to be contemptuous. Aristotle does not appear to mean any definite form of monarchy, so we learn nothing from *Pol.* iii. xiv., to which the commentators refer us. Aristotle here says that the genuine king must be independent in property and position, and above all his subjects in this respect. Externally wanting nothing for himself, he will administer the state for the good of his subjects. If this is not the case, he will be no genuine king, but a *parvenu*, *κληρωτός τις*, like a person who had been raised to the throne by the contingency of lot, and therefore insecure in his position, with perhaps only a temporary tenure of office. The word *ἐμισθούς* is coupled with *μὴ κληρωτός*, (as an epithet of *πενταρχίας*), *Pol.* ii. xi. 7. It is possible that in the present passage a notion of 'paid services' may be implied. If so, 'hiring monarch' would express the terms under notice.

κληρωτὸς ἂν τις εἴη βασιλεὺς. ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτης· τὸ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ἀγαθὸν διώκει. καὶ φανερώτερον ἐπὶ ταύτης ὅτι χειρίστη· κάκιστον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ³ βελτίστῳ. μεταβαίνει δ' ἐκ βασιλείας εἰς τυραννίδα· φαυλότης γάρ ἐστι μοναρχίας ἢ τυραννίς· ὁ δὲ μοχθηρὸς βασιλεὺς τύραννος γίνεται. ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν κακία τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ νέμουσιν τὰ τῆς πόλεως παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, καὶ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενοι τὸ πλουτεῖν· ὀλίγοι δὲ ἄρχουσι καὶ μοχθηροὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων. ἐκ δὲ ὁρῶν τιμοκρατίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν· σύνοροι γάρ εἰσιν αὗται· πλήθους γὰρ βούλεται καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἶναι, καὶ ἴσοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμήματι. ἥκιστα δὲ μοχθηρόν ἐστιν ἡ δημοκρατία· ἐπὶ μικρὸν γὰρ παρεκβαίνει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος. μεταβάλλουσι μὲν οὖν μάλισθ' οὕτως αἱ πολιτεῖαι· ἐλάχιστον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ῥᾶστα μεταβαίνουσιν. ὁμοιώματα δ' αὐτῶν⁴ καὶ οἷον παραδείγματα λάβοι τις ἂν καὶ ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατὴρ πρὸς υἱεῖς κοινωνία βασιλείας ἔχει σχῆμα· τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία πατέρα προσαγορεύει· πατρικὴ γὰρ ἀρχὴ βούλεται ἡ βασιλεία εἶναι. ἐν Πέρσαις δ' ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς τυραννικὴ· χρῶνται γὰρ ὡς δούλοις τοῖς υἱέσιν. τυραννικὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ δεσπότης πρὸς δούλους· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ δεσπότης συμφέρον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττεται. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ὁρθὴ φαίνεται, ἡ Περσικὴ δ' ἡμαρτημένη· τῶν διαφερόντων γὰρ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διάφοροι. ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς ἀριστο-⁵κρατικὴ φαίνεται· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἄρχει, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἂ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα· ὅσα δὲ γυναικὶ ἀρμόζει, ἐκείνη ἀποδίδωσιν. ἀπάντων δὲ κυριεύων ὁ ἀνὴρ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν μεθίστησιν· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐχ ἢ ἀμείνων. ἐνίοτε δὲ ἄρχουσιν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐπὶ κληροῖ οὕσαι·

4 τῶν διαφερόντων—διάφοροι] 'For those who differ should be governed differently.' And therefore the Persian system is wrong, which governs children as if they were the same as slaves.

5 γυναῖκες ἐπὶ κληροῖ οὕσαι] The

Greek feeling about 'heiresses' is strongly expressed in a fragment of Menander (I.V.).

δοτις γυναῖκ' ἐπὶ κληρον ἐπιθυμεῖ λαβεῖν πλουτοῦσαν, ἥτοι μῆνιν ἐκτίνει θεῶν, ἢ βούλετ' ἀτυχεῖν, μακάριος καλούμενος.

οὐ δὴ γίνονται κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ διὰ πλοῦτον
6 καὶ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις. τιμοκρατικῇ
δ' ἔοικεν ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· ἴσοι γὰρ, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον ταῖς
ἡλικίαις διαλλάττουσιν· διόπερ ἂν πολὺ ταῖς ἡλικίαις
διαφέρωσιν, οὐκέτι ἀδελφικὴ γίνεται ἡ φιλία. δημοκρατία
δὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀδеспότοις τῶν οἰκῆσεων (ἐνταῦθα
γὰρ πάντες ἐξ ἴσου), καὶ ἐν αἷς ἀσθενῆς ὁ ἄρχων καὶ
ἐκάστω ἐξουσία.

- II Καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνεται, ἐφ'
ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευμένους
ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας· εὖ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευμένους,
εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἢ εὖ πράττωσιν,
ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων· ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἀγα-
2 μέμνονα ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν. τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ πατρικὴ,
διαφέρει δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν εὐεργετημάτων· αἴτιος γὰρ
τοῦ εἶναι, δοκοῦντος μεγίστου, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας·
καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα ἀπονέμεται· φύσει τε ἀρχικὸν
πατὴρ υἱῶν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐγγόνων καὶ βασιλεὺς βασι-
3 λευόμενων. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὗται, διὸ καὶ
τιμῶνται οἱ γονεῖς. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὴ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ταῦτό
4 ἀλλὰ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ φιλία. καὶ ἀνδρὸς
δὲ πρὸς γυναῖκα ἡ αὐτὴ φιλία καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ· κατ'
ἀρετὴν γάρ, καὶ τῷ ἀμείνονι πλεον ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἀρμόζον
5 ἐκάστω· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῇ
ἐταιρικῇ ἔοικεν· ἴσοι γὰρ καὶ ἡλικιωταί, οἱ τοιοῦτοι δ'
ὁμοπαθεῖς καὶ ὁμοήθεις ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. ἔοικε δὲ ταύτῃ
καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν τιμοκρατικὴν· ἴσοι γὰρ οἱ πολῖται
βούλονται καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι· ἐν μέρει δὴ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ
6 ἐξ ἴσου· οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ φιλία. ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρεκβάσεσιν,
ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπὶ μικρόν ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία

XI. 3 ἐν ὑπεροχῇ—γονεῖς] 'All these friendships imply superiority on the one side, and hence it is that parents are honoured,' i.e. because superiority demands honour, as well as love.

5 ἴσοι γὰρ—εἶναι] 'For it is the part of the citizens (in a timocracy) to

live equally and equitably with one another.' To understand the full meaning of ἐπιεικεῖς, see the fine passage from *Rhet.* i. xiii., translated in the note on *Eth.* v. x. i., and cf. ix. x. 6. βούλονται expresses a natural tendency, cf. viii. x. 3: πλήθους γὰρ βούλεται καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἶναι.

ἐστί, καὶ ἡκιστα ἐν τῇ χειρίσ τη· ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν φιλίας. ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ φιλία· οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον· ἀλλ' οἷον τεχνίτη πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς δοῦλον· ὠφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ' οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλον ἢ δοῦλος. οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦλος. ἢ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἔστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ἢ δ' ἄνθρωπος· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ φιλίας δὴ, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. ἐπὶ μικρὸν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τυραννίσιν αἱ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐπὶ πλεῖστον· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ ἴσοις οὔσιν.

Ἐν κοινωνίᾳ μὲν οὖν πᾶσα φιλία ἐστίν, καθάπερεῖρηται·¹² ἀφορίσειε δ' ἂν τις τὴν τε συγγενικὴν καὶ τὴν ἑταιρικὴν. αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλοϊκαί, καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, κοινωνικαῖς εἰκόασι μᾶλλον· οἷον γὰρ καθ' ὁμολογίαν τινὰ φαίνονται εἶναι. εἰς ταύτας δὲ τάξιεν ἂν τις καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν. καὶ ἡ συγγενικὴ δὲ φαίνεται πολυ-² εἰδὴς εἶναι, ἡρτῆσθαι δὲ πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς· οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα, τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων τι ὄντα. μᾶλλον δ' ἴσασιν οἱ γονεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἢ τὰ γεννηθέντα ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ-

6 ὠφελεῖται—δίκαιον] 'For though all these things receive benefit from those who make use of them, yet neither friendship nor justice is possible toward inanimate objects.' The corresponding passage in the *Eudemian Ethics* serves as a commentary on this: *Eth. Eud.* VII. x. 4: συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ [e conj. Bonitz] ὄργανον ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνειν, ἥς δίκαιον πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ἐκείνου γὰρ ἕνεκέν ἐστι. The instrument receives just so much care from its master, as will keep it in proper condition for the exercise of

its functions. The slave, who is treated not as a person but as a thing, receives the same kind of attention. Friendship and justice imply the recognition of personality, they imply treating men not as instruments, but as ends in themselves. On the slavery of the body to the soul, cf. *Ar. Pol.* i. v. 6-8.

XII. 1 ἀφορίσειε δ' ἂν τις] In saying that all friendships imply community of interests, an exception is to be made of the friendships of relations

των, καὶ μᾶλλον συνωκείωται τὸ ἀφ' οὗ τῷ γεννηθέντι ἢ τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ποιήσαντι· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ οἰκεῖον τῷ ἀφ' οὗ, οἷον ὁδοὺς ἢ θρίξ ἢ ὅτιοῦν τῷ ἔχοντι· ἐκείνω δ' οὐθὲν τὸ ἀφ' οὗ, ἢ ἥττον. καὶ τῷ πλήθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου· οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὐθύς γενόμενα στέργουσιν, τὰ δὲ προελθόντα τοῖς χρόνοις τοὺς γονεῖς, σύνεσιν ἢ αἰσθησιν λαβόντα. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ δι' αὐτὰ φιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες.

3 γονεῖς μὲν οὖν τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἑαυτούς (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν οἷον ἕτεροι αὐτοὶ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι), τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων πεφυκότα, ἀδελφοὶ δ' ἀλλήλους τῷ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι· ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκείνα ταυτότης ἀλλήλοις ταυτοποιεῖ· ὅθεν φασὶ ταῦτόν αἷμα καὶ ρίζαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.

4 εἰσὶ δὲ ταῦτό πως καὶ ἐν διηρημένοις. μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν καὶ τὸ σύντροφον καὶ τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν· ἡλικὴ γὰρ ἡλικία, καὶ οἱ συνήβεις ἑταῖροι· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀδελφικὴ τῇ ἐταιρικῇ ὁμοιοῦται. ἀνεψιοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς ἐκ τούτων συνωκείωνται· τῷ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι. γίγνονται δ' οἱ μὲν οἰκειότεροι οἱ δ' ἀλλοτριώτεροι τῷ σύνεγγυς ἢ πόρρω τὸν ἀρχηγὸν εἶναι.

5 ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν πρὸς γονεῖς φιλία τέκνοις, καὶ ἀνθρώποις πρὸς θεούς, ὡς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὑπερέχον· εὖ γὰρ πεποιήκασιν τὰ μέγιστα· τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφῆναι αἵτιοι, καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδευθῆναι.

6 ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τοιαύτη φιλία μᾶλλον τῶν ὀθνείων, ὅσῳ καὶ κοινότερος ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς ἐστίν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀδελφικῇ ἅπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐταιρικῇ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἐπικεικῇσι, καὶ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, ὅσῳ οἰκειότεροι καὶ ἐκ γένετῆς ὑπάρχουσιν στέργοντες ἀλλήλους, καὶ ὅσῳ ὁμοιοθέστεροι οἱ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ σύντροφοι

and companions, which depend on feeling rather than on any sort of compact.

3 ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκείνα ταυτότης ἀλλήλοις ταυτοποιεῖ] 'For their identity with the parents identifies them with one another.' ἐκείνα is in the neuter gender on account of the words ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν to which it immediately refers.

4 ἀνεψιοὶ δὲ—εἶναι] 'But cousins and all other relations get their bond of unity from these (*i.e.* the brothers); for (it depends) on their coming from the same stock. Relations are more or less closely united to one another, in proportion as their common ancestor is more or less near.'

5 πρὸς θεοὺς ὡς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὑπερέχον] Cf. *Etih.* VIII. vii. 4, ix. i. 7,

καὶ παιδευθέντες ὁμοίως· καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον δοκιμασία πλείστη καὶ βεβαιωτάτη. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοι- 7 ποῖς τῶν συγγενῶν τὰ φιλικά. ἀνδρὶ δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυστατικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν, ὅσω πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον οἰκία πόλεως, καὶ τεκνοποιία κοινότερον τοῖς ζώοις. τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡ κοινωνία ἐστίν, οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι οὐ μόνον τῆς τεκνοποιίας χάριν συνοικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· εὐθύς γὰρ διήρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἔστιν ἕτερα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός· ἐπαρκοῦσιν οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέντες τὰ ἴδια. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ δι' ἀρετῆν, εἰ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐκατέρου ἀρετή, καὶ χαίροιν ἂν τῷ τοιούτῳ. σύνδεσμος δὲ τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι· διὸ θᾶττον οἱ ἄτεκνοι διαλύονται· τὰ γὰρ τέκνα κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀμφοῖν, συνέχει δὲ τὸ κοινόν. τὸ δὲ πῶς 8 συμβιωτέον ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ ὅλως φίλῳ πρὸς φίλον, οὐδὲν ἕτερον φαίνεται ζητεῖσθαι ἢ πῶς δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν φαίνεται τῷ φίλῳ πρὸς τὸν φίλον καὶ τὸν ὀθνεῖον καὶ τὸν ἐταῖρον καὶ τὸν συμφοιτητήν.

Τριττῶν δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, 13 καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην τῶν μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι φίλων ὄντων τῶν δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν (καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γίνονται καὶ

&c. Aristotle throughout these books speaks of "the gods" from the point of view of the popular religion.

7 πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον οἰκία πόλεως] In point of time the family is prior to the state, but in point of idea (λόγῳ) and essentially (φύσει) the state is prior. Cf. *Ar. Pol.* i. ii. 12: καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστίν. Τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους· ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται πούς οὐδὲ χεῖρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμωνύμως. Aristotle argues that, without the idea of the 'state,' the terms 'man' and 'family' would lose their meaning. Thus the idea of family pre-

supposes that of the state, which will accordingly be prior. In the same way, the family is more necessary as a means, the state as an end.

ἐπαρκοῦσιν οὖν—ἴδια] 'They help one another therefore, bringing what they each have separately into the common stock.' Fritzsche quotes the saying of Ischomachus to his wife in the *Æconomics* of Xenophon (vii. 13.) νῦν δὴ οἶκος ἡμῖν ὅδε κοινός ἐστιν. Ἐγὼ τε γάρ, ὅσα μοι ἐστίν, ἅπαντα εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποφαίνω, σὺ τε ὅσα ἡνέγκω, πάντα εἰς τὸ κοινὸν κατέθηκας.

XIII. 1 ἐν ἀρχῇ] *Eth.* viii. iii. 1.

ἀμείνων χείρονα, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς, καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἰσάζοντες ταῖς ὠφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες), τοὺς ἴσους μὲν κατ' ἰσότητά δεῖ τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἰσάζειν, τοὺς
 2 δ' ἀνίσους τῷ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι. γίγνεται δὲ τὰ ἐγκλήματα καὶ αἱ μέμψεις ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίᾳ ἢ μόνῃ ἢ μάλιστα εὐλόγως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἀρετὴν φίλοι ὄντες εὖ δρᾶν ἀλλήλους προθυμοῦνται· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ φιλίας. πρὸς τοῦτο δ' ἀμιλλωμένων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγκλήματα οὐδὲ μάχαι· τὸν γὰρ φιλοῦντα καὶ εὖ ποιοῦντα οὐδεὶς δυσχεραίνει, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἢ χαρίεις, ἀμύνεται εὖ δρῶν. ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον, τυγχάνων οὐ ἐφίεται, οὐκ ἂν ἐγκαλοῖη τῷ φίλῳ· ἐκάτερος γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
 3 ἐφίεται. οὐ πάνυ δ' οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δι' ἡδονήν· ἅμα γὰρ ἀμφοῖν γίνεται οὗ ὀρέγονται, εἰ τῷ συνδιάγειν χαίρουσιν. γελοῖος δ' ἂν φαίνοιτο καὶ ὁ ἐγκαλῶν τῷ μὴ τέρποντι,
 4 ἐξὸν μὴ συνδιημερεύειν. ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐγκληματική· ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ γὰρ χρώμενοι ἀλλήλοις ἀεὶ τοῦ πλείονος δέονται, καὶ ἔλαττον ἔχειν οἶονται τοῦ προσήκοντος, καὶ μέμφονται ὅτι οὐχ ὅσων δέονται τοσούτων τυγχάνουσιν ἄξιοι ὄντες· οἱ δ' εὖ ποιοῦντες οὐ δύνανται ἐπαρκεῖν τοσαῦτα ὅσων οἱ
 5 πᾶσχοντες δέονται. ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἄγραφον τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον, καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ

2 οὐδεὶς δυσχεραίνει, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἢ χαρίεις ἀμύνεται εὖ δρῶν] 'No one takes it ill, but (every one), if he be of gentle mind, pays him back in good deeds.' The subject to ἀμύνεται is implied in οὐδεὶς. Fritzsche quotes Horace Sat. i. i. i.

*Nemo quam sibi sortem
 Seu ratio dederit, seu fors objecerit, illā
 Contentus vivat, laudet diversa se-
 quentes.*

χαρίεις has nothing to do with 'gratitude.' It means much the same as is conveyed in the word 'gentleman.' Cf. *Eth.* i. v. 4: οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοί. iv. viii. 9: χαρίεις καὶ ἐλευθεροί.

5 ἔοικε—διαλύονται] 'Now as justice is twofold, the one unwritten, the

other according to law, so also of utilitarian friendship there appear to be two branches, the one moral, and the other legal. The complaints then (which arise) chiefly take place when men do not conclude their connection in the same branch in which they commenced it.' συναλλάττειν is to make a contract, διαλύεσθαι to wind up a contract by the mutual performance of the terms. Men who consider that they have entered upon a so-called friendship with a fixed stipulation (νομική) of certain advantages to be received, will complain if the fixed stipulation is denied, and only a general moral obligation (ἠθική) to render services is admitted.

χρήσιμον φιλίας ἢ μὲν ἡθικὴ ἢ δὲ νομικὴ εἶναι. γίγνεται οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μάλισθ' ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συναλλάξωσι καὶ διαλύονται. ἔστι δὲ νομικὴ μὲν ἢ ἐπὶ 6 ῥητοῖς, ἢ μὲν πάμπαν ἀγοραία ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα, ἢ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρα εἰς χρόνον, καὶ ὁμολογίαν δὲ τί ἀντὶ τίνος. ὁῦλον δ' ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ ὀφείλημα κοῦκ ἀμφίλογον, φιλικὸν δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει· διὸ παρ' ἐνόις οὐκ εἰσὶ τούτων δίκαι, ἀλλ' οἴονται ὀεῖν στέργειν τοὺς κατὰ πίστιν συναλλάξαντας. ἢ δ' ἡθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλῳ 7 δωρεῖται ἢ ὅτιδ' ἴποτε ἄλλο. κομίζεσθαι δὲ ἀξιοῖ τὸ ἴσον ἢ πλεόν, ὡς οὐ δεδωκὼς ἀλλὰ χρήσας. οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ 8 συναλλάξας καὶ διαλυόμενος ἐγκαλέσει. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἢ τοὺς πλείστους τὰ καλὰ, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὠφέλιμα. καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν μὴ ἵνα ἀντιπάθῃ, ὠφέλιμον δὲ τὸ εὐεργετεῖσθαι. δυναμένῳ 9

6 ἔστι—συναλλάξαντας] 'That which is on stated conditions then is legal (utilitarian friendship). One sort of it is wholly commercial, implying payment on the spot (ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα); another is more liberal, allowing time (εἰς χρόνον), but still on the understanding of a specified return. In this then the debt is plain and undoubted, but the delay which it admits of is friendly. Hence in some states no suits are allowed in cases of this kind, but men think that those who have contracted on faith should abide (by the issue).' ἀναβολή in commerce answers to 'credit,' cf. Plato's *Laws*, xi. p. 915 D: μηδ' ἐπὶ ἀναβολῇ πράσιν μηδὲ ὦν ἡν ποιεῖσθαι. Or it may answer to buying or selling for future delivery. φιλικόν ('of the nature of friendship') stands here as a predicate. Cf. *Eth.* viii. i. 4: τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ.

7—8 ἢ δ' ἡθικὴ—εὐεργετεῖσθαι] 'On the other hand the moral (branch of utilitarian friendship) is not on stated conditions, but the gift, or whatever else it be, is made as if to a friend.

Yet (the giver) claims to get as much, or more, as though he had not given but lent. And if he does not come off in the connection as well as he commenced, he will complain. Now this (sort of disappointment) takes place because all or most men *wish* that which is noble, but *practically choose* that which is expedient. It is noble to do good not with a view to receive it back, but it is expedient to be benefited.' This passage discriminately exposes a sort of vacillation between disinterestedness and self-interest, which occurs in utilitarian friendships. A man at one moment thinks vaguely (βούλεται) of aiming at the noble, and makes a gift as if he expected no return. But presently the more definite bent of his mind (προαίρεσις) reverts to the profitable, and he claims to get back as good as he gave. On the distinction between βούλεσθαι and προαιρεῖσθαι cf. *Eth.* iii. iv. 1, v. ix. 6, and the notes.

9 δυναμένῳ δὴ—ἢ μὴ] 'If one is able then one ought to pay back the full value of what one has received;

ἡ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν ἀξίαν ὣν ἔπαθεν, καὶ ἐκόντι· ἄκοντα
 γὰρ φίλον οὐ ποιητέον. ὡς δὲ διαμαρτόντα ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ
 καὶ εὖ παθόντα ὑφ' οὗ οὐκ ἔδει· οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου, οὐδὲ δι'
 αὐτὸ τοῦτο δρῶντος· καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς εὐεργετηθέντα
 διαλυτέον. καὶ ὁμολογήσαι δ' ἂν δυνάμενος ἀποδώσειν·
 ἀδυνατοῦντα δ' οὐδ' ὁ δοὺς ἡξίωσεν ἄν· ὥστ' εἰ δυνατός,
 ἀποδοτέον. ἐν ἀρχῇ δ' ἐπισκεπτέον ὑφ' οὗ εὐεργετεῖται καὶ
 10 ἐπὶ τίνι, ὅπως ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπομένη ἢ μή. ἀμφισβήτησιν
 δ' ἔχει πότερα δεῖ τῇ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφελείᾳ μετρεῖν καὶ
 πρὸς ταύτην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ δράσαν-
 τος εὐεργεσίᾳ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαῦτά φασι λαβεῖν
 παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν ἅ μικρὰ ἦν ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐξῆν παρ'
 ἐτέρων λαβεῖν, κατασμικρίζοντες· οἱ δ' ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μέ-
 γιστα τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἅ παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἐν
 11 κινδύνοις ἢ τοιαύταις χρεΐαις. ἄρ' οὖν διὰ μὲν τὸ χρή-
 σιμον τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἢ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφελεία μέτρον
 ἐστίν; οὗτος γὰρ ὁ θεόμενος, καὶ ἐπαρκεῖ αὐτῷ ὡς κομιού-
 μενος τὴν ἴσιν· τοσαύτη οὖν γεγένηται ἡ ἐπικουρία ὅσον
 οὗτος ὠφέληται, καὶ ἀποδοτέον δὲ αὐτῷ ὅσον ἐπηύρατο,
 ἢ καὶ πλέον· κάλλιον γάρ. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν

for one must not make a man a friend against his will (*i.e.* treat him as if he were disinterested, when he did not really mean to be so). (One must act) as if one had made a mistake at the outset, and had received a benefit from one whom one ought not to have received it from, that is to say not from a friend, or from some one doing a friendly action; one must conclude the business therefore as if one had been benefited on stated conditions. And (in this case) one would stipulate to repay to the best of one's ability;—if one were unable, not even the giver could demand it; so in short, if one is able, one should repay. But one ought to consider at the outset by whom one is benefited, and on what terms, so that one may agree to accept those terms, or not.' The words

καὶ ἐκόντι are omitted in the above translation. They are left out by two of the MSS., and while they merely interrupt the sense of the passage, they may easily be conceived to have arisen out of the following words ἄκοντα γὰρ. The passage prescribes the mode of dealing with a person who having conferred a benefit (as described in the last section) expects a return for it. The accusative case διαμαρτόντα is governed by the verbal adjective διαλυτέον which follows, cf. *Eth.* VII. i. 1: λεκτέον ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν. Some editions read ὁμολογήσαι δ' ἂν, which the commentators explain to be governed by δεῖ, as implied in the verbal adjectives ἀνταποδοτέον, διαλυτέον.

11 ἄρ' οὖν—πλέον] 'Surely, as the friendship is for the sake of utility,

ἡ γκλήματα μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, μέτρῳ δ' ἔοικεν ἢ τοῦ δράσαντος προαίρεσις· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἡθους ἐν τῇ προαίρεσει τὸ κύριον.

Διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαις· ἀξιοῖ¹⁴ γὰρ ἑκάτερος πλεόν ἔχειν, ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο γίγνηται, διαλύεται ἡ φιλία. οἴεται γὰρ ὃ τε βελτίων προσήκειν αὐτῷ πλεόν ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλεόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ὠφελιμώτερος· ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα οὐ φασὶ δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν· λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι καὶ οὐ φιλίαν, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας· οἴονται γάρ, καθάπερ ἐν χρημάτων κοινωνίᾳ πλεῖον λαμβάνουσιν οἱ συμβαλλόμενοι πλεῖον, οὕτω δεῖν καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ. ὁ δ' ἐνδεὴς καὶ ὁ χείρων ἀνάπαλιν· φίλου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν τοῖς ἐνδεέσιν· τί γάρ, φασίν, ὄφελος σπουδαίῳ ἢ δυνάστη φίλον εἶναι, μὴδὲν γε μέλλοντα ἀπολαύειν; ἔοικε² δὲ ἑκάτερος ὁρθῶς ἀξιοῦν, καὶ δεῖν ἑκατέρῳ πλεόν νέμειν ἐκ τῆς φιλίας, οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δέ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὑπερέχοντι τιμῆς, τῷ δ' ἐνδεεῖ κέρδους· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἡ τιμὴ γέρας, τῆς δ' ἐνδεείας ἐπικουρία τὸ κέρδος. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται· οὐ³ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μὴδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων· τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ δίδεται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, ἡ τιμὴ δὲ κοινόν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει. τῷ δὲ

the benefit accruing to the recipient is the gauge (of what is to be repaid). For he (the recipient) is the asking party, and (the other) assists him on the understanding that he will receive the same value. The assistance rendered then is exactly so much as the recipient has been benefited; and he ought therefore to repay as much as he has reaped, or more.'

XIV. 1 διαφέρονται] 'Men have differences' in those friendships which are contracted between a superior and an inferior. Aristotle says that these differences ought to be settled by both

parties respectively getting more than each other; the one receiving more money or good, the other receiving more honour.

3 οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν—ὑπομένει] 'For it is not allowable that a man should at once gain money, and honour out of the public, for no one endures to have the inferior position in all points.' This notion, that the state-officers should have *either* pay or honour, but not both,—is expressed before, *Eth.* v. vi. 6-7. It is drawn from the Athenian ideas of liberty and equality, but is hardly in accordance with the practice of the modern world.

περὶ χρήματα ἐλαττουμένῳ τιμὴν ἀπονέμουσι καὶ τῷ δω-
ροδόκῳ χρήματα· τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανισοῖ καὶ σώζει
τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀνίστοις
ὁμιλητέον, καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ὠφελουμένῳ ἢ εἰς ἀρετὴν
4 τιμὴν ἀνταποδοτέον, ἀνταποδιδόντα τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον. τὸ δυ-
νατὸν γὰρ ἢ φιλία ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὐδὲ γὰρ
ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς καὶ
τοὺς γονεῖς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ποτε τὴν ἀξίαν ἀποδοίῃ, εἰς
δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπεικῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ. διὸ καὶ δό-
ξειεν οὐκ ἐξεῖναι υἱῷ πατέρα ἀπείπασθαι, πατρὶ δ' υἱόν·
ὀφείλοντα γὰρ ἀποδοτέον, οὐθὲν δὲ ποιήσας ἄξιον τῶν
ὑπεργμένων δέδρακεν, ὥστ' αἰεὶ ὀφείλει. οἷς δ' ὀφείλεται,
ἐξουσία ἀφείναι· καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δὴ. ἅμα δ' ἴσως οὐδεὶς
ποτ' ἂν ἀποστῆναι δοκεῖ μὴ ὑπερβάλλοντος μοχθηρία· χω-
ρὶς γὰρ τῆς Φυσικῆς Φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικὸν μὴ
διωθεῖσθαι. τῷ δὲ φευκτὸν ἢ οὐ σπουδαστὸν τὸ ἐπαρ-
κεῖν, μοχθηρῷ ὄντι· εὖ πάσχειν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ βούλονται,
τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν φεύγουσιν ὡς ἀλυσιτελέες. †περὶ μὲν οὖν τού-
των ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.


4 ἀπείπασθαι] 'To disown.' Card-
well quotes Herodotus i. 59: εἴ τίς οἱ
τυγχάνει ἐὼν παῖς, τοῦτον ἀπείπασθαι.
Demosthenes 1006. 21: (ὁ νόμος) τοὺς
γονέας ποιεῖ κυρίους οὐ μόνον θεσθαι
τοῦνομα ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλιν
ἐξαλεῖψαι ἐὰν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀποκηρύξαι.

χωρὶς γὰρ—διωθεῖσθαι] 'For inde-
pendently of natural affection, it is a
human instinct not to reject the assist-
ance (which he might derive from

his son). διωθεῖσθαι is used in the
same sense, *Eth.* ix. xi. 6.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον
εἰρήσθω] This has every appearance
of being the interpolation of an editor.
There is no real division between
Books VIII. and IX. They follow
each other continuously without any
break in the subject. The editor who
divided one treatise into two books
has added the above artificial division.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ ΙΧ.



ΕΝ ΠΑΣΑΙΣ δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοιοειδέσι φιλίαις τὸ ἀνάλογον ἰσάζει καὶ σώζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, οἷον καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ τῷ σκυτοτόμῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, καὶ τῷ ὑφάντῃ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς. ὕταῦθα μὲν οὖν πεπóρισται κοινὸν μέτρον τὸ νόμισμα, καὶ 2 πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται, καὶ τούτῳ μετρεῖται· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ ἐραστὴς ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι ὑπερφιλῶν οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται, οὐθὲν ἔχων φιλητόν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, πολλακίς δ' ὁ ἐρώμενος ὅτι πρότερον ἐπαγγελλόμενος πάντα νῦν οὐθὲν ἐπιτελεῖ. συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐπειδὴν 3 ὁ μὲν δι' ἡδονὴν τὸν ἐρώμενον φιλεῖ, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τὸν ἐραστήν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει. διὰ ταῦτα γὰρ τῆς φιλίας οὐσης διάλυσις γίνεται, ἐπειδὴν μὴ γίνηται ὧν ἕνεκα ἐφίλουν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἔστεργον ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, οὐ μόνιμα ὕντα· διὸ τοιαῦται καὶ αἱ φιλῖαι. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἡθῶν καθ' αὐτὴν οὕσα μένει, καθάπερ εἴρηται. διαφέ- 4

I. In heterogeneous friendships, equality is to be obtained by the rule of proportion. The same rule holds good in political economy, where the most heterogeneous products are equalized against one another. In political economy there is the convenience of a common standard, money, by which products may be measured. In friendship there is, unfortunately, no such standard.

1 ἀνομοιοειδέσι] This is not quite the same as ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαις. It implies relationships in which the two parties have respectively different objects in view, as for instance, in the

case of the employer and the employed, the ἐρώμενος and the ἐραστής, &c.

καθάπερ εἴρηται] Cf. *Eth.* viii. xiii. 1.

ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ] By the modern division of sciences, Political Economy has been raised into separate existence, so as in its method to be entirely independent of, and in its results subordinate to, Politics. On the Aristotelian theory of the law of value in exchange, see *Eth.* v. v. 8, and note.

3 ἡ δὲ τῶν ἡθῶν] 'Moral friendship' or 'friendship based on character,' the same as ἡ κατ' ἀρετὴν φιλία. Cf. *Eth.* viii. xiii. 11: ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν—τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἡθους,

ρονται δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἕτερα γίγνηται αὐτοῖς καὶ μὴ ὧν ὀρέγονται· ὅμοιον γὰρ τῷ μῆέν γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν οὗ ἐφίεται μὴ τυγχάνη, ὅσον καὶ τῷ κιθαρωδῷ ὁ ἐπαγγελλόμενος, καὶ ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ἄσειεν, τοσούτῳ πλείω· εἰς ἧν δ' ἀπαιτοῦνται τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἀντὶ ἡδονῆς ἡδονὴν ἀποδεδωκέναι ἔφη. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκάτερος τοῦτο ἐβούλετο, ἱκανῶς ἂν εἶχεν· εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν τέρψιν ὁ δὲ κέρδος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχει ὁ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν καλῶς· ὧν γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, κακείνου γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει. 5 τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ ποτέρου τάξαι ἐστί, τοῦ προϊέμενου ἢ τοῦ προλαβόντος; ὁ γὰρ προϊέμενος ἔοικ' ἐπιτρέπειν ἐκείνῳ· ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν· ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἀλήποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν ὅσου δοκεῖ ἀξία ἐπί-

κ.τ.λ. Of course the above terms have nothing to do with the 'moral' branch of utilitarian friendship, mentioned *Eth.* viii. xiii. 5. 7.

4 οἷον—ἔφη] 'As in the case of him who promises (a reward) to the harper, and "the better he sang, the more he should have," but when the man next morning demands the fulfilment of his promises, said that "he had paid pleasure for pleasure,"' (i.e. the pleasure of hope, for the pleasure of hearing music). The present tenses ἐπαγγελλόμενος, ἀπαιτοῦνται, seem to imply an oft-repeated and current story. The story itself is repeated by Plutarch (*De Alexandri Fortunâ*, II. 1) where the trick is attributed to Dionysius. Διονύσιος γοῦν ὁ τύραννος, ὡς φασί, κιθαρωδοῦ τινος εὐδοκιμοῦντος ἀκούων ἐπηγγέλματο δωρεὰν αὐτῷ τάλαντον· τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν ἀπαιτοῦντος· χθές, εἶπεν, εὐφραίνόμενος ὑπὸ σοῦ παρ' ἐν ᾗδε χρόνον, εὐφράνα καὶ γὰρ σε ταῖς ἐλπίσιν· ὥστε τὸν μισθὸν ὧν ἑτερπεῖς ἀπελάμβανες εὐθύς, ἀντιτερπόμενος.

ὧν γὰρ δεόμεῖς—δώσει] 'For a man sets his mind on the things he happens to want, and for the sake of that he will give what he himself possesses.'

The beginning of the sentence (ὧν γὰρ δεόμενος) is a general statement, the words κακείνου γε contain an application of the general statement to a particular case.

5 τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ—τοσούτου] 'But whose part is it to settle the value (of a benefit),—is it the part of the giver in the first instance, or of the recipient? (One would say it was the part of him who was the recipient in the first instance) for the giver seems to leave it to the other. Which they mention Protagoras as doing, for whenever he taught anything he used to bid the learner estimate "how much worth he thinks he has learnt," and he used to take exactly so much.' ὁ προϊέμενος is used in a peculiar sense here to denote 'qui prior donum dedit,' in opposition to ὁ προλαβών (or ὁ προέχων, § 8), 'qui prior ab altero accepit.' Protagoras was said to be the first philosopher who taught for money. He probably found it not disadvantageous to assume a high and liberal attitude towards his pupils. On the wealth which he amassed by teaching, see Plato's *Meno*, p. 91 D, and above, Vol. I. Essay II. p. 80.

στασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσοῦτον. ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις δ' 6 ἐνόις ἀρέσκει τὸ 'μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρί.' οἱ δὲ προλαβίντες τὸ ἀργύριον, εἶτα μὴθὲν ποιοῦντες ὧν ἔφασαν, διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασι γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἃ ὡμολόγησαν. τοῦτο δ' ἴσως 7 ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταὶ ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μὴθένα ἂν δοῦναι ἀργύριον ὧν ἐπίστανται. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὧν ἔλαβον τὸν μισθὸν μὴ ποιοῦντες, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασιν εἰσιν· ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ γίγνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑπουργίας, οἱ μὲν δι' αὐτοὺς προϊέμενοι εἶρηται ὅτι ἀνέγκλητοι· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ κατ' ἀρετὴν φιλία. τὴν ἀμοιβὴν τε ποιητέον κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν· αὕτη γὰρ τοῦ φίλου καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς. οὕτω δ' 8 οἷκε καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφίας κοινωνήσασιν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρήμαθ' ἡ ἀξία μετρεῖται, τιμὴ τ' ἰσόρροπος οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο,

6—7 ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις—ἐπίστανται] 'In such matters some like the principle of "a stated wage." Those, however, who take the money beforehand, and then do nothing of what they promised, are naturally blamed in consequence of their excessive promises, for they do not fulfil what they agreed. But this course the Sophists are perhaps obliged to adopt, because no one would be likely to give money for the things which they know.' Protagoras had no fixed price for his teaching, he left it to the pupil. But some people prefer having terms settled beforehand, *μισθὸς εἰρημένος*, as it is called in the line of Hesiod (*Works and Days*, v. 368): *Μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ εἰρημένος ἄρκιος ἔστω*. It is the perversion of this when men take the money beforehand, and then fail in performing that which was paid for. The Sophists (says Aristotle with severe irony) are perhaps *obliged* to insist on payment beforehand, on account of the utter worthlessness of their teaching. Aristotle contrasts the conduct of Protagoras (of whom he speaks honourably) with that of

'the Sophists' after the profession had become regularly settled.

7 ἐν οἷς δὲ—φιλία] 'But supposing there is no agreement with regard to the service rendered—then, in the first place (*οἱ μὲν*), with regard to those who give purely for personal reasons, we have said that *they* are free from all chance of complaint; for this is the mode of virtuous friendship.' δι' αὐτοὺς is more of a logical than a grammatical formula, and would be represented by *per se* in Latin. This phrase and *καθ' αὐτοὺς* are frequently used by Aristotle to characterise the highest kind of friendship, which is an 'absolute' feeling. *Eth.* viii. iii. 1: *οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρησίμον φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους οὐ καθ' αὐτοὺς φιλοῦσιν*. In the following section, *ἐπὶ τινι*, 'for some external object,' is contrasted with δι' αὐτοὺς, 'that which looks to the personal character alone.' Cf. ix. x. 6: *δι' ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτοὺς (φιλία) οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς πολλοὺς*.

οὕτω δ' οἷκε—ἐνδεχόμενον] 'And thus it seems that they ought to act, who are made partakers in philosophy (*i.e.* they should measure the benefit

- ἀλλ' ἴσως ἰκανόν, καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς γονεῖς,
 8 τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον. μὴ τοιαύτης δ' οὕσης τῆς δόσεως ἀλλ
 ἐπὶ τινι, μάλιστα μὲν ἴσως δεῖ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίνεσθαι
 δοκοῦσαν ἀμφοῖν κατ' ἀξίαν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ συμβαι-
 νοι, οὐ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον δόξειεν ἂν τὸν προέχοντα τάττειν,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον· ὅσον γὰρ οὗτος ὠφελήθη ἢ ἀνθ' ὅσου
 τὴν ἡδονὴν εἴλετ' ἂν, τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβὼν ἔξει τὴν παρὰ
 τούτου ἀξίαν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμε-
 9 νον, ἐνιαχοῦ τ' εἰσὶ νόμοι τῶν ἐκουσίων συμβολαίων δίκας
 μὴ εἶναι ὡς δέον, ὃ ἐπίστυσε, διαλυθῆναι πρὸς τοῦτον καθά-
 περ ἐκοινώνησεν. ὃ γὰρ ἐπετράφθη, τοῦτον οἶεται δικαιο-
 τερον εἶναι τάξαι τοῦ ἐπιτρέψαντος. τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ
 τοῦ ἴσου τιμῶσιν οἱ ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλούμενοι λαβεῖν· τὰ
 γὰρ οἰκεῖα καὶ ἃ διδύασιν ἐκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ ἄξια.
 ἀλλ' ὅμως ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν τάτ-
 τωσιν οἱ λαβόντες. δεῖ δ' ἴσως οὐ τοσούτου τιμᾶν ὅσου
 ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον, ἀλλ' ὅσου πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα.
 2 Ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον πότερα δεῖ πάντα
 τῷ πατρὶ ἀπονέμειν καὶ πείθεσθαι, ἢ κάμνοντα μὲν ἰατρῷ
 πειστέον, στρατηγὸν δὲ χειροτονητέον τὸν πολεμικόν·
 ὁμοίως δὲ φίλῳ μᾶλλον ἢ σπουδαίῳ ὑπηρετητέον, καὶ εὐερ-
 γέτῃ ἀνταποδοτέον χάριν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐταίρῳ δοτέον, ἐὰν
 2 ἀμφοῖν μὴ ἐνδέχεται. ἅρ' οὖν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκρι-
 βῶς μὲν διορίσαι οὐ ῥάδιον; πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ παντοίας
 ἔχει διαφορὰς καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι καὶ τῷ καλῷ

received by the intention of their teacher), for the worth of philosophy is not measured against money, and no amount of honour can balance it. But, perhaps, as also towards the gods and one's parents, it is enough if one gives what one can.' Aristotle, perhaps mindful of the twenty years which he passed in the school of Plato, places very highly the spiritual dignity of teaching in philosophy. After *εἰκε*, *δεῖν ποιεῖν* is to be understood.

8 *μὴ τοιαύτης δ' οὕσης*] 'In the second place, when the gift is not of this kind,' *i.e.* not *δι' αὐτοῦς*.

τὸν προέχοντα] 'The first recipient,' see above § 5.

8—9 *καὶ γὰρ ἐν—ἐκοινώνησεν*] 'For this is what is done in the market (*i.e.* the buyer, who is the recipient, settles the price); and in some places it is the law that there must be no actions on voluntary contracts, it being right that one should conclude with a person whom one has trusted on the same terms as those on which one entered on the contract with him.' Cf. *Eth.* viii. xiii. 6: *κοινωνεῖν* here is used in the same sense as *συναλλάττειν* there.

καὶ ἀναγκαίῳ. ὅτι ὃ οὐ πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον, οὐκ 3
 ἄδηλον. καὶ τὰς μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
 πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χαριστέον ἐταίροις, καὶ ὥσπερ δάνειον, ὃ
 ὀφείλει ἀποδοτέον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐταίρῳ δοτέον. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲ 4
 τοῦτ' αἰεὶ, οἷον τῷ λυτρωθέντι παρὰ ληστῶν πότερον τὸν
 λυσάμενον ἀντιλυτρωτέον, καὶ ὅστισοῦν ἦ, ἢ καὶ μὴ
 ἐαλωκότι ἀπαιτοῦντι δὲ ἀποδοτέον, ἢ τὸν πατέρα λυτ-
 ρωτέον; δόξεις γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα.
 ἔπερ οὖν εἴρηται, καθόλου μὲν τὸ ὑφείλημα ἀποδοτέον, ἐὰν 5
 δ' ὑπερτείνῃ ἢ δόσις τῷ καλῷ ἢ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ, πρὸς ταῦτ'
 ἀποκλιτέον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἴσον τὸ τὴν προὔπαρχὴν
 ἀμείψασθαι, ἐπειδὴν ὁ μὲν σπουδαῖον εἰδὼς εὖ ποιήσῃ, τῷ
 δὲ ἢ ἀνταπόδοσις γίγνηται, ὃν οἶεται μοχθηρὸν εἶναι. οὐδὲ
 γὰρ τῷ δανείσαντι ἐνίοτε ἀντιδανειστέον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 οἰόμενος κομιεῖσθαι ἐδάνεισεν ἐπιεικεῖ ὄντι, ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐλπίζει
 κομιεῖσθαι παρὰ πονηροῦ. εἴτε τοίνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως
 ἔχει, οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἀξίωμα· εἴτ' ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως οἶονται
 δέ, οὐκ ἂν δόξαιεν ἄτοπα ποιεῖν. ὅπερ οὖν πολλάκις 6
 εἴρηται, οἱ περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοι ὁμοίως
 ἔχουσι τὸ ὠρισμένον τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῖς εἶσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ
 ταῦτά πᾶσιν ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲ τῷ πατρὶ πάντα, καθάπερ

5 ὅπερ οὖν εἴρηται—ποιεῖν] 'As I have said then, as a general rule the debt should be repaid, but if the giving (to some one else) preponderates in moral glory, or in the urgency of the case (over repaying), one must incline to this; for sometimes it is not even an equal thing to requite the former favour, (namely) when the one man knowing the other to be good has benefited him, but on the other hand, the repayment has to be made to one whom one thinks to be a scoundrel. For sometimes a man ought not even to lend money in return to one who has lent money to him. For *he* lent it to one who is good, thinking to get it back again, but the other does not hope to get it back again from a villain. If this be

the real state of the case, the claim is of course not equal: and even if it be not, but the parties only think so, such conduct does not seem unreasonable.' This and the other casuistical questions here discussed have very little interest.

εἴρηται] vide § 3.

προὔπαρχήν] 'that which was pre-existing,' here 'primary obligation.' Cf. *Eth.* VIII. xiv. 4: οὐθὲν ποιήσας ἄξιον τῶν ὑπηρεγμένων. *Eth.* IV. ii. 14: οἷς τὰ τοιαῦτα προὔπαρχει.

ὁ μὲν—τῷ δέ] These words, by carelessness of writing, refer to the same subject.

εἴτε τοίνυν—εἴτ' ἔχει μὲν μὴ] This double protasis, instead of having as usual only one, has a double apodosis.

6 ὅπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται] Cf. *Eth.* I. iii. 1; II. ii. 3, and above § 2.

7 οὐδὲ τῷ Διὶ θύεται, οὐκ ἄλλῃλον· ἐπεὶ δ' ἕτερα γονεῦσι καὶ
 ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἑταίροις καὶ εὐεργέταις, ἐκάστοις τὰ οἰκεῖα
 καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα ἀπονεμητέον. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν
 φαίνονται· εἰς γάμους μὲν γὰρ καλοῦσι τοὺς συγγενεῖς·
 τούτοις γὰρ κοινὸν τὸ γένος καὶ αἱ περὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράξεις·
 καὶ εἰς τὰ κήδη δὲ μάλιστ' οἶονται δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς
 8 ἀπαντᾶν διὰ ταῦτό. δόξειε δ' ἂν τροφῆς μὲν γονεῦσι δεῖν
 μάλιστ' ἐπαρκεῖν, ὡς ὀφείλοντας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ
 εἶναι κάλλιον ὢν ἢ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς ταῦτ' ἐπαρκεῖν. καὶ τιμὴν
 δὲ γονεῦσι καθάπερ θεοῖς, οὐ πᾶσαν δέ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν
 αὐτὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρὶ· οὐδ' αὖ τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ τοῦ
 στρατηγοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικὴν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν μητ-
 9 ρικὴν. καὶ παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τιμὴν τὴν καθ'
 ἡλικίαν, ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις.
 πρὸς ἑταίρους δ' αὖ καὶ ἀδελφοὺς παρρησίαν καὶ ἀπάντων
 κοινότητα. καὶ συγγενεῖσι δὴ καὶ φυλέταις καὶ πολίταις
 καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἅπασιν αἰεὶ πειρατέον τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπονέμειν,
 καὶ συγκρίνειν τὰ ἐκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα κατ' οἰκειότητα
 10 καὶ ἀρετὴν ἢ χρῆσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ῥάων ἢ
 κρίσις, τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων ἐργωδεστέρα. οὐ μὲν διὰ γε
 τοῦτο ἀποστατέον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ἐνδέχεται, οὕτω διοριστέον.
 3 Ἐχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς φιλίας ἢ
 μὴ πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας. ἢ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς διὰ τὸ

οὐδὲ τῷ Διὶ θύεται] 'Not even to Zeus are all things indiscriminately sacrificed.' It is given as an illustration of conventional right, *Eth.* v. vii. 1, that goats and not sheep are sacrificed to Zeus.

7 καὶ εἰς τὰ κήδη—διὰ ταῦτό] 'And for the same reason men think that relations ought especially to meet at funeral ceremonies.'

8 τροφῆς ἐπαρκεῖν] 'To furnish subsistence.' Fritzsche quotes Xenophon, *Memor.* ii. vi. 23: δύνανται δὲ καὶ χρημάτων οὐ μόνον—κοινωνεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαρκεῖν ἀλλήλοις.

9 ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει] 'Rising up to greet them, and conducting

them to the seat of honour.' Cf. Plato *Repub.* p. 425 A: σιγάς τε τῶν νεωτέρων παρὰ πρεσβυτέροις, ὡς πρέπει, καὶ κατακλίσεις καὶ ὑπαναστάσεις.

10 τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ῥάων ἢ κρίσις] i.e. It is easy to compare a relation with a relation, a tribesman with a tribesman, &c., but to compare a tribesman with a relation would be more troublesome.

III. 1 πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας] 'Who do not continue the same.' Cf. *Eth.* x. iii. 3: ἀλλ' ἀνιεμένη διαμένει ἕως τίνος.

ἐγκαλέσειε δ'—ἦθος] 'But one might complain, if a man who liked one for

χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ φίλους ὄντας, ὅταν μηκέτι ταῦτ' ἔχωσιν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον διαλύεσθαι; ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι· ὧν ἀπολιπόντων εὐλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν. ἐγκαλέσειε δ' ἄ τις, εἰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαπῶν προσεποιεῖτο διὰ τὸ ἦθος· ὅπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἵπομεν, πλεῖσται διαφοραὶ γίνονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως οἴωνται καὶ ὥσι φίλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ τις καὶ ὑπολάβῃ φι-² λεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ ἦθος, μηθὲν τοιοῦτον ἐκείνου πράττοντος, ἑαυτὸν αἰτιῶτ' ἂν· ὅταν δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως ἀπατηθῇ, δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τὸ νόμισμα κιβδηλεύουσιν, ὅσω περὶ τιμιώτερον ἢ κακουργία. ἐὰν δ' ἀποδέχεται ὡς ἀγαθόν, γένηται δὲ³ μοχθηρὸς καὶ δοκῇ, ἅρ' ἔτι φιλητέον; ἢ οὐ δυνατόν, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλητὸν ἀλλὰ τἀγαθόν; οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ· φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι, οὐδ' ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ· εἴρηται δ' ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον. ἅρ' οὖν εὐθύς διαλυτέον; ἢ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν; ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς τὸ ἦθος ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅσω βέλτιον καὶ τῆς φιλίας οἰκειότερον. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ διαλυόμενος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ποιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιούτῳ φίλος ἦν· ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν ἀνασῶσαι ἀφίσταται. εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν διαμένει ὁ δ' ἐπιεικέσ-⁴ τερος γένοιτο καὶ πολὺ διαλλάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἅρα χρηστέον φίλῳ, ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται; ἐν μεγάλῃ δὲ διαστάσει μάλιστα

profit, or pleasure, pretended to like one for his character.'

ὅπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ] This observation, that 'differences arise, when men are not really friends to each other in the way they think,' has never been exactly made before. The commentators variously refer us to *Eth.* viii. iii. 3, viii. iv. 1, and ix. i. 4, none of which passages correspond.

2 ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ τις] 'Whenever one is mistaken,' i. e. by his own misconception. Cf. *Ar. Metaph.* iii. iii. 7: βεβαιωτάτη δ' ἀρχὴ πασῶν περὶ ἣν διαψευσθῆναι ἀδύνατον. The word

διαψευσθῇ answers to διαμαρτόντα in *Eth.* viii. xiii. 9.

κιβδηλεύουσιν] To counterfeit friendship, says Aristotle, is worse than counterfeiting the coinage. The commentators quote *Theognis*, vv. 119 sqq., where the same maxim occurs.

3 οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ] The MSS. vary extremely about the reading of this passage, in which there is evidently something wrong. οὔτε δεῖ is at all events an interpolation. Fritzsche thinks that the whole is a double gloss upon φιλοπόνηρον.

ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι] 'To those who are capable of restoration.'

- δῆλον γίνεται, οἷον ἐν ταῖς παιδικαῖς φιλίαις· εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν διαμένει τὴν διάνοιαν παῖς ὁ δ' ἀνὴρ εἴη οἷος κράτιστος, πῶς ἂν εἴεν φίλοι μήτ' ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μήτε χαίροντες καὶ λυπούμενοι; οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ' ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι.
- 5 συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων. ἄρ' οὖν οὐθὲν ἀλλοιότερον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκτέον ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγεγόνει φίλος μηδέποτε; ἡ δ' εἰ μνησθῆναι ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης συνηθείας, καὶ καθάπερ φίλοις μᾶλλον ἢ ὀφειλοῖς οἰόμεθα δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς γενομένοις ἀπονεμητέον τι διὰ τὴν προγεγενημένην φιλίαν, ὅταν μὴ δι' ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας ἢ διάλυσιν γένηται.
- 4 Τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλίας ὀρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι. τίθεασιν γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλούμενον καὶ πράττοντα τὰγαθὰ ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ἢ τὸν βουλούμενον εἶναι καὶ ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν· ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκνα πεπνύθασιν, καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκρουκότες. οἱ δὲ τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταῦτ' αἰρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγοῦντα καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει. τούτων δὲ τινὶ καὶ τὴν φιλίαν
- 2 ὀρίζονται. πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ

4 ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι] 'But without these things it is not possible, as we said, that they should be friends.' On this use of the past tense ἦν in reference to what has been previously said by the writer, cf. *Metaph.* xi. vi. 1: ἐπεὶ δ' ἦσαν τρεῖς οὐδίσαι. *Eth.* iii. v. 3: τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι. v. i. 12: ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν, &c. Aristotle is here referring to *Eth.* viii. iii. 9; viii. v. 3.

IV. 1 ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες—προσκεκρουκότες] 'Which mothers feel towards their children, and which friends who have had a rupture (feel towards each other),' i.e. they quite disinterestedly, since in the latter case intercourse is

precluded, wish each other to live. On the disinterested feeling of mothers, cf. *Eth.* viii. viii. 3. On the use of προσκρούειν, cf. *Politics*, ii. v. 4: οἱ πλείστοι διαφερόμενοι ἐκ τῶν ἐν ποσὶ καὶ ἐκ μικρῶν προσκρούοντες ἀλλήλοις. ἔτι δὲ τῶν θεραπεύοντων τοῦτοισι μάλιστα προσκρούομεν, οἷς πλείστα προσχρώμεθα πρὸς τὰς διακονίας τὰς ἐγκυκλίους.

2 πρὸς ἑαυτὸν—εἶναι] 'The good man has every one of these feelings towards himself, and other men have them in so far as they set up to be good;' (i.e. wherever they fall short in these feelings, they fall short also in their attempt to be good). 'For, as we have said, virtue and the good man are the standard for everything.' Cf. *Eth.* iii. iv. 5; x. v. 10.

ὑπάρχει, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ἣ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι. ἔοικε γάρ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἐκάστω ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι. οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν 3 αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ βούλεται δὴ ἑαυτῷ τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τὰγαθὸν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἔνεκα· τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ. καὶ ζῆν δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ σώζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ὃ φρονεῖ· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι. ἕκαστος δ' 4 ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ, γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος, οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται πάντ' ἔχειν ἐκείνο τὸ γενόμενον, (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τὰγαθόν), ἀλλ' ὧν ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστίν. δόξειε δ' αὖν τὸ νῦν ἕκαστος εἶναι, ἢ μάλιστα. συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ 5 βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνημαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαί· αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἡδεῖαι. καὶ θεωρημάτων δ' εὐπορεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ, συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνῆδεται μάλισθ' ἑαυτῷ· πάντοτε γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδύ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν. τῷ δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν μὲν ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν (ἐστὶ γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναί τι δοκεῖ, καὶ φίλοι οἷς

4 ἕκαστος δ' ἑαυτῷ βούλεται—μάλιστα] 'But every man wishes what is good for himself. No one, on condition of becoming another man, chooses that that new thing, which he should become, should possess everything, (for God has now all good); but (every man desires to possess what is good) remaining his present self. And the thinking faculty would appear to be each man's proper self, or more so than anything else.' The usual punctuation of this passage has been altered to obtain the above translation, which has been suggested to the annotator, and which seems to give a more natural explanation of the text than has been arrived at by the commentators, who universally explain ἀλλ' ὧν ὃ τι ποτ'

ἐστίν to refer to the unchangeableness or to the personality of God. If the passage be read as above, it will be seen that the words ὧν ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστίν are in opposition to γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος. Aristotle says that to every man his personality is what is dear to him, he would not relinquish this to gain all the world, for by relinquishing it he would not gain anything. With a changed personality, he would no more possess any good thing, than he now possesses it because God possesses all good. All his wishes are made on the basis of being still what he is. The good man, who fosters his thinking faculty, most of all takes care of his proper self.

6 ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει. πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ πότερόν ἐστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι
 φιλία, ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος· δόξειε δ' ἂν ταύτῃ
 εἶναι φιλία, ἣ ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ ὅτι
 7 ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμοιοῦται. φαίνεται
 δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, καίπερ οὐσι
 φαύλοις. ἄρ' οὖν ἡ ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ὑπολαμβάνου-
 σιν ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, ταύτῃ μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν; ἐπεὶ τῶν
 γε κομιδῇ φαύλων καὶ ἀνοσιουργῶν οὐθενὶ ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει,
 8 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φαίνεται. σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύλοις· δια-
 φέρονται γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ἐτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄλλα
 δὲ βούλονται, οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς· αἰροῦνται γὰρ ἀντὶ τῶν

6 πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ—ὁμοιοῦται] 'But whether friendship towards oneself is, or is not, possible, we may leave undecided for the present. It would seem to be possible in so far as two or more of the above mentioned conditions exist, and because the extreme of friendship resembles one's feelings towards oneself.' Several commentators explain ἣ ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω to mean 'in so far as man consists of two or more parts,' and ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων they would translate 'in accordance with what we have before said,' referring to *Eth.* i. xiii. 9. In this sense the passage would be a parallel one to *Eth.* v. xi. 9. But it is clear from the next section that ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων refers to the definitions of friendship, given in § 1 of this chapter. ἀφείσθω is used as in *Eth.* viii. i. 7, viii. viii. 7. We are not here referred to the subsequent discussion in *Eth.* ix. viii., where by no means the same subject is renewed.

8 Σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύλοις—ἑαυτοῖς] 'But one might almost say that these things do not appertain to the bad at all. For they are at variance with themselves, and desire one set of things while they wish another, just like the incontinent; instead of what seems to them to be good they

choose the pleasant though it is hurtful; and others through cowardice and want of spirit abstain from doing what they think to be best for themselves; and they who through wickedness have committed many crimes hate their life, and fly from it, and put an end to themselves.' The 'desire' of the wicked, as being of the particular and subject to the domination of the senses (*Eth.* vii. iii. 9), is at variance with their 'wish,' which is of the universal and implies a conception of the good. Cf. *Eth.* v. ix. 6, viii. xiii. 8. The description of bad men given here ignores and is at variance with the conclusions of Book vii. In that book the strength, and here the weakness, of vice is represented. Thus in *Eth.* vii. viii. the bad man is described as unrepentant, abiding by his purpose (§ 1), having the major premiss of his mind corrupted (§ 4), and therefore having no wish for the good, even in the universal. The account in Book vii., which makes ἀκολασία or abandoned vice free from all weakness, is more theoretical and less drawn from nature than the above description. All that is said here has a close relation to, and was probably suggested by, the words in the *Lysis* of Plato, p. 214 c: τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς, ὅπερ καὶ λέγεται

δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα βλαβερά ὄντα· οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν ἀφίστανται τοῦ πράττειν ἃ οἴονται ἑαυτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι· οἷς δὲ πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πέπρακται διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν, μισοῦσί τε καὶ φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἀναιροῦσιν ἑαυτούς. ζητοῦσί τε οἱ⁹ μοχθηροὶ μεθ' ὧν συνδιημερεύουσιν, ἑαυτούς δε φεύγουσιν· ἀναμιμνήσκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν, καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι, καθ' ἑαυτούς ὄντες, μεθ' ἑτέρων δ' ὄντες ἐπιλανθάνονται. οὐθέν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες οὐθέν φιλικὸν πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτούς. οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν οὐδὲ συναλγοῦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς· στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενον τινῶν, τὸ δ' ἡδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δ' ἐκεῖσε ἔλκει ὥσπερ διασπῶντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἡδεσθαι,¹⁰ ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρόν γε λυπεῖται ὅτι ἦσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐβούλετο ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὐτῷ· μεταμελείας γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι γέμουσιν. οὐ δὴ φαίνεται ὁ φαῦλος οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς διακεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλητόν. εἰ δὴ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον, φευκτέον τὴν μοχθηρίαν διατεταμένως καὶ πειρατέον ἐπεικῇ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἐτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο.

Ἡ δ' εὖνοια φιλίᾳ μὲν ἕοικεν, οὐ μὲν ἐστὶ γὰρ φιλία·⁵ γίνεται γὰρ εὖνοια καὶ πρὸς ἀγνώτας καὶ λανθάνουσα,

περὶ αὐτῶν, μηδέποτε ὁμοίους μὴδ' αὐτοὺς εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐμπλήκτους τε καὶ ἀσταθμήτους.

9—10 στασιάζει—γέμουσιν] 'For their soul is in tumult, the one part of it, through viciousness, grieves at abstaining from certain things, but the other part is pleased (at this abstinence), and the one pulls this way, the other that way, as though tearing (the man) in pieces. If it is not possible to feel pain and pleasure at the same moment, at all events after a little while (the bad man) is pained that he felt pleasure, and he "could have wished that those pleasures had not

happened to him;" for the wicked are full of repentance.' This picture of the mental struggles of the bad does not recal either the phraseology or the doctrines of Book VII., where *μοχθηρία* is contrasted with, and opposed to, *ἀκρασία* (cf. VII. VIII. 1). The metaphor *στασιάζει* occurs repeatedly in Plato's *Republic*, cf. I. p. 352 A: (ἡ ἀδικία) ἐν ἐνῇ—ἐνούσα—πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸν πράττειν ποιήσει στασιάζοντα καὶ οὐχ ὁμονοοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ, ἔπειτα ἐχθρὸν καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις. Cf. *Etik.* I. xiii. 15.

V. Ἡ δ' εὖνοια—ἀκολουθεῖ] 'Now

φιλία δ' οὐ. καὶ πρότερον δὲ ταῦτ' εἴρηται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ
 φίλησις ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδ' ὄρεξιν, τῇ
 2 φίλῃσει δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκολουθεῖ. καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις μετὰ
 συνηθείας, ἡ δ' εὖνοια καὶ ἐκ προσπαίου, οἷον καὶ περὶ τοὺς
 ἀγωνιστὰς συμβαίνει· εὖνοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται καὶ συν-
 θέλουσιν, συμπράξαιεν δ' ἂν οὐθέν· ὅπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν,
 προσπαίως εὖνοι γίνονται καὶ ἐπιπολαίως στέργουσιν.
 3 ἔοικε δὲ ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν τ' διὰ τῆς
 ὀψεως ἡδονή· μὴ γὰρ προησθεις τῇ ιδέα οὐθεις ἐρᾷ, ὁ δὲ
 χαίρων τῷ εἶδει οὐθέν μᾶλλον ἐρᾷ, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα

good-will is like friendship, but yet it is not friendship, for goodwill is exercised both towards unknown persons, and when its own existence is unknown (to the object), which is not the case with friendship. But all this has been said already. It is not even the same as loving; for it exhibits neither violence nor longing, which are the accompaniments of loving.' The Saxon word 'Good-will,' and not the Latin 'Benevolence,' which is too abstract and general, is the representative of *εὖνοια*. Goodwill, says Aristotle, is engendered by the appearance of noble qualities, it is rapidly conceived, but is passive in its character, and is only the prelude of friendship. There being no correspondent adjective to the substantive 'Good-will,' we must express *εὖνοι* by 'Well-disposed.' Just as in *Eth.* iii. the cognate faculties to Purpose, and in *Eth.* vi. the cognate qualities to Wisdom are discussed, so Aristotle here introduces a discussion of the feelings which are cognate to Friendship.

καὶ πρότερον δὲ] viii. ii. 3-4.

διάτασιν] 'Intensity,' 'straining,' 'violence.' In the previous section *διατεταμένως* means 'strenuously.' Cf. *Ar. Polit.* vii. xvii. 6: τὰς διατάσεις τῶν παίδων καὶ κλαυθμούς, 'the violent passions and cryings of children.'

2 ἡ δ' εὖνοια—συμβαίνει] While loving implies acquaintance and familiarity, good-will is conceived instantaneously; thus men conceive good-will towards particular competitors in the games from their appearance, and are inclined to wish them success.

3 Good-will, says Aristotle, is the prelude of Friendship, just as the pleasure of the eye is the prelude of love. This however does not constitute love. The test of love is longing for a person in absence. Cf. *Ar. Rhet.* i. xi. 11: where the same test is given. In accordance with the unhappy notions of the Greeks, ἀπόντα is here put in the masculine gender.

ἡ διὰ τῆς ὀψεως] In Plato's *Cratylus*, p. 420 A, it is suggested that Ἔρως is derived from εἰσρεῖν.—Ἔρως ὅτι εἰσρεῖ ξεῶθεν καὶ οὐκ οἰκέει ἐστίν ἡ ῥοή αὐτῇ τῷ ἔχοντι, ἀλλ' ἐπείσρακτος διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων, διὰ ταῦτα ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰσρεῖν ἔσραος τό γε παλαιὸν ἐκαλεῖτο. Cf. *Shakespeare Merchant of Venice*, Act iii. Sc. ii.

'It is engendered in the eyes,
 By gazing fed.'

And *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I. Sc. iii.
 'I'll look to like, if looking liking move.'
 οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον] 'Goodwill' is essentially disinterested in its character.

ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἐπιθυμῇ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ φίλους οὐχ οἷον τ' εἶναι μὴ εὖνους γενομένους, οἱ δ' εὖνοι οὐθὲν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν· βούλονται γὰρ μόνον τὰγαθὰ οἷς εἰσὶν εὖνοι, συμπράξαιεν δ' ἂν οὐθέν, οὐδ' ὑχληθεῖεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη τις ἂν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν, χρονιζομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι φιλίαν, οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐδὲ γὰρ εὖνοια ἐπὶ τούτοις γίνεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθεὶς ἀνθ' ὧν πέπονθεν ἀπονέμει τὴν εὖνοιαν, τὰ δίκαια ὁρῶν· ὁ δὲ βουλόμενός τιν' εὐπραγεῖν, ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας δι' ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔοικ' εὖνους ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑαυτῷ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διὰ τινὰ χρῆσιν· ὅλως δ' ἡ εὖνοια δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιείκειάν τινα γίνεται,⁴ ὅταν τῷ φανῇ καλὸς τις ἢ ἀνδρεῖος ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν εἴπομεν.

Φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται· διόπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμοδοξία· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπάρξαιεν ἂν. οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὁτουοῦν ὁμογνωμονοῦντας ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων (οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν τὸ περὶ τούτων ὁμονοεῖν), ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι καὶ ταῦτα προαιρῶνται καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα. περὶ τὰ² πρακτὰ δὲ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν, οἷον αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν πᾶσι δοκῇ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρετὰς εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖν Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἢ ἄρχειν Πιττακόν, ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν.

VI. 1 φιλικὸν δὲ—ὁμοδοξία] 'Unanimity also appears to be of the nature of friendship; therefore it is not the same as agreement of opinion.' On φιλικὸν, cf. *Eth.* viii. i. 4; viii. xiii. 6.

οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων] Cf. *Eth.* iii. iii. 3: περὶ δὲ τῶν αἰδίων οὐδεὶς βουλευεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου. Aristotle arrives at his definition of ὁμόνοια inductively, saying that we do not find the name applied to agreement of opinion in general, nor again to agree-

ment of opinion about every particular subject, but we do find it used of states whose citizens are unanimous on the measures to be adopted for the common weal. Hence we get the idea that unanimity is 'political friendship.' Cf. *Eth.* viii. i. 4, where ὁμόνοια is used as the opposite of στάσις.

2 ἢ ἄρχειν Πιττακόν, ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν] 'Or (if all agree) that Pittacus shall rule, (supposing this to be) during the period when he himself was willing to rule.' Pittacus, having held his

- ὅταν ὁ ἑκάτερος ἑαυτὸν βούληται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις, στασιάζουσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὁδήποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος καὶ οἱ ἐπεικεῖς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν. οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γίγνεται οὗ ἐφίενται. πολιτικὴ δὲ φιλία φαίνεται ἢ ὁμόνοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται· περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γὰρ ἔστι καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἀνήκοντα. ἔστι δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ὁμόνοια ἐν τοῖς ἐπεικέσιν· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι καὶ ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες ὥς εἰπεῖν· τῶν τοιούτων γὰρ μένει τὰ βουλήματα καὶ οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὥσπερ εὐριπος, βούλονται τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, 4 τούτων δὲ καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται. τοὺς δὲ φαύλους οὐχ οἷον τε ὁμονοεῖν πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν, καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι, πλεονεξίας ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς λειτουργίαις ἐλλείποντας· ἑαυτῷ δ' ἕκαστος βουλόμενος ταῦτα τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει· μὴ γὰρ τηρούντων τὸ κοινὸν ἀπόλλυται. συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς στασιάζειν, ἀλλήλους μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν.
- 7 Οἱ δ' εὐεργέται τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας δοκοῦσι μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ οἱ εὖ παθόντες τοὺς δρᾶσαντας, καὶ ὡς παρὰ

elective monarchy for ten years, resigned. Had the citizens *after* this period wished him to reign, his own will would have been wanting to make unanimity in the state.

οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις] Eteocles and Polynices. Cf. Eurip. *Phaenissæ*, vv. 588, sqq.

τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὁδήποτε] The commentators illustrate this by the joke of the man who said 'that he and his wife had always perfectly agreed—in wishing to govern the house.'

3 ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες, ὥς εἰπεῖν] 'Being on the same moorings, as it were,' as opposed to the ebbings and flowings of a Euripus. Cf. Demosthenes, *De Corona*, p. 319, § 281, οὐκ

ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ὁρμῇ τοῖς πολλοῖς, sc. ἀγκύρας.

4 This is a picture of the discord produced by evil passions, where every one grasping at the larger share in good things, and shirking his part in labours and services, watches (ἐξετάζει) his neighbour to prevent him encroaching. Thus men force each other to do what is right, while unwilling to do it themselves.

VII. Aristotle says, it is noticed as something extraordinary (ὡς παρὰ λόγον ἐπιζητεῖται) that benefactors seem to love those, to whom they have done a kindness, more than the benefited persons love them. The common explanation of the paradox

λόγον γινόμενον ἐπιζητεῖται. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις φαίνεται, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς δὲ ὀφείλεται· καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται μὴ εἶναι οἷς ὀφείλουσιν, οἱ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμέλονται τῆς τῶν ὀφειλόντων σωτηρίας, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς εὐεργετήσαντας βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας ὡς κομιουμένους τὰς χάριτας, τοῖς δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιμελὲς τὸ ἀνταποδοῦναι. Ἐπίχαρμος μὲν οὖν τάχ' ἂν φαίη ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους, ἔοικε δ' ἀνθρωπικῶ· ἀμνήμονες γὰρ οἱ πολλοί, καὶ μᾶλλον εὖ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἐφίενται. δόξειε δ' ἂν φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ οὐχ ὅμοιον τῷ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας· οὐ γάρ ἐστι φίλησις περὶ ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ τοῦ σώζεσθαι βούλησις τῆς κομιδῆς ἕνεκα· οἱ δ' εὖ πεποιηκότες φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πεπονθότας, καὶ μὴθὲν ὥσι χρήσιμοι μὴδ' εἰς ὕστερον γένοιντ' ἂν. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν· πᾶς γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθεῖν ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἐμψύχου γενομένου. μάλιστα δ' ἴσως τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει· ὑπεραγαπῶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεῖα

is, that benefactors look forward to obtaining a return for their kindness, they thus cherish the persons of those who are indebted to them. This selfish theory views mankind on the dark side (ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους), but is not altogether devoid of truth. A deeper (φυσικώτερον) reason however may be assigned for the phenomenon in question, namely, that as we can only be said to exist when we are conscious of our vital powers (ἐσμὲν ἐνεργεῖα), so anything which gives or increases the sense of those powers is dear to us. The benefited person stands to the benefactor in the relation of a work to the artist, he is an exponent of the benefactor's self, and is thus regarded with feelings of affection, as being associated by the benefactor with the sense of his own existence (στέργει δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι). These

feelings of course cannot be reciprocated by the benefited person. Again, the benefactor associates an idea of the noble (τὸ καλόν) with the recipient of his good deeds; the other associates with him only an idea of the profitable, and this is a less loveable idea, especially when viewed in the past, and become a matter of memory. Again, the active part taken by the benefactor has more affinity to the active principle of loving.

τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις] This explanation is put by Thucydides (ii. 40) into the mouth of Pericles: βεβαίωτος δὲ ὁ δράσας τὴν χάριν ὥστε ὀφειλομένην δι' εὐνοίας φ' δέδωκε σώζειν· ὁ δ' ἀντοφείλων ἀμβλύτερος, εἰδὼς οὐκ ἐς χάριν, ἀλλ' εἰς ὀφείλημα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀποδώσων.

Ἐπίχαρμος] The words ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους seem to have been taken

- 4 ποιήματα, στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα.— τοιοῦτω δὴ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐεργετῶν· τὸ γὰρ εὖ πεπονθὸς ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν· τοῦτο δὴ ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἔργον τὸν ποιήσαντα. τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι τὸ εἶναι πᾶσιν αἰρετὸν καὶ φιλητόν, ἐσμὲν δ' ἐνεργεῖα· τῷ ζῆν γὰρ καὶ πράττειν. ἐνεργεῖα δὴ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἔστι πως· στέργει δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν· ὁ γὰρ ἐστὶ
- 5 δυνάμει, τοῦτο ἐνεργεῖα τὸ ἔργον μνηύει. ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῷ μὲν εὐεργέτῃ καλὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν προᾶξιν, ὥστε χαίρειν ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ παθόντι οὐβὲν καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι, ἀλλ'
- 6 εἴπερ, συμφέρον· τοῦτο δ' ἥττον ἢδὺ καὶ φιλητόν. ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἢ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἢ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἢ μνήμη. ἥδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ

out of some iambic or trochaic verse of the Sicilian poet, but the verse itself has not been preserved.

4 τοιοῦτω δὴ—μνηύει] 'The case of benefactors seems then something of the same kind. For the object benefited is their "work;" they love this therefore more than the work loves him who made it. The cause of this is that existence is desired and loved by all, but we exist by consciousness, that is to say by living and acting. Thus he who has made the work in question exists consciously, and therefore he loves the work, because he loves his existence. And this is a principle of nature; for that which exists potentially, the work proves to exist actually.' On this mode of paraphrasing ἐνέργεια, see Vol. I. Essay IV. Any work of art, or creation of the mind, or moral achievement, is here said to shew us externally to ourselves. It causes us to exist ἐνεργείᾳ, that is, not only *in* ourselves, but *for* ourselves. It thus becomes a union of the objective and the subjective. And the philosophical principle explains a whole class of homogeneous facts, not only the feelings

of benefactors towards the benefited, but of poets towards their poems, of parents, and especially mothers, towards their children; and of those who have made fortunes towards their property. These facts were brought together, without being analysed, by Plato, cf. *Republic*, p. 330 B-C, and *Eth.* iv. i. 20.

ἐνεργεῖα δὴ—πως] Many commentators understand these words to mean, 'Therefore by means of conscious activity the maker is in a sense his work,' in which they are supported by Eustratius and the Paraphrast. This would not materially alter the general drift of the passage.

6 ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶ—μνήμη] 'Now of the present the living reality is sweet, of the future the hope, of the past the memory.' In two clauses of this sentence subjective words are used (ἐλπίς and μνήμη), but ἐνέργεια in the remaining clause hovers between the objective and the subjective. Cf. *Ar. De Memoria*, i. 4, where αἰσθησις is used in an analogous sentence: τοῦ μὲν παρόντος (ἐστίν) αἰσθησις, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου μνήμη.

τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητὸν ὁμοίως. τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιη-
κότι μένει τὸ ἔργον (τὸ καλὸν γὰρ πολυχρόνιον), τῷ δὲ
παθόντι τὸ χρήσιμον παροίχεται. ἢ τε μνήμη τῶν μὲν
καλῶν ἠδὲα, τῶν δὲ χρησίμων οὐ πάνυ ἢ ἤττον· ἢ προσ-
δοκία δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχειν ἔοικεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν φιλῆσις
ποιήσει ἔοικεν, τὸ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ τῷ πάσχειν. τοῖς ὑπερ-
έχουσι δὴ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἔπεται τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὰ
φιλικά. ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιπόνως γενόμενα πάντες μᾶλλον ἢ
στεργουσιν, οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα οἱ κτησάμενοι τῶν
παραλαβόντων· δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ μὲν εὖ πάσχειν ἄπονον εἶναι,
τὸ δ' εὖ ποιεῖν ἐργῶδες. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ αἱ μητέρες
φιλοτεκνότεραι· ἐπιπονωτέρα γὰρ ἢ γέννησις, καὶ μᾶλλον
ἴσασιν ὅτι αὐτῶν. δοξάζει δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις
οἰκεῖον εἶναι.

Ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα ἢ
ἢ ἄλλον τινά· ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστα ἀγα-
πῶσι, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχυρῷ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι, δοκεῖ
τε ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσω
ἂν μοχθηρότερος ᾖ, τοσούτω μᾶλλον· ἐγκαλοῦσι δὲ αὐτῷ
ὅτι οὐθὲν ἄφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει· ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν,
καὶ ὅσω ἂν βελτίων ᾖ, μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ φίλου
ἐνεκα· τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ παρήσιν. τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ 2

VIII. In this interesting chapter, Aristotle discusses the difficulty as to 'whether one ought to love oneself especially, or some one else.' On the one hand, 'self-loving' is used as a term of reproach; on the other hand, one's feelings towards oneself are made the standard for one's feelings towards friends. These two points of view require reconciliation, which may be effected by a distinction of terms. For the word 'self' has two senses—the lower and the higher self, the one consisting in appetites and passions, the other in the intellect and the higher moral faculties. He that gratifies his lower self at the expense of others is 'self-loving' in the bad sense of the term. He that ministers to his higher

self promotes at the same time the good of others, and is worthy of all praise. Such self-love as this may lead a man even to die for his friends or for his country. A man, grasping at the noble, may give up honour, power, life itself; and thus the greatest self-sacrifice will be identical with the greatest self-love. These considerations show in what sense one ought, and in what sense one ought not, to 'love oneself.'

1 ὡς ἐν αἰσχυρῷ] 'As a term of reproach.'

οὐθὲν ἄφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει] 'He does nothing apart from himself.' 'Nihil a suis rationibus alienum.'

2 τοῖς λόγοις δὲ—οὐκ ἀλόγως] 'With these theories men's actions, not un-

ἔργα διαφωνεῖ, οὐκ ἀλόγως. Φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν
 μάλιστα τὸν μάλιστα φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλό-
 μενος ᾧ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἔνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηθεὶς
 εἴσεται. ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει μάλιστ' αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν,
 καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πάνθ' οἷς ὁ φίλος ὀρίζεται· εἴρηται γὰρ
 ὅτι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους
 διήκει. καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ πᾶσαι ὁμογνωμονοῦσιν,
 οἷον τὸ 'μία ψυχὴ' καὶ 'κοινὰ τὰ φίλων' καὶ 'ισότης
 Φιλότης' καὶ 'γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον.' πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα
 πρὸς αὐτὸν μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει· μάλιστα γὰρ φίλος αὐτῷ,
 καὶ Φιλητέον δὴ μάλισθ' ἑαυτόν. ἀπορεῖται δ' εἰκότως
 ποτέροις χρεὼν ἐπεσθαι, ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντων τὸ πιστόν.
 3 Ἰσως οὖν τοὺς τοιούτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαιρεῖν καὶ
 διορίζειν ἐφ' ὅσον ἐκάτεροι καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν. εἰ δὴ
 λάβοιμεν τὸ φίλαυτον πῶς ἐκάτεροι λέγουσιν, τάχ' ἂν
 4 γένοιτο δῆλον. οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλα-
 αὐτοὺς καλοῦσι τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν
 χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς·
 τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασιν περὶ
 αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητά ἐστιν. οἱ δὲ
 περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως
 τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς. τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ
 πολλοί· διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ
 φαύλου ὄντος. δικαίως δὲ τοῖς οὕτω φιλαύτοις ὀνειδί-
 5 ζεται. ὅτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦθ' αὐτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας εἰώθασιν
 λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαύτους, οὐκ ἄδηλον· εἰ γὰρ τις αἰεὶ
 σπουδάζοι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς μάλιστα πάντων ἢ
 τὰ σώφρονα ἢ ὅποια οὖν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, καὶ
 ὅλως αἰεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιεῖτο, οὐθεὶς ἐρεῖ τοῦτον
 6 φίλαυτον οὐδὲ ψέξει. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος μᾶλλον εἶναι
 φίλαυτος· ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστ'
 ἀγαθὰ, καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ, καὶ πάντα

reasonably, are at variance.' To the list of the meanings of the word ἔργον given in the note on *Eth.* I. vii. 11, we must add the above use of τὰ ἔργα to mean 'actions' as opposed to theory. Cf. *Eth.* x. i. 3: οἱ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἡττόν

εἰσι πιστοὶ τῶν ἔργων. x. viii. 12: τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται. Aristotle says that men do not 'act' as if they considered self-love to be wholly bad, and he proves this by quoting popular proverbs, which support the contrary view.

τούτῳ πείθεται· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τούτῳ χαριζόμενος. καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μὴ, ὡς τούτου ἐκάστου ὄντος· καὶ πεπραγέναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοῖ καὶ ἐκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἐπεικὴς μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀγαπᾷ. διὸ φίλαυτος μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη, καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ἥσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς, 7 πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἀμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν κοινῇ τ' ἂν πάντ' εἴη τὰ θέοντα καὶ ἰδία ἐκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει· τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ· βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλοις πάθεσιν ἐπόμενος. τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν διαφωνεῖ 8 ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ἃ πράττει· ὁ δ' ἐπεικὴς, ἃ δεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει· πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἰρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὁ δ' ἐπεικὴς πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ. ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ 9 σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ τῶν φίλων ἔνεκα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, καὶν δέη ὑπεραποθνήσκειν· προήσεται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὰς καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθά,

6 ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις—ἄνθρωπος]
'But as the predominant part (in a state) seems before all things to be the state, and as the predominant part in every other system seems to be that system, so (the predominant part in man seems, above all things, to be) man.' Cf. *Eth.* x. vii. 9: *δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον*. On the uses of the word *κύριος* cf. note on *Eth.* i. ii. 4. in the above passage τὸ κυριώτατον

means the 'most absolute,' the 'ruling' part. Cf. *Ar. Politics*, iii. vii. 2: *πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι κύριον ἢ ἓνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς πολλοὺς*.

7 εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν]
'If virtue is one of the greatest of goods.'

8-10 The sentiments expressed in these sections may be compared with the elevated description of the self-sacrifice of the brave man, in *Eth.* iii.

περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ καλόν· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἡσ-
θῆναι σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἔλοιτ' ἂν ἢ πολὺν ἡρέμα, καὶ
βιωῖσαι καλῶς ἑνῆαυτὸν ἢ πόλλ' ἔτη τυχόντως, καὶ μίαν
πρᾶξιν καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἢ πολλὰς καὶ μικράς. τοῖς
δ' ὑπεραποθνήσκουσι τοῦτ' ἴσως συμβαίνει· αἰροῦνται δὲ
μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ χρήματα προσῖντ' ἂν ἐφ' ᾧ
πλείονα λήψονται οἱ φίλοι· γίγνεται γὰρ τῷ μὲν φίλῳ
χρήματα, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ καλόν· τὸ δὲ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ
10 ἀπονέμει. καὶ περὶ τιμὰς δὲ καὶ ἀρχὰς ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος·
πάντα γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ ταῦτα προήσεται· καλὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ
τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαινετόν. εἰκότως δὲ δοκεῖ σπουδαῖος εἶναι,
ἀντὶ πάντων αἰρούμενος τὸ καλόν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ
πρᾶξεις τῷ φίλῳ προῖεσθαι, καὶ εἶναι κάλλιον τοῦ αὐτὸν
11 πρᾶξαι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ φίλῳ γενέσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς
ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλεόν
νέμων. οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαυτον εἶναι δεῖ, καθάπερ
εἴρηται· ὥς δ' οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή.
9 Ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰ δεήσεται
φίλων ἢ μή. οὐβὲν γάρ φασι δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις

ix. 4-5. But we may particularly note here the delicacy of thought which suggests that the good man may on occasion give up to his friend the doing of noble acts, and thus acquire to himself a still greater nobility. A comparison is sometimes instituted between the *φιλαυτία* of Aristotle and the 'self-love' of Bishop Butler. But the 'self-love' described by Butler is a creeping quality, it deals with means rather than with ends, and considers the 'interest' of man in this world or the next. Aristotle's *φιλαυτία* is simply a devotion to what is great and noble.

IX. Does the happy man, who is all-sufficient in himself, need friends, or not? To prove the affirmative of this question, Aristotle uses the following arguments.

1 *A priori*, we might assume that, as happiness is the sum of all human goods, the possession of friends, one of the greatest of external goods, would necessarily be included (§ 2).

2 Friends will be required by the happy man, not so much as the givers, but rather as the recipients, of kindness (§ 2).

3 We might assume also that the happy man should neither be condemned to be a solitary, nor to live with strangers and chance people (§ 3).

4 Those who take the negative side in the question have an unworthy conception of friends, as persons affording profit or pleasure. The happy man is almost independent of such (§ 4), but yet he may want friends in a higher sense. Happiness consists in the play of life (*ἐνέργεια*), and he that sees before his eyes the virtuous

καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν· ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὰγαθὰ· αὐτάρκεις οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον αὐτὸν ὄντα, πορίζειν ἅ δι' αὐτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ· ὅθεν τὸ

ὅταν ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;

ἔοικε δ' ἀτόπῳ τὸ πάντ' ἀπονέμοντας τὰγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλους μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἶναι. εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλον ἐστὶ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, καὶ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, κάλλιον δ' εὖ ποιεῖν φίλους ὀφνειῶν, τῶν εὖ πεισομένων δεήσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος. διὸ καὶ ἐπιζητεῖται πότερον ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον δεῖ φίλων ἢ ἐν ἀτυχίαις, ὡς καὶ τοῦ ἀτυχοῦντος δεομένου τῶν εὐεργετησόντων καὶ τῶν εὐτυχούντων οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν. ἀτοπον δ' ἴσως καὶ τὸ μονώ-³την ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἔλοιτ' ἂν καθ' αὐτὸν τὰ πάντ' ἔχειν ἀγαθὰ· πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός. καὶ τῷ εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦθ' ὑπάρχει· τὰ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει. δῆλον δ' ὡς μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπεικῶν κρεῖττον ἢ μετ' ὀφνειῶν καὶ τῶν τυχόντων

a cts of a friend has a delightful sense of the play of life, seeing harmonious action and identifying it with himself (*ἐπεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας*, § 5).

5 Again, the sympathy and excitement of friends enables a man to prolong that vivid action and glow of the mind which is the essence of happiness (§§ 5-6).

6 It also confirms him in the practice of virtue (§§ 6-7).

7 Finally, a deeper reason may be assigned for the necessity of friends to the happy man; it depends on our love of life. That sympathetic consciousness (*συναισθάνεσθαι*) which we have of a friend's existence, by means of intercourse with him, is, only, in a secondary degree (*παραπλήσιον*), the same as the sense of our own existence.

1 αὐτάρκεσιν] The quality αὐτάρκεια is claimed for happiness, *Eth.* i. vii. 6,

where Aristotle guards himself against the supposition that it implies a lonely life. τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐτάρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δ' αὐτάρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸς ἄνθρωπος.

ὅταν ὁ δαίμων] from the *Orestes* of Euripides, 665, sqq.:

τοὺς φίλους
ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς χρή τοῖς φίλοιςιν ὠφελεῖν·
ὅταν δ' ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;
ἀρκεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς ὠφελεῖν θέλων.

2 ἀπονέμοντας] 'Us who allot,' cf. *Eth.* i. vii. 8, where happiness is said to be *τέλειον τι καὶ αὐτάρκες*. The form of expression here used is similar to that in *Eth.* i. x. 2: **Ἡ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἀτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν;*

- 4 συνημερεύειν· δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων. τί οὖν λέγου-
σιν οἱ πρῶτοι, καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν; ἡ ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ φίλους
οἴονται τοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι; τῶν τοιούτων μὲν οὖν οὐθέν
δεήσεται ὁ μακάριος, ἐπειδὴ τὰγαθὰ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ. οὐδὲ
δὴ τῶν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ἡ ἐπὶ μικρόν· ἡδὺς γὰρ ὁ βίος ὧν οὐθέν
δεῖται ἐπείσакτου ἡδονῆς. οὐ δεόμενος δὲ τῶν τοιούτων
5 φίλων οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι φίλων. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀλη-
θές· ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τις
ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει
ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι. εἰ δὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν
καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια σπουδαία καὶ ἡδεῖα
καθ' αὐτήν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ
οἰκεῖον τῶν ἡδέων, θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς πέλας δυνάμεθα
ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ τὰς οἰκείας, αἱ τῶν
σπουδαίων δὴ πράξεις φίλων ὄντων ἡδεῖται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς·
ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα. ὁ μακάριος δὴ

4 ἐπείσакτου ἡδονῆς] 'Adventitious pleasure,' 'pleasure introduced from without,' cf. *Eth.* I. viii. 12: οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Cf. *Eth.* x. vii. 3. The word ἐπείσакτος occurs in Plato's *Cratylus*, p. 420 B, quoted above in the note on IX. v. 3.

5 ἐν ἀρχῇ—ῤῥῶν] 'For we said at the outset (*Eth.* I. vii. 14) that happiness is a certain function of the consciousness, and it is plain that this arises in us, and does not exist in us like a possession. But if being happy consists in the play of life, and the actions of the good man are good and essentially pleasurable, as we said before (*Eth.* I. viii. 13), and also the sense of a thing being identified with oneself is one of the sources of pleasure, but we are able to contemplate our neighbours better than ourselves, and their actions better than our own, then the actions of good men being their friends are pleasurable to the good; for (such actions) contain both

the two elements that are essentially pleasurable. The supremely happy man then will require friends of this character, if he wishes to contemplate actions which are good and also identified with himself: and such are the actions of the good man being his friend. Again, men think that the happy man ought to live pleurably, whereas life is painful to the solitary man, for by oneself it is difficult to maintain long a vivid state of the mind, but with others and in relation to others this is easier.'

The first part of this sentence contains a complex protasis, to which the apodosis is αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὴ, κ.τ.λ.

τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια] In the passage referred to (*Eth.* I. viii. 13) the words are αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, which may justify the above translation.

ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχουσι] Some of the commentators take ἄμφω as though it were the nominative case to ἔχουσι, and meant 'both the good man and

φίλων τοιούτων δεήσεται, ἔπερ θεωρεῖν προαιρεῖται πρά-
ξεις ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας· τοιαῦται δ' αἱ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
φίλου ὄντος. οἶονταί τε δεῖν ἡδέως ζῆν τὸν εὐδαίμονα·
μονώτῃ μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾶδιον καθ' αὐτὸν
ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς, μεθ' ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾶον.
ἔσται οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια συνεχεστέρα, ἡδεῖα οὔσα καθ' αὐτήν, 6
ὁ δὲ περὶ τὸν μακάριον εἶναι· ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος, ἢ σπου-
δαῖος, ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεσι χαίρει, ταῖς δ' ἀπὸ κακίας
δυσχεραίνει, καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσιν ἡδε-
ται, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς φαύλοις λυπεῖται. γίμκοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ 7
ἄσκησιν τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθά-
περ καὶ Θεογνίς φησιν. Φυσικώτερον δ' ἐπισκοποῦσιν
ἔοικεν ὁ σπουδαῖος φίλος τῷ σπουδαίῳ τῇ φύσει αἰρετὸς
εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν εἴρηται ὅτι τῷ σπουδαίῳ
ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι καθ' αὐτό· τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὀρίζονται τοῖς
ζώοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως, ἀνθρώποις δ' αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως·

his friend.' But it would be irrelevant to speak of the feelings of the friend. The question is, what advantage does the happy man get out of having friends? ἄμφω here evidently applies to τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα, as is further proved by the words ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας in the next sentence; it refers to what has gone before, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ—οἰκείον τῶν ἡδέων.

6—7 ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος—φησιν] The good man, feeling the same sort of pleasure in the moral acts reciprocated between himself and his friend which the musical man feels in good music, will prolong and enjoy that reciprocation, and as Theognis says 'will learn what is good by associating with the good.' The advantage here attributed to friendship is that, by adding the element of pleasure to the best functions of our nature, it assists and developes them. Cf. *Eth.* x. v. 2: συναύξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ οἰκεία ἡδονή—ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι καὶ φιλοκοδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστοι

ἐπιδιδόασιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ.

καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς] On the 'moral sense' in its analogy to the 'musical ear,' cf. *Eth.* x. iii. 10.

7 τὸ δὲ ζῆν—νοεῖν] 'People define "living" in the case of animals by the power of sensation, in the case of men by the power of sensation or thought. But the word "power" has its whole meaning in reference to the exercise of that power, and the distinctive part of the conception lies in the "exercise." Thus the act of living appears distinctively to be an act of perceiving or thinking.' The train of reasoning in this latter part of the chapter is, that life consists in consciousness; life is good and sweet; consciousness is intensified, and life therefore is made better and sweeter, by intercourse with friends.

τοῖς ζῴοις] On the ascending scale of life from the plant to the man, cf. *De Animâ*, II. iii. 1—9, *Eth.* I. vii. 12, and Vol. I. Essay V.

ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται. τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ· ἔοικε δὲ τὸ ζῆν εἶναι κυρίως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν. τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων· ὠρισμένον γάρ, τὸ δ' ὠρισμένον τῆς τἀγαθοῦ φύσεως. τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ· διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν ἡδὺ 8 εἶναι. οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηρὰν ζωὴν καὶ διεφθαρμένην, οὐδ' ἐν λύπαις· ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη, καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης ἔσται φανερώτερον. εἰ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ (ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ μακαρίους· τούτοις γὰρ ὁ βίος αἰρετώτατος, καὶ ἡ τούτων μακαριωτάτη ζωὴ), ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔστι τι τὸ αἰσθανό-

ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται] Cf. *Metaphysics*, viii. ix. 5: φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀναγόμενα εὐρίσκειται.

διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν ἡδὺ εἶναι] 'Wherefore it appears to be sweet to all,' i.e. of course ordinary individuals love life, in which there is a certain physical sweetness, cf. *Ar. Politics*, iii. vi. 5: Δῆλον δ' ὡς καρτεροῦσι πολλὴν κακοπάθειαν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γλιχόμενοι τοῦ ζῆν, ὡς ἐνοούσης τινὸς εὐημερίας ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ γλυκύτητος φυσικῆς. This Greek view of the sweetness of life contrasts with the philosophy of the Hindoos, which represents life as a burden, and individuality as a curse.

8 Οὐ δεῖ δὲ—φανερώτερον] 'But one must not take (as an instance) a vicious and corrupt life, nor one in pain; for such a life is unharmonised, like its characteristics. In the following discourse the nature of pain will be made more clear.'

ἀόριστος] 'Unlimited;' 'without law, balance, order, harmony.' On the use made by Aristotle of this Pythagorean formula, see *Eth.* ii. vi. 14, and Vol. I. Essay IV. p. 202-3.

'Ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις] We have here an unfulfilled promise, like that in *Eth.* i. vii. 7: for in 'the following book' there is nothing on the 'unlimited' or 'unharmonised' nature of pain. The sentence may possibly be an interpolation.

9 Εἰ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθόν] This is the beginning of a complex protasis, which goes on prolonging itself, ὁ δ' ὁρῶν—τὸ δ' ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα, &c., till at last it finds its apodosis in § 10: καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἰρετόν ἐστιν ἐκάστω, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησίως.

καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων—νοεῖν] 'And with respect to all the other functions, in like manner there is something which perceives that we are exercising them, so then we can perceive that we perceive, and think that we think. But this (perceiving) that we perceive or think, is perceiving that we exist; for existing, as we said (§ 7), consists in perceiving or thinking.' ἐνεργούμεν is here used in a purely objective sense; the ἐνέργεια is here distinguished from the consciousness which necessarily accompanies it, and with

μενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὥστε αἰσθανοίμεθ' ἂν ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ νοοῖμεν ὅτι νοοῦμεν. τὸ δ' ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμέν. τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἢν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν. τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῇ, τῶν ἡδέων καθ' αὐτό. φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωή, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡδύ. αἰρετὸν δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡδύ. συναισθανόμενοι γὰρ τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἡδονται. ὥς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει ὁ 10 σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον. ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστίν. καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἰρετόν, ἐστιν ἐκάστω, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησίως. τὸ δ' εἶναι ἢν αἰρετὸν διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος. ἢ δὲ τοιαύτη αἰσθησις ἡδεῖα καθ' ἑαυτήν. συναισθάνεσθαι ἄρα δεῖ καὶ τοῦ φίλου ὅτι ἔστιν, τοῦτο δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοίας. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειε τὸ συζῆν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι. εἰ δὴ τῷ μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἰρετόν ἐστι καθ' αὐτό, ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει ὃν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν αἰρετῶν ἂν εἴη. ὁ δ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ αἰρετόν, τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, ἢ ταύτῃ ἐνδεῆς ἔσται. δεήσει ἄρα τῷ εὐδαιμονήσουσι φίλων σπουδαίων.

* Ἀρ' οὖν ὥς πλείστους φίλους ποιητέον, ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ 10 τῆς ξενίας ἐμμελῶς εἰρῆσθαι δοκεῖ

μήτε πολύξεινος μήτ' ἄξεινος,

which it is frequently identified. See Vol. I. Essay IV. The absolute unity of existence with thought here laid down anticipates the 'cogito ergo sum' of Descartes.

10 Συναισθάνεσθαι-νέμεσθαι] 'Therefore we ought to have a sympathetic consciousness of the existence of our friend, and this can arise by means of living together with him, and sharing words and thought with him, which is the true meaning of "living together" in the case of men; it does

not mean, as with cattle, simply herding in the same spot.' This view of the importance of 'intercourse,' and of the advantages to be derived from it, is repeated and summarized in ch. xii., and forms the conclusion of the treatise.

X. The question of the plurality of friends is brought under analysis in this chapter. The number of one's friends for use or for pleasure is shown to be limited by convenience. The

καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας ἀρμόσει μήτ' ἄφιλον εἶναι μήτ' αὖ
 2 πολύφιλον καθ' ὑπερβολήν; τοῖς μὲν δὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν καὶ
 πάνυ δόξειεν ἂν ἀρμόζειν τὸ λεχθέν· πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀνθυπη-
 ρετεῖν ἐπίπονον, καὶ οὐχ ἱκανὸς ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς τοῦτο πράτ-
 τειν. οἱ πλείους δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶς
 περιέργοι καὶ ἐμπόδιοι πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ζῆν· οὐθέν οὖν δεῖ
 3 τῇ τροφῇ τὸ ἡδυσμα. τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους πότερον πλείσ-
 τους κατ' ἀριθμόν, ἢ ἔστι τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικοῦ πλήθους,
 ὥσπερ πόλεως; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ'
 ἂν πόλις, οὔτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ
 ποσὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἔν τι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν
 ὠρισμένων. καὶ φίλων δὲ ἔστι πλήθος ὠρισμένον, καὶ
 ἴσως οἱ πλείστοι, μεθ' ὧν ἂν δύναιτό τις συζῆν· τοῦτο
 4 γὰρ ἐδόκει φιλικώτατον εἶναι, ὅτι δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε πολ-
 λοῖς συζῆν καὶ διανέμειν αὐτόν, οὐκ ἄδηλον. ἔτι δὲ

number of one's friends, properly so called, is shown to be limited by one's incapacity to feel the highest kind of affection (*ὑπερβολή τις φιλίας*) for many individuals, and by the practical difficulties which would attend a close intercourse (*συζῆν*) with many persons at once, who would also have to associate harmoniously with each other. On the whole the question is answered in the negative.

1 *ἐμμελῶς εἰρήσθαι*] 'Neatly expressed.'

μήτε πολύξεινος] From Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 713.

μηδὲ πολύξεινον μηδ' ἄξεινον καλέεσθαι.

The line is untranslatable into English, as we have no word (like the German *Gastfreund*) to express both 'host,' and 'guest,' as *ξένος* does.

2 This section may be said to retract, upon further consideration, what was admitted, *Eth.* viii. vi. 3: *Διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι.*

ἱκανῶς] This reading, adopted by Bekker from a majority of MSS., is surprising; *ἱκανῶς περιέργοι* would not be a natural phrase, whereas the context really requires *οἱ πλείους δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶν.*

3 *οὔτε γὰρ—πόλις ἐστίν*] 'For a state could not consist of ten men, nor again if consisting of a hundred thousand does it still continue to be a state.' This extremely limited idea of the size of a state is based on the Greek notion that each citizen must personally take part in the administration of affairs. On this hypothesis, a state consisting of a hundred thousand citizens might easily appear unwieldy. Aristotle in the *Politics*, vii. iv. 9, represents the state as an organism of limited size. *ἔστι τι καὶ πόλεσι μεγέθους μέτρον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, ζώων, φυτῶν, ὀργάνων· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστον οὔτε λίαν μικρὸν οὔτε κατὰ μέγεθος υπερβάλλον ἔχει τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν, κ. τ. λ.*

κάκείνους δεῖ ἀλλήλοις φίλους εἶναι, εἰ μέλλουσι πάντες μετ' ἀλλήλων συνημερεύειν· τοῦτο δ' ἐργῶδες ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν. χαλεπὸν δὲ γίνεται καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν οἰκείως πολλοῖς· εἰκὸς γὰρ συμπίπτειν ἅμα τῷ μὲν συνήδεσθαι τῷ δὲ συνάχθεσθαι. ἴσως οὖν εὖ ἔχει μὴ ζητεῖν ὡς πολυφιλότατον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοσούτους ὅσοι εἰς τὸ συζῆν ἱκανοί· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι δόξειεν ἂν πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον σφόδρα. διόπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πλειόνων· ὑπερβολὴ γάρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἓνα· καὶ τὸ σφόδρα δὴ πρὸς ὀλίγους. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν ὅσοις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων· οὐ γίνονται γὰρ φίλοι πολλοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐταιρικὴν φιλίαν, αἱ δ' ὑμνούμεναι ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται. οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι καὶ πᾶσιν οἰκείως ἐντυγχάνοντες οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι, πλὴν πολιτικῶς, οὓς καὶ καλοῦσιν ἀρέσκους. πολιτικῶς μὲν οὖν

διόπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πλειόνων] This is almost a *verbatim* repetition of *Eth.* viii. vi. 2, which passage contains the germ of the present chapter.

6 οὕτω δ'—τοιούτους] 'And this seems to be practically the case; for we do not find that people have many friends (together) on the footing of companionship. And the classical friendships of story are recorded to have been between pairs. But they who have many friends, and who associate familiarly with all, seem to be friends to none, except in a civil way, and men call them "over-complaisant." In a civil way indeed it is possible to be a friend to many without being over-complaisant, but being really kind; but on a moral and personal footing this is not possible in relation to many; one must be content to find even a few worthy of this.'

ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων] Opposed to τοῖς λόγοις implied in τὸ λεχθέν above. Cf. the use of τὰ ἔργα, *Eth.* ix. viii. 2.

ἐταιρικὴν] Cf. *Eth.* viii. xii. 1-6, and viii. v. 3. 'Companionship,'

which Aristotle compares to the feeling between brothers, is much more akin to the perfect and ideal friendship than it is to either of the lower forms of friendship (for gain or for pleasure). It is essentially based on personal considerations (δι' αὐτοῦς), though not necessarily on moral considerations (δι' ἀρετήν).

αἱ δ' ὑμνούμεναι] Fritzsche quotes Plutarch *De Am. Mult.* 2: τὸν μακρὸν καὶ παλαιὸν αἰῶνα μάρτυρα ἅμα τοῦ λόγου καὶ σύμβουλον λάβωμεν, ἐν ᾧ κατὰ ζεύγους φιλίας λέγονται Θησεὺς καὶ Πειρίθους, Ἀχιλλεὺς καὶ Πάτροκλος, Ὀρέστης καὶ Πυλάδης, Φιντίας καὶ Δάμων, Ἐπαμεινώνδας καὶ Πελοπίδας.

οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι—οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι] Cf. *Eudemian Ethics*, vii. xii. 17: τὸ ζητεῖν ἡμῖν καὶ εὐχεσθαι πολλοὺς φίλους, ἅμα δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐδεὶς φίλος ᾧ πολλοὶ φίλοι, ἑμφω λέγεται ὀρθῶς, which sentence reconciles the above passage with *Eth.* viii. i. 5. In an external way (πολιτικῶς) a man should have many friends, personally (δι' αὐτοῦς) a few.

ἀρέσκους] Cf. *Eth.* ii. vii. 13, iv. vi. 9.

ἔστι πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον καὶ μὴ ἄρεσκον ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιεικῇ· δι' ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς πολλούς, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγους εὐρεῖν τοιούτους.

- 11 Πότερον δ' ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον φίλων δεῖ ἢ ἐν δυστυχίαις; ἐν ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἐπιζητοῦνται· οἱ τε γὰρ ἀτυχοῦντες δέονται ἐπικουρίας, οἱ τ' εὐτυχοῦντες συμβίων καὶ οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν· βούλονται γὰρ εὖ δρᾶν. ἀναγκαιότερον μὲν δὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις, διὸ τῶν χρησίων ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, κάλλιον δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις, διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ζητοῦσιν· τούτους γὰρ αἰρετώτερον εὐεργετεῖν
2 καὶ μετὰ τούτων διάγειν. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἡ παρουσία αὐτῇ τῶν φίλων ἡδεῖα καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις· κουφίζονται γὰρ οἱ λυπούμενοι συναλγούντων τῶν φίλων. διὸ καὶ ἀπορήσειεν τις πότερον ὥσπερ βάρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, ἡ παρουσία δ' αὐτῶν ἡδεῖα οὔσα καὶ ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ συναλγεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι κουφίζονται, ἀφείσθω·
3 συμβαίνειν δ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεχθέν. ἔοικε δ' ἡ παρουσία μικτὴ τις αὐτῶν εἶναι. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὄρᾶν τοὺς φίλους ἡδύ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτυχοῦντι, καὶ γίνεται τις ἐπικουρία πρὸς τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι· παραμυθητικὸν γὰρ ὁ φίλος καὶ τῇ ὥσει καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐὰν ᾖ ἐπιδέξιος· οἶδε γὰρ τὸ ἦθος
4 καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἡδέεται καὶ λυπεῖται. τὸ δὲ λυπούμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς αὐτοῦ ἀτυχίαις λυπηρόν· πᾶς γὰρ φεύγει λύπης αἴτιος εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις. διόπερ οἱ μὲν

δι' αὐτοὺς] Cf. *Etih.* ix. i. 7, and note.

τοιούτους] i.e. capable of being made personal friends.

XI. The question whether friends are most needed in adversity or prosperity is here answered by saying, that in adversity friendship is more necessary, and in prosperity more glorious. Some remarks are added on the exact operation of friendship in alleviating sorrow, and some practical rules are deduced.

2 ὥσπερ βάρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν] 'Whether they take part of the burden, as it were.' This is the ordinary metaphor. Cf. Xenophon, *Memor.* ii. vii. 1. (Σωκράτης) Ἀρίσταρχόν ποτε ὀρῶν σκυθρωπῶς ἔχοντα· ἔοικας, ἔφη, ᾧ Ἀρίσταρχε, βαρέως φέρειν τι· χρὴ δὲ τοῦ βάρους μεταδιδόναι τοῖς φίλοις. ἴσως γὰρ ἂν τί σε καὶ ἡμεῖς κουφίσαιμεν. Aristotle hints at, without fully giving, a more psychological account of the operation of friendship in adversity.

3 μικτὴ τις] Cf. *Etih.* iii. i. 6, iv. ix. 8.

ἀνδρώδεις τὴν φύσιν εὐλαβοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους αὐτοῖς, καὶ μὴ ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυπία, τὴν ἐκείνοις γινόμενην λύπην οὐχ ὑπομένει, ὅλως τε συνθρήνους οὐ προσίεται διὰ τὸ μὴδ' αὐτὸς εἶναι θρηνητικός· γύναια δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες τοῖς συστένουσι χαίρουσι, καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς φίλους καὶ συναλγοῦντας. μιμεῖσθαι δ' ἐν ἅπασι δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν βελτίω. ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις τῶν φίλων παρουσία τὴν τε διαγωγὴν ἡδεῖαν ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν ὅτι ἡδοναὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῖς. διὸ δόξειεν ἂν δεῖν εἰς μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας καλεῖν τοὺς φίλους προθύμως· εὐεργετητικὸν γὰρ εἶναι καλόν· εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀτυχίας ὀκνοῦντα· μεταδιδόναι γὰρ ὡς ἥκιστα δεῖ τῶν κακῶν, ὅθεν τὸ

ἅλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν.

μάλιστα δὲ παρακλητέον, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ὀλίγα ὀχληθέντες μεγάλ' αὐτὸν ὠφελήσῃν. ἵεναι δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἴσως ἂρμόζει πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀτυχοῦντας ἄκλητον καὶ προθύμως (φίλου γὰρ εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν χρεῖᾳ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀξιῶσαντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ κάλλιον καὶ ἥδιον), εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐτυχίας συνεργοῦντα μὲν προθύμως (καὶ γὰρ εἰς ταῦτα χρεῖα φίλων), πρὸς εὐπάθειαν δὲ σχολαίως· οὐ

4 καὶ μὴ ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυπία—θρηνητικός] 'And (such a one), unless he be excessively impassive, cannot endure the pain which is brought upon them; and altogether he does not like sympathetic wailers, not being given to wailing himself.' The words καὶ μὴ κ.τ.λ. have troubled the commentators. The Paraphrast explains them as if meaning:—'And unless (the sympathetic presence of friends) be exceedingly painless to them.' But evidently the clause is brought in in reference to οἱ ἀνδρώδεις. 'Manly natures' are not at all unlikely to be somewhat blunt and callous, and deficient in sensibility for the feelings of others. One might almost fancy that

Aristotle was thinking of the *Ajax* of Sophocles, vv. 319, 320:

πρὸς γὰρ κακοῦ τε καὶ βαρυψύχου γόους τοιοῦτ' αἰεί ποτ' ἀνδρὸς ἐξηγεῖτ' ἔχειν.

5 ἅλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν] These words are not to be found in any extant play or fragment. The nearest approach to them is in Sophocles, *Oed. Tyr.* 1061: ἅλις νοσοῦσ' ἐγώ.

6 φίλου γὰρ—ἥδιον] 'For it behoves a friend to benefit (his friends), and especially those who are in need, and to (benefit) them when they have not asked. For this is nobler and sweeter for both parties.' With καὶ τὸ, εὖ ποιεῖν is to be repeated. Some editions, against the MSS., read καὶ τοὺς.

γὰρ καλὸν τὸ προθυμεῖσθαι ὠφελεῖσθαι. δόξαν δ' ἀηδίας ἐν τῷ διωθεῖσθαι ἴσως εὐλαβητέον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ συμβαίνει. ἡ παρουσία δὲ τῶν φίλων ἐν ἅπασιν αἰρετὴ φαίνεται.

- 12 Ἄρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐρώσι τὸ ὁρᾶν ἀγαπητότατόν ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὰς λοιπάς, ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος καὶ γινομένου, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς φίλοις αἰρετώτατόν ἐστι τὸ συζῆν; κοινωνία γὰρ ἡ φιλία. καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον. περὶ αὐτὸν δ' ἡ αἴσθησις ὅτι ἔστιν αἰρετὴ· καὶ περὶ τὸν φίλον δὴ. ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ συζῆν, ὥστ' εἰκότως τούτου ἐφίενται.
- 2 καὶ ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκάστοις τὸ εἶναι ἢ οὐ χάριν αἰροῦνται τὸ ζῆν, ἐν τούτῳ μετὰ τῶν φίλων βούλονται διάγειν· διόπερ οἱ μὲν συμπίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ συγκυβεύουσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ συγγυμνάζονται καὶ συγκυνηγοῦσιν ἢ συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἕκαστοι ἐν τούτῳ συνημερεύοντες ὅ τί περ μάλιστα ἀγαπῶσι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ· συζῆν γὰρ βουλόμενοι μετὰ τῶν φίλων, ταῦτα ποιοῦσι καὶ τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν οἷς οἴονται
- 3 συζῆν. γίνεται οὖν ἡ μὲν τῶν φαύλων φιλία μοχθηρά· κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ φαύλων ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες, καὶ μοχθηροὶ δὲ

δόξαν δ'—συμβαίνει] 'But one should beware perhaps of getting the reputation of churlishness in rejecting (benefits); for this sometimes happens.' ἀηδία answers to the 'insuavis, acerbus' of Horace, *Sat.* I. iii. 85.

XII. In conclusion, the best thing in friendship is—intercourse. This gives vividness to the pursuits of life; and when good men have intercourse with each other, they mutually strengthen and increase the good that is in them.

I ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ συζῆν] 'But it is by living together that they attain the fulness of life.' The word ἐνέργεια here has evident reference to ἡ αἴσθησις ὅτι ἔστιν in the preceding sentence. Zell and

Cardwell follow some of the MSS in reading αὐτῆς, i. e. τῆς αἰσθήσεως. But ἡ ἐνέργεια stands naturally alone (cf. *Eth.* ix. ix. 6), meaning 'the vivid sense of life.' And a similar collocation occurs *Eth.* viii. iii. 5: γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ φιλίαν οὕτως.

3 κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ—ἀλλήλοις] 'For, being of an unstable nature, they have fellowship in evil, and become bad by assimilation to each other.' Cf. *Eth.* ix. i. 7: τοῖς φιλοσοφίας κοινωνήσασιν. The word ἀβέβαιοι here is not connected with the use of βέβαιον in *Eth.* viii. viii. 5: Οἱ δὲ μοχθηροὶ τὸ μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ ἔχουσιν. Aristotle is not talking here of the instability of the friendship between bad men, but of its evil results mutually. Throughout the treatise on Friendship

γίνονται ὁμοιοῦμενοι ἀλλήλοις· ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἐπιεικῆς, συναυξανόμενη ταῖς ὁμιλίαις· δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελτίους γίνεσθαι ἐνεργοῦντες καὶ διορθοῦντες ἀλλήλους· ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ' ἀλλήλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν

ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅπ' ἐσθλά.

†περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· ἐπόμενον δ' ἂν 4 εἴη διελεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς.

he speaks of the *weakness* of vice (cf. note on ix. iv. 9), and here he says that bad men, from the weakness and instability of their natures, imbibe evil example.

ἀπομάττονται — ἀρέσκονται] 'For they take the stamp of one another in those things which they like.' Cf. Aristophanes, *Ranæ*, v. 1040.

ὅθεν ἡ 'μὴ φρὴν ἀπομαξαμένη πολλὰς ἀρετὰς ἐποίησεν.

ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ] On this passage of

Theognis, which is referred to above, *Eth.* ix. ix. 7, see Vol. I. Essay II. p. 61. It is after Aristotle's manner to end a treatise with a line of poetry; cf. *Metaphysics*, xi. x. 14, where the book ends with the verse

Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίῃ· εἰς κοίρανος ἔστω.

Accordingly the unnecessary paragraph περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας κ.τ.λ. is probably the interpolation of an editor.

PLAN OF BOOK X.

THIS Book, beginning with a treatise on Pleasure, (which subject is introduced (1) because of its connection with Morals; (2) because of the controversies about it), and rising from the critical examination of extreme views to Aristotle's own theory of Pleasure, namely, that it is the sense of the Vital Functions, or in other words, of the harmonious action of some one faculty; proceeds, almost without transition, to declare that Happiness in the truest sense of the term must consist in the action of the highest faculty, and that, this highest faculty being Intellect, Philosophy must, beyond all comparison with anything else, whether idle amusement or even the exercise of the moral virtues, constitute Happiness, or that practical Chief Good which is the end of Man, and the province of the ethical branch of Politics.

Thus far this branch of Science, having obtained a definite conception, might be thought to be complete. But it still remains to ask whether something cannot be added towards its practical realization, and, as habits of life are clearly necessary for the attainment of human excellence, on which the Chief Good depends, it follows that we shall require such domestic institutions as may be favourable to the cultivation of human excellence. These institutions, whether of public or private ordinance, can only be rightly conceived after a scientific study of the principles of Legislation, *i.e.* of Politics in its highest form. To this then Aristotle proposes to address himself, considering it to be a branch of science which has hitherto been neglected. He roughly sketches out the plan of his work on Politics, with a transition to which the ethical treatise concludes.

This tenth book then shows us the *Ethics* as a rounded whole. It is written in close connection with Book I. (cf. X. vi. 1.), and it sums up referentially the contents of Books I., II., III., IV., VIII., IX. But while the *Ethics* are thus rounded off in their beginning

and end, and as to part of their contents, it is clear on the other hand that they contain a *lacuna* which has been artificially filled up. Book IV., as we have already seen, ends in an abrupt and almost fragmentary manner. And then follow three Books which, we may say decisively, have no literary connection with the other parts of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, while they stand in close relation to the whole of the *Eudemian Ethics*, of which in almost all MSS. they form a part. Those persons who believe the whole of the *Eudemian Ethics* to be as entirely the writing of Aristotle as Book X. of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, as the *Politics*, or as Book I. of the *Metaphysics*, must at all events admit that there is some reason to say that the Nicomacho-Eudemian Books (*Eth.* V. VI. VII.) were written separately from, and in all probability later than, the rest of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Those who consider that the Eudemian treatise, as a whole, gives us the thoughts of Aristotle conveyed in the words of Eudemus, will probably conclude that the same account is to be given of the disputed books.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ X.



META δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ἡδονῆς ἴσως ἔπεται διελθεῖν· μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συνωκείωσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν· διὸ παιδεύουσι τοὺς νέους οἰακίζοντες ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετὴν μέγιστον εἶναι τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ καὶ μισεῖν ἃ δεῖ· διατείνει γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, ῥοπὴν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ ² λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἥκιστ' ἂν δόξειε παρετέον εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐχόντων ἀμφισβήτησιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰγαθὸν ἡδονὴν λέγουσιν, οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κομιδῇ φαῦλον, οἱ μὲν ἴσως πεπεισμένοι οὕτω καὶ ἔχουσιν, οἱ δὲ οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνουσιν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν· ῥέπειν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ δουλεύειν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖν εἰς τούναντίον ἄγειν· ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως

I. The treatise on Pleasure opens analogously to that on the Voluntary (*Eth.* iii. i. 1), and that on Friendship (viii. i. 1, 6), justifying the introduction of the subject, (1) as connected with Ethics, (2) as having been made matter of controversy.

1 μάλιστα γὰρ—ἡμῶν] 'For it seems to be most intimately connected with the human race.' *Omni sed non soli*, see below v. 8.

διὸ παιδεύουσι κ.τ.λ.] This is all taken from Plato's *Laws*, ii. p. 653. See note on *Eth.* ii. iii. 2, where the passage is quoted.

πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετὴν] Some MSS. read ἀρχὴν, which it is strange

that the commentators should have thought a natural reading, supported by αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ (below, viii. 3). Because φρόνησις is regarded by Aristotle as a syllogism, or set of syllogisms, having ἀρχαὶ or major premisses,—it does not follow that the phrase ἡ τοῦ ἥθους ἀρχή is admissible.

2 οἱ μὲν γὰρ—μέσον] 'For some call pleasure the chief good, others on the contrary call it exceedingly evil, (of these latter) some perhaps believing it to be so, but others thinking it for the interests of morality to declare pleasure to be an evil, even if it be not so, because most men incline to—'

ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον. μή ποτε δὲ οὐ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται. οἱ 3
 γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἡττόν
 εἰσι πιστοὶ τῶν ἔργων· ὅταν οὖν διαφωνῶσι τοῖς κατὰ
 τὴν αἴσθησιν, καταφρονούμενοι καὶ τάληθες προσαναιροῦ-
 σιν· ὁ γὰρ ψέγων τὴν ἡδονὴν, ὀφθείς ποτ' ἐφίεμενος, ἀπο-
 κλίνειν δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς τοιαύτην οὔσαν ἅπασαν· τὸ
 διορίζειν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν. εἰκάσιν οὖν οἱ ἀλη-4
 θεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι χρησιμώτατοι
 εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον· συνωδοὶ γὰρ ὄντες τοῖς
 ἔργοις πιστεύονται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς ξυνιέντας ζῆν
 κατ' αὐτούς. τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων ἄλλης, τὰ δ' εἰρημμένα
 περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπέλθωμεν.

wards it, and are enslaved to pleasures, and so one ought to lead men in the opposite direction, for thus they will arrive at the mean.'

In all probability Aristotle here alludes immediately to two sections of the Platonists, (1) the party represented by Eudoxus, whose arguments are quoted; (2) that headed by Speusippus, whose anti-hedonistic arguments were contained in two books mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, under the titles *Περὶ ἡδονῆς α'*· *Ἀριστιππος α'*·, and which are now passed under review. Under the class of those who 'call pleasure the chief good,' Aristotle less directly refers to Aristippus, who, though he belonged to a bygone era, still lived in the pages of Plato's *Philebus*, and in the book of Speusippus bearing his name.

ἐλθεῖν γὰρ—μέσον] Cf. *Eth.* II. ix. 5, where it is said that by going counter to one's natural bias one may attain the mean. Aristotle does not approve of this being done by means of a sacrifice of truth.

3 μή ποτε—λέγεται] 'But perhaps this is not rightly said.' Cf. Plato, *Meno*, p. 89 c: ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὡμολόγησαμεν. This use of

μήποτε became very common in the later Greek.

ὁ γὰρ ψέγων—πολλῶν] 'For he who blames pleasure (unreservedly), and yet is seen occasionally desiring it, is thought to incline towards it as being altogether good; for ordinary persons cannot discriminate.' *τοιαύτην* here, as *τοιούτος* does frequently in Aristotle, takes its sense from the context. Cf. *Eth.* VIII. vi. 6, x. ii. 4, &c. From what is above stated we learn that, the decline of philosophy having commenced, some of the Platonists enunciated theories which were meant to be practically useful, rather than true. Thus they overstated what they believed to be the truth about pleasure, in order to counteract men's universal tendency towards it. Aristotle 'doubts whether this is good policy.' Their whole theory is likely to be upset by their occasionally indulging in the higher kinds of pleasure.

τοὺς ξυνιέντας] 'Those who comprehend them,' i.e. appreciating the truth of the theories, as shown by their agreement with men's actions. Cf. *Eth.* VI. x. 1, note. On *τοῖς ἔργοις* cf. IX. viii. 2.

- 2 Εὐδόξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰγαθὸν ᾧετ' εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάντ' ὀρᾶν ἐφιέμενα αὐτῆς, καὶ ἑλλογα καὶ ἄλλογα· ἐν πᾶσι δ' εἶναι τὸ αἰρετὸν ἐπιεικές, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κράτιστον· τὸ δὲ πάντ' ἐπὶ ταῦτ' ὀφείσθαι μὲν εἶναι ὡς πᾶσι τοῦτο ἄριστον· ἕκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὐρίσκειν, ἄσπερ καὶ τροφήν· τὸ δὲ πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται, τὰγαθὸν εἶναι. ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὐτούς· διαφερόντως γὰρ

II. This chapter contains the grounds on which Eudoxus 'used to think that pleasure is the chief good'; and an examination of three objections, which had been started to those reasonings. The arguments of Eudoxus are, (1) that all things seek pleasure, (2) that pain is essentially (*καθ' αὐτό*) an object of aversion, and therefore pleasure, its contrary, must be essentially an object of desire, (3) that pleasure is always desired as an end-in-itself, and not as a means to anything, (4) that pleasure, when added to any other good, makes it more desirable. The objections to these arguments are, (1) the opinion of Plato (which serves as an objection to argument 4th), that the chief good must be incapable of being added to any other good, and so made better. This objection Aristotle allows as valid. (2) An objection to the 1st argument, probably suggested by Plato's *Philebus*, p. 67, and repeated by Speusippus,—that the testimony of irrational creatures is of no value. This objection is disallowed. (3) The counter-argument of Speusippus to the 2nd argument of Eudoxus,—that not pleasure, but the neutral state, is the true contrary to pain. This is refuted.

1 τὸ αἰρετὸν ἐπιεικές] We have here a quotation of the very words of Eudoxus. In § 4, Aristotle generally approves of the present argument. His whole conclusion is to be found *Eth.* x. iii. 13:—that Eudoxus was

more right than his opponents, but wrong in not discriminating between the different kinds of pleasure, and in going so far as to say that pleasure is the chief good. The term τὸ αἰρετὸν, in opposition to τὸ φευκτόν, seems to have played a great part in the reasonings of Eudoxus. It is admitted by Plato, *Philebus*, p. 20, as a necessary attribute of the chief good, and so also by Aristotle, *Eth.* i. vii. 8; x. ii. 4. Here it is implied in the word ἐφίεται. It appears simply to mean 'that which is a reasonable object of desire,' cf. *Eth.* viii. viii. 2: ἡ φιλία καθ' αὐτὴν αἰρετή, and x. iii. 13, ἡδονὴ οὐ πᾶσα αἰρετή. As implying will and choice, it is applicable in a relative, as well as an absolute sense, to means as well as to ends. Book iii. of the *Topics* contains hints on the method of dealing with this term, and throws light on its use, which fluctuates between a reference to the good, the useful, and the pleasant (cf. *Top.* iii. iii. 7).

ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι] This is a pleasing allusion to the personal character of Eudoxus of Cnidus, who lived about 366 B.C., and who enjoyed great fame as an astronomer. He appears to have introduced the sphere from Egypt into Greece. The poem of Aratus is a versification of his *Φαινόμενα*. Certain stories in Diogenes would leave the impression that, being Plato's pupil, he quarreled with his

ἐδόκει σῶφρων εἶναι· οὐ δὲ ὡς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν. οὐχ ἥττον² δ' ὥστ' εἶναι φανερόν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου· τὴν γὰρ λύπην καὶ αὐτὸ πᾶσι φευκτὸν εἶναι, ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦναντίον αἰρετόν. μάλιστα δ' εἶναι αἰρετόν ὁ μὴ δι' ἕτερον μηδ' ἑτέρου χάριν αἰρούμεθα· τοιοῦτον δ' ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν τίνος ἔνεκα ἡδεται, ὡς καὶ αὐτὴν οὔσαν αἰρετὴν τὴν ἡδονήν. προστιθεμένην τε ὁπωσοῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον ποιεῖν, ὅσον τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν· καὶ αὖξισθαι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ. εἴκει δὲ οὗτός γε ὁ λόγος τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνειν,³ καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἑτέρου· πᾶν γὰρ μεθ' ἑτέρου ἀγαθοῦ αἰρετώτερον ἢ μοναόμενον. τοιοῦτῳ δὲ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων ἀναιρεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ τὰγαθόν· αἰρετώτερον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν ἡδὺν βίον μετὰ φρονήσεως ἢ χωρὶς, εἰ δὲ τὸ μικτὸν κρεῖττον, οὐκ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν τὰγαθόν· οὐδενὸς γὰρ προστεθέντος αὐτὸ τὰγαθὸν αἰρετώτερον γίνεσθαι. ὁῦλον δ' ὡς οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τὰγαθὸν ἂν εἴη, ὁ μετὰ τινος

master. Aristotle (or, as Diogenes says, 'Nicomachus') is the only authority for his ethical opinions.

² ὁ μὴ δι' ἕτερον] The end is better than the means, but this does not prove anything as to the comparative superiority of pleasure to the rest of the whole class of ends. Thus the argument of Eudoxus overshot the mark. A similar argument of his is mentioned with careless approbation, *Eth.* I. xii. 5: *Δοκεῖ καλῶς συνηγορησαί, says Aristotle, 'Eudoxus is thought to have pleaded well' in favour of pleasure being the chief good, because it is never praised. This argument would only prove that it belongs to the class of τὰ τίμια.*

προστιθεμένη] It is suggested as a commonplace of reasoning, *Topics*, III. ii. 2, that you may say 'Justice and courage are better *with* pleasure than *without*.'

³ πᾶν γὰρ—χωρὶς] 'For that "every good is better in combination with another good than alone." This is indeed the very argument by which Plato proves pleasure *not* to be the highest good. For the pleasant life is more desirable with wisdom than without.' Cf. *Philebus*, pp. 21–22: where however the proposition οὐδένα προστεθέντος—γίνεσθαι is not to be found. Plato only argued that, as the highest conception of human good implied a combination of both pleasure and knowledge, pleasure separately could not be the chief good. It is a deduction of Aristotle's from the terms *ικαιὸν καὶ τέλειον*, used by Plato, that the chief good is incapable of addition or improvement. Cf. *Topics*, III. ii. 2: where it is said that the end *plus* the means cannot be called more desirable than the end by itself, cf. *Eth.* I. vii. 8, where the same

4 τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον γίνεται. τί οὖν ἐστὶ
 τοιοῦτον, οὗ καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖ-
 ται. οἱ δ' ἐνιστάμενοι ὥς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται,
 μὴ οὐθὲν λέγωσιν· ὁ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτ' εἶναί φασιν.
 ὁ δ' ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν πίστιν οὐ πᾶν πιστότερα ἐρεῖ·
 εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἀνόητα ὠρέγετο αὐτῶν, ἦν ἂν τι τὸ λεγό-
 μενον, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα, πῶς λέγοιεν ἂν τι; ἴσως δὲ
 καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἐστὶ τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρεῖττον ἢ
 5 καθ' αὐτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ. οὐκ ἔοικε δὲ
 οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι. οὐ γάρ φασιν, εἰ
 ἡ λύπη κακόν ἐστι, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ἀντικειῖσθαι
 γὰρ καὶ κακὸν κακῷ καὶ ἄμφω τῷ μηδετέρῳ, λέγοντες
 ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπί γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες.
 ἀμφοῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων κακῶν καὶ φευκτὰ ἔδει ἄμφω εἶναι,
 τῶν μηδετέρων δὲ μηδέτερον ἢ ὁμοίως· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται τὴν
 μὲν φεύγοντες ὥς κακόν, τὴν δ' αἰρούμενοι ὥς ἀγαθόν·
 οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἀντίκειται.

Οὐ μὴν οὐδ' εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιότητων ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή, διὰ
 3 τοῦτ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι

opinion seems to be conveyed, though that interpretation of the passage has been disputed.

4 τί οὖν—ἐπιζητεῖται] 'What is there then which has these characteristics (*i.e.* supreme goodness without the capability of addition) which we men can partake of? For such is the very object of our enquiries.' That is, not a transcendental good, but something to be practically realised. Cf. *Eth.* I. vi. 13.

ὁ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ] This acceptance of the testimony of instinct occurs also in the Eudemian book, *Eth.* vii. xiii. 5.

ὁ δ' ἀναιρῶν] Probably Speusippus, taking up a suggestion from Plato, *Philebus*, p. 67.

τοῖς φαύλοις] In the neuter gender, 'the lower creatures;'—alluding to

the *θηρία* mentioned by Plato, *Philebus*, l. c.

5 οὐ γάρ φασιν] As we learn from the Eudemian book, *Eth.* vii. xiii. 1, Speusippus was the author of this objection.

III. Aristotle investigates remaining arguments used by the Platonists to prove that pleasure is not a good; (1) that it is 'not a quality.' This argument would prove too much, as it would be equally decisive against happiness, or the actions of virtue; (2) that it is 'unlimited.' But (a) in one sense this will apply to virtue also, (b) in another sense it is only applicable to the 'mixed pleasures,' which are analogous to health, *i.e.* a proportion variable according to circumstances; (3) that it is 'not final'

ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία. λέγουσι δὲ τὸ μὲν² ἀγαθὸν ὀρίσθαι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον εἶναι, ὅτι δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἡδεσθαι τοῦτο κρίνουσι, καὶ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς, καθ' ἃς ἐναργῶς φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον τοὺς ποιοὺς ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, ἔσται τὸ αὐτό· δίκαιοι γάρ εἰσι μᾶλλον καὶ ἄνδρες, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. εἰ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, μή ποτ' οὐ λέγουσι τὸ αἴτιον, ἂν ὥσιν

or perfect, but in some sort 'a transition.' Against which Aristotle argues, (a) that it cannot be a *motion* because not admitting the idea of speed, (b) that it cannot be a *creation*, because not capable of being resolved into its component parts, (c) that it cannot be a *filling up*, for this is merely corporeal, and even in the case of bodily pleasure it is not the body that feels; (4) that there are many disgraceful pleasures. To which it may be answered, that pleasures differ in kind, and even if some be bad, others may be absolutely good.

1 εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιότητων] This seems to be the only record of an argument, probably occurring in the works of Speusippus, that 'pleasure is not a good, because it is not a quality.' It points to the moralising tendency, above noticed, of this school of Platonists, as if they said that nothing could be called 'good' which did not form part of man's moral character.

2 εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἡδεσθαι] Pleasure may be said to admit of degrees; first, in reference to men's different capacities of feeling it, but in this respect it will stand on the same footing as courage and justice.

εἰ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς—μικτα] 'In the second place, if (they predicate this attribute of "unlimited" as existing, not in the recipients of

pleasure, but) in the pleasures themselves, perhaps they omit to state the reason of the fact, namely, that while some pleasures are unmixed, others are mixed.' Plato in the *Philebus* divides pleasures into mixed and unmixed. Of each he makes three classes. Mixed pleasures are (1) bodily pleasures, the restoration of harmony in the animal frame, where the bodily pain of want or desire is mixed up with the bodily pleasure of gratification; (2) the pleasure of expecting this restoration, where the bodily pain of want is mixed up with the mental pleasure of the idea of relief; (3) the pleasure which we feel in the ludicrous, where the mental pain of seeing the un-beautiful is mixed with the mental pleasure of laughing at it. The unmixed pleasures, *i.e.* in which no pain is implied, are (1) those of smell; (2) those of sight and hearing; (3) those that belong to the intellect. Of these two classes Plato confines the attribute of *ἀμετρία*, 'want of measure,' to the first class. The unmixed or pure pleasures necessarily possess *ἐμμετρία*, cf. *Phileb.* p. 52 c. The same doctrine is given *Eth.* vii. xiv. 6: αἱ δ' ἀνευ λυπῶν (ἡδοναὶ) οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολήν. Speusippus, forgetful of this distinction, appears to have made *ἀμετρία* (ἀόριστον εἶναι) a universal predicate of pleasure.

- 3 αἱ μὲν ἀμιγεῖς αἱ δὲ μικταί. τί γὰρ κωλύει, καθάπερ ὑγίεια ὠρισμένη οὔσα δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν; οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ συμμετρία ἐν πᾶσιν ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μία τις αἰεί, ἀλλ' ἀνιεμένη διαμένει ἕως τινός, καὶ διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. τοιοῦτον δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι.
- 4 τέλειόν τε τὰγαθὸν τιθέντες, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις ἀτελεῖς, τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν καὶ γενέσιν ἀποφαίνειν πειρῶνται. οὐ καλῶς δ' εἰκόασι λέγειν οὐδ' εἶναι κίνησιν· πάσῃ γὰρ οἰκεῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ τάχος καὶ βραδυτής, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ' αὐτήν, οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς ἄλλο.

3 τί γὰρ κωλύει κ.τ.λ.] Even the mixed pleasures, says Aristotle, admit the idea of proportion (*συμετρία*), just as health is a proportion, though a relative and variable one, of the elements in the human body. In the *Topics*, vi. ii. 1, the words ἡ ὑγίεια *συμετρία θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν* are given as an instance of an ambiguous definition, *συμετρία* being used in more senses than one.

οὐ γὰρ—ἥττον] 'Health is not the same proportion of elements in all men, nor even in the same man always, but with a certain laxity of variation it still remains health, though admitting of difference in the degrees (according to which the elements are compounded).'

4 τέλειόν τε τὰγαθὸν τιθέντες κ.τ.λ.] Plato, in the *Philebus*, p. 53 c, accepted the doctrine of the Cyrenaics, ὡς αἱ γενέσεις ἐστίν (ἡ ἡδονή), and then, by the contrast of means and end, *γένεσις* and *οὐσία*, he proved that pleasure could not be the chief good. As said above, Vol. I. Essay IV. p. 198, Plato seems to have recognised a class of pleasures above those which were mere states of transition, but to have had no formula to express them. Speusippus probably applied the argument drawn from the Cyrenaic

definition not merely *ad homines*, as Plato had done, but as if absolutely valid.

οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου] *i.e.* οὐκ ἔστι τάχος καὶ βραδυτής καθ' αὐτήν. 'All motion has speed and slowness properly belonging to it, if not relatively to itself, as for instance the motion of the universe has no speed or slowness in itself (because it moves equably),—at all events in relation to other things.' Aristotle argues that though it is possible 'to be pleased' (ἡσθῆναι—*μεταβάλλειν εἰς ἡδονήν*) more or less quickly, it is not possible to 'feel pleasure' (ἡδεσθαι) either quickly or slowly. This argument seems a verbal one, like some of those in *Eth.* i. vi. against Plato's doctrine of ideas. If pleasure be *identified* with *κίνησις*, the argument holds good. But if it only be held to have the same relation to *κίνησις* as Aristotle himself makes it have to *ἐνέργεια*, *Eth.* x. viii. 4, the argument falls to the ground. This argument and the one in § 6 really only apply to the want of a sufficiently subjective formula to express pleasure. If pleasure were defined as 'the consciousness of a transition,' there might then be degrees of speed in the transition, though not in the consciousness of it.

τῇ δ' ἡδονῇ τούτων οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει· ἡσθῆναι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι ταχέως ὥσπερ ὀργισθῆναι, ἡδῆσθαι δ' οὐ, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕτερον, βαδίζειν δὲ καὶ αὖξῆσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. μεταβάλλειν μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν ἡδονὴν ταχέως καὶ βραδέως ἔστιν, ἐνεργεῖν δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν οὐκ ἔστι ταχέως, λέγω δ' ἡδῆσθαι. γένεσις τε πῶς ἂν εἴη; δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος τὸ τυχὸν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται, εἰς τοῦτο διαλύεσθαι. καὶ οὗ γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή, τούτου ἡ λύπη φθορά. καὶ λέγουσι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύπην ἐνδειαν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν. ταῦτα δὲ σωματικά ἐστι τὰ πάθη. εἰ δὴ ἔστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν ᾧ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ' ἂν καὶ ἡδοίτο· τὸ σῶμα ἄρα· οὐ δοκεῖ δέ· οὐδ' ἔστιν ἄρα ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ γινομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἡδοίτ' ἂν τις, καὶ τεμνόμενος λυποῖτο. ἡ δόξα δ' αὕτη

Aristotle's real objection to the term *κίνησις* lies deeper than these mere dialectical skirmishings, and has been explained, Vol. I. Essay IV., p. 197-9.

5 γένεσις τε—φθορά] 'And how can it be a creation? For it does not seem to be the case that *anything* can be created out of *anything*; a thing is resolved into that out of which it is created. And (as the Platonists say) pain is the destruction of that of which pleasure is the creation.' This elliptical argument seems to require for its conclusion, 'Where then are the elements out of which our perfect nature (*οὐσία*) is created by the process called pleasure, and into which it is resolved by the destructive process called pain?' We find pain called a destruction in the *Philebus*, p. 31 B: δίψος δ' αὖ φθορὰ καὶ λύπη καὶ λύσις, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὕγρου πάλιν τὸ ξηρανθὲν πληροῦσα δύναμις ἡδονή. Aristotle, arguing polemically, says, 'Where then are the elements with which the creative and the destructive process must begin and end?'

He afterwards reasonably substitutes *ἐνέργεια* for *γένεσις* as a better formula, but the above polemic seems not to have much value.

6 οὐδ' ἔστιν ἄρα—λυποῖτο] 'Neither is pleasure therefore a replenishment, though one may feel pleasure while replenishment is taking place, just as one may feel pain while one is being cut.' Pleasure, says Aristotle, may be synchronous with replenishment, but cannot be identical with it, for pleasure is a state of the mind, and not of the body, cf. *Eth.* I. viii. 10: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡδῆσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν. All that is proved here is that a more subjective formula than *ἀναπλήρωσις* is required to express the nature of pleasure. Plato had used the formula *πλήρωσις*, *Philebus*, p. 31 E, and Speusippus probably repeated it.

τεμνόμενος] The words *τομαὶ καὶ καύσεις* were commonly used by Plato, as instances of bodily pain. Cf. *Timæus*, p. 65 B: ταῦτα δ' αὖ περὶ τὰς καύσεις καὶ τομὰς τοῦ σώματος γιγνόμενά ἐστι κατὰ δῆλα.

δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφὴν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν· ἐνδεεῖς γὰρ γινομένους καὶ προλυπηθέντας ἥδεσθαι τῇ ἀναπληρώσει. τοῦτο δ' οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς· ἄλυποι γάρ εἰσιν αἱ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς ὁσφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὀράματα πολλὰ καὶ μνήμαι καὶ ἐλπίδες. τίνος οὖν αὗται γενέσεις ἔσονται; οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἔνδεια
 8 γεγένηται, οὗ γένοιτ' ἂν ἀναπλήρωσις. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς προφέροντας τὰς ἐπονιδίστους τῶν ἡδονῶν λέγοι τις ἂν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ταῦθ' ἡδέα· οὐ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς κακῶς διακειμένοις ἡδέα ἐστίν, οἷητέον αὐτὰ καὶ ἡδέα εἶναι πλὴν τούτοις, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὰ τοῖς κάμνουσιν ὑγιεινὰ ἢ γλυκέα ἢ πικρά, οὐδ' αὖ λευκὰ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς
 9 ὀφθαλμιῶσιν. ἢ οὕτω λέγοιτ' ἂν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡδوناὶ αἶρεται εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀπὸ γε τούτων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πλουτεῖν, προδόντι δ' οὐ, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὐ μὴν ὀτιοῦν
 10 φαγόντι. ἢ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἡδوناί· ἕτεραι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡσθῆναι τὴν τοῦ δικαίου μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ μὴ ὄντα μουσικόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
 11 ἐμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος, ἕτερος ὢν τοῦ κόλακος, οὐκ οὔσαν ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ διαφόρους εἶδει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὰγαθὸν ὁμιλεῖν δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἡδονήν, καὶ τῷ μὲν

7 ἄλυποι γάρ εἰσιν αἱ τε μαθηματικαὶ κ.τ.λ.] This is all admitted in so many words by Plato, *Phileb.* p. 52 A: ἔτι δὴ τοίνυν τούτοις (*i.e.* to the pleasures of smell, sight and hearing) προσθῶμεν τὰς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἡδονάς, εἰ ἄρα δοκοῦσιν ἡμῖν αὗται πείνας μὲν μὴ ἔχειν τοῦ μαθάνειν μηδὲ διὰ μαθημάτων πείνην ἀλγηδόνας ἐξ ἀρχῆς γενομένας.

8 πρὸς δὲ τοὺς προφέροντας κ.τ.λ.] This argument of the Platonists is quoted *Eth.* vii. xi. 5.

10 τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ] Cf. *Eth.* ix. ix. 6; x. iv. 10. The arguments here given to prove that pleasures differ in kind are (a) that some men are in-

capable of feeling certain pleasures; (b) that the flatterer is different from the friend; (c) that the pleasures of childhood differ from those of maturity. The whole reasoning is repeated in better form in chap. V.

11 ἐμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος] The term 'friend' is used here in a distinctive sense to denote 'the true friend,' just as it is in *Eth.* viii. xiii. 9: ἔκοντα γὰρ φίλον οὐ ποιητέον. Common language, which contrasts the flatterer, who ministers pleasure, from the friend, who ministers good, testifies to the non-identity of pleasure (in all forms) with good.

ὄνειδίζεται, τὸν δ' ἐπαινοῦσιν ὥς πρὸς ἑτέρα ὁμιλοῦντα. οὐδείς τ' ἂν ἔλοιτο ζῆν παιδίου διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίου,¹² ἠδόμενος ἐφ' οἷς τὰ παῖδιά ὥς οἶόν τε μάλιστα, οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν αἰσχίστων, μηδέποτε μέλλων λυπηθῆναι. περὶ πολλά τε σπουδὴν ποιησαίμεθ' ἂν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπιφέρει ἡδονήν, οἷον ὁρᾶν, μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔπονται τούτοις ἡδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἐλοίμεθα γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνοιτ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἡδονή. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε τὰ γὰθὸν ἢ¹³ ἡδονὴ οὔτε πᾶσα αἰρετή, δῆλον ἔοικεν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι εἰσὶ τινες αἰρεταὶ καθ' αὐτὰς διαφέρουσai τῷ εἶδει ἢ ἀφ' ὧν. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθω.

Τί δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ποῖόν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' ἄρχῃς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὄρασις καθ' ὄντι-

12 περὶ πολλά τε] If pleasure, according to Eudoxus, were the chief good, all pursuits would be prized in proportion to their affording pleasure, but this Aristotle shows not to be the case.

IV. Having finished his critical remarks on existing theories (τὰ λεγόμενα) about pleasure, Aristotle proceeds synthetically to state his own views, as follows: (1) Pleasure is, like sight, something whole and entire, not gradually arrived at, but a moment of consciousness, at once perfect, independent of the conditions of time, §§ 1-4. (2) It arises from any faculty obtaining its proper object, but is better in proportion to the excellence of the faculty exercised, §§ 5-7. (3) It is thus the perfection of our functions, but is distinct from the functions themselves, § 8. (4) It cannot be continuously maintained, owing to the weakness of our powers, our functions being soon blunted by fatigue, § 9. (5) Pleasure, in short, results from the sense of life, and is insepa-

rably connected with the idea of life, §§ 10-11.

1 τί δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ποῖόν τι] Cf. *Eth.* II. v. 1: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον. *Ib.* vi. 1: δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἔστι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποῖα τις. The genus (τί ἐστι) of pleasure here given is that it is ὅλον τι, one of those moments of consciousness which are complete in themselves; the differentia (ποῖόν τι) is that it results from the exercise of any faculty upon its proper object. It may be said that this definition would leave pleasure undefined; but in fact it is a simple sensation, not admitting of entire explication.

ἡ μὲν ὄρασις] Modern researches in optics would tend to modify this view of the entirely *simple* nature of an act of sight. But it may be conceded that any 'process' which takes place in sight is too swift to be noticed by the mind. Cf. Locke, *Essay on the Human Understanding*, book II. c. xiv. § 10. 'Such a part of duration as this, wherein we perceive no succession, is that which we may call an instant, and is that which takes up

νοῦν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενός, ὃ εἰς ὕστερον γεγόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος. τοιούτῳ δ' ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή· ὅλον γάρ τί ἐστι, καὶ κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἧς ἐπὶ πλείῳ χρόνῳ
 2 γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος. διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησις ἐστιν· ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τελεία, ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὗ ἐφίεται. ἡ ἐν ἅπαντι δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ φῆ τούτῳ. ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ χρόνου πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἶδει τῆς ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων· ἡ γὰρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις ἑτέρα τῆς τοῦ κίονος ῥαβδώσεως, καὶ αὗται τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως. καὶ ἡ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεία· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον· ἡ δὲ τῆς κρηπίδος καὶ τοῦ τριγλύφου ἀτελής· μέρους γὰρ ἑκατέρα. τῷ εἶδει οὖν διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὅτῳ οὖν χρόνῳ λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἶδει,
 3 ἀλλ' εἶπερ, ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βαδίσεως καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν· εἰ γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν ποῦ, καὶ ταύτης διαφοραὶ κατ' εἶδη, πτήσις βάδις αἰσις καὶ

the time of only one idea in our minds without the succession of another, wherein therefore we perceive no succession at all.'

2 διόπερ—ἅπαντι] 'Therefore it is not a process; for every process is under conditions of time and aims at some end, as for instance, the (process of) architecture is perfect, when it has effected what it aims at. May we not say (ἡ) then that it is perfect in the particular (τούτῳ) time viewed as a whole? But in the separate parts of the time occupied all processes are imperfect, and are different in species, both from the whole process, and from each other. For the collection of the stones is different from the fluting of the pillars, and both from the making of the temple. And the making the temple is a perfect process, for it wants nothing towards its proposed object; but that of the basement and the triglyph are imperfect, for they are

each the making of a part. Therefore they differ in species, and it is not possible to find a process perfect in species in any time whatsoever, unless it be in the time occupied viewed as a whole.' With Michelet, who follows two MSS., ἡ has been omitted above before τούτῳ. The reading ἡ τούτῳ makes no sense, unless one which would be opposed to what is said afterwards (οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὅτῳ οὖν κ. τ. λ.). The form ἡ with a question, used for conveying Aristotle's opinion on any subject, occurs again in § 9 of this chapter, ἡ κάμνει; In the illustration given, two of the processes mentioned are merely preparatory, the collection of the stones for building, and the fluting of the pillars before they are set up; two others are substantive parts of the building, the laying of the foundation (the first act), and the adding the triglyph, which was a fluted tablet added as an ornament to

τὰ τοιαῦτα. οὐ μόνον δ' οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ βαδίσει· τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποῖ οὐ ταυτόν ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ μέρει καὶ ἑτέρῳ, οὐδὲ τὸ διεξιέναι τὴν γραμμὴν τήνδε κακείνην· οὐ μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν διαπορεύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ οὔσαν, ἐν ἑτέρῳ δ' αὕτη ἐκείνης. δι' ἀκριβείας μὲν οὖν περὶ κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται, ἔοικε δ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλ' αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς καὶ διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἶδει, εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν ποῖ εἰδοποιόν. τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὁπωῦν χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἕτεραί τ' ἂν εἴεν ἀλλήλων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἢ ἡδονή. δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχασθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἥδυσθαι δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ γὰρ πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ

the frieze (perhaps the last act in the creation of the temple). The creation of the temple as a whole, regarded in the whole time which it occupies, is alone to be regarded as a perfect process.

3—4 *ὁμοίως δὲ—εἶδος*] 'So too in the case of walking, and all other processes. For if passage be a process from place to place, even of this there are different species, flying, walking, jumping, and the like. And not only this, but even in walking itself (there are different species), for the whence and the whither are not the same in the whole course and in the part of the course, and in one part and the other part; nor is it the same thing to cross this line and that. For a person not only passes a line, but a line in space, and this line is in different space from that line. We have treated exactly of process elsewhere, but it seems not to be perfect in every time, but the majority of processes seem imperfect and differing in species, if the whence and the whither con-

stitute a differentia. But pleasure seems perfect in kind in any time (of its existence) whatsoever.' Every process, says Aristotle, is under conditions of time, and its parts being under a law of succession are essentially different from each other; the *ὑστερον* is different from the *πρότερον*, the beginning, middle, and end, differ essentially from one another. In pleasure nothing of the kind is to be found. One moment of pleasure does not lead up, as a preparative, to another more advanced moment. Pleasure, when felt, is, *ipso facto*, complete.

ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται] This refers generally to the *Physics* of Aristotle. See especially Books IV. and V.

οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι] 'Non in quolibet tempore,' this is of course different from *ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ*, and *ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι*, in the preceding section.

ἐν ὁποῦν] 'In quolibet,' but above, *οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὁποῦν* means 'in nullo potest.'

4 *δῆλον οὖν—ἡδονή*] 'It is clear then that (process and pleasure) must

ὅλων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι γένεσις οὐδὲ στιγμῆς οὐδὲ
 μονάδος, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθὲν κίνησις οὐδὲ γένεσις· οὐδὲ δὴ
 5 ἡδονῆς· ὅλον γάρ τι. αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθη-
 τὸν ἐνεργούσης, τελείως δὲ τῆς εὖ διακειμένης πρὸς τὸ κάλ-
 λιστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν· τοιοῦτον γὰρ μάλιστ'
 εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἐνέργεια· αὐτὴν δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἡ
 ἐν ᾧ ἐστί, μηθὲν διαφερέτω· καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ βελτίστη
 ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἄριστα διακειμένου πρὸς τὸ κρά-
 τιστον τῶν ὑφ' αὐτὴν. αὕτη δ' ἂν τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ
 ἡδίστη· κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησίν ἐστιν ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ
 καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἡδίστη δ' ἡ τελειοτάτη, τελειο-
 τάτη δ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιότατον τῶν
 6 ὑφ' αὐτήν. τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή. οὐ τὸν
 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἢ τε ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν τε
 καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ
 7 ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἰτία ἐστι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν. καθ' ἕκαστην
 δ' αἴσθησιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή, δῆλον· φαμέν γὰρ ὁρά-
 ματα καὶ ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι
 μάλιστα, ἐπειδὴν ἢ τε αἴσθησις ἢ κρατίστη καὶ πρὸς
 τοιοῦτον ἐνεργῇ· τοιούτων δ' ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ
 τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, αἰεὶ ἔσται ἡδονὴ ὑπάρχοντός γε τοῦ
 8 ποιήσοντος καὶ τοῦ πεισομένου. τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέρ-
 γειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὥς ἡ ἑξίς ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐπι-
 γιγνόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα· ἕως ἂν
 οὖν τό τε νοητὸν ἢ αἰσθητὸν ἢ οἷον δεῖ καὶ τὸ κρῖνον

be different from one another, and that pleasure belongs to the class of things whole and perfect.'

6 τελειοῖ δὲ—*ὑγιαίνειν*] 'Pleasure renders the exercise of a faculty perfect, but not in the same way in which the goodness of the faculty itself and of its object does so, just as health and the physician are in different ways the cause of one's being well;' *i.e.* pleasure is the formal, and not the efficient, cause of a perfect function. 'Cause' in this Aristotelian usage becomes equivalent to 'result.' The

illustration used here is given also, with a slight confusion of terms, in the Eudemean book, *Eth.* vi. xii. 5. 'Ἐπειτα καὶ ποιῶσι μὲν, οὐχ ὥς ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίαιεν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἡ ὑγίεια.

7 τοιούτων δ' ὄντων—*πεισομένου*] 'But if the object and the percipient be in this (highest) condition, there always will be pleasure as long as subject and object remain.' The relative terms *τὸ ποιῶν* and *τὸ πάσχον* take their meaning from the way in which they are applied. Thus, *Eth.* v. v. 9, they are used for 'producer and

ἡ θεωροῦν, ἔσται ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ ἡδονή· ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐχόντων τοῦ τε παθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ταὐτὸ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἥδεται; ἡ κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ 9 τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ' ἡδονή· ἔπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἔνια δὲ τέρπει καινὰ ὄντα, ὕστερον δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως διὰ ταῦτό· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον παρακέκληται ἡ διάνοια καὶ διατεταμένως περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν οἱ ἐμβλέποντες, μετέπειτα δ' οὐ τοιαύτη ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ παρημελημένη· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀμαυροῦται. ὀρέγεσθαι δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς 10 οἰηθεὶς τις ἂν ἅπαντας, ὅτε καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἅπαντες ἐφίενται· ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργειά τις ἐστὶ, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ τοῦτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἅ καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαπᾷ, ὅσον ὁ μὲν μουσικὸς τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ θεωρήματα, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος. ἡ δ' ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τὸ ζῆν δέ, οὐ ὀρέγονται. εὐλόγως οὖν καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐφίενται· τελειοῖ γὰρ ἐκάστω τὸ ζῆν, αἰρετὸν ὄν. πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν 11 αἰρούμεθα ἢ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀφείσθω ἐν τῷ

consumer.' Here τὸ ποιοῦν is used for the percipient, τὸ πάσχον for the object perceived.

8 ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων—γίνεσθαι] 'For from similar pairs of relatives, bearing the same relation to one another, *i. e.* the active and passive, the same result is naturally produced.' This appears to be an abstract and *à priori* way of stating the universality of pleasure attendant on the harmony between a faculty and its proper object.

9 πῶς οὖν—ἀμαυροῦται] 'How is it then that no one is continuously in a state of pleasure? The reason must be that one grows weary. For all human things are incapable of continuous activity. Pleasure therefore ceases to be produced, for it depends on the activity of the faculties. It is on this same

account that some things please us while they are new, but afterwards not in the same way. For at first the intellect is excited and acts strenuously on the objects in question (as in the case of sight, when one first fixes one's glance) but afterwards the action is not equally vivid, but relaxed, and so one's pleasure also fades.' On this doctrine, cf. Vol. I. Essay IV. and Ar. *Metaph.* viii. viii. 18, there quoted, p. 201.

10 It is natural to say that all desire pleasure, from its inseparable connection with the sense of life, and with each of the vital functions. Thus far Eudoxus was right, but he was wrong in not recognizing a difference in kind between different pleasures, and this point is demonstrated in the ensuing chapter.

παρόντι. συνεζεύχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐδέχσθαι· ἄνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνεργειαν τελειοῖ ἡ ἡδονή.

- 5 Ὅθεν δοκοῦσι καὶ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρειν· τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει ὑφ' ἐτέρων οἰόμεθα τελειοῦσθαι. οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης, οἷον ζῶα καὶ δένδρα καὶ γραφὴ καὶ ἀγάλματα καὶ οἰκία καὶ σκεῦος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς διαφερούσας τῷ εἶδει ὑπὸ
 2 διαφερόντων εἶδει τελειοῦσθαι. διαφέρουσι δ' αἱ τῆς διανοίας τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων κατ' εἶδος· καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί. φανείη δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συμφικεῖσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐκάστην τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἣν τελειοῖ. συναύξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνεργειαν ἡ οἰκεία ἡδονή·

V. Pleasures may be thought to differ in kind, (1) Because our several functions (mental and others) differ from each other in kind, and things different in kind are perfected by things different in kind, §§ 1-2. (2) Because while its *own* pleasure promotes any particular exercise of the faculties, an *alien* pleasure impedes it, §§ 2-5. (3) Because the human functions differ from each other in a moral point of view, and the pleasures therefore which are so closely connected with them as almost to be identical must differ in the same way from each other, §§ 6-7. (4) Creatures different in kind must have, and by common consent do have, different pleasures, § 8. (5) The pleasures of man when in a morbid state must differ from the pleasures of man when in a healthy state. As a corollary to the last argument it may be added, that reasonings against pleasure from a reference to the morbid pleasures have no weight. The answer to them would be, that such are not pleasures at all.

1 καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης] The ἐνεργεῖαι here mentioned appear to

be taken as equivalent to τὰ πρακτά. Thus we have the classification of things capable of being made perfect, into nature, art, and morality. Cf. *Eth.* III. iii. 7: αἴτια γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου.

2 φανείη δ'—τελειοῖ] 'This would also seem to be shown by the intimate connection existing between each pleasure and the function which it perfects.' Cf. *Eth.* x. i. 1: μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συμφικεῖσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν. Pleasure, generally speaking, is proper to the human race; from another point of view, each function has its own proper pleasure, and the pleasure 'proper' to one function is 'alien' to other functions. This distinction of *οἰκεία* and *ἀλλοτρία ἡδονή* was perhaps suggested by a passage in the *Republic* of Plato, ix. 587 A, where these terms are used, though not with quite the same application. It is there said that in the philosopher each part of his soul does its proper work and attains its proper pleasure; but when some lower passion has the predominance, that passion, causing disturbance, does not itself attain its

μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν οἱ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες, οἷον γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαίροντες τῷ γεωμετρεῖν, καὶ κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι καὶ φιλοικοδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδῶσιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ. συναύξουσιν δὲ αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰ δὲ συναύξοντα οἰκεῖα. τοῖς ἑτέροις δὲ τῷ εἶδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει. ἔτι δὲ 3 μᾶλλον τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη ἐκ τοῦ τὰς ἀφ' ἑτέρων ἡδονὰς ἐμποδίου ταῖς ἐνεργείαις εἶναι· οἱ γὰρ φίλαυλοι ἀδυνατοῦσι τοῖς λόγοις προσέχειν, ἐὰν κατακούσωσιν αὐλοῦντος, μᾶλλον χαίροντες αὐλητικῇ τῆς παρούσης ἐνεργείας· ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικὴν οὖν ἡδονὴν τὴν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἐνεργείαν φθείρει. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων 4 συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἅμα περὶ δύο ἐνεργῇ· ἢ γὰρ ἡδῶν τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκκρούει, κἂν πολὺ διαφέρει κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, μᾶλλον, ὥστε μὴδ' ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἑτέραν. διὸ χαίροντες ὑποφθοῦν σφόδρα οὐ πᾶν δρῶμεν ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦμεν ἄλλοις ἡρέμα ἀρεσκόμενοι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις οἱ τραγηματίζοντες, ὅταν φαῦλοι οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ᾧσι, τότε μάλιστα αὐτὸ δρῶσιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν οἰκεῖα 5 ἡδονὴ ἐξακριβοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ χρονιωτέρας καὶ βελτίους ποιεῖ, αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι λυμαίνονται, δηλον ὡς πολὺ διστάσιν· σχεδὸν γὰρ αἱ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ ποιοῦσιν ὅπερ αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι· φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι, οἷον εἴ τῳ τὸ γράφειν ἀηδὲς καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἢ τὸ λογίζεσθαι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐ γράφει, ὁ δ' οὐ λογίζεται, λυπηρᾶς οὔσης τῆς ἐνεργείας. συμβαίνει δὲ περὶ τὰς

own pleasure, and compels the other faculties to pursue a pleasure which is alien to them: ὅταν δὲ ἅρα τῶν ἑτέρων τι κρατήσῃ, ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ μῆτε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἡδονὴν ἐξευρίσκειν τὰ τε ἄλλα ἀναγκάζειν ἀλλοτρίαν καὶ μὴ ἀληθῆ ἡδονὴν διώκειν.

ἐξακριβοῦσιν] 'They work out.' Cf. note on *Eth.* i. vii. 18. The word ἐξακριβοῦν is used transitively *Eth.* i. xii. 7, and below, x. v. 5, where from the analogy of the arts it means to

'give the last finish to.' It is used intransitively *Eth.* i. vi. 13: ἐξακριβοῦν ὑπὲρ τούτων, 'to refine.'

4 καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις—δρῶσιν] 'And those who munch sweetmeats in the theatres do so especially when the actors are bad.' This is one of those illustrations from common life, which are richly strewn about the writings of Aristotle; the art of making which he perhaps learnt first from Plato.

ἐνεργείας τούναντίον ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ
 λυπῶν· οἰκεῖται δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ καθ' αὐτὴν γινό-
 μεναι. αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ εἴρηται ὅτι παραπλήσιόν
 τι τῇ λύπῃ ποιοῦσιν· φθείρουσι γάρ, πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως.
 6 διαφερουσῶν δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐπιεικεία καὶ φαυλότητι, καὶ
 τῶν μὲν αἰρετῶν οὐσῶν τῶν δὲ φευκτῶν τῶν δ' οὐδετέρων,
 ὁμοίως ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί· καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἐνέργειαν
 οἰκεία ἡδονή ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ οἰκεία ἐπιεικής,
 ἡ δὲ τῇ φαύλῃ μοχθηρά· καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι τῶν μὲν
 καλῶν ἐπαινεταί, τῶν δ' αἰσχυρῶν ψεκταί. οἰκειότεραι δὲ
 ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναὶ τῶν ὀρέξεων· αἱ μὲν
 γὰρ διωρισμέναι εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ φύσει, αἱ δὲ
 σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστ' ἔχειν
 7 ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ. οὐ
 μὲν ἔοικέ γε ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οὐδ' αἴσθησις· ἄτοπον
 γάρ· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεται τισι ταῦτόν.
 ὥσπερ οὖν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἕτεραι, καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί. διαφέρει δὲ
 ἡ ὄψις ἀφ' ἧς καθαριότητι, καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ ὁσφρησις γεύσεως·
 ὁμοίως δὴ διαφέρουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ
 8 τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων. δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι
 ἐκάστω ζῳῳ καὶ ἡδονὴ οἰκεία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ
 κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. καὶ ἐφ' ἐκάστω δὲ θεωροῦντι τοῦτ'
 ἂν φανείη· ἑτέρα γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονὴ καὶ κυνὸς καὶ ἀνθρώ-
 που, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν ὄνον σύρματ' ἂν ἐλέσθαι
 μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν· ἥδιον γὰρ χρυσοῦ τροφὴ ὄνοις. αἱ μὲν

6—7 καὶ ἀδιόριστοι—ταῦτόν] 'And they are so indivisible as to raise a doubt whether the function is not identical with the pleasure attached to it. And yet pleasure can hardly be thought or perception, this would be absurd; but through their not being separated, some persons fancy them to be identical.' To 'divide' and to 'distinguish' are, as Coleridge tells us, two different things. Pleasure, though not divided, should be distinguished, from the vital functions. The author of the Eudemian books,

however, *Eth.* vii. xii. 3, identified them, and we might well ask Aristotle why happiness, any more than pleasure, should be identified with ἐνέργεια.

7 καθαριότητι] On the superior purity of sight, hearing, and smell over taste, cf. Plato, *Philebus*, p. 51, and *Eth.* iii. x. 3—11.

8 ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον] Cf. Plato, *Republic*, p. 352 B: Ἄρα οὖν τοῦτο ἂν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὄνουσιν ἔργον, δ' ἂν ἡ μόνον ἐκείνῳ ποιῇ τις ἢ ἄριστα; καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος—χρυσόν] 'As

οὖν τῶν ἐτέρων τῷ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν εἶδει, τὰς δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀδιαφόρους εὐλογον εἶναι. διαλλάττουσι δ' οὐ⁹ μικρὸν ἐπὶ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τοὺς μὲν τέρπει τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν λυπηρὰ καὶ μισητὰ ἐστὶ τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα καὶ φιλητά. καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκέων δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ τῷ πυρέττοντι καὶ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι, οὐδὲ θερμὸν εἶναι τῷ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ τῷ εὐεκτικῷ. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἐτέρων συμβαίνει. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν¹⁰ ἅπασιν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάστου μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός, ἢ τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶναι ἂν αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷς οὗτος χαίρει. τὰ δὲ τούτῳ δυσχερῇ εἰ τῷ φαίνεται ἰδέα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· πολλὰ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται· ἡδέα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τούτοις καὶ οὕτω διακειμένοις. τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμολογουμένως αἰσχροὺς δῆλον ὡς οὐ¹¹ φατέον ἡδονὰς εἶναι, πλὴν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις· τῶν δ' ἐπιεικῶν εἶναι δοκουσῶν ποίαν ἢ τίνα φατέον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι; ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν δῆλον; ταύταις γὰρ ἔπονται αἱ ἡδοναί. εἴτ' οὖν μία ἐστὶν εἴτε πλείους αἱ τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακαρίου ἀνδρός, αἱ ταύτας τελειοῦσαι ἡδοναὶ κυρίως

Heraclitus says that "an ass would prefer hay to gold,"—the reason being that he is an ass. This saying of Heraclitus, which reminds us of the Æsopic fable of the Cock and the Jewel, was probably meant to satirize the low desires of the human race. It forms the *pendant* to that other saying, 'Zeus looks on the wisest man as we look on an ape.'

10 ἔστιν ἐκάστου μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός] That there is a definite standard of pleasure and of taste, as of other apparently variable things, is most clearly laid down in Aristotle's discussion upon the saying of Protagoras, that 'man is the measure of all things.' Cf. *Metaphysics*, x. vi. 6: φανερόν δὲ τοῦτ' ἐκ τῶν γιγνομένων

κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν· οὐδέποτε γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεται τοῖς μὲν γλυκὺ, τοῖς δὲ τοῦναντίον, μὴ διεφθαρμένων καὶ λεωβημένων τῶν ἐτέρων τὸ αἰσθητήριον καὶ κριτήριον τῶν λεχθέντων χυμῶν. τούτου δ' ὄντος τοιοῦτου τοὺς ἐτέρους μὲν ὑποληπτέον μέτρον εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἐτέρους οὐχ ὑποληπτέον. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο λέγω καὶ ἐπὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. Those who are vicious and corrupt are to be pronounced not to be right judges of what is good or pleasant. Their pleasures are to be pronounced not pleasures at all. Cf. Plato, *Philebus*, p. 40 c: ψευδέσιν ἄρα ἡδοναῖς τὰ πολλὰ οἱ πονηροὶ χαίρουσιν, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέσιν.

λέγουντ' ἂν ἀνθρώπου ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστῶς, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐνέργειαι.

- 6 Εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονάς, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἀναλαβοῦσι δὴ τὰ ²προειρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος. εἵπομεν δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἔξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχοι ἂν, φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἰρη-
ται, τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἰρεταί, αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτάς, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ' αὐτάς αἰρετῶν τινὰ θετέον καὶ οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς ³γὰρ ἐνδεῆς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης. καθ' αὐτάς δ' εἰσὶν αἰρεταί, ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τοιαῦται δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις· τὰ γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι' αὐτὰ αἰρετῶν. καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι· οὐ γὰρ δι' ἕτερα αὐτάς αἰροῦνται· βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελοῦν-
ται, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως. κατα-
φύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμονι-

VI. Aristotle having concluded his treatise upon the nature of pleasure reverts now to the general question of the nature of happiness, or the chief good for man. He takes up from the first book the following fundamental propositions: (1) that happiness must be a development (*ἐνέργεια*) and not a state (*ἔξις*) of the faculties; (2) that it must be final and satisfying; (3) that it must consist in some development of the faculties sought for its own sake. The remainder of the chapter is occupied with excluding games and amusements from the above definition. Though exercises of the faculties sought for their own sake, these are (*a*) patronised by unworthy judges,—tyrants, children, and the like; (*b*) after all, they are

rather the means to working, than ends in themselves; (*c*) they do not represent the higher faculties in man.

1 *εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονάς*] Cf. *Eth.* I. xiii. 1, where the analysis of *ἀρετή*, or human excellence (the most important part of the conception of happiness, *Eth.* I. x. 9) is introduced; *Eth.* viii. i. 1, where the discussion of friendship, partly as connected with virtue and partly as an external blessing, is justified; *Eth.* x. i. 1, where a treatise on pleasure is added on account of the human interest of the topic, and the controversies which have been raised about it.

2 *εἵπομεν δ' ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*] Cf. *Eth.* I. vii. 13; I. v. 6.

3 *τῶν εὐδαιμονιζομένων*] ¹ Of those

ζομένων οἱ πολλοί, διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι· ὧν γὰρ ἐφίενται, ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡδέϊς· δέονται δὲ τοιούτων. δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ τὰῦτα εἶναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐν δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολάζειν, οὐδὲν δὲ ἴσως 4 σημεῖον οἱ τοιοῦτοὶ εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς, ἀφ' ὧν αἱ σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι· οὐδ' εἰ ἄγευστοι οὗτοι ὄντες ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινοὺς καὶ ἐλευθερίου ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς καταφεύγουσιν, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτας οἰητέον αἰρετωτέρας εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς τιμώμενα κράτιστα οἶονται εἶναι. εὐλογον δὴ, ὥσπερ παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἕτερα φαίνεται τίμια, οὕτω καὶ Φαύλοις καὶ ἐπεικίσιν. καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, 5 καὶ τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τοιαῦτα ὄντα· ἐκάστω δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν ἕξιν αἰρετωτάτη ἐνέργεια, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν. οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ 6 ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι παιδιάν, καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα τοῦ παίζειν χάριν. ἅπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἐτέρου ἕνεκα αἰρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη. σπουδάξουσιν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾷ χάριν ἡλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ λῖαν παιδικόν· παίζουσιν δ' ὅπως σπουδάξῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὁρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ· ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ὅικεν ἡ παιδιά, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. οὐ

who are called happy,' cf. *Eth.* i. ix. 11: τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.

3—4 δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν—ἐνέργειαι] 'These things are *fancied* to be constitutives of happiness because monarchs spend their leisure in them. But perhaps after all monarchs are no evidence, for neither virtue nor reason, on which the higher functions of man depend, are involved in kingly power.' Cf. *Eth.* i. v. 3, where it is said that brutish pleasures 'obtain consideration' owing to potentates, who have everything at their command, devoting themselves to such.

4 ἄγευστοι] This reminds one of the saying about greedy and corrupt kings, in Hesiod, *Works and Days*, vv. 40, sq.:

νήπιοι· οὐδὲ ἴσασιν σφω πλέον ἤμισυ παντός,
οὐδ' ὅσον ἐν μαλάχῃ τε καὶ ἀσφοδέλφ
μέγ' ὕνειαρ.

6 οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία] With the whole of the present chapter we may compare the interesting discussion in *Ar. Politics*, viii. v. 12—14. On the relation of amusements to happiness, see Vol. I. Essay IV.

ὁ δὲ τέλος ἢ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας. δοκεῖ δ' ὁ εὐδαιμόνων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοίων καὶ τῶν μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἢ δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικω-
8 τέρα ἦδη. ἀπολαύσειε τ' ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ ἀνδράποδον οὐχ ἥττον τοῦ ἀρίστου. εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται.

7 Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὐλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου. εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι ὃ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἔννοϊαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θεῖον ὃν καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θεϊότατον, ἢ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαι-
2 μονία. ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητικὴ, εἴρηται. ὁμολογούμενον δὲ

8 εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς—βίου] 'Forno one allows a slave to share in happiness, any more than in the social life of a citizen.' In *Politics*, I. xiii. 13, it is said that the slave, as distinguished from the artisan, is *κοινωνὸς ζωῆς*, *i.e.* he 'lives with the family,' but he is not *κοινωνὸς βίου*, he does not share in the career of his master.

VII. Aristotle's argument now culminates in the declaration that happiness, in the highest sense, consists in philosophy; (1) because this is the function of the most excellent part of our nature; (2) because it most admits of continuance; (3) because it affords most pure and solid pleasure; (4) because it has pre-eminently the character of being self-sufficient; (5) because it is above all things an end-in-itself, and not a means to ulterior results; (6) because it is a sort of repose, and

as it were the fruit of our exertions. It is indeed something higher than man regarded as a composite being, and is only attainable by him through virtue of a divine element which is in him. But we must not listen to those who would preach down our divine aspirations. On the contrary we should encourage them, and endeavour to live in harmony with our noblest part, which is in fact our proper self.

1 εἴτε θεῖον—θεϊότατον] 'Whether it be absolutely divine, or relatively speaking the divinest thing in our nature.' Philosophy is said in the *Metaphysics*, I. ii. 14, to be most divine in two ways, first, as being kindred to the thought of God; second, as being knowledge of things divine. *τοιαύτη δὲ διχῶς ἂν εἴη μόνον· ἢν τε γὰρ μάλιστ' ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι, θεία τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐστί, καὶ εἰ τις τῶν θείων εἴη.* Cf. the note on *Eth.* I. ii. 8.

τοῦτ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ.
 κρατίστη τε γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς
 τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ ᾧ ὁ νοῦς. ἔτι δὲ
 συνεχεστάτη· θεωρεῖν τε γὰρ δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς μᾶλλον
 ἢ πράττειν ὁτιοῦν, οἴομεθά τε δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμῖχθαι³
 τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ
 κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογουμένως ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ
 φιλοσοφία θαυμαστάς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν καθαριότητι καὶ τῷ
 βεβαίῳ, εὐλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδῶ τὴν
 διαγωγὴν εἶναι. ἢ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεω-
 ρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγ-
 καίων καὶ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται, τοῖς
 δὲ τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων· ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται

2 ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητικὴ, εἰρηται] It is difficult to point out a precise passage corresponding to this reference (cf. *Eth.* IX. iii. 1, where a similar vague reference occurs). But perhaps it partly is meant to recal *Eth.* i. xiii. 20: διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἡθικὰς, partly *Eth.* I. v. 7: τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικός, περὶ οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις ποιησόμεθα. There is nothing in Book VI. which corresponds.

3 εὐλογον δὲ—εἶναι] 'And it is reasonable to suppose that those who *know* pass their time more pleasantly than those who are enquiring.' This is opposed to the often repeated saying that 'the search for truth is more precious than truth itself.' Thus Bishop Butler says, 'Knowledge is not our proper happiness. Whoever will in the least attend to the thing will see, that it is the gaining, not the having of it, which is the entertainment of the mind. Indeed, if the proper happiness of man consisted in knowledge considered as a possession or treasure, men who are possessed of the largest share would have a very ill time of it;

as they would be infinitely more sensible than others of their poverty in this respect. Thus *he who increases knowledge would eminently increase sorrow.*' (*Sermon XV.*) In one respect these two views are reconcileable; for Aristotle never meant to say that the *ἔξις* or *κτῆσις* τῆς σοφίας constitutes happiness, but the *ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν*, 'the play of the mind under the guidance of philosophy.' He contrasts the peace and repose of conviction with the restlessness of doubt. In the same spirit Bacon said (*Essay* i.), 'Certainly, it is heaven upon earth to have a man's mind move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth.' But in another respect the views of Aristotle are irreconcilable with those above quoted from Butler. The one over-states, nearly as much as the other under-states, the blessings of knowledge. And Aristotle strangely leaves out of account that sense of ignorance which the wisest man will always retain. His statement is chargeable with philosophic pride, which, as we have said (Vol. I. *Essay* III. p. 165), Socrates and Plato were free from.

πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ
 σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος, ὁ δὲ
 σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ὧν δύνатаι θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσω ἂν
 σοφώτερος ᾖ μᾶλλον· βέλτιον δ' ἴσως συνεργοὺς ἔχων,
 5 ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐταρκέστατος. δόξει τ' ἂν αὐτὴ μόνη δι'
 αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ
 θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτῶν ἢ πλεῖον ἢ ἔλαττον περι-
 6 ποιοῦμεθα παρὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν. δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ
 σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχολοῦμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ
 πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν
 ἀρετῶν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἡ ἐνέργεια·
 αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις δοκοῦσιν ἀσχολοὶ εἶναι, αἱ μὲν
 πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἰρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν
 τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ παρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξει
 γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μισοφόνος τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πο-
 λεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίνωντο. ἔστι δὲ
 καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἀσχολος, καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτεύ-
 εσθαι περιποιουμένη δυναστείας καὶ τιμᾶς ἢ τὴν γε εὐδαι-
 7 μονίαν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις, ἑτέραν οὖσαν τῆς πολι-
 τικῆς, ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν δῆλον ὡς ἑτέραν οὖσαν. εἰ δὲ
 τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ
 πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὗται δ'
 ἀσχολοὶ καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι' αὐτὰς
 αἰρεταί εἰσιν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν
 δοκεῖ θεωρητικὴ οὖσα, καὶ παρ' αὐτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι
 τέλους, ἔχειν τε ἡδονὴν οἰκείαν, αὕτη δὲ συναύξει τὴν
 ἐνέργειαν, καὶ τὸ αὐταρκές δὴ καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ
 ἄτρυτον ὡς ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀπονέ-
 μεται, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν φαίνεται ὄντα. ἡ
 τελεία δὲ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου, λαβοῦσα

6 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ—
 ἑτέραν οὖσαν] 'But moreover the
 (function) of the politician also is
 restless, and beyond mere administra-
 tion it aims at power and distinctions,
 or, if happiness for the man himself
 and his citizens, at all events a happi-
 ness which is something distinct from

the exercise of the political art; nay
 we are in search of this happiness—
 plainly as something distinct.' σοφία,
 while producing happiness, is identical
 with it; but πολιτική is to happiness
 as means to end. Cf. *Eth.* VI. xii. 5:
 οὐχ ὡς ἰατρικὴ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια,
 οὕτως ἡ σοφία (ποιεῖ) εὐδαιμονίαν. The

μῆκος βίου τέλειον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές ἐστι τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' 8 ἀνθρώπον· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἀνθρώπος ἐστὶν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ἢ θεῖον τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσῳ δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσούτω καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετῆν. εἰ δὲ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι 9 ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον· ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον αἰροῖτο ἀλλὰ τινος ἄλλου.

words ἦν καὶ ζητοῦμεν may be referred to *Eth.* i. ii. 9: ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὕσα.

8 κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας] The moralists, says Aristotle, take a shallow view in bidding us tame down our aspirations to our mortal condition. Cf. *Rhet.* ii. xxi. 6, where the gnome, *θνατὰ χρὴ τὸν θνατὸν φρονεῖν*, is quoted from Epicharmus. Isocrates (*Ad Dem.* p. 9 b) gives a sort of reconciliation of the views: *ἀθάνατα μὲν φρόνει τῷ μεγάλῳ ψυχῶς εἶναι· θνητὰ δὲ τῷ συμμέτρως τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀπολαβεῖν*, which reminds one of George Herbert's quaint lines:—

‘Pitch thy behaviour low, thy projects high:

So shalt thou humble and magnanimous be:

Sink not in spirit: who aimeth at the sky

Shoots higher much than he that means a tree.

A grain of glorie mixt with humbleness

Cures both a fever and lethargickness.

εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ—ὑπερέχει] ‘For

though (this noblest part) be small in proportionate bulk, yet in power and dignity it far surpasses all the other parts of our nature.’ Aristotle here signifies that the divine particle (νοῦς) bears a small proportion to the whole of our composite nature. And in accordance with this he elsewhere intimates that only at short and rare intervals can man enjoy the fruition of his diviner nature. Cf. *Metaph.* xi. vii. 9: *εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει, ὥς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς ἀεί, θαυμαστόν.* *Pol.* viii. v. 12: *ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὀλιγάκις γίγνεσθαι.* With which we may compare the saying of Spinoza (*De Intellectus Emendatione*, II.), that at first he found himself only able to rest in the idea of ‘the truly good’ for short intervals, yet that these intervals became longer and more frequent as he went on. ‘Et quamvis in initio hæc intervalla essent rara et per admodum exiguum temporis durarent, postquam tamen Verum Bonum magis ac magis mihi innotuit, intervalla ista frequentiora et longiora fuerunt.’ Aristotle idealises these moments of the philosopher, suppos-

τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἀρμόσει καὶ νῦν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἐκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἡδιστόν ἐστιν ἐκάστῳ. καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀνθρώπος. οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.

- 8 Δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν· αἱ γὰρ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί· δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρεῖαις καὶ πράξεις παντοίαις ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἐκάστῳ. ταῦτα δ' εἶναι φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά. ἔνια δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συσφειῶσθαι
- 3 τοῖς πάθεσιν ἢ τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετῇ. συνέzeugται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, εἴπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἡθικὰς εἰσιν ἀρετὰς, τὸ δ' ὁρβὸν τῶν ἡθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. συ-

ing them to extend throughout life, ἡ τελεία δὲ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου, λαβοῦσα μήκος βίου τέλειον.

VIII. Aristotle, pursuing his theme, declares further the paramount excellence of the philosophic life, by showing that the life of practical morality holds a merely secondary place, (1) because it is bound up with man's composite nature, that is, with the passions; (2) because it is more dependent on external circumstances; (3) because such a life cannot possibly be attributed to the gods. He adds that though the philosopher will certainly require a degree of external prosperity, this will only be a very moderate degree, as the sayings of ancient sages testify. And if there be any providence of the gods watching over men, it may be presumed that this will especially watch over the philosopher, who loves and honours that which is divine.

3 συνέzeugται δὲ—ἀνθρωπικαί] 'Wisdom moreover seems inseparably connected with excellence of the moral

nature, and this with wisdom, since the major premisses of wisdom are in accordance with the moral virtues, and 'the right' in morals is that which is in accordance with wisdom. But as wisdom and moral virtue are bound up with the passions, they must be concerned with our composite nature; and the virtues of the composite nature must be purely human.' And therefore secondary to philosophy, which is more than human. This passage appears to contain the germ of much that is expanded in the Eudemian books, cf. *Eth.* vi. xii. 9-10; xiii. 4. But we may observe, 1st, that wisdom (φρόνησις) is here as if for the first time coming forward in opposition to philosophy (σοφία), and not in that recognised opposition which would have been the case, had Book VI. been previously written; 2nd, that there is no reference to any previous discussions on the moral syllogism.

συνέzeugται] Wisdom and moral virtue are here said to be reciprocally connected, just as it is said of pleasure

νηρτημέναι δ' αὐται καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἂν εἶεν· αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρωπικαί. καὶ ὁ βίος δὴ ὁ κατ' αὐτὰς καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισμένη· τοσοῦτον γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήσθω· διακριβῶσαι γὰρ μεῖζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν. δόξῃς δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς 4 χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον δεῖσθαι τῆς ἡθικῆς· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεῖα καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἔστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπυνεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ πολιτικός, καὶ ἴσα τοιαῦτα· μικρὸν γὰρ ἂν τι διαφέρει· πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλῆσεις ἄθλητοι, προσποιῶνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν), τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμει, εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας· πῶς γὰρ ὁ ἄλλος ἔσται ἢ οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις; ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ πότερον 5 κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὥς ἐν ἀμφοῖν αὐτοῦ. τὸ δὴ τέλειον δῆλον ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη. πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν δεῖται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μείζους ᾧσι καὶ καλλίους, πλεόνων. τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντι οὐδενὸς 6

and life, chap. iv. 11: συνεξεῦχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι.

τὸ σύνθετον] Cf. chap. vii. 8. The term occurs repeatedly in the *Phædo* of Plato, cf. p. 86 A: αὐτὴ δ' ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ ξύνητα καὶ γεῶδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ ἐγγενῆ. Cf. *Eth.* vii. xiv. 8.

4 τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων—διοίσει] 'For though on the one hand both (the philosopher and the practical man) will have an equal need of the ordinary means of life, even if the practical man takes more trouble about the concerns of the body and such like—for there will be but little difference in this respect—on the other hand there will be a wide difference with regard to the discharge of their respective functions.' The term δ

πολιτικός here appears to be used in opposition to δ σοφός (§ 13), not as distinctively indicating 'the politician,' but as representing the whole class of the active virtues, which are subsequently analysed. Thus, *Eth.* i. v. 4, we find οἱ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ given as equivalents for οἱ πολιτικοί.

τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμει] δύναμις here seems used in a sense exactly corresponding to 'physical power.' In modern warfare, a weak body may often be accompanied by the highest personal courage, but in the ancient mode of fighting this would have been impossible or useless.

τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας] 'The temperate man will require full liberty of gratification.' Cf. *Eth.* i. v. 3: διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδανάπαλιν. viii. vi. 5: οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς

τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς γε τὴν ἐνέργειαν χρεία, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐμπόδιά ἐστι πρὸς γε τὴν θεωρίαν· ἥ δ' ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστι καὶ πλείοσι συζῆ, αἰρεῖται τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράττειν·
 7 δεῖσεται οὖν τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι. ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρητικὴ τίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη. τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δικαίας; ἢ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους, ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερά καὶ κινδυνεύοντας, ὅτι καλόν; ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν; ἄτοπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἢ τι τοιοῦτον. αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶν; ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας; διεξιούσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοιτ' ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμῖωνα. τῷ δὴ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία; ὥστε ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη. καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὴ ἡ ταύτη συγγενεστοτάτη εὐδαιμονικωτάτη. σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα εὐδαιμονίας, τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοιωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας

ἐξουσίας. The use of the article, and of the plural number, makes a slight difference in signification.

7 διεξιούσι δὲ—θεῶν] 'And if we went through all the virtues, we should see that whatever relates to moral action is petty and unworthy of the gods.' Aristotle argues here that we cannot attribute morality to the Deity without falling into mere anthropomorphism; but it might be replied that there is the same difficulty in conceiving of God as engaged in philosophic thought. Aristotle himself felt this difficulty, and elsewhere

defined the thought of God as 'the thinking upon thought' (*Metaph.* xi. ix. 4), which would not only deprive the Deity of all those fatherly and tender functions, which the human race is prone to attribute to Him; but would also remove Him from the conditions of all human thinking. If it be conceded that the life of God is only *analogous* to that of the philosopher; we might then ask, why not also analogous to the life of the good man? Plato, by placing the 'idea of justice' in the supra-sensible world, allowed a more than mortal interest to morality.

ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζώων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας. ἐφ' ὅσον δὲ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὐτὴ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὴν τιμία. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις. δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπων ὄντι· οὐ γὰρ αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τροφήν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν ὑπάρχειν. οὐ μὴν οἰητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαιμονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνεν τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὐτάρκες οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις, δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἄρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν τὰ καλὰ· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναιτ' ἂν τις πράττειν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς· οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἥττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῇ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον. ἱκανὸν δὲ τοσαῦτ' ὑπάρχειν· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ βίος εὐδαίμων τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργοῦντος. καὶ Σόλων δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπὼν μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλιστ', ὡς ᾤετο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια κερκτῆμένους πράττειν ἅ δεῖ. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ

And he speaks of the just man, by the practice of virtue, being 'made like to God.' *Rep.* 613 A, quoted below.

10 Aristotle seems to lose no opportunity of expressing his contempt for great potentates. 'Reason is not implied in kingly power,' *Eth.* x. vi. 4. 'One may do noble deeds without ruling over land and sea,' &c. We may again refer to George Herbert, who in his verses on Church Musick says,

'Now I in you without a bodie move,
Rising and falling with your wings;
We both together sweetly live and love,
Yet say sometimes, *God help poore kings.*'

ἱκανὸν δὲ τοσαῦτ' ὑπάρχειν] *i. e.* τὰ μέτρια, referring to ἀπὸ τῶν μετρίων above.

κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν] *i. e.* whether philosophic or moral excellence.

11 καὶ Σόλων δὲ] Referring to the well-known story in Herodotus, i. c. 30, sq., where Solon pronounces Tellus, the Athenian citizen, to have been the happiest man he had ever known.

ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας—μόνον] 'Anaxagoras moreover seems not to have conceived of "the happy man" as a rich man or a potentate, when he said that he should not be surprised if (his "happy man") appeared a strange person to the crowd, for they judge by externals, having no sense

Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυναστὴν ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν εἴ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὗτοι γὰρ κρίνουσι τοῖς ἐκτός, τούτων
 12 αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον. συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰκόασιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι. πίστιν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον. σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιφέροντας, καὶ συναδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων
 13 δὲ λόγους ὑποληπτέον. ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν εἶναι· εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὐλογον χαίρειν

of aught beside.' Anaxagoras, being asked to define "the happy man," said that his opinion, if he declared it, would be thought paradoxical.

12 συμφωνεῖν δὴ—ὑποληπτέον] 'The opinions of the philosophers appear then to coincide with our arguments. Authority of this kind affords a certain ground of belief. But truth in practical matters is settled by an appeal to facts and human life, for in them rests the decision. We ought then to consider previous sayings with a reference to facts and life: if those sayings agree with facts, we should accept them, if they differ, we must undertake a discussion of the subject.' Cf. *Eth.* I. viii. 1.

13 θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν εἶναι] The term *θεοφιλής* occurs repeatedly in Plato; cf. especially the interesting passage in *Republic*, p. 613 A: where it is said that "all things work together" for the good of those whom the gods love. οὕτως ἔρα ὑποληπτέον περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, ἐάν τ' ἐν πείρᾳ γίγνηται ἐάν τ' ἐν νόσοις ἢ τινι ἄλλῃ τῶν δοκούντων κακῶν, ὥς τούτῳ ταῦτα εἰς ἀγαθόν τι τελευτήσει ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθανόντι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπὸ γε θεῶν ποτὲ ἀμελεῖται

ὅς ἂν προθυμείσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ δμοιοῦσθαι θεῶ.

εἰ γάρ τις—ὥσπερ δοκεῖ] 'For if there be any care of human affairs by the gods, as men think there is.' We may compare Shakspeare's

'If powers divine
Behold our human actions, as they do.'

Aristotle expresses here no opinion, one way or the other, as to the reality of a Divine Providence. *δοκεῖ* merely indicates that an opinion is held; the word is frequently used to indicate a false opinion or fancy. Cf. *Eth.* vii. xii. 3: *δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσθαι τις εἶναι*, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν· x. vi. 3: *δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα εἶναι*, ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Plato had said that moral virtue (see the last note) placed men peculiarly under the care of the gods. Aristotle, differing from Plato in his conception of the Deity, says, if there be any care of men by the gods, it must surely be extended in an especial degree not to the just man, but to the philosopher, since philosophy is most akin to the life of the Deity Himself.

τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστω, καὶ τῷ συγγενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ὁρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τῷ σοφῷ μάλιστα ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον. θεοφιλέστατος ἄρα. τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὥστε καὶ οὕτως εἴη ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.

Ἄρ' οὖν εἰ περὶ τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ 9
φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις, τέλος
ἔχειν οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἣ καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ
ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ
γινῶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά; οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ 2

καὶ οὕτως] 'Even on this supposition.' It seems probable that Aristotle had in his mind the very words of Plato, above quoted.

IX. The theory of human life now being complete, Aristotle asks if anything more is wanting? The answer is Yes, since theory is not by itself enough to make men good. For virtue three things are required, nature, teaching, and custom. The first is beyond man's control; the second may be identified with theory, which we have now supplied; the third requires institutions for the regulation of life, which may either be (1) of public, or (2) of private ordinance. As a fact, the state too much neglects (§ 14) the arrangement of daily life, and therefore private individuals must address themselves to the task, in a scientific spirit, and must first learn the principles of legislation. Whence are these principles to be learnt? On the one hand we find that practical politicians neither write nor speak on the principles of their art. On the other hand the Sophists, who profess to teach politics, are far from understanding even what it is, and their mode of

teaching is merely empirical. So far from imparting principles, they go to work in an eclectic way, collecting laws, which are mere results, lying, as it were, on the surface. Legislation, as a science, has in short been neglected hitherto, and must now be essayed. We must enter at once upon the whole theory of the state, examining former speculations, and existing constitutions, and developing a conception of the best form of government.

According to the sequence of ideas in this chapter, it would appear that the connecting link between ethics and politics is to be found in the word *ἔθος*, custom, or mode of life. As custom has great influence upon men's power of attaining virtue and the chief good, and on the other hand as the institutions of individual life have a close connection with those of the state, it follows that politics are the complement of ethics.

1 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά] Under the head of 'doing' are of course included the functions of thought, which, as we have just been told, are the highest forms of action in man. Cf. *Pol.* vii. iii. 3: ἀλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς

ἀρετῆς ἱκανὸν τὸ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πει-
 3 ρατέον, ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα. εἰ μὲν οὖν
 ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολ-
 λούς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν
 Θέογνιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσασθαι. νῦν δὲ φαίνον-
 ται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι τῶν νέων τοὺς
 ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν, ἡθὸς τ' εὐγενὲς καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλό-
 καλον ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, τοὺς δὲ
 4 πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι· οὐ
 γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέχεσ-
 θαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχροὺς ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας·
 πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ δι' ὧν
 αὐτοὶ ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένους λύπας, τοῦ
 δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδ' ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἄγε-
 5 στοι ὄντες. τοὺς δὴ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυσ-
 μίσαι; οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἢ οὐ ῥάδιον τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ
 τοῖς ἡέσι κατελημμένα λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι. ἀγαπητὸν
 δ' ἴσως ἐστὶν εἰ πάντων ὑπαρχόντων, δι' ὧν ἐπιεικεῖς
 6 ὁκοοῦμεν γίνεσθαι, μεταλλάβοιμεν τῆς ἀρετῆς. γίνεσθαι δ'
 ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ' ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδασχῇ. τὸ
 μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει,
 ἀλλὰ διὰ τινος θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν

έτέρους, καθάπερ οἶονταί τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς
 διανοίας εἶναι μόνας ταύτας πρακτικὰς
 τὰς τῶν ἀποβαιόντων χάριν γιγνομένας
 ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰς
 αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἔνεκεν θεωρίας
 καὶ διανοήσεις. So too under ἀρετή,
 σοφία is included as its highest form.

3 πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς] The saying
 of Theognis (v. 432) was that the
 Asclepiadæ would have deserved great
 reward had they known how to heal
 the minds of men.

Εἰ δ' Ἀσκληπιάδαις τοῦτο ἔδωκε θεός,
 ἴασθαι κακότητα καὶ ἀτηρὰς φρένας
 ἀνδρῶν,

Πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους
 ἔφερον.

The last line is quoted in the *Meno*

of Plato, p. 95 B, to indicate that
 Theognis held teaching inefficacious
 to produce virtue. Aristotle borrows
 the application. On Theognis see Vol.
 I. Essay II.

κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς] 'Under
 the influence of virtue.' This word,
 which is also written κατακώχιμον,
 seems derived from κατέχειν, with
 a reduplication. In *Ar. Pol.* II. ix. 8,
 we find κατακώχιμοι πρὸς, and *ib.* VIII.
 vii. 4, κατακώχιμοι ὑπὸ.

5 τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἡέσι κατελημ-
 μένα] 'What has long been fastened
 in the character.'

6 τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν] 'To
 those who are in the most ideal sense
 of the term to be called fortunate.'
Cf. Eth. III. v. 17: καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ

ὑπάρχει· ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μὴ ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἄπασιν ἰσχύη, ἀλλὰ δέη προδιειργάσθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν, ὥσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέψουσιν τὸ σπέρμα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγου τ' ἀποτρέποντος· οὐδ' αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν· τὸν δ' οὕτως ἔχοντα πῶς οἶόν τε μεταπειῖσαι; ὅλως τ' οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ ὑπεῖκειν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βία. δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἥθος προῦ-⁸ πάρχειν πῶς οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν. ἐκ νέου δ' ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέντα νόμοις· τὸ γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οὐχ ἡδὺ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέοις. διὸ νόμοις δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γινόμενα. οὐχ ἱκανὸν δ' ἴσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς⁹ καὶ ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδραθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθ' ἂν νόμων, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκη, μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ. διόπερ οἶονται τινες τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν¹⁰ μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, ὥς ὑπακουσομένων τῶν ἐπιεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων, ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀφυσστέροις οὔσι κολάσεις

καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἢ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα.

9 οὐχ ἱκανὸν δ'—τὸν βίον] 'It is not enough perhaps that, while young, people should meet with right nurture and superintendence, but, as when grown up they must practise the things in question, and accustom themselves to them, so we shall need laws about these things, and in general about the whole of life.' In a spirit the very opposite of this remark, Pericles is reported (Thucyd. ii. 37) to have boasted of the freedom enjoyed by the Athenians from all vexatious interference with the daily conduct of individuals: ἐλευθέρως δὲ τά τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτευόμεν καὶ ἐς τὴν πρὸς

ἀλλήλους τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδεύματων ὑποψίαν, οὐ δὲ ὀργῆς τὸν πέλας, εἰ καθ' ἡδονὴν τι δρᾷ, ἔχοντες, οὐδὲ ἀζημίους μὲν λυπηρὰς δὲ τῇ ὕψει ἀχθηδόνas προστιθέμενοι. On the one hand Thucydides praised the free system of Athens; on the other hand Aristotle praised the organised and educational system of Sparta; see below § 13, and cf. *Eth.* i. xiii. 3, and note. He was probably led into this political mistake, partly by the state of society in Athens itself, partly by the influence of Plato, from whom he imbibed the essential idea of communism,—which is, that the state should arrange as much as possible, instead of as little as possible.

- τε καὶ τιμωρίας ἐπιτιθέναι, τοὺς δ' ἀνιάτους ὅλως ἐξορίζειν· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐπειικῇ καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντα τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσιν, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἡδονῆς ὀρεγόμενον λύπῃ κολάζεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑποζύγιον. διὸ καὶ φασι δεῖν τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι τὰς λύπας αἱ μάλιστα' ἐναντιοῦνται
- 11 ταῖς ἀγαπωμέναις ἡδοναῖς. εἰ δ' οὖν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τὸν ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν τραφῆναι καλῶς δεῖ καὶ ἐθισθῆναι, εἴθ' οὕτως ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπειικέσι ζῆν καὶ μήτ' ἄκοντα μήθ' ἐκόντα πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα, ταῦτα δὲ γίγνοιτ' ἂν βιουμένοις κατὰ τινα νοῦν καὶ τάξιν ὀρθήν, ἔχουσιν ἰσχύν.
- 12 ἡ μὲν οὖν πατρικὴ πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οὐδὲ δὴ ὅλως ἡ ἐνὸς ἀνδρός, μὴ βασιλέως ὄντος ἢ τινος τοιούτου· ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὢν ἀπὸ τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐχθαίρουσι τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους ταῖς ὁρμαῖς, καὶ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ὀρῶσιν· ὁ δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαχθής
- 13 τάττων τὸ ἐπειικές. ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίῳ πόλει μετ' ὀλίγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων· ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων ἐξημέλῃται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ζῆ' ἕκαστος ὥς βούλεται, κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστεύων παίδων ἢδ' ἀλόχου.
- 14 κρᾶτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίγνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ὀρθήν καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι· κοινῇ δ' ἐξαμελουμένων ἕκαστῳ δόξειεν ἂν προσήκειν τοῖς σφετέροις τέκνοις καὶ φίλοις εἰς ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι, ἢ προαιρεῖσθαι γε. μάλιστα δ' ἂν τοῦτο δύνασθαι δόξειεν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων νομοθετικὸς γενόμενος· αἱ μὲν γὰρ κοιναὶ ἐπιμέλειαι

13 κυκλωπικῶς] Referring to Homer, *Odys.* ix. 114:

θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος
παίδων ἢδ' ἀλόχων, οὐδ' ἀλλήλων
ἀλέγουσιν.

Aristotle considers that any people among whom the state does not settle by law the customs of daily life is unworthy to be called a society at all. He ignores that element called 'public

opinion,' which in so many respects, and more naturally, supplies the place of legislation.

14 καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι] 'And that it should have power to effect the object in question.' This apparently refers to § 12: ἡ μὲν οὖν πατρικὴ πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν κ.τ.λ.

μάλιστα δ'—γενόμενος] 'But from what we have said it would appear that a person would best be able to

δῆλον ὅτι διὰ νόμων γίνονται, ἐπεικεῖς δ' αἱ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων. γεγραμμένων δ' ἢ ἀγράφων, οὐδὲν ἂν δέξειε διαφέρειν, οὐδὲ δι' αὐν εἰς ἣ πολλοὶ παιδευθήσονται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνισχύει τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ ἔθη, οὕτω καὶ ἐν οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ ἔθη, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας· προϋπάρχουσι γὰρ στέργοντες καὶ εὐπειθεῖς τῇ φύσει. ἔτι δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ καθ' ἕκαστον¹⁵ παιδεῖαι τῶν κοινῶν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ἱατρικῆς· καθόλου μὲν γὰρ τῷ πυρέττοντι συμφέρει ἡσυχία καὶ ἀσιτία, τινὶ δ' ἴσως οὐ, ὃ τε πυκτικὸς ἴσως οὐ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην περιτίθῃσιν. ἐξακριβοῦσθαι δὴ δόξειεν ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον ἰδίας τῆς ἐπιμελείας γινομένης· μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ προσφόρου τυγχάνει ἕκαστος. ἀλλ' ἐπιμεληθῆναι μὲν ἄριστα καθ' ἓν καὶ ἱατρὸς καὶ γυμναστὴς καὶ πᾶς ἄλλος ὁ τὸ καθόλου εἰδὼς ὅτι πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς τοιοῦσδε· τοῦ κοινοῦ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι λέγονται τε καὶ εἰσίν. οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ¹⁶ καὶ ἐνός τινος οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει καλῶς ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονα ὄντα, τεθεαμένον δ' ἀκριβῶς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐφ' ἑκάστω δι' ἐμπειρίαν, καθάπερ καὶ ἱατροὶ ἔνιοι δοκοῦσιν ἑαυτῶν ἄριστοι εἶναι, ἐτέρῳ οὐδὲν ἂν δυνάμενοι ἐπαρκεσαι. οὐδὲν δ' ἦττον ἴσως τῷ γε βουλομένῳ τεχνικῶ γενέσθαι καὶ θεωρητικῶ ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου βαδιστέον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν, κἀκείνο γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τούθ' αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι. τάχα δὲ καὶ τῷ¹⁷

do this (i.e. to help his children and friends towards virtue) after learning the principles of legislation.' As we find from *Eth.* vi. viii. 2, legislation was considered by Aristotle to be the superior (ἀρχιτεκτονική) form of political thought. A person possessing the general principles of scientific legislation (see below, § 16) would be best able to deduce rules for the guidance of his family, and at the same time to allow of such exceptions as individual peculiarities might call

for. That the family is a deduction from the state, which is prior in point of idea, we know to have been Aristotle's opinion, *Pol.* i. ii. 12.

16 οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ—ἐμπειρίαν] 'And yet perhaps nothing hinders a man even without scientific knowledge treating well some particular case, from an accurate observation, empirically, of what results on each thing being tried.' Cf. *Metaph.* i. i. 7: πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ

βουλομένῳ δι' ἐπιμελείας βελτίους ποιεῖν, εἴτε πολλοὺς εἴτ' ὀλίγους, νομοθετικῶ πειρατέον γενέσθαι, εἰ διὰ νόμων ἀγαθοὶ γενοίμεθ' ἅν. ὅντινα γὰρ οὖν καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα διαθεῖναι καλῶς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τυχόντος, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τινός, τοῦ εἰδότος, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἱατρικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὧν
 18 ἔστιν ἐπιμελεία τις καὶ φρόνησις. ἄρ' οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον πόθεν ἢ πῶς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἅν τις, ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; μῆριον γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. ἢ οὐχ ὅμοιον φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλοις οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τάς τε δυνάμεις παραδιδόντες καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν, οἷον ἱατροὶ καὶ γραφεῖς· τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί, πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, οἱ δόξαιεν ἅν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ ἐμπειρία μᾶλλον ἢ διανοία· οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες οὔτε λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνονται (καίτοι κάλλιον ἦν ἴσως ἢ λόγους δικανικοὺς τε καὶ δημηγορικοὺς), οὐδ' αὖ πολιτικοὺς πεποιηκότες τοὺς σφετέρους υἱεῖς ἢ τινας
 19 ἄλλους τῶν φίλων. εὐλογον δ' ἦν, εἴπερ ἐδύναντο· οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄμεινον οὐδὲν κατέλιπον ἅν, οὔθ' αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξαι προέλουντ' ἅν μᾶλλον τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως, οὐδὲ δὴ ταῖς φιλτάτοις. οὐ μὲν μικρὸν γε ἔοικεν ἢ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίγνοντ' ἅν διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς συνηθείας πολιτικοί· διὸ τοῖς ἐφιεμένοις
 20 περὶ πολιτικῆς εἰδέναι προσδεῖν ἔοικεν ἐμπειρίας. τῶν δὲ

μᾶλλον ἐπιτιγχάνοντας ὀρώμεν τοὺς ἐμπείρους τῶν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἐχόντων.

17 ὅντινα γὰρ οὖν καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα] 'Any one you like to propose.' Cf. *Eth.* i. iii. 8: τί προτιθέμεθα, 'what we propose to ourselves.'

18 μῆριον γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι] 'For, as we said, legislation is generally considered to be a branch of politics.' This probably refers to *Eth.* i. ii. 7: χρωμένης δὲ ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι

δὲ νομοθετοῦσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι.

ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί] Cf. Plato, *Meno*, p. 95 B: οἱ σοφισταὶ σοὶ οὗτοι, οἵπερ μόνον ἐπαγγέλλονται, δοκοῦσι διδάτκαλοι εἶναι ἀρετῆς; The whole of the present discussion on the teaching of political science is evidently suggested by that on the teaching of virtue in the *Meno*, where it was shown that the great statesmen do not attempt to teach their sons virtue, and that the Sophists, who

σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι· ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ἢ περὶ ποῖα ἴσασιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χεῖρῳ ἐτίθουσιν, οὐδ' ἂν ὥντο ῥάδιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετῆσαι συναγαγόντι τοὺς εὐδακίμοῦντας τῶν νόμων· ἐκλέξασθαι γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ἀρίστους, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκλογὴν οὔσαν συνέσεως καὶ τὸ κρίναι ὀρθῶς μέγιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικὴν· οἱ γὰρ ἔμπειροι περὶ ἕκαστα κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ δι' αὐτῶν ἢ πῶς ἐπιτελεῖται συνιᾶσιν, καὶ ποῖα ποίοις συνάδει· τοῖς δ' ἀπείροις ἀγαπητὸν τὸ μὴ διαλανθάνειν εἰ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πεποιήται τὸ ἔργον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ γραφικῆς. οἱ δὲ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργοις ἐοίκασιν· πῶς οὖν ἐκ τούτων νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τις, ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους κρίναι; οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται οὐδ' ἰατρικοὶ ²¹ ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων γίνεσθαι. καίτοι πειρῶνται γὰρ λέγειν οὐ μόνον τὰ θεραπεύματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἰαθεῖεν ἂν καὶ ὡς δεῖ θεραπεύειν ἐκάστους, διελόμενοι τὰς ἔξεις.

profess to teach it, are doubtful instructors.

20 οἱ δὲ νόμοι—ἐοίκασιν] 'But laws are as it were the results of political science.' Aristotle's account of the Sophists' method of teaching politics is precisely analogous to his account of the way in which they taught dialectic. He here speaks of their taking a shallow view of politics, and making it an inferior branch of rhetoric; and he adds that they adopted a superficial eclecticism, making collections of laws without touching upon the principles from which legislation must depend. They thus imparted mere results, which to those who are uninstructed in principles are wholly useless. In the same way (*Soph. Elench.* xxxiii. 16) he says they gave various specimens of argument to be learnt by heart, and that this was no more use than if a person who undertook to teach shoemaking were to provide his pupils with an assortment

of shoes. λόγους γὰρ οἱ μὲν ῥητορικοὺς οἱ δὲ ἐρωτητικοὺς ἐδίδουσαν ἐκμανθάνειν, εἰς οὓς πλειστάκις ἐμπίπτειν φήθησαν ἐκάτεροι τοὺς ἀλλήλων λόγους. Διόπερ ταχεῖα μὲν ἔτεχνος δ' ἦν ἡ διδασκαλία τοῖς μανθάνουσι παρ' αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παιδεύειν ὑπελάμβανον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐπιστήμην φάσκων παραδῶσειν ἐπὶ τὸ μηδὲν πονεῖν τοὺς πόδας, εἴτα σκυτοτομικὴν μὲν μὴ διδάσκει, μὴδ' ὅθεν δυνήσεται πορίζεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, δοίη δὲ πολλὰ γένη παντοδαπῶν ὑποδημάτων.

21 οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται—ἔξεις] 'For men do not appear to learn the physician's art from treatises, though (they who write such treatises) aim at stating not only modes of treatment, but how people can be cured and how each person is to be treated, according to a classification of habits (of body).' *συγγραμμάτων* here is frequently translated 'prescriptions,' but, from what Aristotle says about them, clearly something more is meant. In the *Minos*

ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις ὠφέλιμα εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δ' ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ἀχρεῖα. ἴσως οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαὶ τοῖς μὲν δυναμένοις θεωρῆσαι καὶ κρῖναι τί καλῶς ἢ τοῦναντίον καὶ ποῖα ποίοις ἀρμόττει, εὐχρηστ' ἂν εἴη· τοῖς δ' ἄνευ ἑξέως τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξιούσι τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρχοι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτόματον, εὐσυνετώτεροι δ' εἰς ταῦτα τάχ' ἂν γένοιοντο.

²² παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερεῦνhton τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι μᾶλλον βέλτιον ἴσως, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν ἢ περὶ τὰ

²³ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία τελειωθῇ. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἴ τι κατὰ μέρος εἴρηται καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγενεστέρων πειραβῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν, εἴτα ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν θεω-

which bears Plato's name we find *συγγράμματα* used as a generic word, of which several species, *ιατρικά*, *γεωργικά*, *μαγειρικά*, &c., are mentioned, and are compared (as here) with 'laws.' Cf. *Minos*, p. 316 c sqq.: ἥδη ποτὲ ἐνέτυχες συγγράμματα περὶ ὀγείας τῶν καμνόντων; Ἐγώ γε.—Ἰατρικὰ ἄρα καὶ ἱατρικοὶ νόμοι ταῦτα τὰ συγγράμματα ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν ἱατρῶν; Ἰατρικὰ μέντοι.—Ἀρ' οὖν καὶ τὰ γεωργικὰ συγγράμματα γεωργικοὶ νόμοι εἰσὶν; κ.τ.λ. The *συγγράμματα* here mentioned were perhaps 'reports of cases,' or monographs on particular diseases.

τοῖς δ' ἄνευ—γένειοντο] 'But those who without proper training study such things would not be able to judge of them correctly (except indeed by natural ability), though they might gain an appreciative faculty with regard to the subject.' *ἔξις* here denotes the state of mind formed by scientific training. Such a training especially produces 'judgment' (τὸ κρίνειν καλῶς). Cf. *Pol.* III. xi. 14: ἔσται γὰρ ἕκαστος μὲν χείρων κριτὴς τῶν εἰδόντων. *Eth.* I. iii. 5, and note. This kind of judgment, as being deep and original, is distin-

guished above from *σύνεσις*, the power of appreciation, but in *Eth.* VI. x. 2 *σύνεσις* is called *κριτική*, in a lower sense, and as contrasted with wisdom, which is *πρακτική*.

²² παραλιπόντων οὖν] One must be struck with the disdainful way in which Aristotle here quite sets aside the *Republic* and *Laws* of Plato, by which he had been himself so much influenced, as if they were not to be reckoned as even attempts at founding the science of politics. Below, he alludes to them as 'perhaps on some particular points having made good remarks.'

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν] A rough outline of the *Politics* is here given, as Aristotle conceived it before writing it. The sketch is so very general that it omits the subject of Book I., and yet critics have thought that this passage may be taken as evidence of what the order of books in Aristotle's *Politics* should be.

ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν] 'From my collection of constitutions.' Cf. Cicero, *De Finibus*, v. iv: 'Omnium fere civitatum, non Græciæ solum, sed etiam barbariæ, ab Aristotele mores,

ρῆσαι τὰ ποῖα σώζει καὶ φθείρει τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ποῖα
ἐκάστας τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας αἱ μὲν
καλῶς αἱ δὲ τὸναντίον πολιτεύονται· θεωρηθέντων γὰρ
τούτων τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον συνίδοιμεν καὶ ποία πολιτεία
ἀρίστη, καὶ πῶς ἐκάστη ταχθεῖσα, καὶ τίσι νόμοις καὶ
ἔθεσι χρωμένη. λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξάμενοι.

instituta, disciplinas; a Theophrasto
leges etiam cognovimus.' Diogenes
Laertius, in his list of the works of
Aristotle, mentions (v. i. 12): πολιτεῖαι
πόλεων δύοιν δεοῖσιν ἐξήκοντα καὶ
ἐκατόν, καὶ ἰδίᾳ δημοκρατικά, ὀλιγαρχι-

καί, ἀριστοκρατικά, καὶ τυραννικά. The
fragments of this work have been
collected by C. F. Neumann, and may
be found in the Oxford reprint of
Bekker's edition of Aristotle.

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
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
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